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Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

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FAKE NEWS - A ROADMAP
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FAKE NEWS - A ROADMAP

FAKE NEWS - A ROADMAP

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: media; communication; truth; post-truth; North Korea; Daesh; politics; government; dishonesty; policy; history;

In the summer of 2017 a group of students on the Strategic Communications Masters at King’s College London decided to bring some clarity to the discussion of Fake News. Their concern was that what separated truth from untruth had for too long been obscured—made ever less intelligible by certain people intent on distorting responsible debate, while others simply fail to do their research. The term Fake News has become the default catchphrase for truth-seekers wishing to label inaccurate reporting, truth-obscurers spreading malevolent assertions, or the unprepared who simply want to close down uncomfortable discussion. The shorthand expression ‘Fake News’ may fit neatly into tweeted messages, but willing amplifiers have spread it across all media, traditional and social, without necessarily giving it a meaningful definition. Fake News: A Roadmap is published by King’s Centre for Strategic Communications (KCSC) and the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, in Riga, Latvia. Both organisations are committed to encouraging young talent and innovative thinking. In keeping with NATO’s remit, this book is published and made available free of charge to any reader around the world. Fake News: A Roadmap is edited by Jente Althuis and Leonie Haiden. Its authors are Iona Allan, Jente Althuis, Alexander Averin, Giulia Conci, Sarah Dooley, Erin Duffy, Douglas Gray, Leonie Haiden, Mitchell Ilbury, Natalia Kantovich, Chelsea McManus, Celeste Michaud, Emma Moore, Kierat Ranautta-Sambhi, and Siri Strand. We wish to thank for their advice and support: KCSC – Dr Neville Bolt, Professor David Betz, Dr Nicholas Michelsen, Professor Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, John Williams, Dr Francesca Granelli, Andrea Berger, Victoria Preston, Sophia Krauel. NATO StratCom COE - Jānis Sārts, Linda Curika, Benjamin Heap.

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RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE NORDIC - BALTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
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RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE NORDIC - BALTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE NORDIC - BALTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Nordic-Baltic Region; NB8; communication; media; narratives; information; politics; international relations; security and defense;

This volume presents the first results of the project ‘Russia’s (Dis)Information Activities Against the Nordic-Bal tic Region’, which was initiated in 2016 as an ongoing project for monitoring and analysing Russia’s information influence in the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8), which includes Den - mark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden. In the period of 2016–2017 four pilot studies were conducted to answer questions about the aims of Russia’s information activities in the region; the use of the ‘compatriot’ policy as a tool of influence; the narratives Russia is using to advance its aims in the NB8 region; how the information provided by Russian state-funded media in some of the NB8 countries is used and how much it is trusted; and about public opinion regarding the narratives Russia promotes in some countries in the region. The main findings are structured around these research questions: What are the aims of Russia’s information activities in the NB8 region? • In the political dimension Russia aims to become one of the great powers in the new polycentric world order, to become an equal player in the international system, to challenge the unipolar world order, to counter the post-Cold War interventions of the West, to counter Western liberal democracy as a universal value, to call for the revival of Westphalian sovereignty, and to subvert the unity of the Western states. • In the military dimension Russia aims to counter NATO expansion towards Russia’s borders and to combine military force with other instruments of power. • In the economic dimension the Arctic as a region is a priority for Russia, as well as economic interdependence with the other countries in the region. • In the informational dimension Russia aims to develop its own global media system for the promotion of its worldview, to position itself as a distinct civilization, to support Russian ‘compatriots abroad’, and to develop the concept of the ‘Russian World’—an ideological space that exceeds the territorial boundaries of Russia, as well as to promote its own perspective on Russian and world history. • The main tools for advancing Russia’s aims are identified as: Russia’s domestic and international media system; the Internet and social media; government-organized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs); Russia’s compatriot policy; pipeline diplomacy; economic interdependency; the encouragement of political radicalization and polarization of Western societies; intelligence operations; and demonstrations of military force. How is Russia’s compatriot policy being used as a tool of influence in the NB8 region? • The concept of Russia’s ‘compatriots abroad’ is rather ambiguous and widely interpretable, which gives Russia an opportunity to use the idea of protecting compatriots’ rights as a moral justification for interfering in the internal matters of the sovereign states, for using military force, and for violating the territorial integrity of its neighbouring states. • However, the number of people who identify themselves as Russia’s compatriots may be at least three times smaller than officially estimated by Moscow. Due to the vagueness of the concept the actual number of compatriots is difficult to verify. • There is a gap between the scope of Russia’s compatriot policy as it is officially declared and organized and the strength of Russia’s actual relationship with its compatriots abroad. The organization of Russia’s compatriot activities abroad is rather formal, not well known among or representative of Russian speaking communities abroad, and characterized by internal conflicts. As a result, there is no genuine link between Russia and its compatriots abroad, despite an active state policy. • However, from the perspective of the national security of the NB8 countries, the main concern is not the actual interactions between Russia and its compatriots in the region, but the fact that the narrative of ‘discrimination’ may be used as a political excuse for intervention, as evidenced by the five-day war with Georgia and the crisis in Eastern Ukraine. It may be assumed that Russia exaggerates both the number of its compatriots and the effects of activities to ‘engage’ with them, so that Russia can intervene (if expedient) to ‘protect’ them in a military or non-military manner. • Latvia and Estonia are the countries most vulnerable to the application of the narrative regarding the violation of the rights of Russia’s compatriots, due to their large number of ethnic Russians and speakers of the Russian language as their first language, and to the phenomenon of ‘non-citizens’—people who immigrated to Latvia or Estonia during the Soviet occupation and could have applied for citizenship through naturalization once these countries regained their independence, but have chosen not to do so.1 If Russia chooses to use this narrative as a basis for violations of sovereignty it will be determined by its strategic