Publisher: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: "Otpor", in or beyond politics

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 0

(English edition) The popular movement Otpor (Resistance) is a phenomenon which has left its mark on Serbia’s political stage at the very end of the last decade of the 20th century. Having been established in 1998, it attracted media attention, launched various actions and, especially, grew in numbers and organized structurally at the height of a police crackdown against its members in the spring of 2000. Otpor has played a major part in persuading the ‘silent majority’ to go to the September 2000 polls in order to bring forward the end the neo-socialist regime. Although the full significance of the part played by Otpor can only be assessed on the basis of comprehensive and reliable information about the events and activities leading to the September 24 election results which greatly facilitated the October 5 overthrow, such data as were available fully justify the assessment given above. This study is the result of an empirical questionnaire-type survey carried out in the latter part of October 2000. Irrespective of whether Otpor as such will continue to grow and operate – for the situation has changed radically since its formative days – its organization and the attitudes and frame of mind of its members are a topic which it not without interest. At present, Otpor is highly popular among the general public and is often seen as possessing charismatic attributes. However, it has been pointed out that unreserved praise is sometimes a sign that the recipient is about to perform his swan-song; undivided flattery as a rule is counterproductive in the case of those social actors, especially large political organizations, who are perceived as serious obstacles to groups already controlling large resources of society or at least those who aspire to increase their control of such resources. The absence of any public criticism of Otpor so far may mean that it is regarded as someone who has played his role and is now expected to exit the stage as a relative autonomous political factor; this, of course, does not mean that certain factions and individual members of Otpor may not be recruited by some political parties and other interested organizations. After all, Otpor is still needed as a reserve echelon until the December republican elections in Serbia to throw its weight behind certain political goals such as loosening the grip of the defeated extreme left- and right-wing groupings on these resources, or at least to help the so-called democratic opposition to remain together as the challenge of its political adversaries weakens. However, generally speaking, the absence of any principled opposition to Otpor leads us to the conclusion that its effective influence is less and less; we must bear in mind that the extent of criticism levelled against somebody is a most reliable indicator of his influence on public life. Needless to say, all foretelling is risky; we have all been surprised by events we considered the least likely of a number of possibilities at the time of their prediction. At least we hope that the material presented here will give a true picture of the organization because we believe that it was collected during a period coinciding with the organization’s developed stage.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Balkanski rašomon

Author(s): Todor Kuljić,Olivera Milosavljević,Olga Manojlović-Pintar / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 0

(Serbian edition) The author presents the main and general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe in the 1990s, drawing attention to the various features of revisionism in former socialist countries (Russia, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) and their attitude to Socialism. The necessary scientific re-examination of the past is separated from its ideological reinterpretation inspired by revived nationalism. The attention focuses on Serb and Croat revisionism, that is, on its moderate versions (‘medium compass’ revisionism), as found in the works of the Yugoslavia historians Branko Petranović and Dušan Bilandžić. Digest: Contemporary historiographic revisionism exhibits a number of components: a critical attitude to historiography on the part of the winner (the communists); a clearer understanding of the essence of past events owing to greater distance from them and to the availability of new sources; a pragmatic reinterpretation of the past inspired by narrow or broad party or national motives. Revisionists in former socialist countries find their principal source in revived nationalism which seeks to play down one’s own fascist past by uncritically attacking anti-Communism and anti-totalitarianism. Instead of being confronted, the dark shadows from one’s own past are being shown in a new light. This paper draws attention to state-sponsored and academic revisionism, and lays bare its chief motives and rhetoric in several European countries. The object of this comparative study is to show up the triviality of domestic revisionism. The revisionism in the works of B. Petranović and D. Bilandžić written in the 1990s is discussed at some length to show up the contradictions characterizing their writings before and after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the pattern of their revision fired by awakened concern for their respective ‘endangered’ nations. Selective memory and orchestrated forgetfulness were major catalysts of the civil war in Yugoslavia, with revisionist historiography enlisted to justify the new national objectives. The author believes that one can master one’s past only by confronting its dark aspects and hopes that a critical appraisal by domestic scholars of own nationalism will not be overly delayed by customary tardiness. Is contemporary historiography in former Yugoslav republics under the prevalent influence of any of the following components: a) an inevitably maturer scientific outlook on the past brought about by sounder theory and improved methods, and made possible by the discovery of hitherto unknown archival material of prime importance; b) a rather understandable shift of accent in interpreting key historical events, that is, a fuller and broader understanding of their historical function resulting from changes in the epochal consciousness and from the disappearance of the authoritarian patterns of the one-party socialist regime, or; c) a pragmatic revision of the past prompted by broader or narrower ideological, party or personal interests or motives? Which of the above components are discernible in the leading historians and can they be differentiated in more detail? In trying to answer these questions we shall take a look at: a) some general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe and in former socialist regimes at the end of the twentieth century as an important aspect of reinterpreting the recent past; b) narrower regional characteristics, that is, the chief nationalistic motives of revisionism in the contemporary historiography of former Yugoslav republics, and; c) concrete revisionist components in the works of the Yugoslavia historians D. Bilandžić and B. Petranović.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Briga o mentalnom zdravlju - Po meri ljudskog dostojanstva

Author(s): Dejan Milenković,Miloš Janković,Nikola Grujić,Vlаdimir Jović,Paolo Serra,Darko Sekulić,Jelena Marković,Milan Marković ,Ljiljana Palibrk / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2014

