Publisher: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Potential For Changes

Author(s): Slobodan Inić,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2000

(English edition) This report contains the analysis of data collected during the month of October 1999. One should have in mind this time frame-when considering the findings, drawing different generalizations or setting guidelines for possible actions. Sets of values of members of the observed generation, their social awareness, perception of the past and present, their stance on the West, and above all their potential to bring about changes are essentially determined by some long-standing and less intensive structural factors. To put it simply a generation of people who today have between 25 and 35 years, and who represent the future of the country, was to a large extent formed under the influence of structural features of the society eroded by constant wars and war threats, protracted economic crisis, internal conflicts and strife and total confusion in the sphere of social awareness and public moral. The generation which in the last decade came of age in such a society per force had to reflect its essential characteristics, despite a relative autonomy which each age groups had as its inherent characteristic. Young people and even relatively young people, to which the respondents of this survey belong, have a determined biological and psychological potential which can help them partially overcome the given moment of time and which usually indicates some of their future contents and values in the present day. In that sense one could expect that the mind-set of the observed generation substantially differs from so-called social conscience. But in conditions of an ever-deepening social crisis, in which the process of coming-of-age unfolded under pressure of retrograde, rather than progressive social factors, the aforementioned advantages of such a generation are less manifest, since their potential crumbles under pressure of a regressive society. One must bear in mind the aforementioned and thus avoid to treat unjustly the observed age group: they are expected to be the creators of the Serbian society at the beginning of the Twenty-first century, but it is pretty obvious that their social actions will be affected by a sorry legacy of the social and moral collapse. In fact they were not less predestined than the earlier generations to be unequipped for the contemporary world. They simply developed under much less favorable conditions. But this should not minimize their responsibility for the future development of society in Serbia. On the other hand such adverse development factors should be borne in mind if one truly wishes to understand the traits of this generation, instead of bluntly condemning them. My intention is not to prejudge results evidenced by this survey, but it bears mentioning that it is easier to reject the middle generation in Serbia, like Serbia proper, than to try to understand and render assistance to both.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Praćenje reforme zatvorskog sistema u Srbiji 2012-2013 i Stanje ljudskih prava u zatvorima u 2011

Author(s): Jelena Mirkov Subić,Mara Živkov,Ljiljana Palibrk,Ivan Kuzminović / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2014

Tokom godina Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava obilazio je zatvorske ustanove u Srbiji i izveštavao o stanju ljudskih prava osuđenih i pritvorenih lica – drugim rečima, od 2001. godine Odbor je posetio svih 28 ustanova za izvršenje krivičnih sankcija, mnoge od njih više puta. U velikom broju izveštaja1 Odbor je posebno analizirao raskorake između domaćeg zakonodavstva i međunarodnih standarda s jedne i prakse u sistemu izvršenja sankcija s druge strane, sugerišući moguća rešenja. Pred čitaocem su izveštaji iz zatvora koje je Helsinški odbor posetio u periodu 2011–2013. godina. Ove posete realizovane su u okviru dva kompatibilna projekta – “Reforma zatvorskog sistema u Srbiji” i “Jačanje Nacionalnog preventivnog mehanizma i zagovaranje prava institucionalizovanih osoba”, koje su finansijski podržali Civil Rights Defenders i Ambasade Kraljevine Holandije u Srbiji.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Prevencija nasilnog ekstremizma među srednjoškolcima - Primena i potencijali instrumenta za formiranje alternativnog narativa

Author(s): Izabela Kisić,Jarmila Bujak Stanko,Zlatko Paković,Jelena Višnjić,Srđan Barišić,Pavel Domonji / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2018

Socijlano okruženje i obrazovni sistem u kome odrastaju mladi u Srbiji karakteriše snažan uticaj etnonacionalizma, balast ratne prošlosti, nedovoljno pristupačni edukativni programi koji promovišu kritičko mišljenje i ljudska prava i neadekvatni udžbenici građanskog obrazovanja. U takvom socijalnom, porodičnom, obrazovnom i neprofesionalnom medijskom okruženju, mladi teško dolaze do argumenata koji identitet ne svode samo na verski i nacionalni. Nametanje etnonacionalističkog koncepta odozgo (elite) i klerikalizacija društva, što su procesi koji traju od devedesetih, ne odnose se samo na mlade u većinskoj srpskoj populaciji, već su odavno zahvatili i manjinske zajednice. Uvođenje verskog obrazovanja kao alternative građanskom 2001. godine, ostavilo je posledice na nekoliko generacija mladih, uključujući i one koji su sada predavači i roditelji. Učvršćivanje etnonacionalističkog koncepta podstaknuto je i globalnim promenama tokom poslednje dve decenije. U te globalne faktore spadaju pre svega, uspon konzervativnih političkih stranaka i organizacija, pretnja terorizmom, ratovi, nesigurnost u socijalno-ekonomskom i bezbednosnom smislu, kao i konfuzija i strepnje zbog eskalacije lažnih vesti i krize u medijima. Nasilni ekstremizam u Srbiji se obično prelama kroz prizmu stranih ratnika koji se pridružuju ISIL, ili Al-Nusri u Siriji i Iraku. Tako je, prema zvaničnim podacima, 49 državljana Srbije otišlo da se bori u Siriji i Iraku. Srbija je, međutim, i zemlja Zapadnog Balkana sa najvećim brojem ratnika u Istočnoj Ukrajini na proruskoj strani. Prema podacima MUP Srbije, iz Ukrajine se do kraja 2017, vratilo 48 boraca. U izveštaju koga je objavio Regionalni savet za saradnju sa sedištem u Sarajevu, navodi se da bi Srbija uspešno primenila nacionalnu strategiju za prevenciju i borbu protiv terorizma, neophodno je da standardizuje pristup ekstremizmima, zasnovan na različitim ideološkim osnovama. Alternativni narativ morao bi da se odnosi na sve elemente ekstremizma i različiti sektori bi morali da budu uključeni u njegovo stvaranje, navedeno je u pomenutom izveštaju. Osim za strane borce, nasilni ekstremizam u Srbiji vezuje se za zločine iz mržnje i huliganizam u najvećim nacionalnim i verskim zajednicama. Iako se te grupacije međusobno sukobljavaju, postoje bitne sličnosti među njima. Elemente ideološkog diskursa nasilnih ekstemističkih grupacija koji dolaze iz različitih etnokonfensionalnih zajednica u Srbiji su: ekstremni nacionalizam koji uključuje tendenciju za menjanje granica (širenje teritorije ili pripajanje drugoj državi), snažna vezanost za verske lidere, odbacivanje evropskih integracija i vezivanje za druge međunarodne faktore, istorijski revizionizam – pre svega Drugog svetskog rata i istorije Jugoslavije, proganjanje tradicionalnih neprijatelja nacionalnih, verskih i seksualnih manjina, napadi na organizacije za ljudska prava i degradacija žena. Neke od radikalno konzervativnih grupacija su posebno popularne među studentskom omladinom. Izgradnja alternativnog narativa u odnosu na propagandu ekstremističkih organizacija postao je jedan od najvećih izazova za međuvladine međunarodne organizacije, kao i za lokalne aktere u prevenciji i borbi protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i terorizma. Često svođenje alternativnog narativa na instant rešenja, “gotove” odgovore i “kontra činjenice” solidno vizuelno upakovane, pokazuju se kao neefikasno i sve više kontraproduktivne, pa teško mogu da privuku razočarane mlade ljude koji se osećaju izolovanim i bez perspektive. Zapravo, takav pristup, svodi alternativni narativ, na kontra-propagandu bez dubljeg efekta i željene promene.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Prošlost kao izazov pravu