interests rather than by any perceived discrimination against Russia’s compatriots, be - cause it is a tool and not a strategic goal. • The regional coordination of Russia’s compatriot policy began in 2015, when the Regional Coordination Council of the Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea countries was established. From the perspective of coordinating Russia’s compatriot policy, the Baltic States belong to Northern Europe instead of the ‘Near Abroad’. • The most intensely promoted of Russia’s compatriot activities in the NB8 region is the propagation of Russia’s historical narratives, which are mainly related to the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II. These activities take place in all NB8 countries. • Marginalizing Russia’s compatriot organizations and activists in the Baltic States reduces the possibility of Russia using them as a ‘soft power tool’. Russia’s opportunities for using soft power have been diminished by the Ukrainian crisis because of the increased wariness towards such activities. What narratives is Russia using to advance its goals in the NB8 region? • There were regional differences in terms of the application of certain narratives in relation to the NB8 countries by RT, Sputnik, and Perviy kanal in 2016. Regarding the Baltic States, Russian media have been most concerned with military issues—the two most used narratives were that NATO is a threat to Russia and that the idea of a Russian threat to the West is ridiculous. The analysed Russian media were more concerned with NATO and the activities of the alliance close to its borders, rather than specific is - sues within the Baltic States. • The most common narratives in relation to the Nordic countries were that refugees and migrants are a destabilising factor, and such related narratives as radi - cal Islam is a destabilising factor and far-right nationalism is on the rise, which provide evidence that Russia is attempting to amplify the destructive processes caused by the refugee crisis within Europe. • Another common narrative that emerged in the context of the Nordic countries was that the Arctic is a territory of dialogue, which is, that the interests of Russia and the Nordic countries overlap in this region and Russia’s intention is to solve these issues by peaceful negotiation, as stated in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept. • Apart from these common regional trends, there were also some country-specific narratives. In the case of Latvia, the second most common narrative was discrimination against minorities. Estonia and Latvia have similar issues with their ethnic Russian population; nevertheless, in the case of Estonia the discrimination narrative was ob - served only three times, where - as there were more than 20 discrimination-related articles about Latvia. These data show that Latvia is the main target for the application of the discrimination against minorities narrative. • Norway and Iceland were used as role models in the context of the Brexit referendum, suggesting that these countries may do better without the EU and thus strengthening the narrative of diminishing unity in the EU. • The second most common narrative in relation to Finland was that Finland and Russia are good partners, no matter what. This is indicative of Russia’s attempt to build and strengthen bilateral relations with European countries. • Sweden stood out with the narrative Sweden is part of an unjust persecution of Julian Assange, showing how important the issues related to the WikiLeaks founder are for Russia. How useful and how trusted is the information provided by Russian state-funded media in the Baltic States, Finland, and Sweden? • In the states surveyed, the use of Russia’s global media outlets RT and Sputnik is limited. The general trend is that the majority of communities in the Baltic States are aware of these Russian media outlets, but do not use them (more than 60%), whereas most communities in Finland and Sweden are not aware of these media at all (more than 50%). • Of the Russian media included in the survey, Perviy kanal is the most influential in terms of the audience numbers reached, albeit there are regional differences. An average of 38% of respondents in the Baltic States reported watching Perviy kanal, whereas the majority of respondents in Finland (83%) and Sweden (67%) were not aware of the media outlet. • The demographic profile of the Russian media users surveyed gives evidence that the use of RT and Perviy kanal (the use of Sputnik is so small that it is impossible to make any analysis of the demographic profile of its users within this survey) is linked to the use of the Russian language, thus making these Russian media outlets an integral part of the so called ‘Russian World’. • The results of the survey also give evidence that Russia is not a trusted source of information in the Baltic States, Finland, and Sweden, except among a part of Russian speaking audiences in the Baltic States. What is the public opinion about the narratives promoted by Russia in the Baltic States, Finland, and Sweden? • The main finding in relation to public opinion is that if the views of the respondents overlap with the narratives promoted by the Kremlin, this overlap is not correlated with the use RT, Sputnik, and Perviy kanal. It is necessary to understand that due to methodological constraints and the existence of other determinants for public opinion that were not researched in this study, the over - lap between reported opinions and the Kremlin’s narratives may not be interpreted as the result of Russia’s influence. • The narrative refugees and immigrants are a destabilising factor for Europe gained the most support in Estonia (77% fully agree & agree somewhat) and Latvia (72% fully agree & agree somewhat). In Lithuania and Finland support for the statement was somewhat smaller, albeit still high—69% and 63% of those who agree fully and somewhat, but in Sweden this statement gained the least sup - port—only 46% of respondents agreed fully and somewhat. • The highest support for the narrative that a rebirth of neo-Nazism is taking place in Europe was identified in Sweden (74% fully agree & agree somewhat) and Finland (65% fully agree & agree somewhat)—the countries where consumption of RT, Sputnik, and Perviy kanal was the smallest. • The answers given by respon - dents about the narrative Russian speaking people in Latvia experience discrimination indicate that there is little interest regarding this issue in the neighbouring countries—29% of respondents in Lithuania, 30% in Finland, 41% in Estonia, and 60% in Sweden answered that they have no opinion about it. Respondents in Latvia have a strong resistance to this narrative—54% fully disagreed with the statement and 20% disagreed somewhat (74% of all respondents disagreed). • The response to the question regarding the narrative that Sweden is part of the unjust persecution of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange suggests that some of the narratives Russia is promoting are not at all important for the people of the surveyed countries, as 70% of respondents in Latvia, 69% in Lithuania, 63% in Estonia, 41% in Sweden, and 22% in Fin - land have no opinion about this issue. • NATO is one topic that polarizes opinion in the Baltic States between those who use Russian as their first language and the titular nationalities. The general trend is that titular nationalities are more supportive of a NATO presence in their countries. Therefore the most surprising results in relation to the narrative NATO is a threat to Russia are found in Lat - via, because 45% of respondents fully disagree and 23% disagree somewhat (in total—68%) with the statement, despite the demographics and the high consumption of Russian media in the country.

