Keywords: NATO; StratCom; practices; NATO countries; 2015; politics; military; evaluation;
The findings consist of analysis of the questionnaire results filled in by 11 NATO nations and structured interviews with 6 NATO nations during the first half of 2015.
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Keywords: ICT; internet; communication; media; social media; hybrid warfare; tool; Latvia; case study; NATO; StratCom; trolls; trolling; Russia;
The executive summary outlines the main conclusions of the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: Case of Latvia, commissioned by the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University and the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Institute of Mathematics and Informatics (University of Latvia)1 and was aimed at analysing organised pro-Russian trolling in internet media and measuring its influence on public opinion, using Latvia as a case study. The research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and offers recommendations on how to mitigate its effects when used as a tool in hybrid warfare. A multidisciplinary approach – including communication science, social anthropology, political science and information technology expertise – was applied in order to understand the trolling phenomenon, develop a method for its identification and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used.
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Keywords: Russia; information; communication; Euro-Atlantic region; values; strategic communication; media; TV; Pervij Kanal; RT; Sputnik; politics; mass media;
This document summarises part of a larger research “Euro-Atlantic Values and Russia’s Strategic Communication in the Euro-Atlantic space” (2015) commissioned by the NATO StratCom COE to the Center for International Studies (Latvia). The overall aim of the research is to identify means how Russia with the help of mass media influences the Euro-Atlantic values and re-defines the meaning of democracy, media freedom, human rights, trust to international organizations, freedom of speech and other values in the Euro-Atlantic space for different societal groups during the crisis in Ukraine. The political rhetoric, political content and narrative is analysed in the following audio-visual platforms: Первый канал (Pervij Kanal), RT (previously - Russia Today) and Sputnik. The research includes four case studies: the downing of the passenger liner MH17, issuing of economic counter-sanctions, first humanitarian convoy and Minsk talks on the cease-fire deal (the so-called Minsk II).
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Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; information; communication; crisis; strategic communication; MH17 air tragedy; politics;
The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy.
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Keywords: robotrolling; Twitter; Russian-language account; English-language; manipulation; Internet; NATO; fake social network activity;Poland; Baltic states;
This issue of Robotrolling examines users suspended by Twitter. Contrary to expectation, most of the accounts were human-controlled accounts rather than bots. Since 2017, the speed at which Twitter suspended misbehaving users has by two measures almost doubled. However, removals of Russian-language accounts have been considerably slower than for English. The speed of removal can be critical, for instance in the context of an election. The Latvian elections, conducted on 6 October 2018, passed with remarkably little Russian language activity about the NATO presence in the country. Our analyses show a movement in the past year away from automated manipulation to humans operating fake or disposable identities online. The figures published in this issue reflect the good work done to tackle bots, but show much work remains to tackle manipulation through fake human-controlled accounts. Bots created 46% of Russian-language messaging about the NATO presence in the Baltics and Poland. More than 50% of Russian-language messaging about Estonia this quarter came from automated accounts. Anonymous human-operated accounts posted 46% of all English-language messages about Poland, compared to 29% for the Baltic States. This discrepancy is both anomalous and persistent. Some of the messaging is probably artificial. We continue to publish measures of fake social activity in the hope that quantifying the problem will focus minds on solving it.
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Keywords: Canada; Arctic; political power; national identity; communication strategy;
This is a summary of research based on a discourse analysis of official statements, speeches, and policy documents published by the Government of Canada in English from 2013-2018. The narratives derived from the discourse are coded according to the different national power dimensions and political values which they communicate. Sources were identified through a key word search of these publicly available resources.
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Keywords: China; government; politics; national power; Arctic; international relations; communication strategy;
This is a summary of research based on a discourse analysis of official statements, speeches, and policy documents published by the Government of the Peoples Republic of China in English from 2012-2018. The narratives derived from the discourse are coded according to the national power dimensions and political values which they communicate. Sources were identified using a key word search of these publicly available resources.
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Keywords: Russia; Arctic; sovereignty; economic development; political power;
This is a summary of research based on a discourse analysis of official statements, speeches and policy documents published by the government of the Russian Federation in English from 2012-2017. The narratives derived from the discourse are coded according to the different national power dimensions and political values which they communicate. Sources were identified through a key word search of these publicly available resources.