Author(s): Vladimir V. Vodinelić / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2002

(Serbian edition) Societies in whose present time the authoritarian past is still a socially relevant thing may be placed in two opposing manners in front of this morally, politically and legally compromising past: there is a distinct difference between the policy of coping with the past and the policy of non coping with the past. In German, the only language with a specific expression for the complex phenomenon of the former, for ‘cope with’ the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), one can also use the synonym Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung. However, ‘to cope with’ is a bet-ter expression. The expression, as well as ‘to prevail over’ the past and ‘to get control over’ the past – indicates more clearly that at issue is a process by which the past is dealt with: to im- pose over, to get control over the past that imposed over us, and it would impose over us again, if we do not impose over it. The extreme patterns of the reactions to the authoritarian past by which it cannot be prevailed are on one side retaliation and pure vendetta and on the other side the 'as-if-nothing-has-happened' pattern: closing your eyes before the authoritarian past. By neither method, it must be emphasized, can the past be prevailed over. Retaliation is an authoritarian fight with the authoritarian past, but not the prevailing over it. Fire cannot be fought with fire here. The authoritarian fight with the past, even if it was authoritarian, is just a repetition, but with the opposite roles.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Rusija, Srbija, Crna Gora

Author(s): Jelica Kurjak,Olga Popović-Obradović,Mijat Šuković / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 0

(Serbian edition) Russia’s long presence in the Balkans - from the eleventh century onwards - can be analysed in terms of its two salient features: continuity and, as far as the role of the Russian state in Balkan (especially Serbian) affairs is concerned, inconstancy. Russia has been trying to push out its frontiers as far as the warm seas ever since Muscovy Russ and the principality of Kiev began to expand. Its imperialistic policy has carried its influence as far south-west as the Adriatic Sea across and with the help of Balkan states. Various Balkan states have found in Russia both friend and foe; this depended on their attitude towards Russia’s rivals among the great powers and towards other Balkan countries at the time. At one time the latter found Russia’s support invaluable, at another they regarded it counter-productive. Russia was particularly adept in capitalising on Balkan crises and wars, in which it took an active part, to strengthen its position in the Balkans; its consequent peace-making efforts were almost always hailed by local populations with great relief. This policy has given rise to a number of myths in some Balkan countries (especially among the Serbs) about there being a selfless "mother Russia" always ready to rush to one’s rescue. However, historical evidence shows Russia to have been far less amiable and benevolent than some local political elites concerned primarily with furthering their day-to-day political objectives made out at the time. In the pursuance of its "Balkan strategy" Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, sought to realise its political interests; the fact that at some periods these interests coincided with the interests of some Balkan nations cannot be used to defend the thesis that Russia has been an a priori friend of Balkan states, especially of Serbia and/or Montenegro. Once the need for an outlet to the warm seas ceased being a strategic priority, Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, found another justification for its presence in the Balkans: having emerged from the Second World War as a major world power, it took part in the partition of Europe into two political systems and controlled one-half of the Balkan peninsula for over fifty years ostensibly to protective those parts from the other, imperialistic side. Throughout that period Russia’s political vocabulary and rhetoric abounded with stock ideological phrases to justify this presence in some Balkan country or other. Finally, the closing years of the twentieth century, witnessing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY, proved once again that Russia is an unavoidable protagonist in Balkan tragedies. As a great power, Russia strove permanently to add territory and then to protect its gains by all available means. Whenever it found it impossible to expand territorially, Russia sought to widen the zones of its political, economic and military influence. Russia either waged war or played nations against each other to realise its strategic objectives in the role of victor or peacemaker as the case may be; whether on the winning or the losing side, Russia always made the most of a situation. To be sure, besides paying rich dividends this policy occasionally backfired: in times of war, for instance, Russia usually paid a heavy price in human lives as well as found it necessary to deal with increasingly strong separatist movements on its soil (especially in 1991-93). But even in such times of adversity Russia found the strength to make the most of the setback. On the other hand, whenever it emerged victorious it tried to keep all the spoils. This dual line became especially prominent after the cold war and the end of the bipolar division of the world, when Russia failed to learn to play the part of one of the major forces in Europe; it is still finding it difficult to accept its new role of a respectable factor. The contradictory nature of Russia’s imperialistic policy vis-à-vis the Balkans was shown up in particular during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY. The analyses that follow show that even when Russia seemed to be losing ground it managed to realise its interests at least partially if not in whole.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Russia, Serbia, Montenegro

Author(s): Jelica Kurjak,Olga Popović-Obradović,Mijat Šuković / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 0

