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Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

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ROBOTROLLING 2/2019

ROBOTROLLING 2/2019

Author(s): Specified No Author / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2019

On the popular Russian-language social network VK, material about the NATO presence in the Baltics and Poland was viewed no less than 11 million times this quarter (February – April 2019). 93% of these views were for material from community spaces. On VK, community spaces are increasingly important, both as a sources of content and as places for discussion. The move to groups has implications beyond the Russian-language space. Facebook has recently launched a push to promote community spaces. These spaces, normally closed to researchers, offer huge potential for misuse and manipulation. Our investigation of VK community spaces reveals that the vast majority of groups in which NATO is discussed are communities with radical pro-Kremlin or nationalist tendencies, or dedicated to the conflict in Ukraine. These communities generate more posts and attract more views even than communities created by Russian state media outlets. On Twitter, bots tweeting in Russian remain a bigger problem than bots tweeting in English. In Russian, they account for 43% of all messages—a significant increase in recent months. In English bots posted 17% of messages. English-language bots this quarter overwhelmingly amplified news content from RT (formerly Russia Today) and other pro-Kremlin news outlets. On all platforms, discussion regarding NATO troops in Poland attracted the largest number of posts this quarter. Finally, in this issue we publish our first case study of manipulation on Facebook. It looks at the degree to which bots and trolls targeted posts promoted by Latvian political parties contesting the European Elections in late May 2019.

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ROBOTROLLING 2017/2

ROBOTROLLING 2017/2

Author(s): Specified No Author / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2017

Robotic activity is highly dynamic. The online discussion about the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics shows sharp changes in focus and intensity. The current reporting period August–October has been comparatively free of large-scale, politically motivated robotic interventions. In contrast, the period March–July stands out as one in which content was heavily promoted online. Political actors use bot accounts in the social media space to manipulate public opinion about regional geopolitics. According to our estimate, such accounts produced 5–15% of the activity about the NATO presence in Latvia and Estonia in the period March–July 2017. Bot-generated messages differ depending on the target audience. Messages aimed at the West suggested that Russian exercises pale in comparison with NATO operations. Messages targeted to the domestic audience rarely mentioned the Russian exercises. Russian-language bots create roughly 70% of all Russian messages about NATO in the Baltic States and Poland. Overall, 60% of active Russian-language accounts seem to be automated. In comparison, 39% of accounts tweeting in English are bots. They created 52% of all English-language messages in the period August–October. Our data suggest Twitter is less effective at removing automatically generated Russian content than it is for English material. Nonetheless, we have seen improvement in social media policing by the platform. A ‘cleaner’ social media is good not only for individual users, but also for businesses. Pressure should continue in order to ensure further improvements.

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ROBOTROLLING 2018/1

ROBOTROLLING 2018/1

Author(s): Specified No Author / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

Generational change in malicious activity on social media seems to be at hand. Primitive bots indiscriminately promoting links to news sites are on the decline. They are being replaced by coordinated accounts that target conversations centred upon individual media outlets or members of different elites. In recent months on Twitter, the volume of automated content about NATO activity in the Baltics and Poland has declined at an increasingly rapid pace. The number of bottweets dropped by 15 percentage points for Russian and 20 percentage points for English. We infer that this reduction is best explained by changes introduced by the platform. Our findings are verified by drawing on thirty times more data than for previous Robotrolling issues. For the first time we include messages from VKontakte as a control. We see a marked rise in organised trolling activity conducted by humans using fake accounts compared to early 2017. As of January 2018, 50% of all Russian-language messages are directed at other Twitter users. As social media companies intervene to clean up automation, they should take care that changes they introduce may enable new forms of manipulation. Russian language bot activity is in decline in absolute terms, but Twitter in Russian remains more polluted than Twitter in English.

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ROBOTROLLING 3/2018

ROBOTROLLING 3/2018

Author(s): Specified No Author / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

President Trump’s whirlwind tour of Europe in July provoked ferocious discussion about NATO on social media. Anonymous human-controlled English-language accounts, expressing positions in support of or in opposition to the US President, dominated online conversations. Compared to the levels observed in the Spring issue of Robotrolling, the volume of English-language messages has more than doubled. The increasing proportion of anonymous accounts active during key political moments indicate that anonymity is being abused to cloak manipulation on social networks. We call on social media companies to keep investing in countering platform misuse. The social media companies Reddit and Twitter have released lists of accounts identified as originating from the notorious St Petersburg ‘troll factory’—the Internet Research Agency (IRA). In this issue, we present the first quantitative analysis comparing English- and Russian-language posts from these accounts. The IRA bombarded citizens in Russia and its neighboring states with pro-Kremlin propaganda. For English, fake accounts posed as Trump supporters, and argued both sides of the Black Lives Matter controversy. Russian-language material closely echoed and amplified the narratives popularized by Russian state-media. Amongst the accounts identified by Twitter, 26 also posted about NATO in the Baltics and Poland. Our algorithm correctly identified 24 of these as bot accounts. The other two accounts were anonymous human-controlled (troll) accounts.

