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Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

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“WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US” - AN ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2014.
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“WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US” - AN ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2014.

Author(s): Brett Boudreau / Language(s): English

The 2003-2014 UN-mandated, NATO-led ISAF mission, which featured ground combat for the first time in the Alliance’s history, took a tremendous human and financial toll. By ISAF mission end, well over 1 million NATO troops and civilians had served in theatre along with hundreds of thousands of contractors. Reliable studies conservatively estimate the financial cost to be at least $1 trillion US dollars. Almost 3,500 troops under NATO command from 29 nations paid the ultimate price, and tens of thousands more suffered serious injury. Afghanistan has been a security-related point of discussion and a major part of Western military efforts for almost a fifth of NATO’s existence. By virtually any metric it is the longest, most complex, expensive, challenging and fractious operation in NATO’s history. As a result of the massive NATO and international effort – by any socioeconomic or human development index measure – Afghanistan in 2015 is a considerably better place as a result. That is hardly to say outcomes were optimal, or that NATO helped Afghan government forces decisively defeat the insurgency: they were not, and they did not. A commonly held view is that NATO also ‘lost’ the Afghanistan strategic communication campaign. This report is an effort to deduce what is NATO and ISAF’s score on that point, and if it did not ‘win’ outright then how did Strategic Communications (StratCom) perform? Within the political-military leadership and even within the communications community there are factions of passionate supporters for StratCom and just as many opponents. All seem to agree conceptually of the need for better coordination as long as they are the ‘coordinators’ and not the ‘coordinated’. Throughout ISAF’s duration these factions were often at odds and even as they clashed, the operating and information environment transformed. This should have led to a wholesale re-evaluation of optimal structure, process and capabilities: it did not. Still, as to be expected from the accumulated experience of continuous operations over 11-plus years of the NATO-led ISAF mission, some new capabilities were added that improved how NATO communicated with national domestic audiences including the Media Operations Centre and NATO TV. But the nub of the issues and the old debates – influence versus inform, the public affairs reporting relationship to the commander, measuring effect, how to better synchronise effort – are the same discussions as 5, 10 and even 15 years ago. The current impetus for reform has little to do with lessons learned during ISAF. It does however, have much to do with the Russia/Ukraine crisis. Given the contemporary security environment, the extent to which unsatisfactory campaign outcomes should be attributed to the communication effort is not an inconsequential subject. Today’s information environment bears little resemblance to what it was at the start of the ISAF mission in 2001, in large measure a result of widespread access to reliable Internet, the ubiquity of smart phones, and the global scope and penetration of social media. In the past decade we have transitioned from grasping the implications of the ‘strategic corporal’ to dealing with the operational consequences of the ‘strategic tweet’. Adversaries also became very capable at using new communication tools to their advantage. While it may be unlikely that the Alliance will fight another mission quite like ISAF, many observations can be drawn from ISAF about whether NATO communication-related policy, doctrine, structures and capabilities are fit for purpose in future campaigns. This report offers 12 recommendations where effort and resources might be applied to achieve more favourable outcomes. A North Atlantic Council-approved policy in August 2009 defines NATO StratCom as “the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities ... in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.” Still, the actions and practice during ISAF demonstrate that NATO aspires to achieve more for its strategic communications investment, and that it is increasingly about understanding the desired effect or behavioural change required to shape what to do, say, show and signal to inform, persuade or influence audiences in support of specific objectives. NATO HQs had two strategic communications campaigns to fight during the ISAF operation, the first being for the support of domestic audiences of the 51 troop contributing nations and international audiences. Given the policy hand it was dealt, the manner in which the operation was executed for the better part of a decade, the high operational tempo at NATO and zero nominal growth (thus, downsizing) forced on it by nations, the Alliance communication effort did considerably better than it is given credit for, in particular at NATO HQ in Brussels and Allied Command Operations, and for stretches of time at ISAF. This is a finding that may strike many as counter-intuitive. The second campaign was the operational battle for the contested population and against malign actors including the Taliban. If success is measured against information policy aims: “...create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries and potential adversaries” (Information Operations); “to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives” (Psychological Operations); and “to inform, persuade, or influence audiences in support of NATO aims and objectives” (StratCom), then the outcomes are decidedly more mixed, if not a failure. A detailed assessment of capability and performance in this report supports the argument that ISAF was a case of a fundamentally flawed political/ command structure that was by its structural nature incapable of devising and directing a unified political-military campaign. The international community brought a sense of hubris to that shattered country which had virtually no licit economy or capacity for effective governance. It set unreasonable objectives, looked for short-term metrics of success, and wholly underresourced the mission for almost 10 years. The strategy often changed, or was confused, or was conflicted. It took few Afghan views into account. No answer could be found to effectively deal with the vexing question of Pakistan where insurgent forces found sanctuary. NATO then proceeded to break or subsume most of the principles of war, foremost being ‘selection and maintenance of the aim’, ‘unity of effort’ and ‘unity of command’. But how fair is that considering Afghanistan was a major international endeavour, that the NATO mission has lasted this long and will continue for the foreseeable future albeit in different form, that support in the country for international forces remains high, and that troop contributing nations have not endured major political recriminations from their populations? Taking a long view, the ISAF communications effort cannot have been a failure. The magnitude of collective effort by NATO nations over that period of time is a considerable expression of Alliance will and stamina. From the political-military centre of gravity perspective of “maintaining the solidarity, cohesion and credibility of the Alliance”, this alone points to a strategic success broadly speaking. This report finds that improved StratCom did not, and does not, temper the effects of bad policy and poor operational execution. In the end, strategic communications outcomes weren’t nearly what they could have been but were considerably better than critics suggest. Where policy and operations were well connected and showed results, StratCom amplified that effect. Where policy and operations were weak, negative outcomes could be mitigated but not overcome. Improving strategic communication effects needs to start with better policy, greater understanding of audiences including motivations, conducting operations following established and successful military principles, and skilled practitioners. In that respect, the weakest link in the Alliance communication effort at strategic, operational and tactical levels was the profound lack of trained, expeditionary communication- and information-related military capability in almost all NATO member nations (excepting the U.S., and perhaps Germany). For NATO to be more effective, nations need to professionalise their approach to communications by abandoning the model of employing ‘willing general service officers eager to learn on the job’ to one that is firmly based on ‘qualified, trained and experienced practitioners in all disciplines at each rank level’. ISAF served as a forcing function for incremental albeit important improvements to NATO communication-related policy, capability and capacity aggregated over more than a decade of continuous operations. However, the transformation of the information environment happened much faster than NATO HQs and member nations were able to evolve their communications-related mindset, structures, capabilities and outputs. The real catalyst for the current effort to make substantive reforms has been Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In this regard the Wales Summit Hybrid Warfare initiatives identified a series of actions that if implemented would be a major upgrade to the Alliance’s ability to compete in the new information environment.