(Serbian edition) Publikacija “Briga o mentalnom zdravlju po meri ljudskog dostojanstva” predstavlja skup tekstova o nekim od najvažnijih problema koji usporavaju reformu sistema zaštite mentalnog zdravlja i odlažu početak deinstitucionalizacije u Srbiji. Predstavljene analize rezultat su kontinuiranog rada više organizacija civilnog društva koje se zalažu za promenu odnosa prema osobama sa mentalnim smetnjama, reformu psihijatrije i prelazak sa institucionalnog zbrinjavanja na sistem usluga podrške u zajednici. Time bi se, vremenom, stvorili uslovi za zatvaranje ustanova azilarnog tipa i omogućilo korisnicima psihijatrijskih usluga, deci sa smetnjama u razvoju i drugim osobama sa invaliditetom, da vode dostojanstven život sa jednakim pravima i mogućnostima. Nevladine organizacije okupljene u okviru radne grupe za deinstitucionalizaciju bavile su se, samostalno ili u međusobnom partnerstvu, brojnim temama od značaja za mentalno zdravlje, imajući sve vreme u fokusu povredu osnovnih ljudskih prava osoba sa mentalnim poteškoćama. Osim Helsinškog odbora za ljudska prava u Srbiji i IAN, kao nosilaca projekta „Kampanja civilnog društva za efikasnu zaštitu osoba sa mentalnim smetnjama”, u pripremi ove brošure su učestvovali i zaštitnik građana, Komitet pravnika za ljudska prava – yucom, mdri-s (Menthal Disability Rights Serbia), Beogradski centar za ljudska prava i Udruženje korisnika psihijatrijskih usluga “Duša”, a svoj doprinos su dali i dr Paolo Serra, psihijatar i konsultant Caritasa za mentalno zdravlje, aktivni učesnik u procesu deinstitucionalizacije u psihijatrijskoj bolnici u Goriciji i rukovodilac u službama u zajednici u Arecu i Firenci, kao i Dejan Milenković, profesor na Fakultetu političkih nauka u Beogradu. Projekat „Kampanja civilnog društva za efikasnu zaštitu osoba sa mentalnim smetnjama” ima za cilj da podstakne i pomogne uspostavljanje Centara za mentalno zdravlje širom Srbije, smanjivanje broja korisnika/pacijenata u socijalnim i zdravstvenim ustanovama i njihovo postepeno zatvaranje ili transformaciju, izmenu postojećih i usvajanje novih propisa u različitim oblastima, koji će obezbediti odgovarajući pravni okvir za sistemsku zaštitu ljudskih prava osoba sa mentalnim poteškoćama, okupljanje i zajedničko delovanje organizacija civilnog društva, kampanju za podršku javnosti itd. U tom smislu, nadamo se da će i ova publikacija doprineti boljem sagledavanju problematike i pronalaženju adekvatnijih rešenja koja će biti u skladu sa razvojem medicinske nauke, psihijatrije i sa međunarodnim standardima.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Ekstremizam: Kako prepoznati društveno zlo

Author(s): Srđan Milošević,Pavel Domonji,Jelena Višnjić,Ivana Stjelja,Staša Zajović,Umberto Eco / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2014

(Serbian edition) Pojava ekstremne desnice i desničarske ideologije u Srbiji posledica su strukturalnih promena nakon razgradnje socijalističke države. Ratovi devedestih vođenih sa idejom o prekomponovanju Balkana, odnosno s idejom o Velikoj Srbiji (Memorandumu Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, 1986), samo su jedan od ideoloških osnova na kojima još uvek opstaje desna misao. Njene osnovne karakteristike jesu: etnička homogenizacija, težnja za stapanjem državnih i etničkih granica, antikomunizam i negiranje antifašizma, jačanje tradicionalizma i autoritarnosti, pravoslavlje tretirano kao superiorna religija u odnosu na ostale etničke i religijske grupe (posebno Hrvate, Muslimane i Albance), otpor idejama multikulturalizma i kosmopolitizma i netrpeljivost prema “novim” (LGBT popuacija) i tradicionalnim manjinama (Romi). Zajedničko svim desničarskim pokretima koji se pozivaju na ekstremni srpski nacionalizam i fundamentalističke interpretacije pravoslavlja, odnosno svetosavlja, jeste i izrazita islamofobija i neprijateljski stav prema svemu što je islamsko.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Haški Tribunal, naš nesporazum sa svetom

Author(s): Milivoj Despot,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 0

(Serbian edition) Much was written and said about the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal). And as it usually happens with respect to momentous events, essential things about the Hague Tribunal were committed, notably in view of the fact that in recent wars in the territory of ex- Yugoslavia many crimes were committed and that their perpetrators and accomplices are to be brought to justice and punished. But according to some weird logic, much hyped are opinions of many politicians and some jurists, that the Hague Tribunal is not an institution of justice, but rather a foreign political instrument for trying Serbs, and as such "it should be totally disregarded and vilifed". Exceptions from this general line of thinking were public discussions on the Hague Tribunal staged by some renowned NGOs and institutions and published in some dailies and magazines. The Hague Tribunal was established as an adequate response of international community to drastic violations of international law. During recent wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. The authorities in place hushed up those crimes, downplayed atrocities and covered up the truth. A very small number of people knew what had really happened. As trials were not held before national courts, the International Criminal Tribunal was set up to establish facts in lawful proceedings, to make them public and bring to justice perpetrators of the crimes. There is also another question: Do the trials before the Hague Tribunal have a special significance? Diplomatic means and sanctions were used to put en end to war and ensure peace. But neither were successful. The Dayton and the Paris accord stopped the war, but did not consolidate the peace. Consolidation of peace is not a declaration, but a process. In that process a specific place was accorded to the Hague Tribunal. Within general efforts aimed at re-establishing peace and security in the territory of former Yugoslavia, decisions of the Hague Tribunal have a repressive importance regarding war criminals and a preventive importance regarding every high-ranking politician and military officer. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, international law, thanks to momentous transformation of legal provisions relating to conduct of states and individuals in armed conflicts, and under strong influence of affirmation of human rights stipulated by international covenants, established international individual criminal responsibility of those who gravely violated humanitarian law relating to armed conflicts. If the Hague Tribunal carries out its repressive and preventive tasks and consequently contributes to international justice and legality, stances on war and peace shall be different. In those terms the practice of the Hague Tribunal complements future efficiency of permanent International Criminal Court. Irrefutable legal assumption is that the Hague Tribunal acts as an authorised ad hoc international criminal court and that its decisions should consolidate respect of human rights, peace and international justice. Its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, its orders and warrants transmitted to the states, members of the UN, and obligations of those states to comply with those orders, are in keeping with the international law. Awareness of the obligation that perpetrators of crimes must be handed over to the Hague Tribunal, leads to the replacement of the legal assumption by the truth.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: How to attain european standards - the Situation of Serbian Prisons 2002-2003.