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DIGITAL HYDRA: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF FALSE INFORMATION ONLINE
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DIGITAL HYDRA: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF FALSE INFORMATION ONLINE

DIGITAL HYDRA: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF FALSE INFORMATION ONLINE

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: media; information; communication; fake news; ICT; social media; platforms; blogs; third-party services;

The study investigates misinformation and disinformation on social media in the context of the rise of ‘fake news’ and the birth of the ‘post-truth’ era. Are these concerns substantiated by facts? What are the consequences of these phenomena for the information environment? Most importantly, do these phenomena pose a threat for our societal security? This study will provide actionable knowledge by answering to these questions. This introduction is an attempt to position the emergence of ‘fake news’ in a wider societal context. Particular emphasis is placed on the cognitive biases that enable information manipulation. In turn, this will lead to a discussion about the tactics employed by adversarial actors to carry out information activities.

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“WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US” - AN ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2014.
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“WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US” - AN ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2014.

“WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US” - AN ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2014.

Author(s): Brett Boudreau / Language(s): English

Keywords: Afganistan; NATO; security; military mission; communications; ISAF;

The 2003-2014 UN-mandated, NATO-led ISAF mission, which featured ground combat for the first time in the Alliance’s history, took a tremendous human and financial toll. By ISAF mission end, well over 1 million NATO troops and civilians had served in theatre along with hundreds of thousands of contractors. Reliable studies conservatively estimate the financial cost to be at least $1 trillion US dollars. Almost 3,500 troops under NATO command from 29 nations paid the ultimate price, and tens of thousands more suffered serious injury. Afghanistan has been a security-related point of discussion and a major part of Western military efforts for almost a fifth of NATO’s existence. By virtually any metric it is the longest, most complex, expensive, challenging and fractious operation in NATO’s history. As a result of the massive NATO and international effort – by any socioeconomic or human development index measure – Afghanistan in 2015 is a considerably better place as a result. That is hardly to say outcomes were optimal, or that NATO helped Afghan government forces decisively defeat the insurgency: they were not, and they did not. A commonly held view is that NATO also ‘lost’ the Afghanistan strategic communication campaign. This report is an effort to deduce what is NATO and ISAF’s score on that point, and if it did not ‘win’ outright then how did Strategic Communications (StratCom) perform? Within the political-military leadership and even within the communications community there are factions of passionate supporters for StratCom and just as many opponents. All seem to agree conceptually of the need for better coordination as long as they are the ‘coordinators’ and not the ‘coordinated’. Throughout ISAF’s duration these factions were often at odds and even as they clashed, the operating and information environment transformed. This should have led to a wholesale re-evaluation of optimal structure, process and capabilities: it did not. Still, as to be expected from the accumulated experience of continuous operations over 11-plus years of the NATO-led ISAF mission, some new capabilities were added that improved how NATO communicated with national domestic audiences including the Media Operations Centre and NATO TV. But the nub of the issues and the old debates – influence versus inform, the public affairs reporting relationship to the commander, measuring effect, how to better synchronise effort – are the same discussions as 5, 10 and even 15 years ago. The current impetus for reform has little to do with lessons learned during ISAF. It does however, have much to do with the Russia/Ukraine crisis. Given the contemporary security environment, the extent to which unsatisfactory campaign outcomes should be attributed to the communication effort is not an inconsequential subject. Today’s information environment bears little resemblance to what it was at the start of the ISAF mission in 2001, in large measure a result of widespread access to reliable Internet, the ubiquity of smart phones, and the global scope and penetration of social media. In the past decade we have transitioned from grasping the implications of the ‘strategic corporal’ to dealing with the operational consequences of the ‘strategic tweet’. Adversaries also became very capable at using new communication tools to their advantage. While it may be unlikely that the Alliance will fight another mission quite like ISAF, many observations can be drawn from ISAF about whether NATO communication-related policy, doctrine, structures and capabilities are fit for purpose in future campaigns. This report offers 12 recommendations where effort and resources might be applied to achieve more favourable outcomes. A North Atlantic Council-approved policy in August 2009 defines NATO StratCom as “the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities ... in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.” Still, the actions and practice during ISAF demonstrate that NATO aspires to achieve more for its strategic communications investment, and that it is increasingly about understanding the desired effect or behavioural change required to shape what to do, say, show and signal to inform, persuade or influence audiences in support of specific objectives. NATO HQs had two strategic communications campaigns to fight during the ISAF operation, the first being for the support of domestic audiences of the 51 troop contributing nations and international audiences. Given the policy hand it was dealt, the manner in which the operation was executed for the better part of a decade, the high operational tempo at NATO and zero nominal growth (thus, downsizing) forced on it by nations, the Alliance communication effort did considerably better than it is given credit for, in particular at NATO HQ in Brussels and Allied Command Operations, and for stretches of time at ISAF. This is a finding that may strike many as counter-intuitive. The second campaign was the operational battle for the contested population and against malign actors including the Taliban. If success is measured against information policy aims: “...create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries and potential adversaries” (Information Operations); “to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives” (Psychological Operations); and “to inform, persuade, or influence audiences in support of NATO aims and objectives” (StratCom), then the outcomes are decidedly more mixed, if not a failure. A detailed assessment of capability and performance in this report supports the argument that ISAF was a case of a fundamentally flawed political/ command structure that was by its structural nature incapable of devising and directing a unified political-military campaign. The international community brought a sense of hubris to that shattered country which had virtually no licit economy or capacity for effective governance. It set unreasonable objectives, looked for short-term metrics of success, and wholly underresourced the mission for almost 10 years. The strategy often changed, or was confused, or was conflicted. It took few Afghan views into account. No answer could be found to effectively deal with the vexing question of Pakistan where insurgent forces found sanctuary. NATO then proceeded to break or subsume most of the principles of war, foremost being ‘selection and maintenance of the aim’, ‘unity of effort’ and ‘unity of command’. But how fair is that considering Afghanistan was a major international endeavour, that the NATO mission has lasted this long and will continue for the foreseeable future albeit in different form, that support in the country for international forces remains high, and that troop contributing nations have not endured major political recriminations from their populations? Taking a long view, the ISAF communications effort cannot have been a failure. The magnitude of collective effort by NATO nations over that period of time is a considerable expression of Alliance will and stamina. From the political-military centre of gravity perspective of “maintaining the solidarity, cohesion and credibility of the Alliance”, this alone points to a strategic success broadly speaking. This report finds that improved StratCom did not, and does not, temper the effects of bad policy and poor operational execution. In the end, strategic communications outcomes weren’t nearly what they could have been but were considerably better than critics suggest. Where policy and operations were well connected and showed results, StratCom amplified that effect. Where policy and operations were weak, negative outcomes could be mitigated but not overcome. Improving strategic communication effects needs to start with better policy, greater understanding of audiences including motivations, conducting operations following established and successful military principles, and skilled practitioners. In that respect, the weakest link in the Alliance communication effort at strategic, operational and tactical levels was the profound lack of trained, expeditionary communication- and information-related military capability in almost all NATO member nations (excepting the U.S., and perhaps Germany). For NATO to be more effective, nations need to professionalise their approach to communications by abandoning the model of employing ‘willing general service officers eager to learn on the job’ to one that is firmly based on ‘qualified, trained and experienced practitioners in all disciplines at each rank level’. ISAF served as a forcing function for incremental albeit important improvements to NATO communication-related policy, capability and capacity aggregated over more than a decade of continuous operations. However, the transformation of the information environment happened much faster than NATO HQs and member nations were able to evolve their communications-related mindset, structures, capabilities and outputs. The real catalyst for the current effort to make substantive reforms has been Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In this regard the Wales Summit Hybrid Warfare initiatives identified a series of actions that if implemented would be a major upgrade to the Alliance’s ability to compete in the new information environment.

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VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND COMMUNICATIONS
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VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND COMMUNICATIONS

VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND COMMUNICATIONS

Author(s): Rafal Zgryziewicz / Language(s): English

Keywords: communication; information; media; violent extremism; security and defense; techniques; tactics; ICT;

The aim of the project is to build awareness regarding this emerging threat, and to come to a common understanding about what drives the organizations that use extreme violence to defend their ideologies. Most importantly, our aim was to understand the roots of such violence—the seed of an idea flowers into an ideology, which leading proponents and followers further communicate to potential supporters. Although the existing literature extensively describes the problem, this report was greatly enriched by the seminars, working groups, and one-on-one academic discussions I had the privilege of participating in over the past year.

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THE MOLDOVAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT, HOSTILE NARRATIVES, AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS
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THE MOLDOVAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT, HOSTILE NARRATIVES, AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS

THE MOLDOVAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT, HOSTILE NARRATIVES, AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: Moldova; Russia; politics; public opinion; media; editorial policy; language; communication; information; Kremlin; EU; NATO; mass media; control;

