Cookies help us deliver our services. By using our services, you agree to our use of cookies. Learn more.
  • Log In
  • Register
CEEOL Logo
Advanced Search
  • Home
  • SUBJECT AREAS
  • PUBLISHERS
  • JOURNALS
  • eBooks
  • GREY LITERATURE
  • CEEOL-DIGITS
  • INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT
  • Help
  • Contact
  • for LIBRARIANS
  • for PUBLISHERS

Filters

Content Type

Keywords (795)

  • media (36)
  • social media (36)
  • Russia (36)
  • communication (34)
  • information (33)
  • politics (28)
  • NATO (25)
  • Russia (19)
  • Ukraine (18)
  • Twitter (14)
  • security (14)
  • disinformation (10)
  • media (10)
  • China (9)
  • propaganda (9)
  • security and defense (9)
  • Kremlin (8)
  • NATO (8)
  • Finland (7)
  • ICT (7)
  • Poland (7)
  • Sweden (7)
  • bots (7)
  • strategic communication (7)
  • Daesh (6)
  • EU (6)
  • Facebook (6)
  • StratCom (6)
  • manipulation (6)
  • strategic communications (6)
  • Robotrolling (6)
  • Estonia (5)
  • Latvia (5)
  • Syria (5)
  • conflict (5)
  • government (5)
  • psychology (5)
  • war (5)
  • COVID-19 (4)
  • Internet (4)
  • Norway (4)
  • Telegram (4)
  • geopolitics (4)
  • information environment (4)
  • international relations (4)
  • military exercise (4)
  • narratives (4)
  • public opinion (4)
  • tool (4)
  • twitter (4)
  • values (4)
  • Arctic (3)
  • Baltics (3)
  • BiH (3)
  • COVID-19 pandemic (3)
  • Denmark (3)
  • English-language (3)
  • Iceland (3)
  • Japan (3)
  • Kosovo (3)
  • Lithuania (3)
  • Montenegro (3)
  • NATO countries (3)
  • Russian-language (3)
  • Social media (3)
  • US (3)
  • VKontakte (3)
  • bot activities (3)
  • deepfakes (3)
  • fake news (3)
  • history (3)
  • hybrid warfare (3)
  • influence (3)
  • information space (3)
  • internet (3)
  • malicious use (3)
  • mass media (3)
  • online manipulation of information (3)
  • operations (3)
  • political power (3)
  • More...

Subjects (96)

  • Media studies (127)
  • Security and defense (110)
  • ICT Information and Communications Technologies (102)
  • Communication studies (92)
  • Politics (85)
  • Politics and communication (70)
  • International relations/trade (64)
  • Politics / Political Sciences (63)
  • Social Sciences (57)
  • Peace and Conflict Studies (57)
  • Government/Political systems (56)
  • Sociology (40)
  • Economy (39)
  • Social Informatics (33)
  • Military policy (30)
  • Geopolitics (28)
  • Political behavior (25)
  • Geography, Regional studies (24)
  • Political Theory (24)
  • Social psychology and group interaction (23)
  • Theory of Communication (20)
  • Comparative politics (15)
  • Psychology (14)
  • Crowd Psychology: Mass phenomena and political interactions (14)
  • Evaluation research (13)
  • Governance (12)
  • Studies in violence and power (12)
  • Russian Aggression against Ukraine (12)
  • Methodology and research technology (11)
  • Health and medicine and law (11)
  • Civil Society (9)
  • EU-Approach / EU-Accession / EU-Development (9)
  • Economic policy (6)
  • Electoral systems (6)
  • Russian war against Ukraine (6)
  • History (5)
  • Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (5)
  • Political Sciences (5)
  • Environmental and Energy policy (5)
  • Politics and society (5)
  • Behaviorism (5)
  • Policy, planning, forecast and speculation (5)
  • Present Times (2010 - today) (5)
  • Sociology of Politics (5)
  • Hybrid Warfare (5)
  • Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence (4)
  • Recent History (1900 till today) (3)
  • Criminology (3)
  • Transformation Period (1990 - 2010) (3)
  • Language and Literature Studies (2)
  • Education (2)
  • National Economy (2)
  • Regional Geography (2)
  • Criminal Law (2)
  • International Law (2)
  • Applied Linguistics (2)
  • Diplomatic history (2)
  • Political history (2)
  • Higher Education (2)
  • State/Government and Education (2)
  • Management and complex organizations (2)
  • Nationalism Studies (2)
  • Economic development (2)
  • Social Norms / Social Control (2)
  • Globalization (2)
  • Politics and Identity (2)
  • Theology and Religion (1)
  • Islam studies (1)
  • Lexis (1)
  • Psycholinguistics (1)
  • Sociolinguistics (1)
  • Baltic Languages (1)
  • Organizational Psychology (1)
  • Social development (1)
  • Social differentiation (1)
  • Victimology (1)
  • Radical sociology (1)
  • Environmental interactions (1)
  • Post-War period (1950 - 1989) (1)
  • Migration Studies (1)
  • More...