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ROBOTROLLING 4/2018

ROBOTROLLING 4/2018

Author(s): Specified No Author / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

This issue of Robotrolling examines users suspended by Twitter. Contrary to expectation, most of the accounts were human-controlled accounts rather than bots. Since 2017, the speed at which Twitter suspended misbehaving users has by two measures almost doubled. However, removals of Russian-language accounts have been considerably slower than for English. The speed of removal can be critical, for instance in the context of an election. The Latvian elections, conducted on 6 October 2018, passed with remarkably little Russian language activity about the NATO presence in the country. Our analyses show a movement in the past year away from automated manipulation to humans operating fake or disposable identities online. The figures published in this issue reflect the good work done to tackle bots, but show much work remains to tackle manipulation through fake human-controlled accounts. Bots created 46% of Russian-language messaging about the NATO presence in the Baltics and Poland. More than 50% of Russian-language messaging about Estonia this quarter came from automated accounts. Anonymous human-operated accounts posted 46% of all English-language messages about Poland, compared to 29% for the Baltic States. This discrepancy is both anomalous and persistent. Some of the messaging is probably artificial. We continue to publish measures of fake social activity in the hope that quantifying the problem will focus minds on solving it.

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ROBOTROLLING 4/2019

ROBOTROLLING 4/2019

Author(s): Specified No Author / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2019

In this edition of Robotrolling, we expose a coordinated network of bots on Facebook, Twitter, and VK connected to a militaristic YouTube channel. Through our analysis, we discovered that the group of automated accounts is used to spread anti-NATO videos in the pro-Donbass information space. Our findings demonstrate that the video-sharing platform is a ripe target for robotic exploitation. During this period, the level of Russian-language bot activity decreased on Twitter. Meanwhile, English-language bot activity remained unchanged. On VK, the volume of messaging increased by 8%. Nearly a quarter of unique users engaging with NATO-related topics were identified as bot accounts. Russian- and English-language conversations about the NATO presence in the Baltic States and Poland peaked on 13 August on both Twitter and VK. On Twitter, English-language bot and anonymous accounts targeted Poland, while the Baltic States received the majority of Russian-language bot attention. Events commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Second World War attracted significant levels of fake engagement throughout the monitoring period. We observed two recurring anti-NATO narratives circulating in this context: (1) NATO is occupying the Baltic States and Poland, and (2) NATO supports fascism. Finally, this instalment of Robotrolling provides a glimpse into the flourishing world of commercial social media manipulation or, put simply, bots for hire. In a forthcoming report, we measure the inability of Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter to counter online manipulation.

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ROBOTROLLING FAQ

ROBOTROLLING FAQ

Author(s): Specified No Author / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2017

What is Robotic trolling? Robotic trolling or ‘robotrolling’ is the coordinated use of fake accounts on social media. It is important to note that the divide between a bot and genuine account, by which we mean human-controlled account, is not a clear-cut one. Bots should be thought of on a spectrum, from fully automated to varying degrees of partially automated accounts. Not all bots claim to be humans. We are especially interested in bots which impersonate people or rely on fake identities. Such accounts may be operated either by human-handlers, or by algorithm. It may be impossible to separate the two. As a result, we refer to bot-like activity, that is, activity that could be performed by a computer. Whether it is a human or an algorithm copy-pasting messages is not important for our purposes: in either case, it is an example of deception.

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RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE NORDIC - BALTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE NORDIC - BALTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Author(s): Ieva Bērziņa,Māris Cepurītis,Diana Kaljula,Ivo Juurvee / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

