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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №02: Potential For Changes

Author(s): Slobodan Inić,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

(English edition) This report contains the analysis of data collected during the month of October 1999. One should have in mind this time frame-when considering the findings, drawing different generalizations or setting guidelines for possible actions. Sets of values of members of the observed generation, their social awareness, perception of the past and present, their stance on the West, and above all their potential to bring about changes are essentially determined by some long-standing and less intensive structural factors. To put it simply a generation of people who today have between 25 and 35 years, and who represent the future of the country, was to a large extent formed under the influence of structural features of the society eroded by constant wars and war threats, protracted economic crisis, internal conflicts and strife and total confusion in the sphere of social awareness and public moral. The generation which in the last decade came of age in such a society per force had to reflect its essential characteristics, despite a relative autonomy which each age groups had as its inherent characteristic. Young people and even relatively young people, to which the respondents of this survey belong, have a determined biological and psychological potential which can help them partially overcome the given moment of time and which usually indicates some of their future contents and values in the present day. In that sense one could expect that the mind-set of the observed generation substantially differs from so-called social conscience. But in conditions of an ever-deepening social crisis, in which the process of coming-of-age unfolded under pressure of retrograde, rather than progressive social factors, the aforementioned advantages of such a generation are less manifest, since their potential crumbles under pressure of a regressive society. One must bear in mind the aforementioned and thus avoid to treat unjustly the observed age group: they are expected to be the creators of the Serbian society at the beginning of the Twenty-first century, but it is pretty obvious that their social actions will be affected by a sorry legacy of the social and moral collapse. In fact they were not less predestined than the earlier generations to be unequipped for the contemporary world. They simply developed under much less favorable conditions. But this should not minimize their responsibility for the future development of society in Serbia. On the other hand such adverse development factors should be borne in mind if one truly wishes to understand the traits of this generation, instead of bluntly condemning them. My intention is not to prejudge results evidenced by this survey, but it bears mentioning that it is easier to reject the middle generation in Serbia, like Serbia proper, than to try to understand and render assistance to both.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №03: Rusija, Srbija, Crna Gora

Author(s): Jelica Kurjak,Olga Popović-Obradović,Mijat Šuković / Language(s): Serbian

Russia’s long presence in the Balkans - from the eleventh century onwards - can be analysed in terms of its two salient features: continuity and, as far as the role of the Russian state in Balkan (especially Serbian) affairs is concerned, inconstancy. Russia has been trying to push out its frontiers as far as the warm seas ever since Muscovy Russ and the principality of Kiev began to expand. Its imperialistic policy has carried its influence as far south-west as the Adriatic Sea across and with the help of Balkan states. Various Balkan states have found in Russia both friend and foe; this depended on their attitude towards Russia’s rivals among the great powers and towards other Balkan countries at the time. At one time the latter found Russia’s support invaluable, at another they regarded it counter-productive. Russia was particularly adept in capitalising on Balkan crises and wars, in which it took an active part, to strengthen its position in the Balkans; its consequent peace-making efforts were almost always hailed by local populations with great relief. This policy has given rise to a number of myths in some Balkan countries (especially among the Serbs) about there being a selfless "mother Russia" always ready to rush to one’s rescue. However, historical evidence shows Russia to have been far less amiable and benevolent than some local political elites concerned primarily with furthering their day-to-day political objectives made out at the time. In the pursuance of its "Balkan strategy" Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, sought to realise its political interests; the fact that at some periods these interests coincided with the interests of some Balkan nations cannot be used to defend the thesis that Russia has been an a priori friend of Balkan states, especially of Serbia and/or Montenegro. Once the need for an outlet to the warm seas ceased being a strategic priority, Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, found another justification for its presence in the Balkans: having emerged from the Second World War as a major world power, it took part in the partition of Europe into two political systems and controlled one-half of the Balkan peninsula for over fifty years ostensibly to protective those parts from the other, imperialistic side. Throughout that period Russia’s political vocabulary and rhetoric abounded with stock ideological phrases to justify this presence in some Balkan country or other. Finally, the closing years of the twentieth century, witnessing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY, proved once again that Russia is an unavoidable protagonist in Balkan tragedies. As a great power, Russia strove permanently to add territory and then to protect its gains by all available means. Whenever it found it impossible to expand territorially, Russia sought to widen the zones of its political, economic and military influence. Russia either waged war or played nations against each other to realise its strategic objectives in the role of victor or peacemaker as the case may be; whether on the winning or the losing side, Russia always made the most of a situation. To be sure, besides paying rich dividends this policy occasionally backfired: in times of war, for instance, Russia usually paid a heavy price in human lives as well as found it necessary to deal with increasingly strong separatist movements on its soil (especially in 1991-93). But even in such times of adversity Russia found the strength to make the most of the setback. On the other hand, whenever it emerged victorious it tried to keep all the spoils. This dual line became especially prominent after the cold war and the end of the bipolar division of the world, when Russia failed to learn to play the part of one of the major forces in Europe; it is still finding it difficult to accept its new role of a respectable factor. The contradictory nature of Russia’s imperialistic policy vis-à-vis the Balkans was shown up in particular during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY. The analyses that follow show that even when Russia seemed to be losing ground it managed to realise its interests at least partially if not in whole.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №03: Russia, Serbia, Montenegro