Author(s): Marija Jelić,Nataša Novaković,Marijana Obradović,Milosav Kiurski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2003

(English edition) Throughout the totalitarian rule of the regime of Slobodan Milošević and his henchmen, which lasted for over a decade, the country’s prisons remained shut to public scrutiny. Information about the state of human rights of the prisoners and the conditions in which they served their sentences was the exclusive privilege of the state authorities directly involved and of the individuals and institutions concerned with the matter for purposes of scientific research. The question of prisoners’ human rights was completely marginalized by war, crimes, economic hardship and daily violations of citizens’ human rights and freedoms up to 5 October 2000. For many a convict, being locked away to serve a sentence of imprisonment did not mean mere deprivation of liberty for a set period of time, but also the start of a cruel struggle for survival in the gloom of lawlessness, corruption, torture, inhuman conditions and society’s total lack of interest in his or her life behind bars. It was only after widespread prison rioting broke out in November 2000 that the public’s attention was drawn to the conditions in which the prisoners served their sentences. The prisoners put out announcements throwing light on the substandard and inhuman conditions prevailing in Serbia’s penitentiaries and prisons. During the riots, groups and individual prisoners made statements complaining that the prison conditions were far below the levels set by relevant international standards and domestic prison rules. The prisoners alleged serious violations of their physical and psychological integrity, humiliating and degrading treatment, unjust punishment and general arbitrary treatment by prison personnel. They complained of, among other things, torture by beating, lack of minimum personal hygiene facilities, absence of medical treatment and health care, and corruption among prison administrative staff. Some of the allegations and complaints were partly confirmed by competent officials of the Ministry of Justice. As a palliative for the utterly unsatisfactory prison conditions, federal and republican amnesty laws were duly introduced to be finally adopted respectively on 26 February 2001 and 13 February 2001. Nonetheless, although a number of convicts were fully amnestied and a percentage of sentences commuted, the conditions in which prisoners served their sentenced remained unchanged. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the inhuman conditions in Serbia’s prisons endured and multiplied also owing to the country’s isolation of many years, during which time no international organization other than the International Red Cross was granted access to its prisons. Domestic non-governmental organizations were also kept at arm’s length and only rarely allowed to see what went on inside. In view of the circumstances enumerated above, it was clearly necessary to introduce continuous monitoring of prisons by an independent, non-governmental institution in order to obtain a realistic picture of the prison conditions. The new government is aware that admission to the Council of Europe and to other international organizations depends in part on the conditions in which sentenced persons serve their prison sentences, as well as that the public must be informed about those conditions. So, after presenting the concept and objectives of the Prison Monitoring project, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia was granted permission in May 2001 to visit institutions for the enforcement of criminal sanctions. This meant that for the first time in the history of this state an NGO could apply for and be granted permission to visit places of detention, custody and imprisonment without any restrictions, to interview prisoners with no personnel being present, and to talk to personnel without the presence of administration officers. Between June 2001 and October 2003, the Helsinki Committee paid a total of twenty-one visits to institutions for the enforcement of sanctions entailing the deprivation of liberty. During the period covered by this report (April 2002 to October 2003) the Helsinki Committee visited twelve institutions (one maximum-security prison, two closed prisons, three open prisons, two district prisons, one psychiatric prison, one reformatory, and one juvenile prison). In launching the project, the Helsinki Committee was principally guided by Article 64 of the European Prison Rules which states: ‘Imprisonment is by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself. The conditions of imprisonment and the prison regimes shall not, therefore, except as incidental to justifiable segregation or the maintenance of discipline, aggravate the suffering inherent in this.’ The Helsinki Committee hopes that its efforts to complete the project and publish this book will make a small but valuable contribution towards achieving this goal.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: In the Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units

Author(s): Stipe Sikavica,Budimir Babović,Miloš Vasić,Filip Švarm / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 0

(English edition) Even if one were to maintain that some psychological, political and professional features of Yugoslav Army resembled those of the armies of some European states undergoing transition, then one must also admit that the Yugoslav Army does not have its counterpart anywhere in the world when it comes to the YA origins, background, war experience and the current political engagement. One could say without any exaggeration that it is a phenomenon among the armies of the world, as much as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a phenomenon among other countries in the world. At least this assertion applies to the state and its army during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. It was created not through transformation, as the versions of the domestic (both active and retired) military professionals imply (see, for example, Veljko Kadijević, My perception of the war, Beograd 1993 page 113) but by simple downsizing and (mere renaming) of the former Yugoslav People's Army to the Serbian-Montenegrin combat and high officers cadres. That process evolved in a frightening wanton war destruction and wandering “of the armed force of all our peoples and nationalities” from Karavanka mountains in Slovenia to Danube and Drina. The Army of Yugoslavia after ten years of its existence is still searching for its own identity.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Individualna i kolektivna prava manjina

Author(s): Ljubivoje Aćimović,Janja Beč,Živan Berisavljević,Sonja Biserko,Jan Briza,Ratko Bubalo,Zoltan Bunjik,Niku Čobanu,Janko Čobrda,Gordana Čomić,Frenc Dagi,Aleksandar Dimitrov,Pavel Domonji,Mirko Đorđević,Esad Džudžević,Kenan Fetahović,Zoran Gashi,Momčilo Grubač,Tibor Halaši,Zevdžo Hurić,Vladimir Ilić,Slobodan Jovanović,Tomislav Ketik,Jovan Komšić,Stevan Konstantinović,Snežana Kresoja,Šemsudin Kučević,Žolt Lazar,Živan Lazić,Alpár Lošonc,Zoran Lutovac,Dario Malnar,Zdravko Marjanović,Maria Teresa Mauro,Behlul Nasufi,Ivan Nikolov,Nataša Novaković,Slavko Parać,Aleksandar Popov,Duško Radosavljević,Olivera Radovanović,Janko Ramač,Miroslav Samardžić,Bogoljub Savin,Antun Skenderović,Mile Todorov,Jugoslav Veljkovski,Deborah McWhinney,Tomislav Žigmanov,Aleksandra Šanjević / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2000

(Serbian edition) In view of the key importance of inter-ethnic relations and status of national minorities in Serbia for development of democracy, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Centre for Regionalism, the Vojvodina Club and Centre for Multiculturality have organised the round-table "National Minorities in Serbia" on 8 and 9 September 2000 in Novi Sad. Participants in this round-table were representatives of several dozen NGOs from Vojvodina and Serbia, representatives of political parties, prominent public personalities and experts for minority rights and ethnic relations. In a two-day debate participants in the round-table underscored that peace, tolerance and democratization of the society represent the basic prerequisite of the exercise of individual and collective rights and freedoms in the Republic of Serbia. Considering that a social community in the Republic of Serbia has a markedly heterogeneous cultural character and the fact that it is faced with pronounced ethnification of politics and intolerant nationalism, our discussion confirmed that the majority nation, that is, the ruling political establishment, were to be blamed for such a poor status of inter-ethnic relations. Hence the current political authorities cannot be relieved of responsibility from catastrophic consequences of internal conflicts and external and internal isolation. After analysing institutions and real social and political processes and actions of the most influential political protagonists, it was established that we all must insist on comprehensive implementation of ideas and legal-constitutional norms determining the Republic of Serbia as a state of equitable citizens, and the one guaranteeing corresponding standards in attainment and exercise of collective rights of national minorities in Serbia. Unfortunately during our discussion we identified through a host of examples a pronounced gulf between proclaimed norms and concrete reality in the sphere of protection of national minorities rights, notably in development and expression of their cultural identity. After the SFRY disintegration, the problem of "new minorities", notably Croats, Bosniaks, and Macedonians, emerged in Serbia. This problem entails official recognition of those minorities and concrete legal regulation of their status and rights. During preparations for the 2001 census scientific and cultural institutions and representative bodies should lay the groundwork for facilitating the free declaration of nationality by citizens. This particularly applies to Bosniaks, who have been deprived of that right to date. It is also expected that the democratic opposition of Serbia shall take a clear public stand on manner of resolution of minority problems, and incorporate pertinent proposals into their program of changes, offered as an alternative to the current regime. We brought into prominence the need to revive earlier initiatives for adoption of the Act on National Minorities in the Republic of Serbia, aimed at removing current shortcomings and imprecise points, and boosting harmonisation of domestic legal and political practice with the European standards on the Protection of Minorities. Our discussion indicated that the Republic Serbia in its relations with almost all neighbouring countries disregards the issue of minorities, and that this negligence is in turn reflected in the status of minorities and has a negative impact on relations between the majority and minorities. The role of ecological issues was discussed in the context of good-neighbourly relations, for they alike the minority issue clear the way for establishment of broad and efficient communications. Considering regional trends within the context of Europe those two issues can play an important role in the inclusion of Serbia in the project of European regions. Participants think that the Stability Pact is a conceptual framework for analysis of the most important problems and devising models of their resolution.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Između načela i prakse - položaj "malih" i "velikih" manjina u Srbiji.