(English edition) Russia’s long presence in the Balkans - from the eleventh century onwards - can be analysed in terms of its two salient features: continuity and, as far as the role of the Russian state in Balkan (especially Serbian) affairs is concerned, inconstancy. Russia has been trying to push out its frontiers as far as the warm seas ever since Muscovy Russ and the principality of Kiev began to expand. Its imperialistic policy has carried its influence as far south-west as the Adriatic Sea across and with the help of Balkan states. Various Balkan states have found in Russia both friend and foe; this depended on their attitude towards Russia’s rivals among the great powers and towards other Balkan countries at the time. At one time the latter found Russia’s support invaluable, at another they regarded it counter-productive. Russia was particularly adept in capitalising on Balkan crises and wars, in which it took an active part, to strengthen its position in the Balkans; its consequent peace-making efforts were almost always hailed by local populations with great relief. This policy has given rise to a number of myths in some Balkan countries (especially among the Serbs) about there being a selfless "mother Russia" always ready to rush to one’s rescue. However, historical evidence shows Russia to have been far less amiable and benevolent than some local political elites concerned primarily with furthering their day-to-day political objectives made out at the time. In the pursuance of its "Balkan strategy" Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, sought to realise its political interests; the fact that at some periods these interests coincided with the interests of some Balkan nations cannot be used to defend the thesis that Russia has been an a priori friend of Balkan states, especially of Serbia and/or Montenegro. Once the need for an outlet to the warm seas ceased being a strategic priority, Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, found another justification for its presence in the Balkans: having emerged from the Second World War as a major world power, it took part in the partition of Europe into two political systems and controlled one-half of the Balkan peninsula for over fifty years ostensibly to protective those parts from the other, imperialistic side. Throughout that period Russia’s political vocabulary and rhetoric abounded with stock ideological phrases to justify this presence in some Balkan country or other. Finally, the closing years of the twentieth century, witnessing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY, proved once again that Russia is an unavoidable protagonist in Balkan tragedies. As a great power, Russia strove permanently to add territory and then to protect its gains by all available means. Whenever it found it impossible to expand territorially, Russia sought to widen the zones of its political, economic and military influence. Russia either waged war or played nations against each other to realise its strategic objectives in the role of victor or peacemaker as the case may be; whether on the winning or the losing side, Russia always made the most of a situation. To be sure, besides paying rich dividends this policy occasionally backfired: in times of war, for instance, Russia usually paid a heavy price in human lives as well as found it necessary to deal with increasingly strong separatist movements on its soil (especially in 1991-93). But even in such times of adversity Russia found the strength to make the most of the setback. On the other hand, whenever it emerged victorious it tried to keep all the spoils. This dual line became especially prominent after the cold war and the end of the bipolar division of the world, when Russia failed to learn to play the part of one of the major forces in Europe; it is still finding it difficult to accept its new role of a respectable factor. The contradictory nature of Russia’s imperialistic policy vis-à-vis the Balkans was shown up in particular during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY. The analyses that follow show that even when Russia seemed to be losing ground it managed to realise its interests at least partially if not in whole.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Sandžak i evropska perspektiva

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2010

Sandžak, deo Srbije na tromeđi sa Bosnom i Crnom Gorom, gde živi najveći deo bošnjačke manjine u Srbiji, više od dve decenije je na udaru državne represivne politike u cilju marginalizacije te manjine. Odnos prema islamu i Muslimanima u Jugoslaviji počeo je da se zaoštrava i dobija neprijateljski prizvuk još osamdesetih godina prošlog veka, kada srpska elita pokreće kampanju protiv Muslimana i iznosi tezu o „islamskom fundamentalizmu koji preti da uništi Jugoslaviju“. To je bila priprema za genocid u Bosni, čije su posledice osetili i Bošnjaci u Sandžaku. Odnos prema muslimanima nije se suštinski promenio, ali se pod pritiskom evropskih organizacija kao što su Savet Evrope, OEBS i EU, država uzdržava od otvorene represije. Međutim, sada primenjuje druge metode poput kriminalizacije pojedinaca ili grupa (vehabije), ali pre svega, konstantnim podrivanjem Islamske zajednice (IZ) kao jedine institucije koju Bošnjaci imaju i koja je inače, od ključnog značaja za njihov identitet. Značaj Islamske zajednice za Bošnjake je izraz potrebe za religijom koja doprinosi jačanju vlastitiog identiteta i doprinosi integraciji društva. Potreba za jačanjem identiteta je i razumljiv odgovor na dugogodišnju diskriminaciju i „nevidljivost“, kao i policijski teror, otmice i likvidacije tokom rata u Bosni. Islamska zajednica je takođe, ključna identitetska matrica za bošnjačku zajednicu u odsustvu drugih institucija. Zbog toga je i bila na udaru Beograda i beogradskih „službi“, sa ciljem da se temeljno destabilizuje. To je dovelo do cepanja Islamske zajednice i podizanje tenzije unutar bošnjačke zajednice što može, ako bude potrebno, da se brzo pretvori u kriznu tačku.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Serbian Elite

Author(s): Olivera Milosavljević,Radmila Radić,Obrad Savić / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2000

(English edition) The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) came to the political forefront some 10 years ago. Criticized by the “old regime” for the manner in which it raised the Serb question and its project of national homogenization (1986), and then encouraged by the “new regime” to continue its efforts, the Academy as an institution consented in the most critical years which determined the future of the common Yugoslav state (1987-1991) to act as a “collective mind” in judging and positively evaluating the execution of the “project” by Slobodan Milošević. It was this moment in the Academy’s political activity that caused internal turmoil and led to the crystallization of several groupings within its politically active membership. If the primary rift in 1992 was marked by being for or against Milošević personally, with both sides on the whole approving his “national project,” the breach is now much deeper at all levels. Nowadays the opinions of the members of the Academy differ on virtually all issues: the evaluation of Milošević’s rule, the point at which it became “bad” or “less bad,” the role of the Academy in society, the Memorandum, the nature of the wars in Yugoslavia, what constitutes victory or defeat, the importance and responsibility of intellectuals, population problems, and even election of their own officers. The Academy no longer comes out with common political stands, its present and former presidents deny that it is a “collective mind” and often cite ignorance of the situation as the reason why they cannot make public statements. Members even react to addresses delivered by officers at the Academy’s assemblies and meetings. It is therefore impossible today to reply to questions regarding the political orientation of the Academy, whether or not it at present has a “national program,” how it envisages Serbia’s future, since one would inevitably have to ascribe the views of a particular group of politically active academicians to the institution as a whole. Just as there was no doubt that such a group existed up to 1991 and encountered little overt opposition within the Academy, it is now certain that there are no more undisputed (national-political) authorities in the institution; only individuals remain with their personal opinions which are binding on no one but themselves. After a long series of failures, erroneous prognoses and an impermissibly uncivilized public settling of accounts, their personal authority as the “minds of the nation” has at best been seriously shaken, if it exists at all. For the reasons cited above, this paper is an overview of the stands predominating among the leading members of the Academy, its former and current presidents, and the stands of the politically active academicians. These academicians were in what used to be the dominant current in the Academy and are now only individuals who have closed their political circle – from their former belief that the generation which was nearing its allotted span had been called upon to reveal to the nation the road it should take, to the realization that the responsibility for all the defeats that have occurred in the meantime lies either on one man or is “collective.” Of their once staunch support for Slobodan Milošević, all that remains are their confused replies to the question: “Why do I protest?”