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TOWARDS RULE OF LAW IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
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TOWARDS RULE OF LAW IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT

Author(s): Filippo Raso,Vineta Mēkone / Language(s): English

This report summarizes an invite-only workshop held in Riga, Latvia on 12 December 2018 that focused on exploring which legal and ethical principles can promote the safety and reliability of the digital environment and reduce its risks to democracy worldwide.

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TRACKING RUSSIA’S NARRATIVES IN THE WESTERN BALKAN MEDIA
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TRACKING RUSSIA’S NARRATIVES IN THE WESTERN BALKAN MEDIA

Author(s): Tihomira Doncheva / Language(s): English

‘Russia has complete control over the media.’ Taken out of context, this quote confirms the hypothesis that this research was launched with: Russian influence is present in the Western Balkans media space. Previous research conducted by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence has identified existing weaknesses within Western Balkan (WB) societies which enable hostile influence in diverse areas including the media space. The report ‘Russia’s strategic interests and tools of influence in the Western Balkans’ examines Russia’s influence toolbox and claims that local media has been spreading pro-Russian content, and another study ‘Russia’s narratives toward the Western Balkans: Analysis of Sputnik Srbija ’identifies the content that Sputnik Srbija –the most popular Kremlin-affiliated media in the Western Balkans – fuels the online space with.