Author(s): Jelica Kurjak,Olga Popović-Obradović,Mijat Šuković / Language(s): English

(English edition) Russia’s long presence in the Balkans - from the eleventh century onwards - can be analysed in terms of its two salient features: continuity and, as far as the role of the Russian state in Balkan (especially Serbian) affairs is concerned, inconstancy. Russia has been trying to push out its frontiers as far as the warm seas ever since Muscovy Russ and the principality of Kiev began to expand. Its imperialistic policy has carried its influence as far south-west as the Adriatic Sea across and with the help of Balkan states. Various Balkan states have found in Russia both friend and foe; this depended on their attitude towards Russia’s rivals among the great powers and towards other Balkan countries at the time. At one time the latter found Russia’s support invaluable, at another they regarded it counter-productive. Russia was particularly adept in capitalising on Balkan crises and wars, in which it took an active part, to strengthen its position in the Balkans; its consequent peace-making efforts were almost always hailed by local populations with great relief. This policy has given rise to a number of myths in some Balkan countries (especially among the Serbs) about there being a selfless "mother Russia" always ready to rush to one’s rescue. However, historical evidence shows Russia to have been far less amiable and benevolent than some local political elites concerned primarily with furthering their day-to-day political objectives made out at the time. In the pursuance of its "Balkan strategy" Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, sought to realise its political interests; the fact that at some periods these interests coincided with the interests of some Balkan nations cannot be used to defend the thesis that Russia has been an a priori friend of Balkan states, especially of Serbia and/or Montenegro. Once the need for an outlet to the warm seas ceased being a strategic priority, Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, found another justification for its presence in the Balkans: having emerged from the Second World War as a major world power, it took part in the partition of Europe into two political systems and controlled one-half of the Balkan peninsula for over fifty years ostensibly to protective those parts from the other, imperialistic side. Throughout that period Russia’s political vocabulary and rhetoric abounded with stock ideological phrases to justify this presence in some Balkan country or other. Finally, the closing years of the twentieth century, witnessing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY, proved once again that Russia is an unavoidable protagonist in Balkan tragedies. As a great power, Russia strove permanently to add territory and then to protect its gains by all available means. Whenever it found it impossible to expand territorially, Russia sought to widen the zones of its political, economic and military influence. Russia either waged war or played nations against each other to realise its strategic objectives in the role of victor or peacemaker as the case may be; whether on the winning or the losing side, Russia always made the most of a situation. To be sure, besides paying rich dividends this policy occasionally backfired: in times of war, for instance, Russia usually paid a heavy price in human lives as well as found it necessary to deal with increasingly strong separatist movements on its soil (especially in 1991-93). But even in such times of adversity Russia found the strength to make the most of the setback. On the other hand, whenever it emerged victorious it tried to keep all the spoils. This dual line became especially prominent after the cold war and the end of the bipolar division of the world, when Russia failed to learn to play the part of one of the major forces in Europe; it is still finding it difficult to accept its new role of a respectable factor. The contradictory nature of Russia’s imperialistic policy vis-à-vis the Balkans was shown up in particular during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY. The analyses that follow show that even when Russia seemed to be losing ground it managed to realise its interests at least partially if not in whole.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №04: Individualna i kolektivna prava manjina