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Srbija između ustava i ustavnosti

Author(s): Marijana Pajvančić / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2005

U knjizi SRBIJA IZME ĐU USTAVA I USTAVNOSTI iznela sam svoj pogled na ustavno pitanje u Srbiji. Srbija je jedina među zemljama koje su pošle putem evropske integracije, koja nije izmenila temeljni akt koji definiše osnovne vrednosti na kojima počiva politička zajednica, nije izmenila Ustav koji simbolizuje režim autoritarne vladavine. Šta je tome razlog i zašto Srbija toliko dugo traga za svojim ustavnim identitetom? Koje prepreke stoje na putu uspostavljanja ustavne države u Srbiji? Odgovor na ova pitanja već dugo vremena s pravom očekuju građani i građanke Srbije. Kao građanka Srbije i sama sam želela da saznam odgovor na ta pitanja. Profesija kojom se bavim i uža oblast mog naučnog interesovanja obavezivali su me da i sama pokušam da na neka od pitanja odgovorim. Ova knjiga ilustruje moja traganja za odgovorima. Da li sam u tome uspela i u kojoj meri, ostavljam čitaocima ove knjige da prosude sami. Kontinuirano sam pratila ustavni proces u Srbiji, posebno ustavne kontroverze koje prate ovaj proces. Sudelovala sam aktivno u tom procesu, prvenstveno na profesionalnom planu, na stručnim raspravama, ali i u široj javnosti.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Srpska Elita

Author(s): Olivera Milosavljević,Radmila Radić,Obrad Savić / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2000

(Serbian edition) The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) came to the political forefront some 10 years ago. Criticized by the “old regime” for the manner in which it raised the Serb question and its project of national homogenization (1986), and then encouraged by the “new regime” to continue its efforts, the Academy as an institution consented in the most critical years which determined the future of the common Yugoslav state (1987-1991) to act as a “collective mind” in judging and positively evaluating the execution of the “project” by Slobodan Milošević. It was this moment in the Academy’s political activity that caused internal turmoil and led to the crystallization of several groupings within its politically active membership. If the primary rift in 1992 was marked by being for or against Milošević personally, with both sides on the whole approving his “national project,” the breach is now much deeper at all levels. Nowadays the opinions of the members of the Academy differ on virtually all issues: the evaluation of Milošević’s rule, the point at which it became “bad” or “less bad,” the role of the Academy in society, the Memorandum, the nature of the wars in Yugoslavia, what constitutes victory or defeat, the importance and responsibility of intellectuals, population problems, and even election of their own officers. The Academy no longer comes out with common political stands, its present and former presidents deny that it is a “collective mind” and often cite ignorance of the situation as the reason why they cannot make public statements. Members even react to addresses delivered by officers at the Academy’s assemblies and meetings. It is therefore impossible today to reply to questions regarding the political orientation of the Academy, whether or not it at present has a “national program,” how it envisages Serbia’s future, since one would inevitably have to ascribe the views of a particular group of politically active academicians to the institution as a whole. Just as there was no doubt that such a group existed up to 1991 and encountered little overt opposition within the Academy, it is now certain that there are no more undisputed (national-political) authorities in the institution; only individuals remain with their personal opinions which are binding on no one but themselves. After a long series of failures, erroneous prognoses and an impermissibly uncivilized public settling of accounts, their personal authority as the “minds of the nation” has at best been seriously shaken, if it exists at all. For the reasons cited above, this paper is an overview of the stands predominating among the leading members of the Academy, its former and current presidents, and the stands of the politically active academicians. These academicians were in what used to be the dominant current in the Academy and are now only individuals who have closed their political circle – from their former belief that the generation which was nearing its allotted span had been called upon to reveal to the nation the road it should take, to the realization that the responsibility for all the defeats that have occurred in the meantime lies either on one man or is “collective.” Of their once staunch support for Slobodan Milošević, all that remains are their confused replies to the question: “Why do I protest?”

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Srpsko-albanski dijalog 2005: budući status Kosova