This volume presents the first results of the project ‘Russia’s (Dis)Information Activities Against the Nordic-Bal tic Region’, which was initiated in 2016 as an ongoing project for monitoring and analysing Russia’s information influence in the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8), which includes Den - mark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden. In the period of 2016–2017 four pilot studies were conducted to answer questions about the aims of Russia’s information activities in the region; the use of the ‘compatriot’ policy as a tool of influence; the narratives Russia is using to advance its aims in the NB8 region; how the information provided by Russian state-funded media in some of the NB8 countries is used and how much it is trusted; and about public opinion regarding the narratives Russia promotes in some countries in the region. The main findings are structured around these research questions: What are the aims of Russia’s information activities in the NB8 region? • In the political dimension Russia aims to become one of the great powers in the new polycentric world order, to become an equal player in the international system, to challenge the unipolar world order, to counter the post-Cold War interventions of the West, to counter Western liberal democracy as a universal value, to call for the revival of Westphalian sovereignty, and to subvert the unity of the Western states. • In the military dimension Russia aims to counter NATO expansion towards Russia’s borders and to combine military force with other instruments of power. • In the economic dimension the Arctic as a region is a priority for Russia, as well as economic interdependence with the other countries in the region. • In the informational dimension Russia aims to develop its own global media system for the promotion of its worldview, to position itself as a distinct civilization, to support Russian ‘compatriots abroad’, and to develop the concept of the ‘Russian World’—an ideological space that exceeds the territorial boundaries of Russia, as well as to promote its own perspective on Russian and world history. • The main tools for advancing Russia’s aims are identified as: Russia’s domestic and international media system; the Internet and social media; government-organized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs); Russia’s compatriot policy; pipeline diplomacy; economic interdependency; the encouragement of political radicalization and polarization of Western societies; intelligence operations; and demonstrations of military force. How is Russia’s compatriot policy being used as a tool of influence in the NB8 region? • The concept of Russia’s ‘compatriots abroad’ is rather ambiguous and widely interpretable, which gives Russia an opportunity to use the idea of protecting compatriots’ rights as a moral justification for interfering in the internal matters of the sovereign states, for using military force, and for violating the territorial integrity of its neighbouring states. • However, the number of people who identify themselves as Russia’s compatriots may be at least three times smaller than officially estimated by Moscow. Due to the vagueness of the concept the actual number of compatriots is difficult to verify. • There is a gap between the scope of Russia’s compatriot policy as it is officially declared and organized and the strength of Russia’s actual relationship with its compatriots abroad. The organization of Russia’s compatriot activities abroad is rather formal, not well known among or representative of Russian speaking communities abroad, and characterized by internal conflicts. As a result, there is no genuine link between Russia and its compatriots abroad, despite an active state policy. • However, from the perspective of the national security of the NB8 countries, the main concern is not the actual interactions between Russia and its compatriots in the region, but the fact that the narrative of ‘discrimination’ may be used as a political excuse for intervention, as evidenced by the five-day war with Georgia and the crisis in Eastern Ukraine. It may be assumed that Russia exaggerates both the number of its compatriots and the effects of activities to ‘engage’ with them, so that Russia can intervene (if expedient) to ‘protect’ them in a military or non-military manner. • Latvia and Estonia are the countries most vulnerable to the application of the narrative regarding the violation of the rights of Russia’s compatriots, due to their large number of ethnic Russians and speakers of the Russian language as their first language, and to the phenomenon of ‘non-citizens’—people who immigrated to Latvia or Estonia during the Soviet occupation and could have applied for citizenship through naturalization once these countries regained their independence, but have chosen not to do so.1 If Russia chooses to use this narrative as a basis for violations of sovereignty it will be determined by its strategic interests rather than by any perceived discrimination against Russia’s compatriots, be - cause it is a tool and not a strategic goal. • The regional coordination of Russia’s compatriot policy began in 2015, when the Regional Coordination Council of the Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea countries was established. From the perspective of coordinating Russia’s compatriot policy, the Baltic States belong to Northern Europe instead of the ‘Near Abroad’. • The most intensely promoted of Russia’s compatriot activities in the NB8 region is the propagation of Russia’s historical narratives, which are mainly related to the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II. These activities take place in all NB8 countries. • Marginalizing Russia’s compatriot organizations and activists in the Baltic States reduces the possibility of Russia using them as a ‘soft power tool’. Russia’s opportunities for using soft power have been diminished by the Ukrainian crisis because of the increased wariness towards such activities. What narratives is Russia using to advance its goals in the NB8 region? • There were regional differences in terms of the application of certain narratives in relation to the NB8 countries by RT, Sputnik, and Perviy kanal in 2016. Regarding the Baltic States, Russian media have been most concerned with military issues—the two most used narratives were that NATO is a threat