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Keywords: VK; social media; NATO; misuse and manipulation; politics; Russian-language; English-language; bots; Baltics; Poland; Facebook; European elections; May 2019;
On the popular Russian-language social network VK, material about the NATO presence in the Baltics and Poland was viewed no less than 11 million times this quarter (February – April 2019). 93% of these views were for material from community spaces. On VK, community spaces are increasingly important, both as a sources of content and as places for discussion. The move to groups has implications beyond the Russian-language space. Facebook has recently launched a push to promote community spaces. These spaces, normally closed to researchers, offer huge potential for misuse and manipulation. Our investigation of VK community spaces reveals that the vast majority of groups in which NATO is discussed are communities with radical pro-Kremlin or nationalist tendencies, or dedicated to the conflict in Ukraine. These communities generate more posts and attract more views even than communities created by Russian state media outlets. On Twitter, bots tweeting in Russian remain a bigger problem than bots tweeting in English. In Russian, they account for 43% of all messages—a significant increase in recent months. In English bots posted 17% of messages. English-language bots this quarter overwhelmingly amplified news content from RT (formerly Russia Today) and other pro-Kremlin news outlets. On all platforms, discussion regarding NATO troops in Poland attracted the largest number of posts this quarter. Finally, in this issue we publish our first case study of manipulation on Facebook. It looks at the degree to which bots and trolls targeted posts promoted by Latvian political parties contesting the European Elections in late May 2019.
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Keywords: VK; Russian social media; NATO; manipulation; fake story; twitter; bots; bot accounts; Poland; Baltic;
This report presents top-level findings from the first research project to systematically track and measure the scale of inauthentic activity on the Russian social network VK. On VK, a vocal core consisting of loyal news media, pro-Kremlin groups, and bots and trolls dominates the conversation about NATO. The volume of material from this core group is such, that overall genuine users account for only of 14% of the total number of messages about NATO in the Baltic States and Poland. The spread of demonstrably fake content can offer a starting point for measuring how social media manipulation impacts genuine conversations. In the case of one story about a fictitious Finnish blogger, our algorithm estimates that at least 80% of users who shared the fake story were authentic. This quarter, messages appeared in more than 2 000 different group pages on VK. Setting aside messages from group pages, 37% of VK posts came from ‘bot’ accounts—software that mimics human behavior online. This level of activity is comparable to what we have seen on Russian-language Twitter. Unlike on Twitter, where the vast majority of human-controlled accounts are operated anonymously, on VK most accounts are likely to be authentic. Western social media companies have belatedly taken an active role in reducing the reach of the Kremlin’s social media manipulation efforts. However, it remains hard for researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of these measures on platforms such as Facebook and Instagram. In this context, VK offers a cautionary view of a network with minimal privacy, regulation, and moderation.
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Keywords: Confucius Institutes; educational institution; Chinese government; Chinese language and culture; intellectual freedom;
The Confucius Institutes (CIs) are non-profit educational institutions funded by the Chinese government, with the stated purpose of promoting Chinese language and culture. Since the launch of the Confucius Institutes programme in 2004, the large-scale initiative has been described as a Chinese “soft power” success. The Confucius Institutes have secured a number of partnerships with universities in 146 countries around the world, including in NATO member states. In 2017, there were 525 Confucius Institutes at colleges and universities, as well as 1,113 Confucius classrooms at primary and secondary schools. The CI initiative takes on a number of measures that differentiate it from other cultural institutions, particularly in the way the CIs become a structural unit of a host university and employ a double directorship system. However, the motives behind this large-scale initiative and the procedures of installation in host countries have attracted criticism, in particular the lack of transparency concerning the university contracts, hiring policies and financial aspects. Moreover, reports of self-censorship on sensitive political and historical topics (such as Tibet, Taiwan, or the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989) by both Chinese teachers and local university professors have raised concerns about intellectual freedom. Several scandals in 2014 involving instances on censorship cast light on the hard-line approach applied by the previous Director General, and the tight control exerted by the CI’s governing body Hanban and the Chinese Ministry of Education. The controversy resulted in the non-renewal of CI contracts in several universities in the US and Europe and greatly contributed to the perception of CIs as an instrument of Chinese influence.
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Keywords: Estonia; cyber attacks; Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS); government; malicious network traffic; security;
In April and May 2007, Estonia became the target of a coordinated cyber attack. Over a three-week period, government and parliamentary portals, ministries, news outlets, internet service providers, major banks, and small businesses were all targeted, predominantly by a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). The cyber attack coincided with the Estonian government’s decision to relocate the ‘Bronze Soldier Memorial’ in Tallinn, which led to significant civil disturbance in both Estonia and Russia. The vast majority of malicious network traffic was of Russian-language origin and had indications of political motivation. The Russian government denied any involvement; however, the cyber attacks were accompanied by hostile political rhetoric by Russian officials, unfriendly economic measures, and refusal to cooperate with the Estonian investigation in the aftermath of the attacks, all of which likely encouraged the perpetrators. The attacks caused some disruption and economic cost to Estonia. Perhaps more importantly, though, they exposed Estonia’s vulnerabilities, and demonstrated the potential of cyber attacks to cause far more lasting damage if intended. However, the incident also demonstrated Estonia’s capabilities and resilience in countering the cyber attacks. Ultimately, the shock caused by the cyber attack led to a significant strengthening of cyber defence capabilities, institutions and legislation in Estonia, the European Union, and NATO.