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TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MALICIOUS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
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TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MALICIOUS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Author(s): Jakob Willemo / Language(s): English

The malicious use of social media is a widespread phenomenon, targeting individuals, public opinion, and in some cases even the functioning of the state. In recent years, social media platforms have been abused by foreign governments, private companies, and individuals to influence the outcomes of democratic elections and to undermine public trust in the societies in which we live. Today, social media platforms are manipulated by malign actors in order to pursue their political and military goals. In other words, social media platforms have developed into an effective tool for waging information warfare. Although information warfare is nothing new, social media platforms offer a cheaper, more efficient, and less demanding stage for influencing larger numbers of people than ever before. While the social media platforms are conduits facilitating the free passage of information, the companies that own them are active participants wielding significant influence over what takes place in the social media space and, increasingly, over how we communicate, interact, and socialise in the 21st century.

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VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND COMMUNICATIONS
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VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND COMMUNICATIONS

Author(s): Rafal Zgryziewicz / Language(s): English

The aim of the project is to build awareness regarding this emerging threat, and to come to a common understanding about what drives the organizations that use extreme violence to defend their ideologies. Most importantly, our aim was to understand the roots of such violence—the seed of an idea flowers into an ideology, which leading proponents and followers further communicate to potential supporters. Although the existing literature extensively describes the problem, this report was greatly enriched by the seminars, working groups, and one-on-one academic discussions I had the privilege of participating in over the past year.

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Virtual Manipulation Brief: Russia's Struggle to Circumvent Sanctions and Communicate Its War Against Ukraine
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Virtual Manipulation Brief: Russia's Struggle to Circumvent Sanctions and Communicate Its War Against Ukraine

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Martha Stolze / Language(s): English

In this first issue of the Virtual Manipulation Brief, we zoom in on the Russian language conversation, and how it changed as a result of the decision to invade Ukraine. Sanctions hindered the Kremlin’s messaging on Western platforms, while the focus on domestic audiences pulled many propagandists to Telegram, VKontakte, and RuTube. The number of Russian Telegram users has increased by two-thirds, while four in five users of Facebook and Instagram have left Meta’s platforms. The increase in users understates the importance of Telegram. It acts as a reliable hub, where pro-regime voices can post (almost) without fear of platform censorship. Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan’s social media posting patterns reveal how communication has adapted following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In response to sanctions, she, together with many journalists working for RT and Sputnik, moved to posting through Telegram. Telegram posts are automatically cross-posted to her Western platforms, meaning the messaging continues to flow at little or no extra effort. This method has the added benefit of evading attempts by Twitter to prevent the amplification of RT content. Such use of automation means the Kremlin’s messaging will not disappear on Western platforms, even when domestic audiences are the primary focus. The comparison of Russian-language messaging about NATO on VKontakte and Twitter shows how this combination of push and pull factors has dramatically altered the Kremlin’s reach. We estimate that the relative reach of pro-Kremlin messaging on VKontakte in March 2022 was a hundred times more than normal, compared to Twitter. The Virtual Manipulation Brief builds on our Robotrolling reports, tracking how Russian bots and trolls manipulate the flow of information online. It expands the area of focus beyond the conversation about NATO to Russia’s war against Ukraine. And it will look beyond Twitter and VKontakte to track how antagonists use other social media platforms to disinform the public. In this issue, we start by examining how social media usage in Russia changed since February. A comparison of heavily amplified content about NATO on Twitter and VKontakte exposes the Kremlin’s waning ability to control conversations on Western platforms. Finally, we show how the Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan moved her communication to Telegram to evade sanctions directed at RT.