This study describes the current information environment of Moldova. The main focus is on how societal vulnerabilities are exploited by political actors who are following policies promoted by the Kremlin. The mechanisms linking societal vulnerabilities and people’s behaviour are described here in order to better understand the Moldovan information environment, especially the Russian influence on Moldovan politics. Compared to a traditional target audience analysis, this study highlights the importance of the structure of media environment, which promotes hostile Kremlin narratives in Moldova (see picture page 5). This study assumes that societal problems are not discussed in a vacuum. Moldovans’ perception of what is going on around them and the actions they take in response are shaped by the structure of and key actors in the media environment. As a result, only some topics are selected for public consumption. The chapters that follow describe the vulnerabilities in today’s Moldovan society, the divisive narratives promoted by the Kremlin and its local affiliates, local media ownership and control, and the most influential opinion-leaders in Moldova. Conclusions and recommendations are given at the end of each section. People living in Moldova today worry about their children’s future, poverty, unemployment, prices, corruption, and the possibility of war. This report highlights the importance of corruption, weak state structures, the dysfunctional political system, and the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia as the major vulnerabilities currently faced by Moldovan society. All of these issues are closely linked to both poverty and the lack of security many people feel in the unstable political environment. These vulnerabilities are effectively leveraged to foster mistrust and polarization. After analysing the situation, we cluster Kremlin promoted messages, speeches, videos, demonstrations, and other acts. We consider these clusters as four identifiable hostile narratives that serve to create divisions in an already fragmented society. We have named them ‘Russkii Mir and Soviet Nostalgia’, ‘Federalization Will Ensure Equality’, ‘The European Union is Bad, Russia’s Customs Union is What You Need’, and ‘Romania and NATO are a Threat to Peace’. Each of these narratives targets feelings and emotions—the sense of belonging, the sense of selfdetermination, a sense of economic security, and a sense of physical security. Each narrative touches upon particular Moldovan vulnerabilities, but the tactics behind them can be recognised in other, similar narratives promoted by Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin in other countries along the Russian border. The ideas in these hostile narratives overlap, sharing many of the same features. For instance, ideological conservatism supports both cultural propagation and is opposed to economic ties with the European Union. These narratives can also be contradictory, such as the idea of Russkii Mir, which attempts to link the Moldovans more closely to their former Russian rulers, while federalization strategy claims to promote self-determination for the ethnic Moldovan majority. Therefore, hostile narratives are not meant as idealized truth that the audience should swallow whole. Instead, individuals pick and choose the story elements that make sense to them, like choosing dishes from a buffet. What is crucial is that people accept a portion of the misleading information, which itself is enough to deepen the wedges between the various factions of Moldovan society. Post-Soviet narratives are a mix of residual memories, political failures, and regional conflicts. Ideological narratives affect minds and public behaviour via emotions and iconic images. The ‘Russkii Mir and Soviet Nostalgia’ narrative inspires unity between Moldovans and Russia on an emotional, even spiritual, level. The idea of Russkii Mir,’ or ‘the Russian world’, is an ideology built on the assumption that those who speak Russian think and act like the subset of Russians currently in power. In Moldova, this manifests itself through emphasizing Russian Orthodox religion, remembering and cherishing the sacrifices made during the Great Patriotic War, and clearly distinguishing between Moldova and Romania. These are attempts to create positive feelings about influence from the East and sharing the conservative Russian mental space. The ‘Federalization Will Ensure Equality’ narrative comprises acts and messages that stress the equality of different ethnic groups living in Moldova. Here Russia wants to take on the role of an alternative to the Moldovan titular group. The portrayal of Russians as the most important linguistic minority can be challenged. Not only is the size of Ukrainian population bigger, but Russians are closely followed by other groups in number. Politically, federalization might create veto-rights for the administrative areas of Transnistria and Gagauzia, which themselves are closely linked with Russia due to various historical circumstances. The narrative ‘The European Union is Bad, Russia’s Customs Union is What You Need’ seems to be about economics, but actually the arguments used are often based on ideological conservatism and used to create fear among Moldovans. The related Kremlin narrative, ‘Romania and NATO are a Threat to Peace’, leverages people’s sense of insecurity. Echoing messages from the Kremlin, some political leaders are claiming that Western expansionism is underway, or that NATO and Romania have ambitions towards the East. The narrative has produced results: a large number of Moldovans favour both Vladimir Putin and political neutrality, which suggests that these audiences do not see the risks the current Russian regime poses to the region. These narratives are most powerfully communicated through various forms of media. Without a mechanism for the transmission of these narratives, they would have a limited audience and those sending messages would be unable to bring about changes in the behaviour of the people they seek to influence. For the most part, the Moldovan people are only exposed to that information, which local powerbrokers or the Kremlin-controlled media want them to be aware of. At the moment Moldova has too many media outlets for them all to remain economically viable in the small Moldovan economy. This reduces the quality of the news and creates an incentive for affluent actors to promote their own agendas. A handful of individuals in Moldova and the Kremlin are effectively dominating the news landscape. Much of the control lies in the hands of politicians or oligarchs such as Vladimir Plahotniuc, who has consolidated his business and political power structure, leveraging also his media assets. Plahotniuc plays a leading role in the pro-Western Democratic Party of Moldova, while his television channels run programming produced by Kremlin-controlled media. Some other influential politicians and businessmen active in the media include Chiril Luchinschi, Vlad Filat, Vadim Ciubara, Victor Țopa, Dan Lozovan, Dumitru Țîra, and Ilan Shor. This report includes charts showing who controls the Moldovan media (see picture page 48) and which parties are affiliated with pro-Kremlin and Pro-Western media outlets. (see picture page 47). The media is a pipeline that carries content. Journalists and researchers, who influence the national agenda, create the content. They are influential because audiences see and hear them actively analysing and discussing pressing issues. According to our study, some of the most influential opinion-makers were Corneliu Ciurea, Serghei Ostaf, Veaceslav Ionita, Victor Gurau, and Alexandru Cauia, who happen to be especially popular on platforms connected with Plahotniuc. Because the situation in Moldova shows every indication of remaining challenging, there will be a constant stream of opportunities to negatively affect the fragile development of proWestern narratives. Hostile narratives can be fine-tuned and kept alive with minimal effort. Adversarial forces needn’t actively worsen the current situation, as conditions are already bad. In the current political climate, Western values are under attack. In Moldova, neither the public sector, nor the public at large are clear about where they want to be heading. While the Kremlin is clearly leveraging the vulnerabilities of Moldova, the population itself is divided along several lines. Self-interest, greed, and lust for power are often veiled in political rhetoric, which makes evaluating the information environment challenging. Large segments of Moldovan society are inclined to agree with messaging originating from the Kremlin, while the pro-Western segments of the population are divided on a number of issues. The current Moldovan understanding of Western or European values is often distorted either by adversaries, or by noncredible proponents of alternative messages. There are many flag carriers for European values in Moldova, but many others exploit fears about Russia for their own benefit. In order for the voices representing truth and justice to be heard in the Moldovan information environment, the country and its people will continue to need support from free and open societies. Adversaries can affect decision making, first by distorting the quality of information, second by controlling access to information, and third by influencing people’s perception and understanding of the information they do come into contact with. There are several ways Moldova and its partners can help to protect Moldovan society along these lines. First, there are various ways to improve information quality in Moldova. Western values can be promoted using current media structures. The political agenda of each media outlet is partly moulded by a circumscribed number of opinion leaders, many of whom are discussed in this study. Offering good journalistic content to the existing popular channels is a way to improve understanding among audiences. Adding new channels is not effective in an already saturated market. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Moldova has managed to include both Romanian and Russian language programming on Moldova’s public TV and radio channels. Second, access to information might require marketing, more attractive programming as well as technical solutions. Large segments of the Moldovan population have limited access to high-quality information. They are barely in the Moldovan media space but voluntarily rely on Kremlin news sources. It is very difficult to reach these people if they are stuck in their media habits and not used to searching for news from different sources. To find a way to break through to individuals caught in this type of Kremlin information bubble, we should further analyse what kind of content, e.g. entertaining or journalistic, would encourage people to change their media habits. In Transnistria and Gagauzia there are even fewer opportunities to get Moldovan or Western content due to local broadcasting decisions, so reaching them requires other technical solutions. Third, protecting perceptions and understanding is the most difficult issue to solve. Proposals for various types of co-operation projects that would bring Moldova into closer contact with the rest of Europe and provide work in Transnistria and Gagauzia are especially relevant, as they are more isolated from the West. The situation in these regions is only one symptom of the problem. As long as there is no shared national vision about present realities and the future goals, all solutions remain partial. The Moldovan authorities and citizens must bear the brunt of the responsibility for creating new opportunities and developing cohesion among the inhabitants of the country. Western support for the Moldovan people, especially for education, rule of law, functioning state structures, and quality journalism will bear fruit in the long run. To summarize the policy recommendations, we are suggesting improving quality journalism leveraging the current media structures, targeting marketing and projects aimed at bursting proKremlin information bubbles, and continued co-operation in supporting the Moldovan response to improve state vulnerabilities.