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Keywords: People’s Republic of China; China's foreign policy; Taiwan; international relations; diplomacy; national identity;
The People’s Republic of China’s ‘One China’ principle is a fundamental part of China’s foreign policy. It plays a large role in China’s relations with other countries including Taiwan and, more recently, has been included in the Communist Party of China’s 2049 ‘National Rejuvenation’ centenary goals. China engages in public diplomacy – the means of engaging with foreign publics in service of the national interest – in Taiwan in an attempt to persuade the Taiwanese public of the benefits of one China subordinated to Beijing. In recent years, opinion polls of Taiwanese views on reunification and national identity indicate the results of these efforts have been mixed. China also makes its ‘One China’ principle a non-negotiable aspect of its relations with other countries. This is part of a campaign to cut off ties with Taiwan in an attempt to force Taiwan to come to the negotiation table. While Chinese efforts may not have curbed Taiwan’s growing sense of national identity, this activity should be viewed within the context of China’s broader presence on the international stage, its increasing economic and military might; China’s ambitions to ‘rejuvenate and reunify the great Chinese nation’; and China’s continued refusal to rule out the rule of force to achieve reunification.
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Keywords: Hamas; Islamist militant group; Gaza Strip; human shields; conflict; civilians; war crimes; civilian casualties; Israel;
Hamas, an Islamist militant group and the de facto governing authority of the Gaza Strip, has been using human shields in conflicts with Israel since 2007. According to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the war crime of using human shields encompasses “utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas, or military forces immune from military operations.” Hamas has launched rockets, positioned military-related infrastructure-hubs and routes, and engaged the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from, or in proximity to, residential and commercial areas. The strategic logic of human shields has two components. It is based on an awareness of Israel’s desire to minimise collateral damage, and of Western public opinion’s sensitivity towards civilian casualties. If the IDF uses lethal force and causes an increase in civilian casualties, Hamas can utilise that as a lawfare tool: it can accuse Israel of committing war crimes, which could result in the imposition of a wide array of sanctions. Alternatively, if the IDF limits its use of military force in Gaza to avoid collateral damage, Hamas will be less susceptible to Israeli attacks, and thereby able to protect its assets while continuing to fight. Moreover, despite the Israeli public’s high level of support for the Israeli political and military leadership during operations, civilian casualties are one of the friction points between Israeli left-wing and right-wing supporters, with the former questioning the outcomes of the operation.
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Keywords: Russian Federation; Georgia; separatist population; Russian government; humanitarian assistance; humanitarian aid;
In 2008, the Russian Federation used ‘humanitarian’ assets in support of the separatist populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions of Georgia, which both declared independence in the early 1990s. In this case study, the Russian government used what it termed ‘humanitarian assistance’ as an instrument to pursue broader policy goals that were not humanitarian in nature. Moscow relied on relief efforts and the language of humanitarianism to present itself as a neutral and impartial actor and to justify its continued support for the residents and de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite Georgian protests against its continued involvement. These humanitarian activities were utilised to strengthen the political and social ties between Russia and the Abkhaz and South Ossetian populations and to weaken their allegiance to the Georgian state. Russia’s ‘humanitarian’ activities demonstrated Georgia’s incapability to prevent Russian intervention in its domestic affairs and physical territory, as well as its inability to assert its authority over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
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Keywords: Sweden; National Defence Policy; re-militarization; NATO; media; disinformation; island of Gotland;
In June 2015, a Swedish government proposition for a new National Defence Policy 2016-2020 triggered a nation-wide debate about rebuilding Sweden’s “total defence” capacity and the remilitarisation of the strategically important island of Gotland. During this domestic debate, a report by a US think tank also stimulated pro-NATO narratives, alleging that Sweden was not able to defend itself against a qualified opponent without NATO support. Joining the debate, Sputnik published an English-language news article which directly accused Sweden of preparing to fire missiles from Gotland Island. The article used statements from the Governor of Gotland and a well-known military commentator, but removed context, and mistranslated and distorted their remarks. Sputnik did not quote the original source, but instead referred to third-party sources in different languages. This Sputnik article provides a typical example of the systematic means by which Swedish domestic media debates are used as part of wider influence strategies by pro-Russian actors.