to Russia and that the idea of a Russian threat to the West is ridiculous. The analysed Russian media were more concerned with NATO and the activities of the alliance close to its borders, rather than specific is - sues within the Baltic States. • The most common narratives in relation to the Nordic countries were that refugees and migrants are a destabilising factor, and such related narratives as radi - cal Islam is a destabilising factor and far-right nationalism is on the rise, which provide evidence that Russia is attempting to amplify the destructive processes caused by the refugee crisis within Europe. • Another common narrative that emerged in the context of the Nordic countries was that the Arctic is a territory of dialogue, which is, that the interests of Russia and the Nordic countries overlap in this region and Russia’s intention is to solve these issues by peaceful negotiation, as stated in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept. • Apart from these common regional trends, there were also some country-specific narratives. In the case of Latvia, the second most common narrative was discrimination against minorities. Estonia and Latvia have similar issues with their ethnic Russian population; nevertheless, in the case of Estonia the discrimination narrative was ob - served only three times, where - as there were more than 20 discrimination-related articles about Latvia. These data show that Latvia is the main target for the application of the discrimination against minorities narrative. • Norway and Iceland were used as role models in the context of the Brexit referendum, suggesting that these countries may do better without the EU and thus strengthening the narrative of diminishing unity in the EU. • The second most common narrative in relation to Finland was that Finland and Russia are good partners, no matter what. This is indicative of Russia’s attempt to build and strengthen bilateral relations with European countries. • Sweden stood out with the narrative Sweden is part of an unjust persecution of Julian Assange, showing how important the issues related to the WikiLeaks founder are for Russia. How useful and how trusted is the information provided by Russian state-funded media in the Baltic States, Finland, and Sweden? • In the states surveyed, the use of Russia’s global media outlets RT and Sputnik is limited. The general trend is that the majority of communities in the Baltic States are aware of these Russian media outlets, but do not use them (more than 60%), whereas most communities in Finland and Sweden are not aware of these media at all (more than 50%). • Of the Russian media included in the survey, Perviy kanal is the most influential in terms of the audience numbers reached, albeit there are regional differences. An average of 38% of respondents in the Baltic States reported watching Perviy kanal, whereas the majority of respondents in Finland (83%) and Sweden (67%) were not aware of the media outlet. • The demographic profile of the Russian media users surveyed gives evidence that the use of RT and Perviy kanal (the use of Sputnik is so small that it is impossible to make any analysis of the demographic profile of its users within this survey) is linked to the use of the Russian language, thus making these Russian media outlets an integral part of the so called ‘Russian World’. • The results of the survey also give evidence that Russia is not a trusted source of information in the Baltic States, Finland, and Sweden, except among a part of Russian speaking audiences in the Baltic States. What is the public opinion about the narratives promoted by Russia in the Baltic States, Finland, and Sweden? • The main finding in relation to public opinion is that if the views of the respondents overlap with the narratives promoted by the Kremlin, this overlap is not correlated with the use RT, Sputnik, and Perviy kanal. It is necessary to understand that due to methodological constraints and the existence of other determinants for public opinion that were not researched in this study, the over - lap between reported opinions and the Kremlin’s narratives may not be interpreted as the result of Russia’s influence. • The narrative refugees and immigrants are a destabilising factor for Europe gained the most support in Estonia (77% fully agree & agree somewhat) and Latvia (72% fully agree & agree somewhat). In Lithuania and Finland support for the statement was somewhat smaller, albeit still high—69% and 63% of those who agree fully and somewhat, but in Sweden this statement gained the least sup - port—only 46% of respondents agreed fully and somewhat. • The highest support for the narrative that a rebirth of neo-Nazism is taking place in Europe was identified in Sweden (74% fully agree & agree somewhat) and Finland (65% fully agree & agree somewhat)—the countries where consumption of RT, Sputnik, and Perviy kanal was the smallest. • The answers given by respon - dents about the narrative Russian speaking people in Latvia experience discrimination indicate that there is little interest regarding this issue in the neighbouring countries—29% of respondents in Lithuania, 30% in Finland, 41% in Estonia, and 60% in Sweden answered that they have no opinion about it. Respondents in Latvia have a strong resistance to this narrative—54% fully disagreed with the statement and 20% disagreed somewhat (74% of all respondents disagreed). • The response to the question regarding the narrative that Sweden is part of the unjust persecution of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange suggests that some of the narratives Russia is promoting are not at all important for the people of the surveyed countries, as 70% of respondents in Latvia, 69% in Lithuania, 63% in Estonia, 41% in Sweden, and 22% in Fin - land have no opinion about this issue. • NATO is one topic that polarizes opinion in the Baltic States between those who use Russian as their first language and the titular nationalities. The general trend is that titular nationalities are more supportive of a NATO presence in their countries. Therefore the most surprising results in relation to the narrative NATO is a threat to Russia are found in Lat - via, because 45% of respondents fully disagree and 23% disagree somewhat (in total—68%) with the statement, despite the demographics and the high consumption of Russian media in the country.