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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS - INSIGHTS FROM THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS - INSIGHTS FROM THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS - INSIGHTS FROM THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR

Author(s): Vilma Scarpino,Stephen Harley,Paul Smyth,Caitlin Hayden,Sergei Makedonsky,Jacek Mirenski,Jonathan Russell,Mathew Sweezey,Kim Osborne,Paul Baines,Sarah-Jean Cunningham,Dagnija Lejina,Christopher Ryder,John-Paul Gravelines / Language(s): English

Keywords: communication; strategic communications; information; media; commercial sector; insight; narratives; propaganda; politics; public opinion; StratCom;

In order to address the questions outlined in the previous section, the project was conducted in 3 phases. RESEARCH AND SCOPING ATTENDANCE. A baseline study of critical capability gaps in NATO StratCom capacity and capability was first conducted, drawing upon key NATO and COE StratCom research documents. Key observations were used to construct a question matrix, which can be found at Annex A to this report. As questions were identified, the COE reached out to commercial experts in these fields inviting them to present their views at a seminar in Riga. At the same time, invitations were sent out to all COE member nations to send delegates to the seminar. THE RIGA SEMINAR. In August 2016, the StratCom COE conducted a two day expert seminar in Riga, split into four sessions which represented a generic communications model: “Research-Plan-Implement-Evaluate”. Two of the four identified sessions were conducted on each day of the seminar with a panel of up to 5 experts giving short introductions and then inviting questions from delegates. Over 50 delegates from 16 NATO nations attended the conference indicating the high degree of interest by the NATO StratCom community. It would have been tempting to draw our experts solely from the point at which government and commercial communications intersect. Instead the COE felt that more powerful insights could be captured by reaching deeper into the corporate sector. We therefore enjoyed listening to the accounts of market research agencies and PR representatives from the retail sector as well as the commercial agencies wholly or partially engaged in complex governmental communications challenges. The list of experts is given below. Full biographies of the contributors can be found in the conference programme at Annex B to this report. For brevity, the term “NATO StratCom” also refers to those working within Strategic Communications and related functions, in government or military institutions at the national level. OUTPUT GENERATION. Transcript evidence was captured in outline to deliver a short presentation to the NATO Information and Communicators Conference in Tallinn in mid-September 2016. This report aims to pass on key insights from the Seminar in greater detail. It is constructed in two parts: The New Commercial Communications Environment – Key insights of our contributors on essential considerations to foster competitive advantage. Advice for NATO StratCom Practitioners – Techniques and approaches that are applicable across the state vs commercial divide.

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STRATCOM LAUGHS - IN SEARCH OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
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STRATCOM LAUGHS - IN SEARCH OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

STRATCOM LAUGHS - IN SEARCH OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; media; television; humour; laugh; tool; politics; audience; psychology; KVN;

The study “StratCom laughs. In search of an analytical framework“ is a multidisciplinary effort to design an analytical framework for analysing humour in scenarios where researchers and practitioners find themselves working through large data collections where humour has been used as a potent tool in the construction of messages designed for strategic communication. The research was conducted in four stages. The first stage approaches the concept of humour from the perspectives of cognitive, communication, political science and psychology. The relevant components of humour, namely shared knowledge, target audience, perception, function and message delivery have been factored in.

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THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AGAINST UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIA CAMPAIGN
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THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AGAINST UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIA CAMPAIGN

THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AGAINST UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIA CAMPAIGN

Author(s): Dace Kundrāte / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; Syria; information; communication; media; propaganda; politics; security and defense;

Two major geopolitical conflicts are at the core of this research. Military conflict in Syria and the related rise of terrorism carried out by Daesh, in both the region and beyond, pose an enormous policy challenge for the governments of the United States of America (US) and Europe. Simultaneously, Russia faces sanctions after it annexed Crimea – the biggest and most serious geopolitical violation of national borders in the 21st century so far. This paper provides an analysis of the dynamics and changes in the level of Russia’s information activities against Ukraine before and after the commencement of the Syrian campaign. The analysis proves that, despite the geographical distance between them, both conflicts share mutually coordinated strategic narratives promoted by Russia. This report argues that the strategic goals of the Russian government’s propaganda are the following: • to promote Russia as a crucial player in the polycentric world in the process of international peace; • to claim Russia’s superiority over the US; • to prevent Ukraine’s transformation into being part of the external border of NATO and the European Union (EU); • to soften and, in the nearest future, achieve the lifting of the sanctions regime against Russia.

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NEW TRENDS IN SOCIAL MEDIA
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NEW TRENDS IN SOCIAL MEDIA

NEW TRENDS IN SOCIAL MEDIA

Author(s): Beata Bialy,Sanda Svetoka / Language(s): English

Keywords: media; social media; globalization; trends; information; communication; internet; news; control;

In the current media landscape, social media has taken on a very prominent role. It has evolved into a mainstream information channel and developed into a new online platform through which people organise their lives. Social media influences almost every aspect of human interaction, and the online and offline worlds are increasingly merging. Social media has become one of the main channels through which people connect and communicate, as well as getting news, however as the technology develops, social media consumption habits and communication models are also changing unpredictably, both in terms of speed and direction. Social media has also emerged as a powerful weapon, used more and more frequently in information warfare. Since its development in the early 2000s, social media has become an important tool for influencing people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviour. Both states and terrorist groups are exploiting social media platforms effectively and experimenting with the engagement techniques and types of content that best achieve their political or military goals. In order to be better prepared for this rapidly changing information environment, the Polish National Ministry of Defence requested that the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence explore the current trends in social media, analyse its potential development in the future, including usage patterns, models of communication and engagement techniques. This report is the outcome of that request and will seek to: - Identify social media trends in types of platform and content. - Analyse usage patterns. - Analyse the expectations from the further opportunities social media offers NATO and its member states. - Discuss the threats and opportunities presented by the use of social media, as well as analyse current gaps in NATO’s communications via social media. - Develop recommendations on how to further improve current communication techniques in order to support the strategic communication needs of governments, armed forces and NATO in the future. The report summarises the conclusions of the expert seminar New Trends in Social Media, organised in Riga on 18-19 April 2016 by NATO StratCom COE. The seminar attracted more than 50 communication practitioners, industry representatives and academics. The report includes social media usage statistics and a literature review, as well as lessons learned from the communication efforts during recent NATO exercises. Finally, it presents the main outcome from the survey carried out by NATO StratCom COE on the perception, understanding and use of social media by NATO communication personnel.