Authors (269)

  • Anna Reynolds (34)
  • Rolf Fredheim (17)
  • Linda Curika (12)
  • Sebastian Bay (10)
  • Monika Izandra Hanley (9)
  • Kristina Van Sant (9)
  • Gundars Bergmanis-Korats (8)
  • Merle Anne Read (8)
  • Author Not Specified (7)
  • James Pamment (7)
  • Sanda Svetoka (6)
  • Iona Allan (6)
  • Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili (5)
  • Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili (5)
  • Tomass Pildegovičs (5)
  • Anton Dek (4)
  • Elina Lange Ionatamishvili (4)
  • Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova (4)
  • Belén Carrasco Rodríguez (4)
  • Rueban Manokara (4)
  • Martha Stolze (4)
  • Tetiana Haiduchyk (4)
  • Leonie Haiden (3)
  • Giorgio Bertolin (3)
  • Juris Benkis (3)
  • Dace Kundrāte (3)
  • Neville Bolt (3)
  • Tihomira Doncheva (3)
  • Troy Bouffard (3)
  • Henrik Twetman (3)
  • Daivis Petraitis (3)
  • Valeriy Akimenko (3)
  • Holger Mölder (2)
  • Dimitar Bechev (2)
  • Richard Turcsányi (2)
  • Vladimir Sazonov (2)
  • Vira Ratsiborynska (2)
  • Nora Biteniece (2)
  • Rafal Zgryziewicz (2)
  • John-Paul Gravelines (2)
  • Brigita Stroda (2)
  • Gerry Osborne (2)
  • Joseph Shaheen (2)
  • Ben Heap (2)
  • Samantha Bradshaw (2)
  • Charlie Winter (2)
  • Baris Kirdemir (2)
  • Rufin Zamfir (2)
  • Jonathan Corpus Ong (2)
  • Kārlis Streips (2)
  • Marina Paramonova (2)
  • Jazlyn Melnychuk (2)
  • Giorgio Bertolini (2)
  • Alvin Lim (2)
  • Alfonsas Juršėnas (2)
  • Kasparas Karlauskas (2)
  • Eimantas Ledinauskas (2)
  • Gediminas Maskeliūnas (2)
  • Julius Ruseckas (2)
  • Marija Isupova (2)
  • Viktoras Daukšas (2)
  • Balys Liubinavičius (2)
  • Marie-Eve Carignan (2)
  • Anneli Ahonen (2)
  • Jonathan Morley-Davies (2)
  • Jem Thomas (2)
  • Graham Baines (2)
  • Yukai Zeng (2)
  • Sara Sörensen (2)
  • Monika Hanley (2)
  • Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv (2)
  • Alexander Brand (1)
  • Māris Andžāns (1)
  • Gregory John Simons (1)
  • Elizabeth Buchanan (1)
  • Tomasz Grzyb (1)
  • Howard Nothhaft (1)
  • Katarína Kertýsová (1)
  • More...

Languages

Legend

  • Journal
  • Article
  • Book
  • Chapter
  • Open Access

Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

Result 161-180 of 183
  • Prev
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • ...
  • 8
  • 9
  • 10
  • Next
Defence Strategic Communications

Defence Strategic Communications

Defence Strategic Communications

Frequency: 2 issues / Country: Latvia

Academic journal “Defence Strategic Communications” serves as an academic forum where scholars and practitioners share knowledge and ideas about Strategic Communications specifically from the defence perspective. “Defence Strategic Communications” publishes original papers, review papers, conceptual framework, analytical and simulation models, case studies, empirical research, technical notes and book reviews. The Journal welcomes two kinds of contributions: full-length analytical articles ranging between 8000-10000 words, and commentaries/book review essays between 3000–5000 words. Authors are requested to submit their papers in an electronic/soft format to the following email address: linda.curika@stratcomcoe.org.