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RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE WESTERN BALKAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE WESTERN BALKAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Author(s): Dimitar Bechev,Rufin Zamfir,Tihomira Doncheva / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2020

This is a summary of four reports published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in the framework of project “Russia’s Footprint in the Western Balkan Information Environment”. You can read full reports by clicking on links or visiting www.stratcomcoe.org: Russia’s Strategic Interests and Tools of Influence in the Western Balkans; Risks and Vulnerabilities in the Western Balkans; Russia’s Narratives toward Western Balkans: Analysis of Sputnik Srbija; Tracking Russia’s Narratives in the Western Balkan Media; The project investigates Russia’s tools of influence in the Western Balkans (WB), with a focus on the media landscape. The scope of analysis is Russia’s activities in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The project analyses Russia’s interests and influence toolbox, as well as identifies the vulnerabilities that make the Western Balkan countries susceptible to hostile influence. It also identifies the Kremlin’s narratives in the WB as well as looks at the role of local WB media in spreading those narratives. The report provides a basis for interested stakeholders to understand the methods and means that Russia uses to influence decision-making in the Western Balkans, as well as offers insights into the regional characteristics that facilitate Russia’s influence in the WB media space.

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RUSSIA’S NARRATIVES TOWARD THE WESTERN BALKANS: ANALYSIS OF SPUTNIK SRBIJA

RUSSIA’S NARRATIVES TOWARD THE WESTERN BALKANS: ANALYSIS OF SPUTNIK SRBIJA

Author(s): . Atlantic Council of Montenegro / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2020

The Kremlin-sponsored Sputnik news website has been recognised as one of the primary channels of Russian influence in the Western Balkan (WB) media space, and so a comprehensive analysis was conducted to learn about its content and way of operation. This report is based on analysis of a year-long monitoring process that lasted from 1 January to 31 December 2018. The focus was on Sputnik online platform https://rs-lat.sputniknews.com that has presented information in the Serbian language since 2015 (hereafter referred to as Sputnik Srbija). The report seeks to identify the primary narratives that are advanced by the media outlet about six WB countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, as well as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

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RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND TOOLS OF INFLUENCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND TOOLS OF INFLUENCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Author(s): Dimitar Bechev / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2019

On 17 January 2019, Vladimir Putin paid a landmark visit to Belgrade. A jubilant 100,000-strong multitude waving the white-blue-and-red flags of the Russian Federation and Serbia filled the streets, many people bused in from across the country to participate. The hosts greeted their distinguished guest with an artillery salute. Crowds grew ecstatic as Putin and President Aleksandar Vučić made their way to St. Sava, the Balkans’ largest Orthodox cathedral, completed thanks to a grant from Russia. Just weeks away from the 20th anniversary of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the hero’s reception Putin was given accentuated the two countries’ burgeoning ties. Vučić discussed his plans for partitioning Kosovo with Russia’s president.

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RUSSIAN INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA WAR: SOME METHODS AND FORMS TO COUNTERACT

RUSSIAN INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA WAR: SOME METHODS AND FORMS TO COUNTERACT

Author(s): Volodymyr Ogrysko / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2016

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the form of the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas has apart from a military also a powerful informative dimension. The latter is a planned, well-coordinated and well-funded disinformation campaign targeting different audiences. From my point of view and that of other experts of the Centre for Russian Studies, to effectively counteract Russian’s propaganda we must take into account three key factors. First, to clearly identify the audience we are talking about. Second, the messages that Moscow propaganda uses for each audience. Third, the tools the Russian propaganda machine uses for their spread. Within the first factor the Kremlin targets three groups. The first – Russian’s civil society (or what is called “civil society” in Russia). The second – the Ukrainian audience, with particular emphasis on areas occupied by Russians in Ukraine (Crimea and parts of Donbas). The third - the EU and NATO member- states. Obviously, each of Russia’s targets has its own specifics and needs different approaches, forms and methods of research. Only this would allow us to realistically analyze Kremlin’s propaganda and offer practical countermeasures. The limited scope of this article does not allow a thorough analysis of all the factors, hence І will focus only on some of them. According to a survey conducted by the Levada Center in Moscow in March 2015, Russian citizens consider the following three countries (or unions) as main enemies of Russia: the US (73%), the EU (64%) and Ukraine (55%). Instead, “friends” of Russia are Belarus (85%) and China (76%). 50% of Russians believe that Putin acted correctly during his Crimea annexation speech mentioning a possibility to use nuclear weapon. Moreover, 49% believe that Russia’s main foreign policy achievement was its return to the status of “a great power.”

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RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA CONCERNING UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO ASSESS INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA CONCERNING UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO ASSESS INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Author(s): Denis Bohush,Oleksandra Baglai,Dace Kundrāte / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2016