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2004

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Ka izgradnji održivog kosovskog društva

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2007

The edition “Moving towards a Sustainable Society in Kosovo” provides insight into the activities the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia realized under the project of the same name. Serbia’s policymakers have managed to prolong the resolution of the Kosovo status for more than a year and thus fuel the regional vulnerability. Encouraged by Russia’s support and its embargo on the UN Security Council resolution that could have laid the foundations for Kosovo’s future status, the official Belgrade has been toughening nationalistic rhetoric and focusing on Kosovo as the top priority of the agenda of national interest. Such an attitude has turned the relations between Albanian and Serb communities in Kosovo even more delicate. For, the drawn-out status debate has overshadowed key issues of the Kosovo society, economy and interethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs and other minority communities. Two panel discussions, “Human Security in Kosovo” and “Framed Trials of Kosovo Albanians,” the Helsinki Committee organized with the assistance of partner organizations from Pristine probably best testify the need for interethnic dialogue. This edition carries integral proceedings of those gatherings. The workshops – described in this edition – one in the Serb enclave of Plemetina and another in Pristine bringing together Serb and Albanian women are also illustrative of Belgrade’s attempt to choke any rapprochement between Serbs and Albanians and of such policy’s detrimental effects on Kosovo Serbs. The rhetoric of confrontation and the emotion-fueled delusion that Kosovo would remain a part of Serbia have dominated Serbia’s political and social scene for the past twelve months. This is why this edition also brings to the public eye relevant discussions in the Serbian parliament, the text of the “Resolution on the Need for Just Solution of the Question of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo Based on International Law” that was unanimously adopted in late July 2007, as well as major Kosovo-related addresses by highest state officials. However, Serbia does have a political alternative to such mainstream: the Liberal Democratic Party /LDP/, which entered the parliament following the January 2007 elections. The LDP alternative document on Kosovo, submitted for the parliamentary consideration, is also presented in this edition. Last but not least, some illustrative commentaries, run in the Committee’s magazine The Helsinki Charter – scrutinizing Kosovo developments along with other key issues of Serbia’s modernization and Europeanization – are here available to readers as condensed reading matter.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Kako do evropskih standarda - zatvori u Srbiji 2002-2003.

Author(s): Marija Jelić,Milosav Kiurski,Nataša Novaković,Marijana Obradović / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2003

(Serbian edition) Throughout the totalitarian rule of the regime of Slobodan Milošević and his henchmen, which lasted for over a decade, the country’s prisons remained shut to public scrutiny. Information about the state of human rights of the prisoners and the conditions in which they served their sentences was the exclusive privilege of the state authorities directly involved and of the individuals and institutions concerned with the matter for purposes of scientific research. The question of prisoners’ human rights was completely marginalized by war, crimes, economic hardship and daily violations of citizens’ human rights and freedoms up to 5 October 2000. For many a convict, being locked away to serve a sentence of imprisonment did not mean mere deprivation of liberty for a set period of time, but also the start of a cruel struggle for survival in the gloom of lawlessness, corruption, torture, inhuman conditions and society’s total lack of interest in his or her life behind bars. It was only after widespread prison rioting broke out in November 2000 that the public’s attention was drawn to the conditions in which the prisoners served their sentences. The prisoners put out announcements throwing light on the substandard and inhuman conditions prevailing in Serbia’s penitentiaries and prisons. During the riots, groups and individual prisoners made statements complaining that the prison conditions were far below the levels set by relevant international standards and domestic prison rules. The prisoners alleged serious violations of their physical and psychological integrity, humiliating and degrading treatment, unjust punishment and general arbitrary treatment by prison personnel. They complained of, among other things, torture by beating, lack of minimum personal hygiene facilities, absence of medical treatment and health care, and corruption among prison administrative staff. Some of the allegations and complaints were partly confirmed by competent officials of the Ministry of Justice. As a palliative for the utterly unsatisfactory prison conditions, federal and republican amnesty laws were duly introduced to be finally adopted respectively on 26 February 2001 and 13 February 2001. Nonetheless, although a number of convicts were fully amnestied and a percentage of sentences commuted, the conditions in which prisoners served their sentenced remained unchanged. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the inhuman conditions in Serbia’s prisons endured and multiplied also owing to the country’s isolation of many years, during which time no international organization other than the International Red Cross was granted access to its prisons. Domestic non-governmental organizations were also kept at arm’s length and only rarely allowed to see what went on inside. In view of the circumstances enumerated above, it was clearly necessary to introduce continuous monitoring of prisons by an independent, non-governmental institution in order to obtain a realistic picture of the prison conditions. The new government is aware that admission to the Council of Europe and to other international organizations depends in part on the conditions in which sentenced persons serve their prison sentences, as well as that the public must be informed about those conditions. So, after presenting the concept and objectives of the Prison Monitoring project, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia was granted permission in May 2001 to visit institutions for the enforcement of criminal sanctions. This meant that for the first time in the history of this state an NGO could apply for and be granted permission to visit places of detention, custody and imprisonment without any restrictions, to interview prisoners with no personnel being present, and to talk to personnel without the presence of administration officers. Between June 2001 and October 2003, the Helsinki Committee paid a total of twenty-one visits to institutions for the enforcement of sanctions entailing the deprivation of liberty. During the period covered by this report (April 2002 to October 2003) the Helsinki Committee visited twelve institutions (one maximum-security prison, two closed prisons, three open prisons, two district prisons, one psychiatric prison, one reformatory, and one juvenile prison). In launching the project, the Helsinki Committee was principally guided by Article 64 of the European Prison Rules which states: ‘Imprisonment is by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself. The conditions of imprisonment and the prison regimes shall not, therefore, except as incidental to justifiable segregation or the maintenance of discipline, aggravate the suffering inherent in this.’ The Helsinki Committee hopes that its efforts to complete the project and publish this book will make a small but valuable contribution towards achieving this goal.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: LJUDI NA DRUŠTVENOJ MARGINI - Ljudska prava u psihijatrijskim bolnicama (septembar 2006 – mart 2007)