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Keywords: Senkaku Islands; East China Sea; Japan; China; Taiwan; geostrategic value;
The Senkaku Islands are a group of five uninhabited islands and three islets located in the East China Sea. They are under the administrative control of Japan, but are also claimed by China and Taiwan. The Senkaku Islands have both economic and military value, as there are rich fishing grounds in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surrounding the Senkaku Islands, as well as significant oil and gas deposits. The islands are also of great geostrategic value, facilitating control over the East China Sea. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler refused Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) requests to leave Senkaku territorial waters. After a stand-off, the trawler rammed two JCG vessels and after a 40 minute chase, the JCG boarded the Chinese trawler and arrested the 15-man crew and captain. The captain was later tried under Japanese domestic law. China initiated a range of hostile measures in response to the incident. In particular, China drastically curbed its rare earth elements (REE) exports to Japan, whose high-tech oriented economy is very dependent on REEs. As of 2009, Chinese supplies comprised 80 per cent of Japan’s demand for REEs. Short-term, China wanted to force Japan to immediately release the detained trawler captain; long-term, China wanted to demonstrate its ability to use a potent economic instrument which could be used as deterrent and as coercive measure or for punishment.
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Keywords: Manas International Airport; air base; military operations; US military presence; Transit Center at Manas; Russian government; Kyrgyzstan;
In 2001, the United States established a strategic air base at the Manas International Airport in Kyrgyzstan to support its military operation in Afghanistan. In return, Kyrgyzstan received at least USD 318 million in direct investment and additional indirect financial and non-financial benefits from the US. Russia, however, was wary of a long-term US military presence in the region, and tried to exert pressure on Kyrgyzstan to close the Transit Center. The Russian government made generous offers of financial and economic assistance, while simultaneously exerting diplomatic pressure on the Kyrgyz government. The Russian media focused extensively on supposed negative impacts of the Transit Center at Manas. Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan would likely have been much stronger from the beginning, had it not been for the US-Russian dialogue in the wake of the Global War on Terror (2001) and the US-Russian grand ‘reset’ attempt (2009). Kyrgyz public opinion grew increasingly critical of the US military presence in the country. Using increasing Russian pressure and growing anti-American public opinion in Kyrgyzstan as bargaining chips, the Kyrgyz government managed to considerably increase US payments. The Transit Center at Manas (TCM) was eventually closed in 2014.
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Keywords: Robotrolling; bots; automated activity; Twitter; military exercise; hostile media; spam bots; political manipulation of social media;
In the period May—July 2019 bots accounted for 55% of all Russian-language messages on Twitter. This big increase in automated activity was largely driven by news-bots contributing to information effects around stories published by the Kremlin’s propaganda outlet, Sputnik. On VK, the bot presence also increased, and currently accounts for one quarter of all users. 17% of English language messaging was done by bots. Three military exercises were of particular interest for Russian-language bots on Twitter and VK: Spring Storm, Baltic Operations (BALTOPS), and Dragon-19. The level of Twitter activity during the month of July was less than half that observed for the period May–June. Having studied robotic activity for almost three years, we see a clear pattern: whenever a military exercise takes place, coverage by hostile pro-Kremlin media is systematically amplified by inauthentic accounts. In this issue of Robotrolling we take a closer look at how manipulation has changed during the period 2017–2019 in response to measures implemented by Twitter. Since 2017 bot activity has changed. Spam bots have given way to news bots—accounts promoting fringe or fake news outlets—and mention-trolls, which systematically direct messaging in support of pro-Kremlin voices and in opposition to its critics. We present an innovative case study measuring the impact political social media manipulation has on online conversations. Analysis of Russian Internet Research Agency posts to the platform Reddit shows that manipulation caused a short-term increase in the number of identity attacks by other users, as well as a longer-term increase in the toxicity of conversations.
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Keywords: NATO; NATO StratCom COE; strategic communications; terminology; efficient communication; precise communication; politics;
The world is experiencing political turbulence. Buzzwords hijack political discourse, preventing, rather than enabling, meaningful critique and discussion. In this contested space it is imperative that NATO member states communicate between themselves in the most precise, efficient, and frictionless way and strengthen the alliance’s understanding and application of Strategic Communications. In October 2017 the Netherlands, one of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) founding nations, requested a Strategic Communications terminology review project. Over the past year a team of StratCom COE and external experts have been working to streamline and improve the language used in the StratCom community at NATO.
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