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VIRTUAL RUSSIAN WORLD IN THE BALTICS: PSYCHOLINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF ONLINE BEHAVIOR AND IDEOLOGICAL CONTENT AMONG RUSSIAN-SPEAKING SOCIAL MEDIA USERS IN THE BALTIC STATES
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VIRTUAL RUSSIAN WORLD IN THE BALTICS: PSYCHOLINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF ONLINE BEHAVIOR AND IDEOLOGICAL CONTENT AMONG RUSSIAN-SPEAKING SOCIAL MEDIA USERS IN THE BALTIC STATES

Author(s): Dmitri Teperik,Grigori Senkiv,Giorgio Bertolin,Kateryna Kononova,Anton Dek / Language(s): English

More than one in four people in the world have online social network accounts; Facebook (FB) alone has over two billion users, and the site is by some estimates the second-most popular in the world after Google. By comparison, VK, the largest Russian social network on the European continent, has more than 460 million registered user profiles and ranks 10th most popular in the world. Even a regional, largely Russian-speaking network Odnoklassniki [literally “Classmates”] can boast some 330 million users and the 27th place worldwide. There is more and more evidence that Russia has been conducting a long-term campaign aimed at a Western audience which includes both so-called soft power tools as well as more active measures. Social networks emerged as active channels through which Russia actively spreads a toxic mix of disinformation and propaganda. Russia views the Baltic states—and their Russian-speaking populations—as key target groups that can be used as focal points for efforts to spread a disruptive influence, reshape political and popular opinion, and reinforce misleading or false images and narratives. The main objective of the current analysis is the study of the demographic, public posts, and behavior patterns of Russian-speaking users of VK, OK, and FB in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The analysis achieves this by evaluating the general characteristics of its chosen statistical sample of the target audience; analyzing the public profiles and posts of social network users in the target regions; describing the public profiles of users who create, distribute, and consume ideological content; describing the typical online behavior of ideological active users; investigating the structure of the relationships between ideological active users and ideological groups, and examining the rhetoric used in posts while researching thematic associations related to ideological content. A variety of analytical methods were used, including information search algorithms, data visualization, applied linguistics tools, structural network analysis, elements of expert systems theory, trend and opinion analysis, neural networks, and machine learning. Profiles and public Russian-language posts/comments in the three social media networks in the Baltic states served as the analysis sample, with a geographical focal points being the areas in the three states that comprise large Russian-speaking population: the cities of Tallinn, Maardu and Paldiski as well as Ida-Viru county in Estonia; the cities of Riga, Jūrmala, Jelgava and Liepāja as well as the Latgale region in Latvia; the cities of Vilnius, Visaginas, Klaipėda, Kaunas, Šiauliai as well as Šalčininkai and Vilnius districts in Lithuania. Textual analysis, conducted during the period from January 2013 to May 2017, focused on eleven macro topics such as the USSR, World War II, Russia, West, Ukraine, non-citizens, defense forces, Allies, hostile influence, etc., each of which contained a number of carefully chosen keywords. Analysis revealed presence of a relatively small but significant proportion of active ideological users in every network in each of the Baltic states—the ones who primarily create, support, and disseminate pro-Russian rhetoric, exploiting the increasingly well-developed connections among users as well as the growth in the number of public groups featuring ideological content. The analysis in this study shows that 10% of Russian speaking social network users (identified as real people rather than bots) generate 70% of the ideological information found on those networks. Many events taking place offline are used as pretexts to push certain topics into public discussion, making use of dramatic language. Particular attention is paid to topics related to the Second World War, the USSR, present-day Russia, and anti-Western sentiment. Russian-speaking sectors of social networks in the Baltic states are thus widely used both to continue Russia’s information activities against EU and NATO member countries while cementing its own positive image among the Russian-speaking population of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Analysis also revealed clusters of clearly active and interconnected ideological users, each of which specializes in the creation (Writers), distribution (Distributors), or consumption (Readers) of ideological information. In addition, there is a significant number of members of “active reserve”, from which the ranks of the above clusters are replenished. It seems that users who create ideological content on a wide range of macro topics do not give any preference to any particular topic; consequently they have no personal desire to promote certain political values or views, which indicates that they might be motivated by non-ideological factors—perhaps even those that are material in nature. Nonetheless, there is a significant—and growing— number of Russian-speaking social media groups and communities in the three networks members of which are based in the Baltic states and which exhibit pro-Kremlin, pro-Russia and anti-Western orientations. They serve as sources of ideological posts that are widely disseminated by active users who capitalize on their connectivity and visibility among the Russian-speaking users of VK, OK and FB in the Baltics.