More...
ROBOTROLLING 2/2018

ROBOTROLLING 2/2018

ROBOTROLLING 2/2018

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: NATO; Russian-language; English-language; VK; media; social media; open and free society; malicious activity; bots; Baltics; Poland; twitter;

Anonymous users stole the show this quarter. Never before have we observed such high levels of activity from anonymous accounts. At the same time, bot activity in Russian-language conversations about NATO activity in the Baltics and Poland has emerged from its winter slumber. In the wake of the Skripal poisonings in the UK in March, Russian-language bot and anonymous activity about NATO more than doubled. Mentions of NATO on VK, in contrast, have been stable and declining during the whole period. Social media companies are working to end platform misuse. But malicious activity is evolving. Today, anonymous accounts are dominating the conversation. These accounts are either operated manually, or they have become advanced enough to fool human observers. The responses from open and free societies to the problem of online malicious activity have neither been strong enough, nor consistent enough. Figures presented in this issue reveal a disparity between the conversation quality in English and Russian-language spaces. Currently, the Russian-language conversation about NATO in the Baltics and Poland has six times the proportion of content from bot and anonymous accounts. As Twitter has taken steps to remove bots, the disparity has only widened. We assess that 93% of Russian-language accounts in our dataset are operated anonymously or automatically. In no way does this conversation mirror opinions of citizens. Journalists, policy makers, and advertisers take note!

More...
ROBOTROLLING 3/2018

ROBOTROLLING 3/2018

ROBOTROLLING 3/2018

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: NATO; social media; anonymous account; online conversation; English-language message; platform misuse; Baltic; Poland; Russian-language; Reddit; Twitter; English language; Donald Trump;

President Trump’s whirlwind tour of Europe in July provoked ferocious discussion about NATO on social media. Anonymous human-controlled English-language accounts, expressing positions in support of or in opposition to the US President, dominated online conversations. Compared to the levels observed in the Spring issue of Robotrolling, the volume of English-language messages has more than doubled. The increasing proportion of anonymous accounts active during key political moments indicate that anonymity is being abused to cloak manipulation on social networks. We call on social media companies to keep investing in countering platform misuse. The social media companies Reddit and Twitter have released lists of accounts identified as originating from the notorious St Petersburg ‘troll factory’—the Internet Research Agency (IRA). In this issue, we present the first quantitative analysis comparing English- and Russian-language posts from these accounts. The IRA bombarded citizens in Russia and its neighboring states with pro-Kremlin propaganda. For English, fake accounts posed as Trump supporters, and argued both sides of the Black Lives Matter controversy. Russian-language material closely echoed and amplified the narratives popularized by Russian state-media. Amongst the accounts identified by Twitter, 26 also posted about NATO in the Baltics and Poland. Our algorithm correctly identified 24 of these as bot accounts. The other two accounts were anonymous human-controlled (troll) accounts.

More...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Confucius Institutes; educational institution; Chinese government; Chinese language and culture; intellectual freedom;

The Confucius Institutes (CIs) are non-profit educational institutions funded by the Chinese government, with the stated purpose of promoting Chinese language and culture. Since the launch of the Confucius Institutes programme in 2004, the large-scale initiative has been described as a Chinese “soft power” success. The Confucius Institutes have secured a number of partnerships with universities in 146 countries around the world, including in NATO member states. In 2017, there were 525 Confucius Institutes at colleges and universities, as well as 1,113 Confucius classrooms at primary and secondary schools. The CI initiative takes on a number of measures that differentiate it from other cultural institutions, particularly in the way the CIs become a structural unit of a host university and employ a double directorship system. However, the motives behind this large-scale initiative and the procedures of installation in host countries have attracted criticism, in particular the lack of transparency concerning the university contracts, hiring policies and financial aspects. Moreover, reports of self-censorship on sensitive political and historical topics (such as Tibet, Taiwan, or the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989) by both Chinese teachers and local university professors have raised concerns about intellectual freedom. Several scandals in 2014 involving instances on censorship cast light on the hard-line approach applied by the previous Director General, and the tight control exerted by the CI’s governing body Hanban and the Chinese Ministry of Education. The controversy resulted in the non-renewal of CI contracts in several universities in the US and Europe and greatly contributed to the perception of CIs as an instrument of Chinese influence.