During the Syrian campaign the (dis-) information activities of the Russian Federation concerning Ukraine dropped significantly. Key narratives and topics employed by Russia vis – a –vis Ukraine a) aimed to worsen relations between Ukraine and countries of the European Union; b) repeated and added new details to a previously actively exploited narrative on the illegal, outrageous, violent and aggressive behavior of Ukrainian battalions in the Donbas region; c) drew different connections between Ukraine and the war in Syria and especially DAESH; d) repeated a previously widely spread narrative about the illegal nature of Maidan, and the fascist government in power in Ukraine. Narratives aimed at countries of the European Union strove to increase tension among European countries and between European countries and the United States of America, and to create the impression of growing sympathy towards and support for Russia in the region. Additionally, the narratives aimed at creating ideological clashes and distrust among countries within the European Union and painting a negative image of Ukraine. SOURCES This research is based on the European External Action Service Disinformation reviews for the period under observation. Key narratives and themes of disinformation activities against Ukraine and countries of the European Union have been identified. An assessment of the intensity of (dis-) information activities was made by analyzing such sources as ria.ru, rt.com.ru, aif.ru, vesti. ru and r24.ru. METHODOLOGY The research is based on qualitative and quantitative content analyses, accompanied by innovative methodology to assess (dis-) information activities. The Bohush Pyramid of Influence method allows for analysis of (dis-)information activities according to the perceived target – at what level of influence is the activity aimed, what perception is it intended to produce, and what kind of consequences are envisioned for this particular (dis-)information activity at this particular level for this particular audience. PERIOD UNDER STUDY The period of the Syrian campaign from September 2015 to March 2016 was a time of information support for the Russian Federation active phase of military operations in Syria. Hereafter, in this study it will be referred to as the Syrian period. In order to ensure the accuracy of the results, given the fact that the official Syrian campaign began only in the last two days of September, the Syrian period is measured and presented in charts from October 2015 to March 2016. For illustrative purposes and strength of comparison, the time frame of the research has been expanded to cover the period from June 2015 to May 2016.

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RUSSIAN SNAP EXERCISES IN THE HIGH NORTH

RUSSIAN SNAP EXERCISES IN THE HIGH NORTH

Author(s): Specified No Author / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2019

On 16 March 2015 the Russian Federation began a combat readiness test (a ‘snap exercise’) of its Northern Fleet and force elements situated in its Western Military District. The scale of the exercise was much larger than originally announced, and coincided with the Norwegian exercise Joint Viking in Finnmark (the northernmost part of Norway), as well as with the US exercise Dragoon Ride. Since both exercises were announced well ahead of time, it is reasonable to assume that the Russian exercise was intended as a defensive move and/or response to them. There remains considerable debate as to whether the readiness exercise violated the Vienna Document, a confidence and security-building measure agreed upon with the OSCE. Norway stated at the time that it was monitoring the situation, and did not submit a complaint to the OSCE. However, the consistent use of such snap exercises to circumvent requirements for notification runs counter to the spirit of the agreement and undermines its provisions.

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RUSSIA'S FOOTPRINT IN THE NORDIC-BALTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

RUSSIA'S FOOTPRINT IN THE NORDIC-BALTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Author(s): Specified No Author / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

The ongoing project covering Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden monitors Russia’s information activities in the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8) and analyses their impact. The report covering the period of 2016/2017 looks at the aims of Russia’s information activities and the narratives used; discusses the compatriot policy as a tool of influence; provides an insight into the use and varying level of trust in the information provided by Russian state-funded media and the public opinion on particular narrative themes promoted by Russia. The main findings are structured around the following research questions.

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SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE

SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE

Author(s): Sanda Svetoka / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2016

The development of information technology has changed the nature of conflicts by creating an additional layer of complexity to traditional battle spaces. Nearly global access to the virtual environment has created numerous opportunities to conduct battles online affecting events in both the physical domain, such as computer systems, and in the cognitive domain of people’s attitudes and beliefs. Recently we have witnessed how both states and non-state actors use hybrid approaches to pursue their political and military aims, skilfully combining military operations with cyber-attacks, diplomatic and/or economic pressure, and information (propaganda) campaigns. Over the past decade, social media has rapidly grown into one of the main channels of communication used today. Virtual communication platforms have become an integral part of warfare strategy. The recent conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine have demonstrated that social media is widely used to coordinate actions, collect information, and, most importantly, to influence the beliefs and attitudes of target audiences, even mobilise them for action. Given this state of affairs, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) was tasked with looking into how state and non-state actors leverage social media as a tool for conflict and hybrid warfare strategies. The following topics will be addressed in the report: • What is the role of social media in hybrid warfare? How is it ‘weaponised’? • What techniques and tactics do state and non-state actors employ to support their political and military aims using social media? What effects can they achieve? • What can NATO and its member nations do to identify and counter the malicious use of social media? We hope that this paper will serve as a comprehensive introduction and useful educational material for anyone interested in understanding the complexity of today’s information environment, and specifically the techniques of influence used in the digital space. The report summarises the conclusions of research commissioned by the StratCom COE—Internet trolling as hybrid warfare tool: the case of Latvia by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA) in cooperation with Riga Stradiņš University, Social influence in Russia-Ukraine-conflictrelated communication in social media by a team of Polish researchers, Network of terror: how Daesh uses adaptive social networks to spread its message by Joseph Shaheen, US State Department Fellow at the StratCom COE, as well as discussions from the seminars and conferences conducted by the COE over the course of 2015. The StratCom COE would like to thank Thomas Elkjer Nissen, Head of the StratCom Section of the Royal Danish Defence College, Dr Rebecca Goolsby, Project Officer at the US Office of Naval Research, Col (rtd) Ian Tunnicliffe, Director of Accordance Associates, Prof Aki-Mauri Huhtinen, Professor of Military Leadership and Management at the Finnish National Defence University, Prof Ben O’Loughlin, Professor of International Relations at the Royal Holloway University of London, Nik Gowing, Visiting Professor in War Studies at Kings College London, Assoc prof Cristina Archetti, Lecturer at the University of Oslo, as well as Mark Laity, Chief of Strategic Communications at NATO SHAPE, for valuable contributions to the social media related discussions organised by the StratCom COE.

