Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

FAKE NEWS - A ROADMAP

Author(s): / Language(s): English

In the summer of 2017 a group of students on the Strategic Communications Masters at King’s College London decided to bring some clarity to the discussion of Fake News. Their concern was that what separated truth from untruth had for too long been obscured—made ever less intelligible by certain people intent on distorting responsible debate, while others simply fail to do their research. The term Fake News has become the default catchphrase for truth-seekers wishing to label inaccurate reporting, truth-obscurers spreading malevolent assertions, or the unprepared who simply want to close down uncomfortable discussion. The shorthand expression ‘Fake News’ may fit neatly into tweeted messages, but willing amplifiers have spread it across all media, traditional and social, without necessarily giving it a meaningful definition. Fake News: A Roadmap is published by King’s Centre for Strategic Communications (KCSC) and the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, in Riga, Latvia. Both organisations are committed to encouraging young talent and innovative thinking. In keeping with NATO’s remit, this book is published and made available free of charge to any reader around the world. Fake News: A Roadmap is edited by Jente Althuis and Leonie Haiden. Its authors are Iona Allan, Jente Althuis, Alexander Averin, Giulia Conci, Sarah Dooley, Erin Duffy, Douglas Gray, Leonie Haiden, Mitchell Ilbury, Natalia Kantovich, Chelsea McManus, Celeste Michaud, Emma Moore, Kierat Ranautta-Sambhi, and Siri Strand. We wish to thank for their advice and support: KCSC – Dr Neville Bolt, Professor David Betz, Dr Nicholas Michelsen, Professor Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, John Williams, Dr Francesca Granelli, Andrea Berger, Victoria Preston, Sophia Krauel. NATO StratCom COE - Jānis Sārts, Linda Curika, Benjamin Heap.

FALLING BEHIND: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES ARE FAILING TO COMBAT INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOUR ONLINE

Author(s): Sebastian Bay,Rolf Fredheim / Language(s): English

From the 2014 invasion of Ukraine to more recent attempts to interfere in democratic elections, antagonists seeking to influence their adversaries have turned to social media manipulation. At the heart of this practice is a flourishing market dominated by Manipulation Service Providers (MSPs) based in Russia. Buyers range from individuals to companies to state-level actors. Typically, these service providers sell social media engagement in the form of comments, clicks, likes, and shares. Since its foundation, the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence in Riga has studied social media manipulation as an important and integral part of the influence campaigns malicious state and non-state actors direct against the Alliance and its partners.

Falsification of History as a Tool of Influence

Author(s): / Language(s): English

This study deals with the growing trend of Russia’s use of historical propaganda to further its foreign policy goals. It contains chapters written by experts in the field in the respective countries of Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland. The methodological aspects of the project were discussed in detail during a seminar in Riga on 11 December 2018. It was agreed that, for the integrity of the compendium, at least the central theme should be commonly understood as Jowett and O’Donnell conceptualise it: propaganda is a deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist. Its systematic nature requires the longitudinal study of its progress. Because the essence of propaganda is its deliberateness of purpose, considerable investigation is required to find out what this purpose is.

FRAMING OF THE UKRAINE–RUSSIA CONFLICT IN ONLINE AND SOCIAL MEDIA

Author(s): Robert Szwed,Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili / Language(s): English

The aim of the project is to describe and reconstruct the information campaign carried out by Russia and pro-Russian activists in the internet and to reconstruct representations and frames of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict emerging from internet commentary sections and social media posts. Textual and visual analyses reveal the tools and methods used by pro-Kremlin commentators to build representations of Crimea’s annexation and the Ukrainian-Russia conflict. The subject of analysis is the framing of how the Ukraine–Russia conflict played out in internet portals (DELFI, korrespondent.net, pravda.com.ua, kyivpost.com and onet.pl) and social media (Facebook, Vkontakte) in the period from 1 April to 31 December 2014. The effectiveness of influence on the internet were also analysed, particularly in mobilizing internet users to engage in communication.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO MALICIOUS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Author(s): Samantha Bradshaw,Lisa-Maria Neudert,Philip N. Howard / Language(s): English

The manipulation of public opinion regarding social media during critical moments of political life has emerged as a pressing policy concern. During the 2016 Presidential Election in the United States and the Brexit Referendum in the United Kingdom reports about the malicious use of social media and the exploitation of personal data for political gain rose to global prominence, prompting legal and regulatory intervention by governments around the world. But the use of social media to undermine democracy has long been a concern for NATO and the European security community.