More...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. 2007 CYBER ATTACKS ON ESTONIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. 2007 CYBER ATTACKS ON ESTONIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. 2007 CYBER ATTACKS ON ESTONIA

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Estonia; cyber attacks; Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS); government; malicious network traffic; security;

In April and May 2007, Estonia became the target of a coordinated cyber attack. Over a three-week period, government and parliamentary portals, ministries, news outlets, internet service providers, major banks, and small businesses were all targeted, predominantly by a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). The cyber attack coincided with the Estonian government’s decision to relocate the ‘Bronze Soldier Memorial’ in Tallinn, which led to significant civil disturbance in both Estonia and Russia. The vast majority of malicious network traffic was of Russian-language origin and had indications of political motivation. The Russian government denied any involvement; however, the cyber attacks were accompanied by hostile political rhetoric by Russian officials, unfriendly economic measures, and refusal to cooperate with the Estonian investigation in the aftermath of the attacks, all of which likely encouraged the perpetrators. The attacks caused some disruption and economic cost to Estonia. Perhaps more importantly, though, they exposed Estonia’s vulnerabilities, and demonstrated the potential of cyber attacks to cause far more lasting damage if intended. However, the incident also demonstrated Estonia’s capabilities and resilience in countering the cyber attacks. Ultimately, the shock caused by the cyber attack led to a significant strengthening of cyber defence capabilities, institutions and legislation in Estonia, the European Union, and NATO.

More...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. CHINESE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN TAIWAN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. CHINESE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN TAIWAN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. CHINESE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN TAIWAN

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: People’s Republic of China; China's foreign policy; Taiwan; international relations; diplomacy; national identity;

The People’s Republic of China’s ‘One China’ principle is a fundamental part of China’s foreign policy. It plays a large role in China’s relations with other countries including Taiwan and, more recently, has been included in the Communist Party of China’s 2049 ‘National Rejuvenation’ centenary goals. China engages in public diplomacy – the means of engaging with foreign publics in service of the national interest – in Taiwan in an attempt to persuade the Taiwanese public of the benefits of one China subordinated to Beijing. In recent years, opinion polls of Taiwanese views on reunification and national identity indicate the results of these efforts have been mixed. China also makes its ‘One China’ principle a non-negotiable aspect of its relations with other countries. This is part of a campaign to cut off ties with Taiwan in an attempt to force Taiwan to come to the negotiation table. While Chinese efforts may not have curbed Taiwan’s growing sense of national identity, this activity should be viewed within the context of China’s broader presence on the international stage, its increasing economic and military might; China’s ambitions to ‘rejuvenate and reunify the great Chinese nation’; and China’s continued refusal to rule out the rule of force to achieve reunification.

More...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. HAMAS’ USE OF HUMAN SHIELDS IN GAZA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. HAMAS’ USE OF HUMAN SHIELDS IN GAZA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. HAMAS’ USE OF HUMAN SHIELDS IN GAZA

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Hamas; Islamist militant group; Gaza Strip; human shields; conflict; civilians; war crimes; civilian casualties; Israel;

Hamas, an Islamist militant group and the de facto governing authority of the Gaza Strip, has been using human shields in conflicts with Israel since 2007. According to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the war crime of using human shields encompasses “utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas, or military forces immune from military operations.” Hamas has launched rockets, positioned military-related infrastructure-hubs and routes, and engaged the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from, or in proximity to, residential and commercial areas. The strategic logic of human shields has two components. It is based on an awareness of Israel’s desire to minimise collateral damage, and of Western public opinion’s sensitivity towards civilian casualties. If the IDF uses lethal force and causes an increase in civilian casualties, Hamas can utilise that as a lawfare tool: it can accuse Israel of committing war crimes, which could result in the imposition of a wide array of sanctions. Alternatively, if the IDF limits its use of military force in Gaza to avoid collateral damage, Hamas will be less susceptible to Israeli attacks, and thereby able to protect its assets while continuing to fight. Moreover, despite the Israeli public’s high level of support for the Israeli political and military leadership during operations, civilian casualties are one of the friction points between Israeli left-wing and right-wing supporters, with the former questioning the outcomes of the operation.