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2005

The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia organized a two-day conference “The Future Status of Kosovo” on June 13-14, 2005 in Prishtina. The conference not only stood for the third in the series of Serb-Albanian dialogues the Committee has staged over the past eight years, but also for the final and most important segment of the US Institute for Peace-supported project “Belgrade - Prishtina: Steps to Build Confidence and Understanding.” The idea behind the conference was to provide – on the eve of the announced startup of negotiations on Kosovo’s status – a realistic insight into the complexity of this major regional issue. The book’s contents – authentic discussions of the conference participants – practically figures for a public debate on a reality and real problems. Regardless of many a different stand, the conference participants, Serbs and Albanians alike, attempted to conceptualize a policy that moves towards a lasting solution and regional stability. A policy as such implies a sober assessment of Kosovo’s reality, as well as of possibilities, problems and constraints. The two-day conference, echoing more in Prishtina and somewhat less in Belgrade, assembled a number of outstanding political and public figures from Prishtina – Albanians, Serbs and people from Kosovo’s other ethnic communities, all of them concerned with their own future and ready to acknowledge major changes in the Kosovo society in the past six years. The same were the considerations of the participants from Belgrade, the people standing for Serbia’s alternative politics, and of Podgorica’s officials. Representatives of the international community and regional neighbors, Macedonia and Croatia, also partook in the conference and creatively contributed to the exchange of views. “Key international players were clear that that the startup of the talks about Kosovo’s future status is on the international agenda this year. And now it is on political leaders and institutions to demonstrate that they aim at building a stable, tolerant, multiethnic and democratic society in Kosovo, a society in which all communities will be living together in peace and in peace with their neighbors. It is time for all sides to let go short lived politics, join in a dialogue about real problems in good faith, with passion and constructiveness, and take all measures we know are necessary. This conference is a good start in the right direction. We need more such dialogues, said Soren Jessen Petersen, the UN Secretary General Special Representative, addressing the conference. The conference was organized in five panels: “Kosovo in the Context of Regional Stability,” “Minorities and International Standards in Kosovo,” “Decentralization and its Implications in Kosovo,” “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation” and “Status of Kosovo.” The first panel, “Kosovo in the Context of Regional Stability” chaired by Professor Enver Hasani, broached key security aspects, the role of Kosovo’s future army under civilian control, regional security challenges not only in the event of Kosovo’s independence, but also of Montenegro’s, the state of a ff airs in Kosovska Mitrovica as a major problem to be solved, etc. “Unconditional safety of minority communities is a key standard preconditioning stability and the pace of solving future status of Kosovo,” concluded, inter alia, the second panel “Minorities and International Standards in Kosovo,” chaired by lawyer Azem Vllasi. The discussion also highlighted that the return of all displaced persons and refugees was a priority task of all Kosovo institutions and factors. As for Kosovo Serbs, their integration into Kosovo society, as many put it, is their right, the same as their right to live safely in their homes is a fundamental human right without any alternative solution whatsoever. According to Vera Markovic, who chaired the third panel “Decentralization and its Implications in Kosovo,” the discussion that resembled a parliamentary debate indicated that political power was being gradually institutionalized. “It’s most encouraging that different positions on the decentralization plan do not divide the political sphere into Serbian and Albanian parts, but into groupings that include both Albanian and minority parties…I would say that the debate on decentralization testifies that Kosovo society obviously endeavors to let go the issues related to ‘outer freedom’ or freedom from domination and come to grips with the question of ‘inner freedom’ that cannot but benefit all minorities, ethnic and political alike,” said Vera Markovic. What marked the panel “Post-Con fl ict Rehabilitation,” but the entire conference as well, was the stance that position of minorities was a measure of any society’s democratic potential. In this context, as Dr. Olga Popovic-Obradovic put it, still rather high interethnic tensions make the situation in Kosovo extremely complex. Referring to preconditions of post-conflict rehabilitation, she singled out the issues brought forward by panelists, ranging from acknowledgment and condemnation of crimes and the policy that has given birth to it, lustration and individual accountability to culture as a lasting value linking people and nations. Summing up the “Status of Kosovo” panel, its chair, Sonja Biserko, said that the view that prevailed – at the panel and throughout the conference – was that some form of Kosovo’s independence was unquestionable. However, the panel itself, she added, was more focused on the sum and substance of Kosovo’s independence. It is impossible to ignore the past, the recent past in particular, as it brought about the situation under discussion. In other words, what should be recognized are not only developments in the recent past, but also the fact that the Greater Serbia project that generated ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration persists as an illusion to come true once the international constellation changes. Therefore, Serbs should reconcile not only with Albanians, but also with all neighbors – Croats, Bosniaks and, in a manner of speaking, with some minorities in Serbia proper, according to Biserko. The conference ended by adopting a declaration welcoming the international community’s intention to tackle the future status of Kosovo as a priority issue of its agenda. Taking into account that the Contact Group has already defined the framework for negotiations that should ensure regional security and stability, and open the door to Western Balkans’ association with and ultimate membership of the European Union, “cognizant that such approach by the international community and favorable circumstance should not be allowed to pass by, and confident that this provides a unique momentum for all regional leaders to prove their political wisdom, constructiveness and genuine commitment to true interests of peoples and citizens,” participants in the conference, “call on Belgrade and Prishtina, as two directly involved parties, to engage in a substantial dialogue with maximum good will and to fully cooperate with representatives of the international community; request political actors on both sides to acknowledge Kosovo’s reality as the starting point for negotiations, while constantly bearing in mind legitimate interests of Serbs, Albanians and other communities in Kosovo, and to insist on the respect and full implementation of all international documents and standards dealing with human and minority rights,” quotes, inter alia, the unanimously adopted declaration.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Stavovi i vrednosne orijentacije srednjoškolaca u Srbiji

Author(s): Marija Radoman / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2011

Analiza stavova i vrednosnih orijentacija srednjoškolaca je rezultat istraživanja na osnovu podataka prikupljenih u periodu april-jun 2011, u šest gradova u Srbiji. Da bismo se uopšte bavili vrednostima ove mlađe generacije u našem društvu, moramo se osvrnuti na neke strukturalne promene koje obeležavaju vreme njihovog odrastanja. Period u kome želimo da proučavamo stavove i vrednosne orijentacije srednjoškolaca u Srbiji, jeste period nakon decenije «demokratskih» promena u zemlji, period (još uvek) zakasnele transformacije. Došlo je do proglašenja nezavisnosti Crne Gore i Republike Kosovo a nestabilnost država regiona (Bosne i Hercegovine i još uvek nerešene granice sa Kosovom) su uzrok osećaja nesigurnosti u socijalnom ali i nacionalnom smislu, kod većine stanovništva Srbije. Govorimo i o periodu u kome se odvija revizija istorije i relativizacija, pa i promocija desnih ideologija (ravnogorski pokret i omladinske profašističke organizacije) i u kome su religija i crkva i dalje veoma važne za veliki deo naroda. Ne smemo da zanemarimo i povećan prodor globalizacijiskih faktora koji su relativno uticali na izgradnju demokratije u zemlji. Najupadljiviji faktor je zvanična odluka da se pristupi ulasku u EU. Kao rezultat postoji donekle približavanje državne politike interesima Evropske unije. Međutim, u zemlji problemi postoje: oligarhijski sistem, uticaj političkih stranaka i visoka korupcija – kako u privredi tako i u politici – kao i problemi zaštite prava marginalizovanih grupa koji sprečavaju izgradnju građanskog društva.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Stavovi mladih u Sandžaku - Koliko su mladi otvoreni prema islamskom ekstremizmu

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić,Izabela Kisić,Jovana Saračević,Stefan Stefanović,Srđan Barišić / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2016