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DAESH RECRUITMENT - HOW THE GROUP ATTRACTS SUPPORTERS
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DAESH RECRUITMENT - HOW THE GROUP ATTRACTS SUPPORTERS

DAESH RECRUITMENT - HOW THE GROUP ATTRACTS SUPPORTERS

Author(s): Rafal Zgryziewicz / Language(s): English

Keywords: Daesh; extremist groups; recruiting methods; supporters; media; communication; Islamic State; Jihad;

To be successful, an organization must have a carefully prepared strategy communicated through the proper channels, which leads to the implementation of actions that will result in the desired end state. The process used to achieve coherence between communication and information activities, closing the gap between words, visuals, and actions is known as strategic communication. In order to be effective, strategic communication must involve both charismatic leaders and active communicators. A well thought out recruitment campaign is essential to identifying and acquiring sufficient human resources. Recruitment is a function of human resource management and refers to the process of attracting, selecting, and appointing suitable candidates for specific positions within an organisation. Just as legally operating institutions choose the best people they can find to fulfil specific needs, organized crime and terrorist organizations must recruit people to carry out their plans. The main goal is to attract the attention of potential audiences and draw them into the organisation, either regionally or globally. Daesh has been working in its strategic communications to attract the attention of people who may be willing to support Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s ideology. Daesh youth recruitment has history of its own, which is as old as the organization itself. Their approach to recruitment plays a vital role in sustaining the number of foreign terrorist fighters and many other kinds of supporters who are an essential part of the overall strategy. If we only think of Daesh recruits as foreign fighters, we are not thinking broadly enough. Of course, any recruit could potentially become a foreign or domestic fighter. A ‘foreign fighter’ is a terrorist who comes from any country other than Syria and Iraq to support Daesh in battle. However, it is important to keep in mind that the recruitment campaign is not reserved only for those who choose to fight. The campaign targets many other audiences, including those who stay in their own countries and support Daesh by executing a great many tasks necessary for the operation of the organisation. Therefore, to understand the communication strategy of the terrorists, we must first understand how Daesh wants to be supported and what motivates possible Daesh recruits. This study focuses on the ‘Support Line of Effort’ mentioned in the previous report on Daesh published by the NATO StratCom CoE. The main objectives of this report are to show who is a potentially target for Daesh recruitment, what motivates people to support Daesh, and to identify the steps recruiters take to secure new members. The Centre has been analysing Daesh products on a monthly basis. These monthly assessments have been used to calculate what percentage of the overall communication strategy is dedicated to recruitment support. They also provide some indication of what steps are being taken and what techniques Daesh has been using to staff its terrorism and intimidation projects.

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SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE
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SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE

SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE

Author(s): Sanda Svetoka / Language(s): English

Keywords: media; communication; information; hybrid warfare; tool; strategic communication; politics; cyberspace; social media;

The development of information technology has changed the nature of conflicts by creating an additional layer of complexity to traditional battle spaces. Nearly global access to the virtual environment has created numerous opportunities to conduct battles online affecting events in both the physical domain, such as computer systems, and in the cognitive domain of people’s attitudes and beliefs. Recently we have witnessed how both states and non-state actors use hybrid approaches to pursue their political and military aims, skilfully combining military operations with cyber-attacks, diplomatic and/or economic pressure, and information (propaganda) campaigns. Over the past decade, social media has rapidly grown into one of the main channels of communication used today. Virtual communication platforms have become an integral part of warfare strategy. The recent conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine have demonstrated that social media is widely used to coordinate actions, collect information, and, most importantly, to influence the beliefs and attitudes of target audiences, even mobilise them for action. Given this state of affairs, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) was tasked with looking into how state and non-state actors leverage social media as a tool for conflict and hybrid warfare strategies. The following topics will be addressed in the report: • What is the role of social media in hybrid warfare? How is it ‘weaponised’? • What techniques and tactics do state and non-state actors employ to support their political and military aims using social media? What effects can they achieve? • What can NATO and its member nations do to identify and counter the malicious use of social media? We hope that this paper will serve as a comprehensive introduction and useful educational material for anyone interested in understanding the complexity of today’s information environment, and specifically the techniques of influence used in the digital space. The report summarises the conclusions of research commissioned by the StratCom COE—Internet trolling as hybrid warfare tool: the case of Latvia by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA) in cooperation with Riga Stradiņš University, Social influence in Russia-Ukraine-conflictrelated communication in social media by a team of Polish researchers, Network of terror: how Daesh uses adaptive social networks to spread its message by Joseph Shaheen, US State Department Fellow at the StratCom COE, as well as discussions from the seminars and conferences conducted by the COE over the course of 2015. The StratCom COE would like to thank Thomas Elkjer Nissen, Head of the StratCom Section of the Royal Danish Defence College, Dr Rebecca Goolsby, Project Officer at the US Office of Naval Research, Col (rtd) Ian Tunnicliffe, Director of Accordance Associates, Prof Aki-Mauri Huhtinen, Professor of Military Leadership and Management at the Finnish National Defence University, Prof Ben O’Loughlin, Professor of International Relations at the Royal Holloway University of London, Nik Gowing, Visiting Professor in War Studies at Kings College London, Assoc prof Cristina Archetti, Lecturer at the University of Oslo, as well as Mark Laity, Chief of Strategic Communications at NATO SHAPE, for valuable contributions to the social media related discussions organised by the StratCom COE.

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RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA CONCERNING UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO ASSESS INFORMATION ACTIVITIES
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RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA CONCERNING UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO ASSESS INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA CONCERNING UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO ASSESS INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Author(s): Denis Bohush,Oleksandra Baglai,Dace Kundrāte / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; Syria; information; communication; media; politics; narrative;

During the Syrian campaign the (dis-) information activities of the Russian Federation concerning Ukraine dropped significantly. Key narratives and topics employed by Russia vis – a –vis Ukraine a) aimed to worsen relations between Ukraine and countries of the European Union; b) repeated and added new details to a previously actively exploited narrative on the illegal, outrageous, violent and aggressive behavior of Ukrainian battalions in the Donbas region; c) drew different connections between Ukraine and the war in Syria and especially DAESH; d) repeated a previously widely spread narrative about the illegal nature of Maidan, and the fascist government in power in Ukraine. Narratives aimed at countries of the European Union strove to increase tension among European countries and between European countries and the United States of America, and to create the impression of growing sympathy towards and support for Russia in the region. Additionally, the narratives aimed at creating ideological clashes and distrust among countries within the European Union and painting a negative image of Ukraine. SOURCES This research is based on the European External Action Service Disinformation reviews for the period under observation. Key narratives and themes of disinformation activities against Ukraine and countries of the European Union have been identified. An assessment of the intensity of (dis-) information activities was made by analyzing such sources as ria.ru, rt.com.ru, aif.ru, vesti. ru and r24.ru. METHODOLOGY The research is based on qualitative and quantitative content analyses, accompanied by innovative methodology to assess (dis-) information activities. The Bohush Pyramid of Influence method allows for analysis of (dis-)information activities according to the perceived target – at what level of influence is the activity aimed, what perception is it intended to produce, and what kind of consequences are envisioned for this particular (dis-)information activity at this particular level for this particular audience. PERIOD UNDER STUDY The period of the Syrian campaign from September 2015 to March 2016 was a time of information support for the Russian Federation active phase of military operations in Syria. Hereafter, in this study it will be referred to as the Syrian period. In order to ensure the accuracy of the results, given the fact that the official Syrian campaign began only in the last two days of September, the Syrian period is measured and presented in charts from October 2015 to March 2016. For illustrative purposes and strength of comparison, the time frame of the research has been expanded to cover the period from June 2015 to May 2016.