More...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. HUMANITARIAN AID IN THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. HUMANITARIAN AID IN THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. HUMANITARIAN AID IN THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian Federation; Georgia; separatist population; Russian government; humanitarian assistance; humanitarian aid;

In 2008, the Russian Federation used ‘humanitarian’ assets in support of the separatist populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions of Georgia, which both declared independence in the early 1990s. In this case study, the Russian government used what it termed ‘humanitarian assistance’ as an instrument to pursue broader policy goals that were not humanitarian in nature. Moscow relied on relief efforts and the language of humanitarianism to present itself as a neutral and impartial actor and to justify its continued support for the residents and de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite Georgian protests against its continued involvement. These humanitarian activities were utilised to strengthen the political and social ties between Russia and the Abkhaz and South Ossetian populations and to weaken their allegiance to the Georgian state. Russia’s ‘humanitarian’ activities demonstrated Georgia’s incapability to prevent Russian intervention in its domestic affairs and physical territory, as well as its inability to assert its authority over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

More...
DISINFORMATION IN SWEDEN

DISINFORMATION IN SWEDEN

DISINFORMATION IN SWEDEN

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Sweden; National Defence Policy; re-militarization; NATO; media; disinformation; island of Gotland;

In June 2015, a Swedish government proposition for a new National Defence Policy 2016-2020 triggered a nation-wide debate about rebuilding Sweden’s “total defence” capacity and the remilitarisation of the strategically important island of Gotland. During this domestic debate, a report by a US think tank also stimulated pro-NATO narratives, alleging that Sweden was not able to defend itself against a qualified opponent without NATO support. Joining the debate, Sputnik published an English-language news article which directly accused Sweden of preparing to fire missiles from Gotland Island. The article used statements from the Governor of Gotland and a well-known military commentator, but removed context, and mistranslated and distorted their remarks. Sputnik did not quote the original source, but instead referred to third-party sources in different languages. This Sputnik article provides a typical example of the systematic means by which Swedish domestic media debates are used as part of wider influence strategies by pro-Russian actors.

More...
RUSSIAN SNAP EXERCISES IN THE HIGH NORTH

RUSSIAN SNAP EXERCISES IN THE HIGH NORTH

RUSSIAN SNAP EXERCISES IN THE HIGH NORTH

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian Federation; Western Military District; Northern Fleet; military exercise; OSCE;

On 16 March 2015 the Russian Federation began a combat readiness test (a ‘snap exercise’) of its Northern Fleet and force elements situated in its Western Military District. The scale of the exercise was much larger than originally announced, and coincided with the Norwegian exercise Joint Viking in Finnmark (the northernmost part of Norway), as well as with the US exercise Dragoon Ride. Since both exercises were announced well ahead of time, it is reasonable to assume that the Russian exercise was intended as a defensive move and/or response to them. There remains considerable debate as to whether the readiness exercise violated the Vienna Document, a confidence and security-building measure agreed upon with the OSCE. Norway stated at the time that it was monitoring the situation, and did not submit a complaint to the OSCE. However, the consistent use of such snap exercises to circumvent requirements for notification runs counter to the spirit of the agreement and undermines its provisions.

More...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. US TRANSIT CENTER AT MANAS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. US TRANSIT CENTER AT MANAS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. US TRANSIT CENTER AT MANAS

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Manas International Airport; air base; military operations; US military presence; Transit Center at Manas; Russian government; Kyrgyzstan;

In 2001, the United States established a strategic air base at the Manas International Airport in Kyrgyzstan to support its military operation in Afghanistan. In return, Kyrgyzstan received at least USD 318 million in direct investment and additional indirect financial and non-financial benefits from the US. Russia, however, was wary of a long-term US military presence in the region, and tried to exert pressure on Kyrgyzstan to close the Transit Center. The Russian government made generous offers of financial and economic assistance, while simultaneously exerting diplomatic pressure on the Kyrgyz government. The Russian media focused extensively on supposed negative impacts of the Transit Center at Manas. Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan would likely have been much stronger from the beginning, had it not been for the US-Russian dialogue in the wake of the Global War on Terror (2001) and the US-Russian grand ‘reset’ attempt (2009). Kyrgyz public opinion grew increasingly critical of the US military presence in the country. Using increasing Russian pressure and growing anti-American public opinion in Kyrgyzstan as bargaining chips, the Kyrgyz government managed to considerably increase US payments. The Transit Center at Manas (TCM) was eventually closed in 2014.