HYBRID THREATS - A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE

Author(s): Sean Aday,Māris Andžāns,Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova,Francesca Granelli,John-Paul Gravelines,Mils Hills,Miranda Holmstrom,Adam Klus,Irene Martinez-Sanchez,Mariita Mattiisen,Holger Mölder,Yeganeh Morakabati,James Pamment,Aurel Sari,Vladimir Sazonov,Gregory Simons,Jonathan Terra / Language(s): English

This report is the product of a research project undertaken by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE), at the request of the governments of Lithuania and Estonia. The project was designed to deepen our understanding of the wide range of measures which come under the umbrella of ‘hybrid threats’. Such measures aim to influence the political decision-making of a targeted nation in a way which hurts their national security interests, predominantly conducted in the ‘grey zone’ between peace, crisis and war. Scope The project broadens the framing of current debates on hybrid threats beyond the most common empirical reference points, which tend to relate to the Russian Federation. A standardized framework is used to analyze case studies which are assessed to offer examples of hybrid threats. Analysis has been conducted from the perspective of ‘Strategic Communications’, which is articulated for this report not simply as a suite of capabilities disseminating messages to explain actions or intentions in support of strategy but as a basic function of statecraft. Strategic Communications is therefore considered both as an overarching philosophy to be inculcated into organizational culture and as a cross-government process, central to integrating the instruments of national power. The research focuses on the national level, where the primary responsibility lies for understanding, identifying and responding to hybrid threats. In this main volume, summaries of 30 cases are provided, of which a representative selection of 10 cases are analysed in detail in a separate annex. In order to limit the scope of the project, this phase of research focuses solely on state actors. Purpose The case studies are not intended to be definitive accounts of a particular scenario or provide templated solutions to similar situations, nor does the inclusion of any particular state actor necessarily conclude malicious intent. The report encourages the reader to take a ‘360-degree view’ of an issue area, deepening their knowledge of factors and considerations relevant to threat assessment. This report is designed to help the reader develop two complementary viewpoints. First, being agile and adaptive enough to deal with emerging security challenges where the identity and intent of adversaries may be unclear or deliberatively deceptive. Threats may also be constituted by the synergy of many different, apparently unconnected measures. Second, the Strategic Communications mindset. This is the notion that everything communicates. The key to an effective strategy is therefore to understand actors and audiences, then integrate policies, actions and words across government in a coherent way to build national resilience and leverage strategic influence.

HYBRID THREATS - ANNEX OF CASE STUDIES

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

IMPROVING NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS TERMINOLOGY

Author(s): Neville Bolt,Leonie Haiden / Language(s): English

The proposal for “StratCom Terminology Improvement” came from the Netherlands, one of the founding member of the NATO StratCom COE, and was approved by the Steering Committee in December 2017. The Terminology Working Group held consultative sessions throughout 2018. Terminology projects are usually concerned with making communication within a specialized language community more efficient and minimizing misunderstandings. Improving StratCom terminology aims to unify different NATO agencies in their endeavors but also increase efficiency in planning and executing military (communications) operations. NATO is a multi-national organization with civilian and military personnel, working toward political and military objectives. A common language (in the broader sense) is one of the key success factors for effective Strategic Communications.

INDUSTRY RESPONSES TO THE MALICIOUS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Author(s): Emily Taylor,Stacie Walsh,Samantha Bradshaw / Language(s): English

In November 2016, the idea that one of the world’s most sophisticated democracies could have been gamed by hostile states using social media platforms seemed ‘crazy’ to many people, not just Mark Zuckerberg. But as evidence continues to emerge, whether from FBI investigations, disclosures by whistle-blowers, or digitally-distributed disinformation campaigns in other countries, an uncomfortable picture takes shape — Silicon Valley’s leading technology platforms have found themselves at the centre of a perfect storm.

Information Laundering in Germany

Author(s): Belén Carrasco Rodríguez / Language(s): English

Information laundering (IL) is a stratagem used by hostile actors within an information influence campaign. In this process, false or deceitful information is legitimised through a network of intermediaries that gradually apply a set of techniques to distort it and obscure the original source. In the context of this research, IL is leveraged by Kremlin-official or pro-Kremlin actors in a hostile information influence campaign (HIIC) to further their interests in Germany. Information Laundering represents a relatively new approach to information influence activities targeting a particular media environment. In the context of this report, IL research allows governments, national institutions and civil society to reach a deeper understanding of the activity of domestic and transnational networks that enable the spread of the Kremlin’s influence in a particular country, since it uncovers how actors gradually distort, disseminate, and legitimise a piece of information through the application of IL techniques.