Author(s): Suzana Perović,Zoran Milojković,Marijana Obradović,Ljiljana Palibrk / Language(s): English,Serbian / Publication Year: 2007

Arhitektonsko-tehnički uslovi, higijena i opremljenost u bolnicama u koje su smešteni psihijatrijski pacijenti na veoma je niskom nivou. Reč je o ustanovama koje imaju velike kapacitete, do 1000 bolesnika, koje su u suštini izolovane od društvene zajednice. Spavaonice su predviđene za smeštaj velikog broja ljudi. U bolnici u Kovinu, na akutnom odeljenju u sobama je smešteno više od 20 pacijenata. Visoki plafoni, nepostojeća toplotna i hidroizolacija, vlažni i memljivi zidovi, betonske podloge, prozori i vrata koji ne dihtuju, itd., često ne obezbeđuju ni minimum potrebnih uslova za smeštaj i lečenje bolesnika; nedostatak i prirodnog i veštačkog osvetljenja, nedovoljna provetrenost, hladni ili mlaki radijatori, deo su svakodnevnih uslova kojima su izloženi i bolesnici i zaposleno osoblje. U nekim odeljenjima (oligofreno odeljenje vršačke bolnice) životni uslovi se mogu definisati kao nečovečno ili ponižavajuće postupanje. Lečenje psihijatrijskih pacijenata u ovim ustanovama je neadekvatno, jer se, uglavnom, sastoji od farmakoterapije. Pacijenti nemaju mogućnost da učestvuju u izboru lekara, niti da donose bilo kakve odluke u pogledu terapije i načina lečenja kojem se podvrgavaju. Podaci iz medicinskih kartona nisu dostupni pacijentima, članovima porodice, niti zastupnicima ili advokatima pacijenata. Kada se nalaze u ulozi somatskih pacijenata, psihijatrijski pacijenti su diskriminisani u drugim zdravstvenim ustanovama. Zdravstveno osoblje u drugim ustanovama, za lečenje somatskih bolesti, odbija da tretira i leči psihijatrijske pacijente na isti način kako se leče drugi pacijenti. Veoma mali broj pacijenata, uglavnom onih koji posećuju dnevne bolnice u sklopu psihijatrijskih bolnica, ima mogućnosti da koristi i druge pristupe u tretmanu osim farmakoterapije. Za sve ostale, što znači za „veliku većinu,“ važi „skladištenje“ u psihijatrijske bolnice koje ih, praktično, izdvaja iz zajednice, čime se pospešuje njihovo brže propadanje. Veliki broj pacijenata u ovim bolnicama, faktički, živi u njima po 10 ili 20 godina, jer nema gde da ode iz bolnice i ne postoji adekvatnija institucija koja bi ove pacijente prihvatila i omogućila im postepenu integraciju u društvo. Osoblje u bolnicama (nemedicinsko, kao i srednji medicinski kadar i više medicinske sestre) nema adekvatnu obuku za rad u psihijatrijskim bolnicama i tretman psihijatrijskih pacijenata. Osoblje nije obučeno tehnikama ne-fizičkog i manuelnog obuzdavanja agitiranih pacijenata. Srednje medicinsko osoblje i nemedicinsko osoblje nije dovoljno nadzirano u popodnevnim i noćnim časovima. Mali broj zaposlenih ostaje u popodnevnim i noćnim smenama sa pacijentima i nema adekvatan nadzor nad njima. Osoblje je zbog uslova u bolnicama, neobučenosti, nedovoljnog broja zaposlenih, nepostojanja jasne procedure za reagovanje u kriznim situacijama, izloženo velikom stresu. Osoblje je posebno nezadovoljno zbog malih primanja, s obzirom na težinu posla kojim se bave i uslove pod kojima rade.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Manjine i izbeglice u vojvodini

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 0

(Serbian edition) Presence of over half a million refugees and displaced persons in Serbia is a palpable and live criticism of our recent national program and its implementation. Their fate demonstrates that the nation is not homogenous, that there are no common national interests, but rather different goals with different price tags. It bears stressing that the price paid by the aforementioned population groups was the highest one. Conduct and fate of refugees and their choices, if any, in a drastic way indicate disastrous failure of the idea of annexation of so-called Western Serb countries to the ethnic Serb state. In those terms they are the most convincing critique of domestic nationalism, for they indicate consequences thereof better than any other population groups. If one is to believe different facts and figures, more than three fourth of refugees and displaced persons until recently wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, and only one fifth expressed their wish to return to their homes. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia through its continuing project "I want to go home" helped a sustained return of a large number of refugees, in the face of inertia and political obstacles in several involved countries. Moreover the NGO through this survey tried to look into ways of future return of refugees and displaced persons from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Minorities and Refugees In Vojvodina

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 0

(English edition) Presence of over half a million refugees and displaced persons in Serbia is a palpable and live criticism of our recent national program and its implementation. Their fate demonstrates that the nation is not homogenous, that there are no common national interests, but rather different goals with different price tags. It bears stressing that the price paid by the aforementioned population groups was the highest one. Conduct and fate of refugees and their choices, if any, in a drastic way indicate disastrous failure of the idea of annexation of so-called Western Serb countries to the ethnic Serb state. In those terms they are the most convincing critique of domestic nationalism, for they indicate consequences thereof better than any other population groups. If one is to believe different facts and figures, more than three fourth of refugees and displaced persons until recently wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, and only one fifth expressed their wish to return to their homes. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia through its continuing project "I want to go home" helped a sustained return of a large number of refugees, in the face of inertia and political obstacles in several involved countries. Moreover the NGO through this survey tried to look into ways of future return of refugees and displaced persons from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Minorities in transition