More...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 3/2019

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 3/2019

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ROBOTROLLING 3/2019

Author(s): Belén Carrasco Rodríguez,John Gallagher,Rolf Fredheim / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; bots; automated activity; Twitter; military exercise; hostile media; spam bots; political manipulation of social media;

In the period May—July 2019 bots accounted for 55% of all Russian-language messages on Twitter. This big increase in automated activity was largely driven by news-bots contributing to information effects around stories published by the Kremlin’s propaganda outlet, Sputnik. On VK, the bot presence also increased, and currently accounts for one quarter of all users. 17% of English language messaging was done by bots. Three military exercises were of particular interest for Russian-language bots on Twitter and VK: Spring Storm, Baltic Operations (BALTOPS), and Dragon-19. The level of Twitter activity during the month of July was less than half that observed for the period May–June. Having studied robotic activity for almost three years, we see a clear pattern: whenever a military exercise takes place, coverage by hostile pro-Kremlin media is systematically amplified by inauthentic accounts. In this issue of Robotrolling we take a closer look at how manipulation has changed during the period 2017–2019 in response to measures implemented by Twitter. Since 2017 bot activity has changed. Spam bots have given way to news bots—accounts promoting fringe or fake news outlets—and mention-trolls, which systematically direct messaging in support of pro-Kremlin voices and in opposition to its critics. We present an innovative case study measuring the impact political social media manipulation has on online conversations. Analysis of Russian Internet Research Agency posts to the platform Reddit shows that manipulation caused a short-term increase in the number of identity attacks by other users, as well as a longer-term increase in the toxicity of conversations.

More...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS TERMINOLOGY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS TERMINOLOGY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. IMPROVING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS TERMINOLOGY

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: NATO; NATO StratCom COE; strategic communications; terminology; efficient communication; precise communication; politics;

The world is experiencing political turbulence. Buzzwords hijack political discourse, preventing, rather than enabling, meaningful critique and discussion. In this contested space it is imperative that NATO member states communicate between themselves in the most precise, efficient, and frictionless way and strengthen the alliance’s understanding and application of Strategic Communications. In October 2017 the Netherlands, one of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) founding nations, requested a Strategic Communications terminology review project. Over the past year a team of StratCom COE and external experts have been working to streamline and improve the language used in the StratCom community at NATO.

More...
ROBOTROLLING 4/2019
0.00 €

ROBOTROLLING 4/2019

ROBOTROLLING 4/2019

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Coordinated network of bots; Facebook; Twitter; Instagram; Youtube; Russian-language bot activity; English-language bot;

In this edition of Robotrolling, we expose a coordinated network of bots on Facebook, Twitter, and VK connected to a militaristic YouTube channel. Through our analysis, we discovered that the group of automated accounts is used to spread anti-NATO videos in the pro-Donbass information space. Our findings demonstrate that the video-sharing platform is a ripe target for robotic exploitation. During this period, the level of Russian-language bot activity decreased on Twitter. Meanwhile, English-language bot activity remained unchanged. On VK, the volume of messaging increased by 8%. Nearly a quarter of unique users engaging with NATO-related topics were identified as bot accounts. Russian- and English-language conversations about the NATO presence in the Baltic States and Poland peaked on 13 August on both Twitter and VK. On Twitter, English-language bot and anonymous accounts targeted Poland, while the Baltic States received the majority of Russian-language bot attention. Events commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Second World War attracted significant levels of fake engagement throughout the monitoring period. We observed two recurring anti-NATO narratives circulating in this context: (1) NATO is occupying the Baltic States and Poland, and (2) NATO supports fascism. Finally, this instalment of Robotrolling provides a glimpse into the flourishing world of commercial social media manipulation or, put simply, bots for hire. In a forthcoming report, we measure the inability of Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter to counter online manipulation.

More...
ROBOTROLLING 1/2020
0.00 €

ROBOTROLLING 1/2020

ROBOTROLLING 1/2020

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; NATO presence in Poland and the Baltic States; Robotic accounts; Facebook; Twitter;

Inauthentic English- and Russian-language conversations on Twitter about the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltic States peaked on 4 and 5 December, respectively, coinciding with the 2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting in London. Robotic accounts focused heavily on the meeting this quarter, particularly on English-language Twitter, which saw roughly 3 times the usual level of bot activity. On VK, an anomalous increase in activity from anonymous human-controlled accounts coincided with the meeting. Due to the contentious atmosphere surrounding the meeting in London, a considerable increase in the proportion of posts generated by bots was observed on English-language Twitter this quarter. At the same time, Russian-language bot activity on Twitter decreased to the lowest level observed thus far. In this issue of Robotrolling, we dig deeply into a sample of political pages amassed by a COE report on commercial social media manipulation in order to identify patterns in inauthentic activity on Facebook. We demonstrate that the 2019 elections in Ukraine were the primary focus of actors willing to pay for inflated social media engagement. Our analysis also reveals several shared traits among political manipulators on Facebook and provides a network visualisation that shows the connections between them. As a new year of Robotrolling begins, we review trends observed in VK groups over the past 18 months. A steady reduction in the proportion of content shared in communities dedicated to the so-called Novorossia region and the Donbass coincides with inauthentic content increasingly being posted in community spaces such as private groups or pages.