Information Laundering in the Nordic-Baltic Region

Author(s): Belén Carrasco Rodríguez,Nika Aleksejeva,Sebastien Cubbon,Tihomira Doncheva,Benjamin Heap,Rueban Manokara,Thomas Elkjer Nissen,Merete Voetmann / Language(s): English

The penetration of external information influence in a domestic media ecosystem is largely enabled by the interactions between foreign and domestic actors. The term ‘Information Laundering’ describes how these actors manipulate and amplify manipulated information in a particular media environment and the techniques utilised for such purposes. This report evaluates to what extent Kremlin-official and pro-Kremlin actors leverage Information Laundering techniques to conduct influence campaigns in the Nordic-Baltic countries and examines the role that domestic and foreign actors play in enabling these campaigns to reach target audiences. For this purpose, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence developed a theoretical model of Information Laundering presented in this study. The model was applied to a comparative analysis of 32 Information Laundering cases, linked to the activity of 570 single actors in the eight Nordic-Baltic countries. Through researching Information Laundering in the region, this report aims to support national institutions in their goal to build resilience against hostile information influence operations.

Informationswäsche in Deutschland

Author(s): Belén Carrasco Rodríguez / Language(s): German

Informationswäsche (IL, engl. Information Laundering) ist ein Strategem, das von Akteuren mit feindlichen Absichten bei Kampagnen zur Informationsbeeinflussung eingesetzt wird. Die Bezeichnung leitet sich vom Begriff der Geldwäsche ab und weitet die Metapher auf Nachrichten aus. Das bedeutet, ein Netzwerk von Vermittlern legitimiert falsche oder trügerische Informationen. Dafür wird schrittweise eine Reihe an Methoden eingesetzt, um die Informationen zu verdrehen und die ursprüngliche Quelle zu verschleiern. Der Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit liegt auf Informationswäsche, die von kremlfreundlichen oder offiziellen Akteuren des Kreml ausgeht. Im Zuge aggressiver Kampagnen zur Informationsbeeinflussung sollen die eigenen Interessen in Deutschland vorangebracht werden. Informationswäsche ist ein relativ neuer Ansatz bei Maßnahmen zur Informationsbeeinflussung, die auf eine bestimmte Medienlandschaft abzielen. Diese Arbeit deckt auf, wie Akteure mithilfe von Methoden der Informationswäsche nach und nach Informationen verdrehen, verbreiten und legitimieren. Dadurch können Regierungen, staatliche Institutionen und die Zivilgesellschaft besser verstehen, welche Aktionen heimischer und transnationaler Netzwerke zur Ausweitung des Einflusses des Kreml in einem bestimmten Land beitragen.

INTERNET TROLLING AS A HYBRID WARFARE TOOL: THE CASE OF LATVIA

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The executive summary outlines the main conclusions of the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: Case of Latvia, commissioned by the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University and the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Institute of Mathematics and Informatics (University of Latvia)1 and was aimed at analysing organised pro-Russian trolling in internet media and measuring its influence on public opinion, using Latvia as a case study. The research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and offers recommendations on how to mitigate its effects when used as a tool in hybrid warfare. A multidisciplinary approach – including communication science, social anthropology, political science and information technology expertise – was applied in order to understand the trolling phenomenon, develop a method for its identification and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used.

INTERNET TROLLING AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF LATVIA

Author(s): Alexander Fokin / Language(s): English

Social media has been used increasingly to support military actions. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that the fight for hearts and minds is as important as kinetic activity, and social media plays a crucial role in this process. Both state and non-state actors effectively exploit social media to gain support for their actions, recruit new members, deceive and intimidate the adversary, and even use it for traditional military activities such as intelligence collection or command and control. Given these conditions, the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) was tasked to conduct a study on how social media can be used as a weapon of hybrid warfare. The recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict demonstrated how fake identities and accounts were used to disseminate narratives through social media, blogs, and web commentaries in order to manipulate, harass, or deceive opponents. Several reports by investigative journalists have reported about the existence of so called troll farms in Russian cities, employing people to spread disinformation, rumours, or falsified facts, enter into discussions and flood topic-related web spaces with their own messages or abuse. Nevertheless, trolling is still a relatively unexplored phenomenon. Although such activities have been widely identified, their effects have not been measured, particularly due to the fact that is it difficult to distinguish between the paid trolls and people who are simply expressing their opinions. In order to analyse how pro-Russian trolling is used to influence the public opinion in NATOmember countries the NATO StratCom COE commissioned the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: the Case of Latvia. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University, and was aimed at analysing organised proRussian trolling in internet media to measure its impact on public opinion in Latvia. Latvia was chosen for the case study due to the specifics of its information environment (a strong division between the Latvian and Russian language information spaces), as well as the country’s historical background and potentially vulnerability to Russian hybrid warfare tactics. Communication science, social anthropology, political science, and information technology expertise was employed to gain a better understanding of the trolling phenomenon, and to develop methods to identify trolling and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used. This research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and it offers recommendations on how to mitigate the effects of trolling when used as a tool in hybrid warfare, beyond the specific case study.