(Serbian edition) The crucial question here is: Are the Muslim youth in Sandžak imbued with religious extremism or not? Hardly any interethnic and inter-religious incident has been registered in this part of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, fighters from Sandžak are being involved in the Iraqi and Syrian wars. Depending on the answer to the question above, the authorities could take appropriate actions aiming at young people in Sandžak. Both domestic and international stakeholders – and there are many of them, including the non-governmental sector – could develop plans and take a variety of concrete steps depending on the answer to this very question. Fahrudin Kladničanin wrote about the influence of Wahhabi Islamic extremism on the youth in Sandžak: “Wahhabis are usually focused on recruiting young people 19 – 27 years old with little education, who are poor and often come from dysfunctional families. The youth are being indoctrinated in private places of worship (masjids), which are either rented or owned by Wahhabis, and in certain religious objects (mosques) whose imams support Wahhabi teaching, and prayers in these mosques are always led by Wahhabis. (Kladničanin, 2013: 130) Marija Radoman analyzed the reasons driving young people in Serbia towards extremist ideologies. Two citations from an earlier research of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia will thus be mentioned: „Regarding the period after 2000, surveys show that the family remains the mainstay of its young members, that young people’s life patterns lack individualization, and that they normatively accept the traditional sequence of events in a person’s life (i.e. completion of education, getting a job, entry into marriage and only then having children). What intrigues me is the sphere of influence between the respondents to this survey and their families. I tried all the time to keep a picture in my head of the families in which they grew up. I wanted to find out whether the respondents’ attitudes would reflect that background, which is hardly bright and optimistic, or whether the differences would be more than conspicuous.” (Radoman, 2011: 12). Family is the primary mechanism by which extremism is interiorized. However, it is not a cause, given that the changes stemming from structural circumstances also occurred within the family. Radoman wrote that “Today’s efforts to establish a stable democratic society in Serbia are being sabotaged, conditionally speaking, by the second generation of the nationalist current (i.e. by the circles close to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the remaining appointees of political parties who served the Milošević regime and members of Russophile conservative options, notably the Democratic Party of Serbia and New Serbia, but also the Serbian Progressive Party), as well as by the extreme right-wing reactionary Russophiles, i.e. the Serbian Radical Party. The efforts to establish a democracy are also hindered by the economic crisis.” (Ibid: 10) The analysis is based on the survey the Helsinki Committee conducted with the youth in Sandžak in May 2016. The focus was on their attitude towards religious extremism, whereas the goal to contextualize the findings: to see how to recognize and understand Islamic extremism and what could be done – preventively and concretely – considering the factors that have influenced the Sandžak youth. No doubt, interviewees’ attitudes towards extremism – or their everyday experience – differ from theoretical considerations of the phenomenon. The very notion of extremism is indisputable. In 2013 I wrote that mainstream social forces of individual societies were arbitrarily determining the notion of extremism. Official codification of political extremism and radicalism make it possible for governments and other political factors to place all those opposing the values such as equality, freedom, democracy, rule of law, etc. under control or control those advocating these values in the manner that contradicts a government’s interests. On the other hand, radicalism (or extremism) gauged by “political correctness” is being determined, as a rule, by the manner or scope in which a certain value is considered either unquestionable or unacceptable. And in all this, decision makers and the majority of population need not see eye to eye. For instance, according to many opinion polls, the majority of Serbia’s population discriminates sexual minorities, national minorities, some religious minorities and, especially fenced off communities such as Roma. By the standards of political correctness decision-makers term such stands – notwithstanding its predominance – extremist and “expel” them from media space. Extremism is deep-rooted in social structures. “The emergence of extreme right-wing and rightist ideology in Serbia derive from structural changes following on the disintegration of the socialist state. The 1990s wars, inspired by the idea of recomposition of the Balkans – or the Greater Serbia idea – are only one of many ideological bases on which the right-wing thought still lives; and its basic characteristics are: ethnic homogenization, wish to have ethnic and state borders ‘merged,’ anticommunism and denial of antifascism, the growingly stronger traditionalism and authoritarianism, the Eastern Orthodoxy seen as superior to other religions and ethnic groups (especially Croats, Muslims and Albanians), resistance to multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, and intolerance of ‘new’ (LGBT population) and traditional minorities (Roma),” writes Sonja Biserko in 2014. To what extent is Islamic, religious extremism spread in Sandžak? In June 2015 in Novi Pazar Snežana Ilić quoted the ICG report “Serb Sandžak still Forgotten” saying that there were some 300 Wahhabis in Sandžak who were not exactly organized, that only some 50 of them were active, but the movement was spreading anyway. According to the said report, Wahhabism emerged in Sandžak in 1997, triggered off by an imam wanting his believers in a mosque to pray in a different way. The believers had opposed the imam and sent him away. However, over the past couple of years Wahhabis have better organized themselves in Sandžak, while getting more and more funds from abroad for their movement. Many of them were going to work in Vienna; apparently to be recruited in a way, since they dressed and behaved like true Wahhabis once back home. Snežana Ilić believes that the highest authorities of the Islamic Community in Serbia have been using Wahhabis in several ways. For instance, they have been presenting themselves internationally as someone capable of controlling Bosniaks’ religious radicalism by the principle of Islamic legitimacy. The message they have been putting across to Western diplomats and governments runs, “Give us a free hand, we must advocate Islamization of the society as that is the only way of keeping religious radicals under control.”

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Tačka razlaza - povodom polemike vođene na stranicama lista "Vreme" od 1. avgusta do 21. novembra 2002. godine

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2003

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: The Balkans Rachomon

Author(s): Todor Kuljić,Olivera Milosavljević,Olga Manojlović-Pintar / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 0