More...
RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE WESTERN BALKAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
0.00 €

RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE WESTERN BALKAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE WESTERN BALKAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Author(s): Dimitar Bechev,Rufin Zamfir,Tihomira Doncheva / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Strategic interests; Western Balkans; Media; Albania; BiH; Kosovo; North Macedonia; Montenegro; Serbia;

This is a summary of four reports published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in the framework of project “Russia’s Footprint in the Western Balkan Information Environment”. You can read full reports by clicking on links or visiting www.stratcomcoe.org: Russia’s Strategic Interests and Tools of Influence in the Western Balkans; Risks and Vulnerabilities in the Western Balkans; Russia’s Narratives toward Western Balkans: Analysis of Sputnik Srbija; Tracking Russia’s Narratives in the Western Balkan Media; The project investigates Russia’s tools of influence in the Western Balkans (WB), with a focus on the media landscape. The scope of analysis is Russia’s activities in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The project analyses Russia’s interests and influence toolbox, as well as identifies the vulnerabilities that make the Western Balkan countries susceptible to hostile influence. It also identifies the Kremlin’s narratives in the WB as well as looks at the role of local WB media in spreading those narratives. The report provides a basis for interested stakeholders to understand the methods and means that Russia uses to influence decision-making in the Western Balkans, as well as offers insights into the regional characteristics that facilitate Russia’s influence in the WB media space.

More...
ROBOTROLLING 2/2020
0.00 €

ROBOTROLLING 2/2020

ROBOTROLLING 2/2020

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Kristina Van Sant / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; bot activities; social media; disinformation; pro-Kremlin social media accounts; COVID-19 pandemic; pro-Kremlin bots; online manipulation of information;

Bot activity this quarter fixated on the global COVID-19 pandemic, with conversations about the virus captured by our dataset peaking in March. Pro-Kremlin social media accounts amplified a false story, originally shared by a Russian politician, that Poland closed its airspace to Russian planes delivering humanitarian aid to Italy. Though we found that bots commanded the Russian-language conversations about COVID-19, their content was no more viral than examples from recent Robotrolling reports. Throughout this quarter, we observed a considerable reduction in both the number of unique users and volume of messages. Inauthentic English- and Russian-language activity experienced a similar decline. Since late March, Russian-language activity on Twitter and on VK has been abnormally low. On VK, the conversation about NATO in the Baltics and Poland is currently being conducted in groups with regional or nationalist profiles. Notably, the large Russian state-run media outlets we frequently observe on the platform have engaged far less with the subject in recent months. Additionally, we observed a halving of posts from bot accounts this quarter. Finally, in this edition of Robotrolling, we delve into the role of pro-Kremlin bots in spreading disinformation about COVID-19 throughout March. In our analysis, we identify striking differences between how bots engaged with COVID-19 in the Russian- and English-language information spaces.

More...
ROBOTROLLING 3/2020
0.00 €

ROBOTROLLING 3/2020

ROBOTROLLING 3/2020

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Kristina Van Sant / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; bot activities; information space; NATO military exercise; social media; online manipulation of information;

Inauthentic activity in the Russian-language information space this quarter targeted NATO military exercises, peaking on 8 June with the commencement of BALTOPS in the Baltic Sea. Conversations amplified by both automated and anonymous accounts portrayed NATO’s summer exercises as exceptionally aggressive and demonstrative of the alliance’s ambitions to expand into Belarus and Ukraine. Throughout this quarter, we observed a significant increase in English-language bot activity. This flurry of activity was triggered by public statements suggesting the US move nuclear weapons, troops, and military equipment from Germany to Poland for permanent deployment. While the volume of Russian-language automated activity on both Twitter and VK shrunk this quarter, the percentage of conversations amplified by bot voices increased. Statebacked media outlets Sputnik and RT were popular sources of information among both English- and Russian-language audiences. The latter two sections of this report concentrate on the deleted account dataset published by Twitter in June 2020. First, we compare our list of previously identified bot accounts with those published by Twitter, which is visualised in Figure 5. Second, we evaluate Twitter’s capacity for combatting inauthentic activity on its platform, concluding that rates of identification, suspension, and deletion of accounts are unnecessarily slow.