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SOCIAL MEDIA IN OPERATIONS – A COUNTER-TERRORISM PERSPECTIVE

SOCIAL MEDIA IN OPERATIONS – A COUNTER-TERRORISM PERSPECTIVE

Author(s): Berfin Kandemir,Alexander Brand,Ben Heap / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2017

Social media has assumed a fundamental role in today’s society. As a technology with a high level of reach, billions of people are connected daily through global platforms, where they share personal experiences, documents and visual content. Social media has become one of the main channels through which people connect and communicate. NATO, as an organisation of 29 member states with different historical and cultural backgrounds, has made great efforts to develop its social media capabilities. NATO and its key decision makers are present in nearly all major social media networks and have gathered thousands of fans and followers. The current #wearenato campaign conveys the message that every day NATO allies work and train together to keep their citizens safe and that NATO, through partnership and cooperation, has secured peace and freedom for nearly 70 years. Most of NATO’s current social media efforts are focused on this ‘message delivery role’, aiming to raise awareness about NATO as a brand and to resonate with key opinion formers within a younger audience. Since September 2014, when NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) was established in Riga, Latvia, substantive progress in the study and understanding of social media has been made. The StratCom COE has published a number of research papers exploring current trends in social media and leading discussions on future strategy and related concepts, including the delivery of courses in social media analysis. NATO is involved with two major strands of work, both of which explore more flexible approaches of analysing and engaging with social media. First, the ‘Digital and Social Media Playbook’ currently under development by NATO’s Science and Technology Organisation (STO) will constitute an up-to-date information environment assessment tool. Second, through the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC), NATO has supported the development of two social media-related concepts to be used specifically in operations. Although there are a number of academic publications that cover the use of social media for military purposes or provide recommendations on how social media can support military actions on the ground, few previous projects have focused on the exploitation of social media in the context of Counter-Terrorism (CT). This is understandable, as according to NATO’s CT policy and concept, terrorism is dealt with at the national level by law enforcement agencies under state control and supervision. In most cases NATO would support Member States at their request, or as part of an operation in an environment in which law enforcement forces of the nation state are overstretched or non-existent. Apart from a collective defence scenario, this is unlikely to happen within the territories of the Member States and has more relevance for non-aligned nations. As part of ongoing efforts to further develop the CT perspective on social media, the NATO Centre of Excellence-Defence against Terrorism (COE-DAT) and the NATO StratCom COE conducted a workshop on ‘The exploitation of social media on operations’ in September 2017. The views were collected of over 20 social media experts and analysts, as well as NATO CT experts. The aim of the workshop was to develop the overall approach of the military’s use of social media to deliver effects in CT scenarios. As such, the workshop can also be seen as part of both centres’ contribution to strengthening of NATO’s fight against terrorism. This report provides a summary of those discussions. A brief outline of the panel’s main presentations is provided as well as a summary of the following questions discussed during the Q&A. „ Can hard-line terrorist groups with extremist narratives be effectively countered with messaging or would it be better to focus on those individuals and groups on the brink of radicalisation and joining a terrorist group? „ Assuming that former terrorists enjoy high credibility within the target audience (with reference to “Breaking the ISIS Brand” by Anne Speckhardt), how could or should they be integrated within military operations? What would such operations look like? „ Can offensive Cyberspace and Information Operations extend the role of the military within Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programmes? „ How could CT-related social media expertise be integrated into HQ structures? „ Is it possible to develop reach-back capabilities to support deployed forces? „ What tools are there to offensively counter aggressive strategic narratives and which of them are in use in military entities of NATO and the nations? „ Which information from social media is relevant from an intelligence analyst’s viewpoint and which tools are used for social media analysis in military entities? „ Once key influencers and propaganda distribution centres have been identified, should the military take measures to impede the spread of certain messages? In such cases, is the military capable of doing so or would this require external / industry support? „ How are CT aspects reflected in the roles and responsibilities of existing functions and capabilities, such as StratCom, Info Ops, PA, and PSYOPS? Which concepts / doctrine could be improved and updated? „ How does the social media industry counter terrorism and where would cooperation with the military be beneficial? In closing, a number of suggestions regarding the following key issues identified are provided: „ Counter-Narratives „ Identities „ Social Media Analysis in support of Intelligence „ Information Operations, Psychological Operations and Counter-Terrorism These suggestions include future steps which might be beneficial for further CT-related exploitation of social media in military operations. We hope that those who could not attend the workshop can enjoy the content of this publication – as well as spark their interest in future activities dealing with this important topic.