IRAN’S PROXY WAR IN YEMEN: THE INFORMATION WARFARE LANDSCAPE

Author(s): Mariam Fekry,Can Kasapoglu / Language(s): English

The Yemeni conflict has been witnessing essential information warfare and propaganda front. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Houthi movement has been aware of the importance of the internet. Notably, they avoid adopting an aggressive sectarian lexicon on social media. Instead, following drone and missile strikes, the Houthi-associated accounts frequently emphasize IRGC-assisted game-changing military capabilities. This focus seems to follow Iranian priorities in Yemen, namely promoting the militarized political movement and portraying it in a less sectarian but more patriotic and battle-hardened fashion. This approach likely emanates from the different characteristics of the Shia faith in Yemen compared with the rest of the Middle East.

MALICIOUS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA: CASE STUDIES FROM BBC MONITORING

Author(s): Olga Robinson / Language(s): English

BBC Monitoring (BBCM) is a specialist unit within BBC News that tracks thousands of international media outlets, including hard-to-reach broadcast sources, to report news from and about the world’s media and social media. Set up at the outbreak of World War II with the primary purpose of informing the War Office about propaganda by Nazi-controlled media, BBCM has a long history of tackling disinformation and misleading reporting. Over the past 79 years, the service has translated, explained, and interpreted media messages, from the broadcast propaganda of the Cold War to the multi-platform campaigns of today. The rise of social networks and instant messaging platforms has ushered in a new and fast-changing era for open-source media monitoring. Today, BBCM still relies on its detailed knowledge of media sources and behavior along with linguistic, regional, and cultural expertise to navigate the increasingly complex and muddled information space. In addition, it uses a range of tools for social media analysis, and continues to explore ways of using evolving technology to improve its journalists’ ability to track multiple sources and spot media manipulation. BBCM this year launched a new dedicated disinformation team, whose primary purpose is to spot, collate, and investigate examples of misleading reporting and manipulation, drawing on BBCM’s overall monitoring of global media. This report shows some of the disinformation techniques and tactics that BBCM journalists have come across in their recent work, and outlines the approach adopted by BBCM to rise to the challenges of disinformation in the 21st century.

MANIPULATION ECOSYSTEM OF SOCIAL MESSAGING PLATFORMS

Author(s): Marina Paramonova,Rueban Manokara / Language(s): English

Social messaging platforms started as analternative to the Short Messaging Service (SMS), pitching themselves as faster and cheaper, with additional features such as the ability to send documents and media securely. These features granted users a level of encryption that meant no third party, including the messaging services themselves, was able to read the messages sent. Today, social messaging platforms account for a combined 4.1 billion users and social messaging has become the most frequent activity a person carries out online. Similarly to major social media platforms that are being artificially inflated and manipulated for financial and political gain, social messaging platforms are equally vulnerable to the threat of exploitation.

MAPPING EXTREMIST COMMUNITIES: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS APPROACH

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Online social networks are used by everyone in our everyday lives, including by malicious actors and organisations. Previous work has characterised the specific online behaviour of Middle East-based terror groups. However, this behaviour is constantly evolving, as a response to events such as the battle of Mosul and also due to the strengthening of the platforms’ moderation rules. Terror groups target social media platforms such as Twitter, Telegram, and Discord, and while their past behavioural patterns and narrative strategies have been well documented, the adaptive nature of these groups require continuous analysis of their online presence.

MAPPING OF STRATCOM PRACTICES IN NATO COUNTRIES - RESULTS OF THE STUDY

Author(s): Gerry Osborne / Language(s): English

“There is a curious dichotomy concerning StratCom in the NATO Alliance and in its membership nations. The term occupies an inordinately larger space in verbiage and documents than the function is given in the environments in which it is has the most potential to effect. This most recent study not only re-affirms previous results but more importantly, attempts to add to them by seeking to get to the “why”. While it does get to the “why”, the integrity of the results is somewhat diminished by the disappointing level of national participation with only 11 of 28 nations responding. For a function often on the lips of leadership -- both in the Alliance and its nations -- it is rather telling that 17 nations passed over the opportunity to illuminate the function and contribute to the discussion. Nevertheless, the report builds on the baseline understanding of how Allied nations define, organise and implement the StratCom function, and the results are as encouraging as they are concerning. Concerning because the author found that many responding nations still consider Strategic Communication to essentially be another name for what they formerly termed Public Affairs. Encouraging because the authors found that many nations acknowledged that the StratCom function needed to change from a supporting to a supported role – an understanding which is finding traction amongst experienced operators. Having previously written a paper which included Alliance nation mapping with respect to StratCom, I welcome this report for updating and contributing more to NATO’s understanding about how its membership individually considers StratCom. It gives needed insight into NATO policy development on behalf of all nations.”

MAPPING OF STRATCOM PRACTICES IN THE NATO COUNTRIES

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The findings consist of analysis of the questionnaire results filled in by 11 NATO nations and structured interviews with 6 NATO nations during the first half of 2015.