Author(s): Verona Molnar,Svetislav Milanković,Kalman Kuntić,Tomislav Žigmanov,Mile Todorov,Aleksandar Dimitrov,Ivan Nikolov,Nasufi Behlul,Riza Halimi,Zevdžo Hurić,Sulejman Ugljanin,Semiha Kačar,Alija Halilović,Esad Džudžević,Jon Čizmaš,Jugoslav Veljkovski,Gojko Ilijevski,Srdjan Šajn,Dejan Marković,Zoroslav Spevak,Slavko Almazan,Janko Ramač,Andreas Birgermajer,Jovan Komšić,Agneš Kartag Odri,Jasmina Murić,Tamás Korhecz,Žarko Korać,Miroslav Samardžić,Zoran Lutovac,Dušan Janjić,Zdravko Marjanović,Duško Radosavljević,Ivana Simović Hiber,Stanko Pihler,Ratko Bubalo,Alan Phillips,Mitja Žagar,Slavko Parać,Aleksandra Vujić,Rudolf Vajs,Bajro Omeragić,Goran Bašić,Nada Stojnev,Vladan Nikolić,Marijeta Luketa,Šefko Alomerović,Aleksandar Lebl,Bojan Barbucić,Sonja Biserko,Ljubivoje Aćimović,Milenko Marković,Latinka Perović,Pavel Domonji,Seška Stanojlović,Ksenija Lazović,Biljana Stanojević,Aleksandra Šanjević,Nataša Novaković,Aaron Rhodes,Ružica Žarevac / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2001

(English edition) Referring to minority rights, we refer to an endeavor to establish equality. What minorities want is what all of us want. It is promotion and development of minority rights that indicate to aspirations to bring about social equality so that each individual has same rights as the other. Minority rights are not something one should be afraid of, they are no threat whatsoever to a society's indivisibility, its integrity. Minority rights are, as I've said, an endeavor to establish equality, for there is no indivisibility unless there is equality. We are anxious to safeguard our society, we care for law and order, and that what equality is about. Unfortunately, we have social inequality in terms of human rights. We have weak, divided societies that - politically unstable as they are - might threaten international piece and security. So, by encouraging minority rights we, in a way, encourage peace and security. It is the European Commission's generosity that made this conference possible. Therefore, let me remind you, that funds supporting activities such is this one are provided by citizens of the European Union. These public funds, therefore, reflect their aspirations and the wish to uphold minority rights in this region. This conference also reflects cooperation between the Helsinki Federation and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. I take pride in working together with the Helsinki Committee in Serbia. I see it as a most reliable organization that overdid itself at extremely hard times of this country's history. I think the Committee in Serbia has always had the right stuff and deserves to be both commended on and recognized for its courage, integrity and dedication to key principles. This prompts me to tackle the issue of civil society. Usually, whenever there is a political overturn civil societies have to cope with a special tension. Such was the tension ensuing Czechoslovakian velvet revolution. As you know, new people came to power, the people that used to advocate human rights. So, once elected, they thought there was no longer need for the Chapter 77 or the Helsinki Charter. However, people from the Helsinki Committee said, "Stop for a moment, there is such need and very much so”. For, who should protect rights of those that were hurt? Who should watch out for the way the government and people in power behave? Who should keep an eye on the respect of human rights and the government's attitude towards international standards? There certainly are problems in Yugoslavia and Serbia. They are many, and can only be settled if there are intellectual and moral resources, through support and assistance of various non-governmental organizations that keep a sharp lookout at steps taken by the state and attitudes of people in power, and watch out for respect of commitments the state took upon itself by signing international documents. No state that lacks a strong civil society can plume itself when it comes to the situation in the domain of human and minority rights.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Mladi u eri postistine – Evropski identitet i obrazovanje

Author(s): Vladimir Gligorov,Aleksandra Đurić Bosnić,Boris Varga,Tamara Tomašević,Srđan Barišić,Izabela Kisić,Sonja Biserko,Miloš Ćirić,Jelena Vasiljević,Dragan Stanojević,Aleksandar Miletić,Srđan Milošević,Ivan Đurić,Srđan Atanasovski,Biljana Đorđević,Časlav Ninković,Duško Radosavljević,Pavel Domonji,Miroslav Keveždi,Branislava Opranović,Ana Pataki,Andrea Ratković,Iskra Vuksanović / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2018