More...
ROBOTROLLING 4/2020
0.00 €

ROBOTROLLING 4/2020

ROBOTROLLING 4/2020

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Kristina Van Sant / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; bot activities; social media; disinformation; presidential elections in Belarus; increased fake activity; NATO; fake social media accounts;

This quarter, the disputed presidential election result and nationwide protests in Belarus were the main targets of inauthentic Russian-language accounts, resulting in a cluster of spikes in fake activity in August. Pro-Lukashenka users concocted an external threat from NATO by pushing false claims of NATO buildup along the Belarusian border and shared rumours of impending intervention. Automated users asserted that NATO posed an internal threat in Belarus as well, alleging that the demonstrations are “puppeteered” by the West. The situation in Belarus coincided with the most pronounced uptick in attention from identifiably human Russian-language accounts. Compared to the previous report, the portion of messages attributed to identifiable humans increased from 14% to 18% on Twitter and from 26% to nearly 30% on VK. This increase in legitimate engagement in NATO-related discussions of Belarus drove down the percentage of bot users to the lowest figure we have observed, 15% on Russian Twitter and 19% on VK. English-language activity focused on Polish affairs, both independently and in relation to the ongoing protests in Belarus. Inauthentic English-language discussions peaked with announcements of US troop relocation from Germany to Poland. In September, former US vice president Joe Biden made critical comments about Hungary and Poland, triggering the highest volume of automated retweets from English-language bots this quarter. Finally, in this instalment of Robotrolling we take a look at the supply side of fake social media accounts. The second iteration of the COE’s social media manipulation experiment tracks variation between the responses of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and TikTok to inauthentic engagement. Strikingly, the report found that Instagram is 10x cheaper to manipulate than Facebook, TikTok has virtually no self-regulatory defences, and it remains easy to manipulate US senators’ accounts, even during an election period.

More...
ROBOTROLLING 1/2021
0.00 €

ROBOTROLLING 1/2021

ROBOTROLLING 1/2021

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Kristina Van Sant / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; decrease of bot activities; social media; disinformation; Twitter; fake news; online manipulation of information;

This quarter, we observed a significant drop in both authentic and inauthentic engagement with the topic of NATO in Poland and the Baltics. The number of bots and the volume of messages they disseminated decreased among both English- and Russian-language communities on Twitter and VK. Spikes in bot activity this winter coincided with NATO military exercises. Inauthentic accounts placed particular emphasis on unfounded claims of disorderly conduct among NATO soldiers and the alleged effects that military exercises have on local civilian populations. Throughout this period, inauthentic accounts also amplified claims of turmoil within the alliance and fears of military buildup along the border of Kaliningrad. While Russian-language bot activity was focused primarily on military affairs, English-language bot activity was centered on US affairs in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, particularly debates over how the Biden administration will impact US-Polish relations and transatlantic security more generally. In this issue of Robotrolling, we also discuss the steps Twitter has taken to protect its platforms from attempts to incite violence, organise attacks, and share misinformation following the riot at the US Capitol on 6 January 2021. This regulatory enforcement resulted in the removal of tens of thousands of accounts connected to QAnon conspiracy theorists. Our analysis is accompanied by a visualisation of the English-language accounts mentioning the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics, demonstrating the impact these account removals will have on the information space.

More...
Result 161-180 of 183
  • Prev
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • ...
  • 8
  • 9
  • 10
  • Next

About

CEEOL is a leading provider of academic eJournals, eBooks and Grey Literature documents in Humanities and Social Sciences from and about Central, East and Southeast Europe. In the rapidly changing digital sphere CEEOL is a reliable source of adjusting expertise trusted by scholars, researchers, publishers, and librarians. CEEOL offers various services to subscribing institutions and their patrons to make access to its content as easy as possible. CEEOL supports publishers to reach new audiences and disseminate the scientific achievements to a broad readership worldwide. Un-affiliated scholars have the possibility to access the repository by creating their personal user account.

Contact Us

Central and Eastern European Online Library GmbH
Basaltstrasse 9
60487 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Amtsgericht Frankfurt am Main HRB 102056
VAT number: DE300273105
Phone: +49 (0)69-20026820
Email: info@ceeol.com

Connect with CEEOL

  • Join our Facebook page
  • Follow us on Twitter
CEEOL Logo Footer
2025 © CEEOL. ALL Rights Reserved. Privacy Policy | Terms & Conditions of use | Accessibility
ver2.0.428
Toggle Accessibility Mode

Login CEEOL

{{forgottenPasswordMessage.Message}}

Enter your Username (Email) below.

Institutional Login