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FRAMING OF THE UKRAINE–RUSSIA CONFLICT IN ONLINE AND SOCIAL MEDIA
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FRAMING OF THE UKRAINE–RUSSIA CONFLICT IN ONLINE AND SOCIAL MEDIA

FRAMING OF THE UKRAINE–RUSSIA CONFLICT IN ONLINE AND SOCIAL MEDIA

Author(s): Robert Szwed,Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; conflict; framing; media; information; communication; social media; ICT; Kremlin; tools; methods;

The aim of the project is to describe and reconstruct the information campaign carried out by Russia and pro-Russian activists in the internet and to reconstruct representations and frames of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict emerging from internet commentary sections and social media posts. Textual and visual analyses reveal the tools and methods used by pro-Kremlin commentators to build representations of Crimea’s annexation and the Ukrainian-Russia conflict. The subject of analysis is the framing of how the Ukraine–Russia conflict played out in internet portals (DELFI, korrespondent.net, pravda.com.ua, kyivpost.com and onet.pl) and social media (Facebook, Vkontakte) in the period from 1 April to 31 December 2014. The effectiveness of influence on the internet were also analysed, particularly in mobilizing internet users to engage in communication.

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DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE
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DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

Author(s): Tomasz Grzyb,Shahira Fahmy,Joseph Shaheen / Language(s): English

Keywords: extremist groups; terror; Daesh; information; communication; media; psychology; ICT; social media;

The terrorist organization, Daesh, also known as the so-called ‘Islamic State/IS/ISIS/ISIL’, has launched an extremely sophisticated information campaign targeting a wide range of audiences around the world to gain support for its expansion in the Middle East. Daesh first strategic success was the public address of self-styled Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaiming the existence of a renewed Islamic Caliphate. The speech drew immediate and lasting attention. The NATO StratCom COE was asked to conduct research into Daesh information strategy in order to gain a better understanding of how the Daesh information campaign is managed, and to propose practical solutions concerning the situation in the Middle East. The methodology for analysing Daesh information strategy included examining the issue from a number of aspects related to strategic communications such as social psychology, communication, and social media analysis. The work was done in collaboration with experts and advisors from NATO member states in order to achieve the best result. StratCom COE research into Daesh information strategy shows that the spectrum of the problem is much greater than only recruitment and radicalization alone. Roots • Fifteen years of insurgency, including the experience of the former soldiers of Saddam Hussein’s regime and foreign fighters from all over the world, have given the group a deep understanding of how to effectively shape the information environment. • The proclamation of ‘the Caliphate’ and the release of a propaganda publication entitled This is the Promise of Allah by the Alhayat Media Centre provide information about the future plans of the organisation and give an indication of goals of the Daesh information strategy. • One year after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s speech, many organizations have pledged allegiance or offered their support to Daesh. This support is instrumental, not only for conducting terrorist attacks, but also for amplifying the Daesh Information Strategy globally. Structure • Daesh is divided into specialised councils and departments at both the global and regional levels. A specific group within the structure is responsible for shaping the information environment by disseminating different kinds of messages, however, each department plays an important role and contributes to the effectiveness of their information strategy. Information Strategy • The name of the organization represents the core message of the group. The group wants to be described by westerners as ‘the Islamic State’, and by Middle Eastern audiences as ‘ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah’, ‘ad-Dawlah al-Caliphate’ or ‘the Caliphate’. • Daesh narratives can be divided into three main themes: Political, Religious, and Social. • The main efforts of the information strategy can be divided into four types of messages or Lines of Effort (LOE)—to Unite, Frighten, Support, and Inform. • The most effective LOE for western audiences from the point of view of the organization is the one spreading information about success of the group. The group seems to be aware of this, since informative messaging has increased significantly since the beginning of the information campaign. • Various tools, including social media propaganda, direct physical actions, and computer network operations are used to access or target potential audiences. • Twitter is used as an umbrella media platform that connects various media sources into one easily browsable and searchable information index. • Daesh uses the Twitter community structure as a defensive structure against account deletion and suspension. The structure is able to recover quickly by organizing in a number of small communities and some larger ones. Conclusions • The effectiveness has its roots in what was done at the beginning. Proclamation of the Caliphate, speech of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and strategic guidance for future plans made the group strong enough to draw attention of different countries, media and terrorist organizations. • Various audiences perceive the name of the organization differently. Since ‘perception is reality’, the choice of name used for communication purposes is crucial. • Religion underpins Middle Eastern societies. Daesh uses the radical interpretation of religion for its most effective communication. • Recruitment campaign, done internally and externally by group members has incredible meaning in overall Daesh campaign and at the same time it is the main concern of many countries around the globe. • Actions speak louder than words. Daesh knows that it is more important to take action than to merely declare intentions. In other words, Daesh is aware of the importance of avoiding ‘say-do gaps’. • Daesh is well versed in persuasion techniques that manipulate not only its adversaries, but also its own members and supporters. By paying close attention to the basic principles of influence we can identify the ways in which the group implements its strategy and the reasons its information strategies are so effective. Recommendations • It is necessary for all countries to understand Daesh’s strategic goals and how they formulate their messages. The key to success in countering Daesh at every level and building resistance to Daesh messages through the education of home audiences, is understanding how the structure works and who the potential target audiences are. • Language and terminology matter. Therefore, the words used to spread information and counter messaging should be carefully chosen. • A unified linguistic and strategic approach is needed to disrupt the networking Daesh does through various social media platforms. • It is essential to encourage Muslim authorities—recognized moderate religious and community leaders— to explain the radicalism in Daesh messages, and to rebut and refute the organization’s erroneous interpretations of Islam. • From the psychological point of view, intimidation or ridicule will not be effective counter narrative strategies. Illustrating how Daesh propaganda actually works to reach its audiences and pointing out its manipulative nature will undermine the credibility of Daesh and provide a much more productive strategy. • Testimonials from disaffected and critical foreign fighters (defectors) or supporters, can be used to reveal the true face of the terrorist group. The strategy will be much more effective if the messages come from the Middle East instead of Western countries—‘don’t come here’ is a much stronger message than ‘don’t go there’. • When communicating to the outside world, emphasis should be placed on the effectiveness of a global coalition, as well as on every loss and defeat suffered by Daesh. • It is necessary to understand the principles of influence, which draw out specific behaviours, so that countries can protect their own societies from Daesh information strategies, including recruitment and the process of radicalization. Each country, society, and audience needs to have its own specialised and comprehensive approach based on local demographics and psychographics. • Since every country has its own intelligence system, which focuses on those aspects of the situation that are closest to that country, wider information sharing about Daesh actions, techniques, and strategies will benefit everyone. Security Institutions of various countries should cooperate in order to share resources.