Author(s): Rada Beronja,Dragan Dabić,Tatjana Ivelić,Nedim Sejdimović,Vladeta Stanković,Vlastimira Stanković / Language(s): Serbian

In view of the key importance of inter-ethnic relations and status of national minorities in Serbia for development of democracy, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Centre for Regionalism, the Vojvodina Club and Centre for Multiculturality have organised the round-table "National Minorities in Serbia" on 8 and 9 September 2000 in Novi Sad. Participants in this round-table were representatives of several dozen NGOs from Vojvodina and Serbia, representatives of political parties, prominent public personalities and experts for minority rights and ethnic relations. In a two-day debate participants in the round-table underscored that peace, tolerance and democratization of the society represent the basic prerequisite of the exercise of individual and collective rights and freedoms in the Republic of Serbia. Considering that a social community in the Republic of Serbia has a markedly heterogeneous cultural character and the fact that it is faced with pronounced ethnification of politics and intolerant nationalism, our discussion confirmed that the majority nation, that is, the ruling political establishment, were to be blamed for such a poor status of inter-ethnic relations. Hence the current political authorities cannot be relieved of responsibility from catastrophic consequences of internal conflicts and external and internal isolation. After analysing institutions and real social and political processes and actions of the most influential political protagonists, it was established that we all must insist on comprehensive implementation of ideas and legal-constitutional norms determining the Republic of Serbia as a state of equitable citizens, and the one guaranteeing corresponding standards in attainment and exercise of collective rights of national minorities in Serbia. Unfortunately during our discussion we identified through a host of examples a pronounced gulf between proclaimed norms and concrete reality in the sphere of protection of national minorities rights, notably in development and expression of their cultural identity. After the SFRY disintegration, the problem of "new minorities", notably Croats, Bosniaks, and Macedonians, emerged in Serbia. This problem entails official recognition of those minorities and concrete legal regulation of their status and rights. During preparations for the 2001 census scientific and cultural institutions and representative bodies should lay the groundwork for facilitating the free declaration of nationality by citizens. This particularly applies to Bosniaks, who have been deprived of that right to date. It is also expected that the democratic opposition of Serbia shall take a clear public stand on manner of resolution of minority problems, and incorporate pertinent proposals into their program of changes, offered as an alternative to the current regime. We brought into prominence the need to revive earlier initiatives for adoption of the Act on National Minorities in the Republic of Serbia, aimed at removing current shortcomings and imprecise points, and boosting harmonisation of domestic legal and political practice with the European standards on the Protection of Minorities. Our discussion indicated that the Republic Serbia in its relations with almost all neighbouring countries disregards the issue of minorities, and that this negligence is in turn reflected in the status of minorities and has a negative impact on relations between the majority and minorities. The role of ecological issues was discussed in the context of good-neighbourly relations, for they alike the minority issue clear the way for establishment of broad and efficient communications. Considering regional trends within the context of Europe those two issues can play an important role in the inclusion of Serbia in the project of European regions. Participants think that the Stability Pact is a conceptual framework for analysis of the most important problems and devising models of their resolution.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №04: Universal and Collective Rights of Minorities

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №05: "Otpor" - više ili manje od politike