(Serbian edition) Ongoing public debates frequently focus on European identity. What sparked off such debates were tremendous global changes after the Cold War, disappearance of two opposing blocs, ethnic conflicts, migrations, sociopolitical crises of liberal societies as well as the mass renouncement of value-based orientations Europe and the whole world had been built on after World War II and defeat of Nazism. People all over the world are now growingly concerned with the issues of statehood, ethnicity and the notion of “being a citizen.” Political manipulation of collective identities badly affects people’s lives and policies on which societies are being built. Many theoreticians are questioning – and with good reason – the very notion of collective identity, ethnic in the first place, as extremely exclusive. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia has launched a series of round tables under the title “Youth in a Post-Truth Era: European Identity and Education.” Participants were intellectuals of younger generations mostly, NGO activists and civil sector representatives, but secondary school and university students too. What we wanted achieve with these open debates – never devoid of controversial arguments – was to give shape to authentic views with impact on practical politics and (in)formal education of the youth. Our researches and experience in communication with young people show that they do care about collective identities, and that their ethnicities and religions are crucial in identity-building. Although they recognize the potential of Euro-integration for, say, better schooling or economic progress, a snail’s pace of the accession process and domestic propaganda make them turn to other international players. Young Serbs are turning to Russia and Putin, Bosniaks to Turkey and Erdogan, while young Hungarians to Serbia’s neighbor in the north and Orban. Revisionism also strongly influences the youth regardless of their ethnicities. They practically always oppose strongly any questioning of patriarchal values and react fiercely to it. Value-based orientations as such are mostly the effects of the spread of fake news and narratives predominant in the media, schools environments and families; the narratives that forced their way into the public sphere in the 1980s, bloomed in the 1990s and are thriving now against the global backdrop. Is the narrative about European identity and education a key to changes and inclusive enough? When I say European identity I am not advocating for Euro-centrism, especially not now when it implies social and economic exclusion of people heading for Europe from various continents and countries, or those outside the European Union. In Balkan countries aspiring to EU membership European identity is used as a political instrument supportive to integration processes. At the same time, it supports the transfer from a one-dimensional, nationalistic and wartime identity to a multi-dimensional, civic one. As it has turned out so far, the issues of class consciousness, socioeconomic justice and the right to education for all will be predominant in the debates to come. We do not intend to impose alternative narratives on the youth but to capacitate them for critical thought; to help them recognize and stand up against social repression and collective identities that have been imposed on them and exclude any “otherness.” Ever since the early 1990s the European Commission has also been focused on the researches of European identity (or identities). The European bureaucracy was interested in it for very practical reasons: the European Commission’s concern with the manner in which different processes of identification with the European Union shape integrative processes and strengthen the sense of solidarity among Europeans. On the eve of the Gothenburg Summit in November 2017 the European Commission issued guidelines for strengthening of the common European identity through education and culture, under the motto “unity in diversity.” The document was meant for the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the European Socioeconomic Committee and the Committee of Regions. It was motivated by the rise of populism “at home” and beyond the EU, the spread of fake news and manipulation of information networks. Given that the EU administration interferes not into educational systems and culture of its member-states but leaves them to national, regional and local authorities, its role is limited to strengthening of cooperation and support to national projects in these spheres. It realized that education and culture make Europe attractive for learning and working, attractive as a space of freedom and shared values reflected in fundamental rights and an open society. And education as such builds foundations for active citizenship and helps to prevent populism, xenophobia and violent radicalism. Education, along with culture, plays a key role in cross-border meetings and learning about the true meaning of “being a European.” According to an analysis commissioned by the European Commission, joint, cross-border actions such as engagement in social movements or in organizations with shared goals (such as ecologic organizations) can promote the sense for European identity since collective actions are always taking into consideration the “other’s” points of view. How to involve candidates for the membership of the EU in the debate on Europe’s future and identity (identities) is among major issues. Isolated periphery and people’s frustration with accession that is being constantly postponed incite Euroskepticism and passivity of the youth who actually stand for European integration. The publication “European Identity and Education” resulted from a series of discussions and debates organized by the Helsinki Committee. Its introductory section presents one of the essays and political analyses of the international and local context in which Serbia’s youth are being raised: “Democracy, Pluralism and Extremism” by Vladimir Gligorov. The following section presents readers with draft practical politics for those dealing with institutional and informal education of the young. These draft policies, actually suggestions, are about teaching methods that may efficiently develop critical thinking among the youth and their awareness about alternatives. Inter alia, the suggested approaches are meant to motivate young people to get actively involved in building of a democratic society based on pluralism, inter-culturalism, solidarity and socioeconomic rights. Recommendations can be summed up as follows: 1. Strengthening of the idea of active citizenship; 2. Media literacy and development of critical thinking of the youth; and 3. Development and modernization of educational programs and present approaches to education of school children. Drafts of public policies were on the agenda of debates held in Belgrade and Novi Sad with participation of scholars and activists from younger generations mostly, concerned with the issues of identity and education. This publication also presents excerpts from those debates. How possibly could cosmopolitanism, inter-culturalism, anti-fascism and open society be promoted in today’s Serbia but also in Europe where extremism, fear of “otherness,” concerns for the safeguard of one’s own national identity that is allegedly threatened, be on the up and up? This is one of major dilemmas facing us today. Few students have access to informal education that rests on the principles guiding a democratic society. Speaking from experience many participants in debates pointed to the lack in professional staffs involved in educational process. Civic education is being marginalized in elementary and secondary schools. The participants also presented well-thought-out arguments against religious teaching in school curricula. The majority of participants take that strengthening of informal education that would lead towards incorporation of similar contents and methods into the educational system could be a solution to the above-mentioned dilemma. That would be a chance for attracting young people whose interests and ambitions are well beyond the rigid educational system, they argue. Positive experiences of Yugoslavia’s interculturalism and socialism, and the common history and culture can be used as resources for strengthening interculturalism throughout the region. Small steps forward within institutions that depend, above all, on individual activism and courage are another possible approach to resolution. This publication is meant as a contribution to local but also more extensive debate on European identity and new European policies that would cope with today’s challenges by far more efficiently.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Multietnički identitet Vojvodine: izazovi u 2007-08

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2008

(Serbian edition) Isticanje etničkog pluralizma Vojvodine predstavlja opšte mesto u retorici pokrajinskih političara, medija i predstavnika civilnog društva. Činjenica da na području Vojvodine žive pripadnici velikog broja nacionalnih manjina u toj se retorici uzdiže kao prednost i vojvođanska vrednost. Ovo naglašavanje višeetničnosti nije slučajno. Tokom raspada bivše Jugoslavije, multietnički karakter vojvođanskog društva često je bio na udaru. U sudaru sa heterogenom prirodom društva, novi politički ideal - nacionalna država - vrlo brzo je oslobodio svoje destruktivne potencijale. Nacionalistička histerija, nasilje, reduciranje prava i omalovažavanje vodile su marginalizaciji i izolaciji manjina, njihovom zatvaranju u uske granice vlastite etničke grupe, povlačenju iz sfere javnosti, iseljavanju u matične, odnosno treće države. Nakon 5. oktobra 2000. godine učinjeni su stanoviti pomaci u saniranju posledica Miloševićevog režima. Ti su pomaci, međutim, bili i ostali polovični. Donet je, recimo, zakon o Zaštiti prava i sloboda nacionalnih manjina, ali ne i zakon o načinu izbora i nadležnostima nacionalnih saveta. Na nivou republike i pokrajine formirani su, nakon zaoštravanja međuetničkih odnosa u Vojvodini, saveti za nacionalne manjine, ali oni, lišeni bilo kakvog realnog uticaja, vegetiraju pretvoreni u fasadne institucije. Spremnost države da se obračuna sa govorom mržnje i etnički motivisanim napadima je, najčešće, izostajala, što je kod manjina stvorilo utisak o selektivnoj primeni krivičnih paragrafa. Kampanja koju je, u cilju protežiranja tolerancije, svojevremeno vodilo Ministarstvo za ljudska i manjinska prava završila je neuspehom. Ni sadašnji projekat koji sprovodi Pokrajinski sekretarijat za upravu, propise i nacionalne manjine, neće uspeti ako njegovi napori na afirmisanju tolerancije i multikulturalizma ne budu snažno podržani od strane važnih društvenih podsistema.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Nacionalne manjine i pravo

Author(s): Jan Briza,Mikloš Biro,Mirej Grčki,Nataša Novaković,Ljiljana Palibrk,Pavel Domonji / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2002