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When 5G meets AI: Next Generation of Communication and Information Sharing
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When 5G meets AI: Next Generation of Communication and Information Sharing

Author(s): Katarína Kertýsová / Language(s): English

The adoption of fifth generation (5G) wireless technology will touch nearly every aspect of our lives. While changes brought by 5G will primarily affect sectors that depend on smooth wireless connection – such as transportation, healthcare, or manufacturing – they will also alter the realm of (strategic) communications. In the coming decade, 5G and edge computing will generate new opportunities for how humans interact with each other and experience the world. Greater connectivity and access to information enabled by 5G also promise to bridge the digital divide, improving democratic participation and citizen mobilization. At the same time, there will be more opportunities for misuse of this technology. Events of the last ten years have demonstrated the impact that digital transformation is having on democracy and political life. Consider the role that social media has played in key political events such as the Arab Spring or how the advent of e-voting and e-political participation changed the outcome of some elections throughout the pandemic. The emergence and accelerated adoption of new technologies has seen a concurrent rise in digital repression and disinformation operations. While (online) disinformation is not a new phenomenon, rapid advances in information technologies have altered the ways in which information (and disinformation) can be produced and disseminated. Data capture, speed, and connectivity offered by 5G will equip both state and non-state actors with more effective tools to tighten information control, repress political opponents, and manipulate public opinion online.

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ZAPAD 2021 Communication analysis: messages, narratives, (dis)information
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ZAPAD 2021 Communication analysis: messages, narratives, (dis)information

Author(s): Valeriy Akimenko,Daivis Petraitis,Viktoras Daukšas,Balys Liubinavičius / Language(s): English

On 10-16 September 2021, Russia conducted the formal part of ZAPAD 2021, one in a cycle of annual military exercises which represent the culmination of training by the Russian Federation Armed Forces in a given year. As ‘Zapad’ (the Russian word for ‘west’) suggests, the exercise is centred on what Russia calls the Western strategic sector or ‘direction’. ZAPAD 2021 included Belarus. Accordingly, it was termed ‘a joint strategic exercise’, primarily to emphasise the participation of Belarus as well as that of the Russia-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organisation. ZAPAD 2021 was preceded by weeks of preparatory and associated exercises, and, as repeatedly emphasised by Russia, involved as many as 200,000 troops, drawn predominantly from Russia. ZAPAD 2021 included a powerful communication campaign in the form of messages and narratives, which this study identifies, explores, and explains. This study consists of two separate but interconnected parts: Part I looks at the exercise from the perspective of what the exercise signalled, both explicitly and implicitly. It deconstructs and groups these messages and narratives.

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الدعائية، » داعش « حملات
قبل انهيار التنظيم وبعده
طرّف العنيف
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الدعائية، » داعش « حملات قبل انهيار التنظيم وبعده طرّف العنيف

Author(s): Charlie Winter / Language(s): Arabic

إن هذا التقرير يقارن بين ارشيفين من وسائل الإعلام الرسمية ل”داعش“ بفارق أربعسنوات. يبحث التقرير في تفاصيل نظرة التنظيم للعالم ويتابع تأثير العوامل الظرفيةالخارجية والداخلية عليه خلال سنوات تكوين الخلافة. وقد تب أن نشاط البنية التحتية يالإعلامية للتنظيم في أواسط 2019 قد انخفض الى حوالى عُشرٍ من نشاطها في أواسط2015 . تُظهر البيانات أيضاً أن التنظيم كان يخصص وقتاً أطول لمتابعة شبكته العالمية في2019 مقارنة ب 2015 . وأخيراً، تشير البيانات الى تغيير مواضيعي جسيم في رواية التنظيمالدعائية بشكل شامل، وقد تجسد ذلك في تحويل روايته من طوباوية مليارية الىإنكارية عسكرية. وخلاصة القول أن البيانات تدل على أنه بحلول عام 2019 ، انخفضنشاط القائمين بالدعاية لتنظيم “داعش” بشكل ملحوظ، وعملهم الإجمالي كان دولياًومركّزاً أقل على القضايا المدنية. إن هذا التغيير يشير الى بدء مرحلة جديدة في مسارالترويج السياسي للتنظيم، وقد أصبح مركّزاً أكثر على البقاء وليس على التوسّع.

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