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

The popular movement Otpor (Resistance) is a phenomenon which has left its mark on Serbia’s political stage at the very end of the last decade of the 20th century. Having been established in 1998, it attracted media attention, launched various actions and, especially, grew in numbers and organized structurally at the height of a police crackdown against its members in the spring of 2000. Otpor has played a major part in persuading the ‘silent majority’ to go to the September 2000 polls in order to bring forward the end the neo-socialist regime. Although the full significance of the part played by Otpor can only be assessed on the basis of comprehensive and reliable information about the events and activities leading to the September 24 election results which greatly facilitated the October 5 overthrow, such data as were available fully justify the assessment given above. This study is the result of an empirical questionnaire-type survey carried out in the latter part of October 2000. Irrespective of whether Otpor as such will continue to grow and operate – for the situation has changed radically since its formative days – its organization and the attitudes and frame of mind of its members are a topic which it not without interest. At present, Otpor is highly popular among the general public and is often seen as possessing charismatic attributes. However, it has been pointed out that unreserved praise is sometimes a sign that the recipient is about to perform his swan-song; undivided flattery as a rule is counterproductive in the case of those social actors, especially large political organizations, who are perceived as serious obstacles to groups already controlling large resources of society or at least those who aspire to increase their control of such resources. The absence of any public criticism of Otpor so far may mean that it is regarded as someone who has played his role and is now expected to exit the stage as a relative autonomous political factor; this, of course, does not mean that certain factions and individual members of Otpor may not be recruited by some political parties and other interested organizations. After all, Otpor is still needed as a reserve echelon until the December republican elections in Serbia to throw its weight behind certain political goals such as loosening the grip of the defeated extreme left- and right-wing groupings on these resources, or at least to help the so-called democratic opposition to remain together as the challenge of its political adversaries weakens. However, generally speaking, the absence of any principled opposition to Otpor leads us to the conclusion that its effective influence is less and less; we must bear in mind that the extent of criticism levelled against somebody is a most reliable indicator of his influence on public life. Needless to say, all foretelling is risky; we have all been surprised by events we considered the least likely of a number of possibilities at the time of their prediction. At least we hope that the material presented here will give a true picture of the organization because we believe that it was collected during a period coinciding with the organization’s developed stage.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №05: "Otpor", in or beyond politics

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №07: Haški Tribunal, naš nesporazum sa svetom

Author(s): Milivoj Despot,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

Much was written and said about the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal). And as it usually happens with respect to momentous events, essential things about the Hague Tribunal were committed, notably in view of the fact that in recent wars in the territory of ex- Yugoslavia many crimes were committed and that their perpetrators and accomplices are to be brought to justice and punished. But according to some weird logic, much hyped are opinions of many politicians and some jurists, that the Hague Tribunal is not an institution of justice, but rather a foreign political instrument for trying Serbs, and as such "it should be totally disregarded and vilifed". Exceptions from this general line of thinking were public discussions on the Hague Tribunal staged by some renowned NGOs and institutions and published in some dailies and magazines. The Hague Tribunal was established as an adequate response of international community to drastic violations of international law. During recent wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. The authorities in place hushed up those crimes, downplayed atrocities and covered up the truth. A very small number of people knew what had really happened. As trials were not held before national courts, the International Criminal Tribunal was set up to establish facts in lawful proceedings, to make them public and bring to justice perpetrators of the crimes. There is also another question: Do the trials before the Hague Tribunal have a special significance? Diplomatic means and sanctions were used to put en end to war and ensure peace. But neither were successful. The Dayton and the Paris accord stopped the war, but did not consolidate the peace. Consolidation of peace is not a declaration, but a process. In that process a specific place was accorded to the Hague Tribunal. Within general efforts aimed at re-establishing peace and security in the territory of former Yugoslavia, decisions of the Hague Tribunal have a repressive importance regarding war criminals and a preventive importance regarding every high-ranking politician and military officer. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, international law, thanks to momentous transformation of legal provisions relating to conduct of states and individuals in armed conflicts, and under strong influence of affirmation of human rights stipulated by international covenants, established international individual criminal responsibility of those who gravely violated humanitarian law relating to armed conflicts. If the Hague Tribunal carries out its repressive and preventive tasks and consequently contributes to international justice and legality, stances on war and peace shall be different. In those terms the practice of the Hague Tribunal complements future efficiency of permanent International Criminal Court. Irrefutable legal assumption is that the Hague Tribunal acts as an authorised ad hoc international criminal court and that its decisions should consolidate respect of human rights, peace and international justice. Its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, its orders and warrants transmitted to the states, members of the UN, and obligations of those states to comply with those orders, are in keeping with the international law. Awareness of the obligation that perpetrators of crimes must be handed over to the Hague Tribunal, leads to the replacement of the legal assumption by the truth.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №07: The Hague Tribunal Discord Between Us and the World

Author(s): Milivoj Despot,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №08: Manjine i izbeglice u vojvodini