(English edition) The author presents the main and general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe in the 1990s, drawing attention to the various features of revisionism in former socialist countries (Russia, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) and their attitude to Socialism. The necessary scientific re-examination of the past is separated from its ideological reinterpretation inspired by revived nationalism. The attention focuses on Serb and Croat revisionism, that is, on its moderate versions (‘medium compass’ revisionism), as found in the works of the Yugoslavia historians Branko Petranović and Dušan Bilandžić. Digest: Contemporary historiographic revisionism exhibits a number of components: a critical attitude to historiography on the part of the winner (the communists); a clearer understanding of the essence of past events owing to greater distance from them and to the availability of new sources; a pragmatic reinterpretation of the past inspired by narrow or broad party or national motives. Revisionists in former socialist countries find their principal source in revived nationalism which seeks to play down one’s own fascist past by uncritically attacking anti-Communism and anti-totalitarianism. Instead of being confronted, the dark shadows from one’s own past are being shown in a new light. This paper draws attention to state-sponsored and academic revisionism, and lays bare its chief motives and rhetoric in several European countries. The object of this comparative study is to show up the triviality of domestic revisionism. The revisionism in the works of B. Petranović and D. Bilandžić written in the 1990s is discussed at some length to show up the contradictions characterizing their writings before and after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the pattern of their revision fired by awakened concern for their respective ‘endangered’ nations. Selective memory and orchestrated forgetfulness were major catalysts of the civil war in Yugoslavia, with revisionist historiography enlisted to justify the new national objectives. The author believes that one can master one’s past only by confronting its dark aspects and hopes that a critical appraisal by domestic scholars of own nationalism will not be overly delayed by customary tardiness. Is contemporary historiography in former Yugoslav republics under the prevalent influence of any of the following components: a) an inevitably maturer scientific outlook on the past brought about by sounder theory and improved methods, and made possible by the discovery of hitherto unknown archival material of prime importance; b) a rather understandable shift of accent in interpreting key historical events, that is, a fuller and broader understanding of their historical function resulting from changes in the epochal consciousness and from the disappearance of the authoritarian patterns of the one-party socialist regime, or; c) a pragmatic revision of the past prompted by broader or narrower ideological, party or personal interests or motives? Which of the above components are discernible in the leading historians and can they be differentiated in more detail? In trying to answer these questions we shall take a look at: a) some general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe and in former socialist regimes at the end of the twentieth century as an important aspect of reinterpreting the recent past; b) narrower regional characteristics, that is, the chief nationalistic motives of revisionism in the contemporary historiography of former Yugoslav republics, and; c) concrete revisionist components in the works of the Yugoslavia historians D. Bilandžić and B. Petranović.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: The Hague Tribunal Discord Between Us and the World

Author(s): Milivoj Despot,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2001

(English edition) Much was written and said about the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal). And as it usually happens with respect to momentous events, essential things about the Hague Tribunal were committed, notably in view of the fact that in recent wars in the territory of ex- Yugoslavia many crimes were committed and that their perpetrators and accomplices are to be brought to justice and punished. But according to some weird logic, much hyped are opinions of many politicians and some jurists, that the Hague Tribunal is not an institution of justice, but rather a foreign political instrument for trying Serbs, and as such "it should be totally disregarded and vilifed". Exceptions from this general line of thinking were public discussions on the Hague Tribunal staged by some renowned NGOs and institutions and published in some dailies and magazines. The Hague Tribunal was established as an adequate response of international community to drastic violations of international law. During recent wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. The authorities in place hushed up those crimes, downplayed atrocities and covered up the truth. A very small number of people knew what had really happened. As trials were not held before national courts, the International Criminal Tribunal was set up to establish facts in lawful proceedings, to make them public and bring to justice perpetrators of the crimes. There is also another question: Do the trials before the Hague Tribunal have a special significance? Diplomatic means and sanctions were used to put en end to war and ensure peace. But neither were successful. The Dayton and the Paris accord stopped the war, but did not consolidate the peace. Consolidation of peace is not a declaration, but a process. In that process a specific place was accorded to the Hague Tribunal. Within general efforts aimed at re-establishing peace and security in the territory of former Yugoslavia, decisions of the Hague Tribunal have a repressive importance regarding war criminals and a preventive importance regarding every high-ranking politician and military officer. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, international law, thanks to momentous transformation of legal provisions relating to conduct of states and individuals in armed conflicts, and under strong influence of affirmation of human rights stipulated by international covenants, established international individual criminal responsibility of those who gravely violated humanitarian law relating to armed conflicts. If the Hague Tribunal carries out its repressive and preventive tasks and consequently contributes to international justice and legality, stances on war and peace shall be different. In those terms the practice of the Hague Tribunal complements future efficiency of permanent International Criminal Court. Irrefutable legal assumption is that the Hague Tribunal acts as an authorised ad hoc international criminal court and that its decisions should consolidate respect of human rights, peace and international justice. Its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, its orders and warrants transmitted to the states, members of the UN, and obligations of those states to comply with those orders, are in keeping with the international law. Awareness of the obligation that perpetrators of crimes must be handed over to the Hague Tribunal, leads to the replacement of the legal assumption by the truth.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: The Past as a challenge to the law

Author(s): Vladimir V. Vodinelić / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2002

(English edition) Societies in whose present time the authoritarian past is still a socially relevant thing may be placed in two opposing manners in front of this morally, politically and legally compromising past: there is a distinct difference between the policy of coping with the past and the policy of non coping with the past. In German, the only language with a specific expression for the complex phenomenon of the former, for ‘cope with’ the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), one can also use the synonym Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung. However, ‘to cope with’ is a bet-ter expression. The expression, as well as ‘to prevail over’ the past and ‘to get control over’ the past – indicates more clearly that at issue is a process by which the past is dealt with: to im- pose over, to get control over the past that imposed over us, and it would impose over us again, if we do not impose over it. The extreme patterns of the reactions to the authoritarian past by which it cannot be prevailed are on one side retaliation and pure vendetta and on the other side the 'as-if-nothing-has-happened' pattern: closing your eyes before the authoritarian past. By neither method, it must be emphasized, can the past be prevailed over. Retaliation is an authoritarian fight with the authoritarian past, but not the prevailing over it. Fire cannot be fought with fire here. The authoritarian fight with the past, even if it was authoritarian, is just a repetition, but with the opposite roles.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Tranzicija i manjine

Author(s): Verona Molnar,Svetislav Milanković,Kalman Kuntić,Tomislav Žigmanov,Mile Todorov,Aleksandar Dimitrov,Ivan Nikolov,Nasufi Behlul,Riza Halimi,Zevdžo Hurić,Sulejman Ugljanin,Semiha Kačar,Alija Halilović,Esad Džudžević,Jon Čizmaš,Jugoslav Veljkovski,Gojko Ilijevski,Srdjan Šajn,Dejan Marković,Zoroslav Spevak,Slavko Almazan,Janko Ramač,Andreas Birgermajer,Jovan Komšić,Agneš Kartag Odri,Jasmina Murić,Tamás Korhecz,Žarko Korać,Miroslav Samardžić,Zoran Lutovac,Dušan Janjić,Zdravko Marjanović,Dušan Torbica,Duško Radosavljević,Ivana Simović Hiber,Stanko Pihler,Ratko Bubalo,Alan Phillips,Mitja Žagar,Slavko Parać,Aleksandra Vujić,Rudolf Vajs,Bajro Omeragić,Goran Bašić,Nada Stojnev,Vladan Nikolić,Marijeta Luketa,Sonja Biserko,Ljubivoje Aćimović,Milenko Marković / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2001