(Serbian edition) October 2000 political changeover did not produce the fundamental break with Milosevic's policy. There are numerous examples thereof, notably as regards Republika Srpska, Kosovo and Montenegro. Insistence on that orientation in the face of factual defeat had a negative impact on status of inter-ethnic relations in Serbia proper. National policy aiming at creating an ethnically pure Serb state ended with a catastrophic balance: hundreds of thousands of dead, several million displaced persons and refugees. In the past decade minorities, notably Croats (during the war in Croatia), Bosniaks (during the war in B&H) and Albanians (during the whole decade) bore the brunt of "ethnic-cleansing" policy. By extension, relations between the majority people and some minorities were exacerbated. In the meantime minorities have radicalised their stands and are waiting for resolution of their problems by dint of international community brokerage. Most conspicuous example of the aforementioned was South Serbia, in which the danger of conflict spill-over was great for a while. But thanks to NATO and other international organisations actions and efforts tension has eased and cooperation and revival of economy have been initiated owing to enormous political and financial support of the West. Serbia has entered the period of facing up to difficult and long-term consequences of nationalistic and war policy of the former regime. The entire society has been devastated, and institutions of system destroyed. Long wars, international isolation and bombardment campaign have impacted the general social mood, which is marked by high intolerance, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and emergence of neo-Nazi groups. This is all due to the political vacuum and absence of vision of Serbia's future. Such a general atmosphere affects national minorities, who feel increasingly threatened. The last census, according to unofficial information, indicates that Serbia remains a markedly multi-ethnic country. This may be explained by massive emigration or brain-drain of young and educated Serbs. About 400,000 refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, contrary to some expectations, have not to a larger extent changed the demographic structure of the country. Despite emigration of minorities, their percentage remained the same, in view of de-assimilation of Vlahs and Romany (they stopped identifying with Serbs). This means that the minority issue would remain the hot issue, notably if the nationalistic block continues to persist on realisation of ethnically pure state. Some ethnic communities have been territorially homogenised, hence some of them, in some areas constitute the majority population. Some national minorities, notably Albanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Hungarians, Bosniaks/Muslims, and Romanians inhabit border areas. Thus their territorial homogenisation is a complex political fact. Despite current authorities efforts to fine-tune national minorities-related domestic legislation to the European standards, situation in that regard is slowly changing because of badly impaired inter-ethnic relations in the last decade. Ethnic distance had been increased, but as of late it started dwindling, but not everywhere and not with respect to all minorities.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: National minorities and law

Author(s): Jan Briza,Mikloš Biro,Mirej Grčki,Nataša Novaković,Ljiljana Palibrk,Pavel Domonji / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2002

(English edition) October 2000 political changeover did not produce the fundamental break with Milosevic's policy. There are numerous examples thereof, notably as regards Republika Srpska, Kosovo and Montenegro. Insistence on that orientation in the face of factual defeat had a negative impact on status of inter-ethnic relations in Serbia proper. National policy aiming at creating an ethnically pure Serb state ended with a catastrophic balance: hundreds of thousands of dead, several million displaced persons and refugees. In the past decade minorities, notably Croats (during the war in Croatia), Bosniaks (during the war in B&H) and Albanians (during the whole decade) bore the brunt of "ethnic-cleansing" policy. By extension, relations between the majority people and some minorities were exacerbated. In the meantime minorities have radicalised their stands and are waiting for resolution of their problems by dint of international community brokerage. Most conspicuous example of the aforementioned was South Serbia, in which the danger of conflict spill-over was great for a while. But thanks to NATO and other international organisations actions and efforts tension has eased and cooperation and revival of economy have been initiated owing to enormous political and financial support of the West. Serbia has entered the period of facing up to difficult and long-term consequences of nationalistic and war policy of the former regime. The entire society has been devastated, and institutions of system destroyed. Long wars, international isolation and bombardment campaign have impacted the general social mood, which is marked by high intolerance, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and emergence of neo-Nazi groups. This is all due to the political vacuum and absence of vision of Serbia's future. Such a general atmosphere affects national minorities, who feel increasingly threatened. The last census, according to unofficial information, indicates that Serbia remains a markedly multi-ethnic country. This may be explained by massive emigration or brain-drain of young and educated Serbs. About 400,000 refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, contrary to some expectations, have not to a larger extent changed the demographic structure of the country. Despite emigration of minorities, their percentage remained the same, in view of de-assimilation of Vlahs and Romany (they stopped identifying with Serbs). This means that the minority issue would remain the hot issue, notably if the nationalistic block continues to persist on realisation of ethnically pure state. Some ethnic communities have been territorially homogenised, hence some of them, in some areas constitute the majority population. Some national minorities, notably Albanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Hungarians, Bosniaks/Muslims, and Romanians inhabit border areas. Thus their territorial homogenisation is a complex political fact. Despite current authorities efforts to fine-tune national minorities-related domestic legislation to the European standards, situation in that regard is slowly changing because of badly impaired inter-ethnic relations in the last decade. Ethnic distance had been increased, but as of late it started dwindling, but not everywhere and not with respect to all minorities.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Potencijal za promene

Author(s): Slobodan Inić,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2000

(Serbian edition) This report contains the analysis of data collected during the month of October 1999. One should have in mind this time frame-when considering the findings, drawing different generalizations or setting guidelines for possible actions. Sets of values of members of the observed generation, their social awareness, perception of the past and present, their stance on the West, and above all their potential to bring about changes are essentially determined by some long-standing and less intensive structural factors. To put it simply a generation of people who today have between 25 and 35 years, and who represent the future of the country, was to a large extent formed under the influence of structural features of the society eroded by constant wars and war threats, protracted economic crisis, internal conflicts and strife and total confusion in the sphere of social awareness and public moral. The generation which in the last decade came of age in such a society per force had to reflect its essential characteristics, despite a relative autonomy which each age groups had as its inherent characteristic. Young people and even relatively young people, to which the respondents of this survey belong, have a determined biological and psychological potential which can help them partially overcome the given moment of time and which usually indicates some of their future contents and values in the present day. In that sense one could expect that the mind-set of the observed generation substantially differs from so-called social conscience. But in conditions of an ever-deepening social crisis, in which the process of coming-of-age unfolded under pressure of retrograde, rather than progressive social factors, the aforementioned advantages of such a generation are less manifest, since their potential crumbles under pressure of a regressive society. One must bear in mind the aforementioned and thus avoid to treat unjustly the observed age group: they are expected to be the creators of the Serbian society at the beginning of the Twenty-first century, but it is pretty obvious that their social actions will be affected by a sorry legacy of the social and moral collapse. In fact they were not less predestined than the earlier generations to be unequipped for the contemporary world. They simply developed under much less favorable conditions. But this should not minimize their responsibility for the future development of society in Serbia. On the other hand such adverse development factors should be borne in mind if one truly wishes to understand the traits of this generation, instead of bluntly condemning them. My intention is not to prejudge results evidenced by this survey, but it bears mentioning that it is easier to reject the middle generation in Serbia, like Serbia proper, than to try to understand and render assistance to both.