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

Presence of over half a million refugees and displaced persons in Serbia is a palpable and live criticism of our recent national program and its implementation. Their fate demonstrates that the nation is not homogenous, that there are no common national interests, but rather different goals with different price tags. It bears stressing that the price paid by the aforementioned population groups was the highest one. Conduct and fate of refugees and their choices, if any, in a drastic way indicate disastrous failure of the idea of annexation of so-called Western Serb countries to the ethnic Serb state. In those terms they are the most convincing critique of domestic nationalism, for they indicate consequences thereof better than any other population groups. If one is to believe different facts and figures, more than three fourth of refugees and displaced persons until recently wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, and only one fifth expressed their wish to return to their homes. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia through its continuing project "I want to go home" helped a sustained return of a large number of refugees, in the face of inertia and political obstacles in several involved countries. Moreover the NGO through this survey tried to look into ways of future return of refugees and displaced persons from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №08: Minorities and Refugees In Vojvodina

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №09: In the Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units

Author(s): Stipe Sikavica,Budimir Babović,Miloš Vasić,Filip Švarm / Language(s): English

Even if one were to maintain that some psychological, political and professional features of Yugoslav Army resembled those of the armies of some European states undergoing transition, then one must also admit that the Yugoslav Army does not have its counterpart anywhere in the world when it comes to the YA origins, background, war experience and the current political engagement. One could say without any exaggeration that it is a phenomenon among the armies of the world, as much as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a phenomenon among other countries in the world. At least this assertion applies to the state and its army during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. It was created not through transformation, as the versions of the domestic (both active and retired) military professionals imply (see, for example, Veljko Kadijević, My perception of the war, Beograd 1993 page 113) but by simple downsizing and (mere renaming) of the former Yugoslav People's Army to the Serbian-Montenegrin combat and high officers cadres. That process evolved in a frightening wanton war destruction and wandering “of the armed force of all our peoples and nationalities” from Karavanka mountains in Slovenia to Danube and Drina. The Army of Yugoslavia after ten years of its existence is still searching for its own identity.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №09: U trouglu državne sile - vojska, policija, paravojska

Author(s): Stipe Sikavica,Budimir Babović,Miloš Vasić,Filip Švarm / Language(s): Serbian

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №10: Unlearnt Lesson - Central-European Idea and Serb National Program

Author(s): Charles Ingrao,Lazar Vrkatić / Language(s): English

Neville Chamberlain spoke for millions of his contemporaries when, at the height of the Munich Crisis, he lamented the prospects of going to war over ‘a faraway country’ inhabited by ‘people of whom we know nothing’. The prime minister was, of course, speaking to his fellow Britons about Czechoslovakia. But he could have just as easily used these same words to characterize the Anglo-American world’s knowledge - or concern - about the lands and peoples of the entire region between Germany and the former Soviet Union. A half century later we still know very little about what the Germans call Mitteleuropa, and even less about its history. Even today, as the world press reports recent events in the former Yugoslavia in terrible detail, it has never explained why there is such intense ethnic conflict throughout Central Europe. One tragic consequence of their ignorance has been the incessant, but incorrect allusion to "age-old hatreds" that helped desensitize America’s public and politicians to Slobodan Milošević’s carefully orchestrated campaign of ethnic genocide. We have many excuses. The region's languages are dissimilar to anything we speak. Its multiplicity of intermingled ethnic and linguistic groups challenges the most curious. It boasts no great power to attract our admiration or concern. And, it is not especially strategic or important to us. It may have been only a century ago when Bismarck warned that "the Balkans are not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier", but his advice has guided the statesmen of the West for centuries. But our lack of knowledge or commitment does not mean that we have not played a major role in shaping its past, present, and - as it now seems - future. Although it is true that Central Europe has many endemic problems, the current crisis stems in great part from the West's imposition of its own values and solutions on a region about which it knows little - and cares less. Unfortunately, those in the public sector who mold and make this country’s policy have shown little interest in reading serious historical scholarship. As a result, crucial insights have been lost to the frantic schedules of journalists, who prefer to get their "historical background" from the flip clichés and breezy accounts other journalists. Nor have historical insights gained currency among politicians, who have less time and inclination to read much more than a daily news summary, the requisite opinion polls, and the occasional journalistic account. Thus President Clinton’s memorable remark at a press conference in 1995, in which he justified his belated decision to intervene militarily in Bosnia by proclaiming that he now understood the situation, having just read reporter Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts. Even those social scientists who serve as area specialists for central Europe have tended to restrict their historical background to the previous generation or two, failing to see how anything that occurred before World War II could possibly inform our understanding of the events of the last decade; hence the broad currency given to political scientist Susan Woodward’s Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, which convincingly ascribes the events of the last decade to a failure of that country’s governmental leaders and institutions, without regard to underlying, historically-informed cultural forces that might have prompted that collapse. The devaluation of history by the public, press, politicians, and social scientists presents a formidable challenge to us as historians. Surely we have a vocational interest in reminding them of our ability to discern the continuity between the past and present as an instrument for determining the likely course(s) of future developments. To this I would add a second, moral imperative to repay the tax- and tuition-paying public that sustains us by contributing to the formulation of public policy. The past decade has exposed us to the tragic alternative. In the aftermath of Srebrenica, Operation Storm and the successful NATO intervention, there has evolved a broad consensus that attributes the war, genocide and the subsequent need for costly, long-term Western intervention to our failure to learn from the lessons of history. I would suggest that part of our responsibility lies in a failure of historians to teach these lessons beyond the narrow confines of the Ivory Tower. Perhaps most remiss have been Habsburg scholars, who have failed to share what they have learned about the multiethnic experience in a "western" institutional environment that upholds the rule of law and codes of professional conduct. To Balkan and Habsburg historians alike, I say that it is not so difficult for a reasonably intelligent person to understand how we have gotten to this terrible juncture in Central Europe, or to envision where we are heading. The answers to our questions are not unteachable, just untaught. Looking over the events of the past decade, I would suggest a number of historically informed insights that bridge the gap between scholarly discourse and the lay public’s self-professed factual ignorance and conceptual confusion.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №11: Balkanski rašomon