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THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AGAINST UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIA CAMPAIGN - STUDY RESULTS
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THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AGAINST UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIA CAMPAIGN - STUDY RESULTS

THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AGAINST UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIA CAMPAIGN - STUDY RESULTS

Author(s): Dace Kundrāte / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; Syria; information; communication; media; propaganda; politics; security and defense;

Two major geopolitical conflicts are at the core of this research. Military conflict in Syria and the related rise of terrorism carried out by Daesh, in both the region and beyond, pose an enormous policy challenge for the governments of the United States of America (US) and Europe. Simultaneously, Russia faces sanctions after it annexed Crimea – the biggest and most serious geopolitical violation of national borders in the 21st century so far. This paper provides an analysis of the dynamics and changes in the level of Russia’s information activities against Ukraine before and after the commencement of the Syrian campaign. The analysis proves that, despite the geographical distance between them, both conflicts share mutually coordinated strategic narratives promoted by Russia. This report argues that the strategic goals of the Russian government’s propaganda are the following: • to promote Russia as a crucial player in the polycentric world in the process of international peace; • to claim Russia’s superiority over the US; • to prevent Ukraine’s transformation into being part of the external border of NATO and the European Union (EU); • to soften and, in the nearest future, achieve the lifting of the sanctions regime against Russia.

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HYBRID THREATS - A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE
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HYBRID THREATS - A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE

HYBRID THREATS - A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVE

Author(s): Sean Aday,Māris Andžāns,Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova,Francesca Granelli,John-Paul Gravelines,Mils Hills,Miranda Holmstrom,Adam Klus,Irene Martinez-Sanchez,Mariita Mattiisen,Holger Mölder,Yeganeh Morakabati,James Pamment,Aurel Sari,Vladimir Sazonov,Gregory Simons,Jonathan Terra / Language(s): English

Keywords: hybrid threats; strategic communication; Russia; Estonia; cyber attack; salafism; Egypt; US; Sweden; Gaza; China; public diplomacy; Serbian Orthodox Church; Bahrain; Pakistan; criminal networks; electronic warfare; religious extremism;

This report is the product of a research project undertaken by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE), at the request of the governments of Lithuania and Estonia. The project was designed to deepen our understanding of the wide range of measures which come under the umbrella of ‘hybrid threats’. Such measures aim to influence the political decision-making of a targeted nation in a way which hurts their national security interests, predominantly conducted in the ‘grey zone’ between peace, crisis and war. Scope The project broadens the framing of current debates on hybrid threats beyond the most common empirical reference points, which tend to relate to the Russian Federation. A standardized framework is used to analyze case studies which are assessed to offer examples of hybrid threats. Analysis has been conducted from the perspective of ‘Strategic Communications’, which is articulated for this report not simply as a suite of capabilities disseminating messages to explain actions or intentions in support of strategy but as a basic function of statecraft. Strategic Communications is therefore considered both as an overarching philosophy to be inculcated into organizational culture and as a cross-government process, central to integrating the instruments of national power. The research focuses on the national level, where the primary responsibility lies for understanding, identifying and responding to hybrid threats. In this main volume, summaries of 30 cases are provided, of which a representative selection of 10 cases are analysed in detail in a separate annex. In order to limit the scope of the project, this phase of research focuses solely on state actors. Purpose The case studies are not intended to be definitive accounts of a particular scenario or provide templated solutions to similar situations, nor does the inclusion of any particular state actor necessarily conclude malicious intent. The report encourages the reader to take a ‘360-degree view’ of an issue area, deepening their knowledge of factors and considerations relevant to threat assessment. This report is designed to help the reader develop two complementary viewpoints. First, being agile and adaptive enough to deal with emerging security challenges where the identity and intent of adversaries may be unclear or deliberatively deceptive. Threats may also be constituted by the synergy of many different, apparently unconnected measures. Second, the Strategic Communications mindset. This is the notion that everything communicates. The key to an effective strategy is therefore to understand actors and audiences, then integrate policies, actions and words across government in a coherent way to build national resilience and leverage strategic influence.

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HYBRID THREATS - ANNEX OF CASE STUDIES
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HYBRID THREATS - ANNEX OF CASE STUDIES

HYBRID THREATS - ANNEX OF CASE STUDIES

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Norway; military exercise; Confucius institutes; higher education; Estonia; cyber attack; US; Manas; Egypt; Salafism; Sweden; media; Gaza; war crime; Senkaku crisis; Russo-Georgian conflict; humanitarian aid; politics; public diplomacy; China;

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RESPONDING TO COGNITIVE SECURITY CHALLENGE
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RESPONDING TO COGNITIVE SECURITY CHALLENGE

RESPONDING TO COGNITIVE SECURITY CHALLENGE

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: military; Internet; social media; security; politics; user data; pro-regime messages; ideology; public policy;

This research product is a collection of different efforts, united by a common goal: to identify some of the most critical security challenges in online environment and what can be done to counter them, and to determine the role of governments and state institutions in countering them. People spend increasing amounts of time online, either communicating, networking, entertaining themselves, or obtaining news. On the one hand, this narrows the number of places analysts must look at when assessing the information environment, on the other, we have yet to fully tap into the analysis potential for this enormous space and leverage it to increase the effectiveness of our communications.

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ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUES – RUSSIA, CHINA AND CANADA IN THE HIGH NORTH
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ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUES – RUSSIA, CHINA AND CANADA IN THE HIGH NORTH

ARCTIC NARRATIVES AND POLITICAL VALUES – RUSSIA, CHINA AND CANADA IN THE HIGH NORTH

Author(s): Iona Allan / Language(s): English

Keywords: Arctic; Russia; China; Canada; global shipping trade; politics; economy; regional access; natural gas; oil; security and defense; political influence;

With almost 30% of the world’s remaining natural gas supply and 13% of oil located under the Northern Polar ice, the Arctic represents a place of great untapped potential.1) After the record-breaking summer ice melts of 2007 and 2012, previously impassable stretches of Arctic waters became ice-free and navigable for the first time. This allowed oil companies to send drilling ships northward and begin the first phases of oil and gas extraction. The decline of Arctic sea ice also significantly impacts the global shipping trade, opening up shorter and more lucrative trade routes between Asia and Europe, and cutting nearly 4000 nautical miles from the route in the process. 2) For Russia and Canada, countries with extensive Arctic shorelines, the receding ice has also exposed significant vulnerabilities in their collective defense and security. Unrestricted passage through their internal Arctic waters means access to Russian and Canadian territory has increased exponentially. For some governments, however, the security risks and grim long-term environmental costs of the melting Arctic ice are dwarfed by the enormity of the short-term economic opportunities on offer. Commercial interests in the Circumpolar North have never been greater. And with such high economic stakes, efforts to secure political influence and regional access to the Arctic have increased dramatically.

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