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STRATCOM LAUGHS - IN SEARCH OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

STRATCOM LAUGHS - IN SEARCH OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Author(s): Ivars Austers,Jurģis Škilters,Žaneta Ozoliņa,Sigita Struberga,Solvita Denisa-Liepniece,Maksym Kyiak / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2017

The study “StratCom laughs. In search of an analytical framework“ is a multidisciplinary effort to design an analytical framework for analysing humour in scenarios where researchers and practitioners find themselves working through large data collections where humour has been used as a potent tool in the construction of messages designed for strategic communication. The research was conducted in four stages. The first stage approaches the concept of humour from the perspectives of cognitive, communication, political science and psychology. The relevant components of humour, namely shared knowledge, target audience, perception, function and message delivery have been factored in.

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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS - INSIGHTS FROM THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS - INSIGHTS FROM THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR

Author(s): Vilma Scarpino,Stephen Harley,Paul Smyth,Caitlin Hayden,Sergei Makedonsky,Jacek Mirenski,Jonathan Russell,Mathew Sweezey,Kim Osborne,Paul Baines,Sarah-Jean Cunningham,Dagnija Lejina,Christopher Ryder,John-Paul Gravelines / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2017

In order to address the questions outlined in the previous section, the project was conducted in 3 phases. RESEARCH AND SCOPING ATTENDANCE. A baseline study of critical capability gaps in NATO StratCom capacity and capability was first conducted, drawing upon key NATO and COE StratCom research documents. Key observations were used to construct a question matrix, which can be found at Annex A to this report. As questions were identified, the COE reached out to commercial experts in these fields inviting them to present their views at a seminar in Riga. At the same time, invitations were sent out to all COE member nations to send delegates to the seminar. THE RIGA SEMINAR. In August 2016, the StratCom COE conducted a two day expert seminar in Riga, split into four sessions which represented a generic communications model: “Research-Plan-Implement-Evaluate”. Two of the four identified sessions were conducted on each day of the seminar with a panel of up to 5 experts giving short introductions and then inviting questions from delegates. Over 50 delegates from 16 NATO nations attended the conference indicating the high degree of interest by the NATO StratCom community. It would have been tempting to draw our experts solely from the point at which government and commercial communications intersect. Instead the COE felt that more powerful insights could be captured by reaching deeper into the corporate sector. We therefore enjoyed listening to the accounts of market research agencies and PR representatives from the retail sector as well as the commercial agencies wholly or partially engaged in complex governmental communications challenges. The list of experts is given below. Full biographies of the contributors can be found in the conference programme at Annex B to this report. For brevity, the term “NATO StratCom” also refers to those working within Strategic Communications and related functions, in government or military institutions at the national level. OUTPUT GENERATION. Transcript evidence was captured in outline to deliver a short presentation to the NATO Information and Communicators Conference in Tallinn in mid-September 2016. This report aims to pass on key insights from the Seminar in greater detail. It is constructed in two parts: The New Commercial Communications Environment – Key insights of our contributors on essential considerations to foster competitive advantage. Advice for NATO StratCom Practitioners – Techniques and approaches that are applicable across the state vs commercial divide.

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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE RUSSIA UKRAINE CONFLICT

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE RUSSIA UKRAINE CONFLICT

Author(s): Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili,Sanda Svetoka / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2015

Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili and Sanda Svetoka of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia, in Chapter 12, discuss the role of social media in this conflict. In the Internet era, the battle for hearts and minds has never been more important. Social media is a trust-based network that provides fertile soil for intelligence collection, propaganda dissemination, and psychological operations (PSYOPS) to influence public opinion – or to lead adversaries into harm’s way. ‘Soft’ cyber attacks can be as severe as any attack on critical infrastructure. In Ukraine, they have generated fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the economic, cultural, and national security of Ukraine, while promoting positive messages about Russia’s role in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The authors provide recommendations for defence against such attacks, including how to identify them, challenge them, and how to develop a resilient political narrative to withstand false propaganda.

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