Author(s): Todor Kuljić,Olivera Milosavljević,Olga Manojlović-Pintar / Language(s): Serbian

The author presents the main and general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe in the 1990s, drawing attention to the various features of revisionism in former socialist countries (Russia, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) and their attitude to Socialism. The necessary scientific re-examination of the past is separated from its ideological reinterpretation inspired by revived nationalism. The attention focuses on Serb and Croat revisionism, that is, on its moderate versions (‘medium compass’ revisionism), as found in the works of the Yugoslavia historians Branko Petranović and Dušan Bilandžić. Digest: Contemporary historiographic revisionism exhibits a number of components: a critical attitude to historiography on the part of the winner (the communists); a clearer understanding of the essence of past events owing to greater distance from them and to the availability of new sources; a pragmatic reinterpretation of the past inspired by narrow or broad party or national motives. Revisionists in former socialist countries find their principal source in revived nationalism which seeks to play down one’s own fascist past by uncritically attacking anti-Communism and anti-totalitarianism. Instead of being confronted, the dark shadows from one’s own past are being shown in a new light. This paper draws attention to state-sponsored and academic revisionism, and lays bare its chief motives and rhetoric in several European countries. The object of this comparative study is to show up the triviality of domestic revisionism. The revisionism in the works of B. Petranović and D. Bilandžić written in the 1990s is discussed at some length to show up the contradictions characterizing their writings before and after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the pattern of their revision fired by awakened concern for their respective ‘endangered’ nations. Selective memory and orchestrated forgetfulness were major catalysts of the civil war in Yugoslavia, with revisionist historiography enlisted to justify the new national objectives. The author believes that one can master one’s past only by confronting its dark aspects and hopes that a critical appraisal by domestic scholars of own nationalism will not be overly delayed by customary tardiness. Is contemporary historiography in former Yugoslav republics under the prevalent influence of any of the following components: a) an inevitably maturer scientific outlook on the past brought about by sounder theory and improved methods, and made possible by the discovery of hitherto unknown archival material of prime importance; b) a rather understandable shift of accent in interpreting key historical events, that is, a fuller and broader understanding of their historical function resulting from changes in the epochal consciousness and from the disappearance of the authoritarian patterns of the one-party socialist regime, or; c) a pragmatic revision of the past prompted by broader or narrower ideological, party or personal interests or motives? Which of the above components are discernible in the leading historians and can they be differentiated in more detail? In trying to answer these questions we shall take a look at: a) some general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe and in former socialist regimes at the end of the twentieth century as an important aspect of reinterpreting the recent past; b) narrower regional characteristics, that is, the chief nationalistic motives of revisionism in the contemporary historiography of former Yugoslav republics, and; c) concrete revisionist components in the works of the Yugoslavia historians D. Bilandžić and B. Petranović.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №11: The Balkans Rachomon