(Serbian edition) Referring to minority rights, we refer to an endeavor to establish equality. What minorities want is what all of us want. It is promotion and development of minority rights that indicate to aspirations to bring about social equality so that each individual has same rights as the other. Minority rights are not something one should be afraid of, they are no threat whatsoever to a society's indivisibility, its integrity. Minority rights are, as I've said, an endeavor to establish equality, for there is no indivisibility unless there is equality. We are anxious to safeguard our society, we care for law and order, and that what equality is about. Unfortunately, we have social inequality in terms of human rights. We have weak, divided societies that - politically unstable as they are - might threaten international piece and security. So, by encouraging minority rights we, in a way, encourage peace and security. It is the European Commission's generosity that made this conference possible. Therefore, let me remind you, that funds supporting activities such is this one are provided by citizens of the European Union. These public funds, therefore, reflect their aspirations and the wish to uphold minority rights in this region. This conference also reflects cooperation between the Helsinki Federation and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. I take pride in working together with the Helsinki Committee in Serbia. I see it as a most reliable organization that overdid itself at extremely hard times of this country's history. I think the Committee in Serbia has always had the right stuff and deserves to be both commended on and recognized for its courage, integrity and dedication to key principles. This prompts me to tackle the issue of civil society. Usually, whenever there is a political overturn civil societies have to cope with a special tension. Such was the tension ensuing Czechoslovakian velvet revolution. As you know, new people came to power, the people that used to advocate human rights. So, once elected, they thought there was no longer need for the Chapter 77 or the Helsinki Charter. However, people from the Helsinki Committee said, "Stop for a moment, there is such need and very much so”. For, who should protect rights of those that were hurt? Who should watch out for the way the government and people in power behave? Who should keep an eye on the respect of human rights and the government's attitude towards international standards? There certainly are problems in Yugoslavia and Serbia. They are many, and can only be settled if there are intellectual and moral resources, through support and assistance of various non-governmental organizations that keep a sharp lookout at steps taken by the state and attitudes of people in power, and watch out for respect of commitments the state took upon itself by signing international documents. No state that lacks a strong civil society can plume itself when it comes to the situation in the domain of human and minority rights.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: U trouglu državne sile - vojska, policija, paravojska

Author(s): Stipe Sikavica,Budimir Babović,Miloš Vasić,Filip Švarm / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2001

(Serbian edition) Even if one were to maintain that some psychological, political and professional features of Yugoslav Army resembled those of the armies of some European states undergoing transition, then one must also admit that the Yugoslav Army does not have its counterpart anywhere in the world when it comes to the YA origins, background, war experience and the current political engagement. One could say without any exaggeration that it is a phenomenon among the armies of the world, as much as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a phenomenon among other countries in the world. At least this assertion applies to the state and its army during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. It was created not through transformation, as the versions of the domestic (both active and retired) military professionals imply (see, for example, Veljko Kadijević, My perception of the war, Beograd 1993 page 113) but by simple downsizing and (mere renaming) of the former Yugoslav People's Army to the Serbian-Montenegrin combat and high officers cadres. That process evolved in a frightening wanton war destruction and wandering “of the armed force of all our peoples and nationalities” from Karavanka mountains in Slovenia to Danube and Drina. The Army of Yugoslavia after ten years of its existence is still searching for its own identity.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Universal and Collective Rights of Minorities

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2000

(English edition) In view of the key importance of inter-ethnic relations and status of national minorities in Serbia for development of democracy, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Centre for Regionalism, the Vojvodina Club and Centre for Multiculturality have organised the round-table "National Minorities in Serbia" on 8 and 9 September 2000 in Novi Sad. Participants in this round-table were representatives of several dozen NGOs from Vojvodina and Serbia, representatives of political parties, prominent public personalities and experts for minority rights and ethnic relations. In a two-day debate participants in the round-table underscored that peace, tolerance and democratization of the society represent the basic prerequisite of the exercise of individual and collective rights and freedoms in the Republic of Serbia. Considering that a social community in the Republic of Serbia has a markedly heterogeneous cultural character and the fact that it is faced with pronounced ethnification of politics and intolerant nationalism, our discussion confirmed that the majority nation, that is, the ruling political establishment, were to be blamed for such a poor status of inter-ethnic relations. Hence the current political authorities cannot be relieved of responsibility from catastrophic consequences of internal conflicts and external and internal isolation. After analysing institutions and real social and political processes and actions of the most influential political protagonists, it was established that we all must insist on comprehensive implementation of ideas and legal-constitutional norms determining the Republic of Serbia as a state of equitable citizens, and the one guaranteeing corresponding standards in attainment and exercise of collective rights of national minorities in Serbia. Unfortunately during our discussion we identified through a host of examples a pronounced gulf between proclaimed norms and concrete reality in the sphere of protection of national minorities rights, notably in development and expression of their cultural identity. After the SFRY disintegration, the problem of "new minorities", notably Croats, Bosniaks, and Macedonians, emerged in Serbia. This problem entails official recognition of those minorities and concrete legal regulation of their status and rights. During preparations for the 2001 census scientific and cultural institutions and representative bodies should lay the groundwork for facilitating the free declaration of nationality by citizens. This particularly applies to Bosniaks, who have been deprived of that right to date. It is also expected that the democratic opposition of Serbia shall take a clear public stand on manner of resolution of minority problems, and incorporate pertinent proposals into their program of changes, offered as an alternative to the current regime. We brought into prominence the need to revive earlier initiatives for adoption of the Act on National Minorities in the Republic of Serbia, aimed at removing current shortcomings and imprecise points, and boosting harmonisation of domestic legal and political practice with the European standards on the Protection of Minorities. Our discussion indicated that the Republic Serbia in its relations with almost all neighbouring countries disregards the issue of minorities, and that this negligence is in turn reflected in the status of minorities and has a negative impact on relations between the majority and minorities. The role of ecological issues was discussed in the context of good-neighbourly relations, for they alike the minority issue clear the way for establishment of broad and efficient communications. Considering regional trends within the context of Europe those two issues can play an important role in the inclusion of Serbia in the project of European regions. Participants think that the Stability Pact is a conceptual framework for analysis of the most important problems and devising models of their resolution.