Author(s): Todor Kuljić,Olivera Milosavljević,Olga Manojlović-Pintar / Language(s): English

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №12: Minorities in transition

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Referring to minority rights, we refer to an endeavor to establish equality. What minorities want is what all of us want. It is promotion and development of minority rights that indicate to aspirations to bring about social equality so that each individual has same rights as the other. Minority rights are not something one should be afraid of, they are no threat whatsoever to a society's indivisibility, its integrity. Minority rights are, as I've said, an endeavor to establish equality, for there is no indivisibility unless there is equality. We are anxious to safeguard our society, we care for law and order, and that what equality is about. Unfortunately, we have social inequality in terms of human rights. We have weak, divided societies that - politically unstable as they are - might threaten international piece and security. So, by encouraging minority rights we, in a way, encourage peace and security. It is the European Commission's generosity that made this conference possible. Therefore, let me remind you, that funds supporting activities such is this one are provided by citizens of the European Union. These public funds, therefore, reflect their aspirations and the wish to uphold minority rights in this region. This conference also reflects cooperation between the Helsinki Federation and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. I take pride in working together with the Helsinki Committee in Serbia. I see it as a most reliable organization that overdid itself at extremely hard times of this country's history. I think the Committee in Serbia has always had the right stuff and deserves to be both commended on and recognized for its courage, integrity and dedication to key principles. This prompts me to tackle the issue of civil society. Usually, whenever there is a political overturn civil societies have to cope with a special tension. Such was the tension ensuing Czechoslovakian velvet revolution. As you know, new people came to power, the people that used to advocate human rights. So, once elected, they thought there was no longer need for the Chapter 77 or the Helsinki Charter. However, people from the Helsinki Committee said, "Stop for a moment, there is such need and very much so”. For, who should protect rights of those that were hurt? Who should watch out for the way the government and people in power behave? Who should keep an eye on the respect of human rights and the government's attitude towards international standards? There certainly are problems in Yugoslavia and Serbia. They are many, and can only be settled if there are intellectual and moral resources, through support and assistance of various non-governmental organizations that keep a sharp lookout at steps taken by the state and attitudes of people in power, and watch out for respect of commitments the state took upon itself by signing international documents. No state that lacks a strong civil society can plume itself when it comes to the situation in the domain of human and minority rights.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №12: Tranzicija i manjine

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №13: Prošlost kao izazov pravu

Author(s): Vladimir V. Vodinelić / Language(s): Serbian

Societies in whose present time the authoritarian past is still a socially relevant thing may be placed in two opposing manners in front of this morally, politically and legally compromising past: there is a distinct difference between the policy of coping with the past and the policy of non coping with the past. In German, the only language with a specific expression for the complex phenomenon of the former, for ‘cope with’ the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), one can also use the synonym Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung. However, ‘to cope with’ is a bet-ter expression. The expression, as well as ‘to prevail over’ the past and ‘to get control over’ the past – indicates more clearly that at issue is a process by which the past is dealt with: to im- pose over, to get control over the past that imposed over us, and it would impose over us again, if we do not impose over it. The extreme patterns of the reactions to the authoritarian past by which it cannot be prevailed are on one side retaliation and pure vendetta and on the other side the 'as-if-nothing-has-happened' pattern: closing your eyes before the authoritarian past. By neither method, it must be emphasized, can the past be prevailed over. Retaliation is an authoritarian fight with the authoritarian past, but not the prevailing over it. Fire cannot be fought with fire here. The authoritarian fight with the past, even if it was authoritarian, is just a repetition, but with the opposite roles.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №13: The Past as a challenge to the law

Author(s): Vladimir V. Vodinelić / Language(s): English

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Publisher: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji