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ROBOTROLLING 2/2021

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim / Language(s): English

Keywords: Manipulation on social media platforms; Twitter; Russian-language bot activity; online discussions; information space; GDELT;

In this edition of Robotrolling we track the most significant increase in inauthentic Russian-language social media activity we have observed since we began in 2017. While the level of bot activity remains much lower than four years ago, the uptick is concerning. The increased activity coincided with the spring and summer military exercise season, and the period running up to the Russian Federation’s Zapad exercises, scheduled for September 2021. While fake activity increased in the Russian-language space, we observed no increase in English-language activity, either from bots or from human-controlled accounts. In this edition of Robotrolling, we introduce the Global Database of Events Location and Tone (GDELT). This database of news articles helps map how the conversation about NATO in Poland and the Baltics is covered by news media, and serves as a contrast to the environment observed on Twitter and VK. This contrast reveals that in April 2021—as Russian troops mobilized along the Ukrainian border—inauthentic Russian accounts were also disproportionately active online. We round off the issue with a discussion of how AI can help us better understand the global news environment in near-real time, based on conversations with StratCom COE expert Gundars Bergmanis-Korāts and GDELT-founder Kalev Leetaru.

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ROBOTROLLING 1/2022

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Martha Stolze / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia's invasion of Ukraine; fake pro-Kremlin social media activity; pro-Kremlin channels; Donbas region; false information; Twitter; NATO; pro-Ukraininan messaging;

In this edition of Robotrolling, we trace messaging about the build-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, there has been an expectation that kinetic activity would be preceded by large-scale information activities. We assess that the period from August 2021 to 20 February 2022 saw an increase in elite statements (and troop movements) unmatched by fake pro-Kremlin social media activity. This may reflect a top-down communication hierarchy, wherein lower echelons either received little guidance, or the guidance was to be silent. The volumes of automated activity were too low to offer any reliable signal of the looming invasion. In February 2022, pro-Kremlin channels and accounts amplified the narrative that the “genocide” of Russian-speakers in the Donbas justified intervention. Our analysis shows that this narrative’s traction was attributable to statements by Putin personally, not online propaganda channels. The comparative absence of pro-Kremlin activity on Twitter, combined with increased activity on VKontakte, suggests that Kremlin propagandists prioritised domestic audiences. On Twitter, the increase in Russian-language tweets about NATO was overwhelmingly driven by anti-Kremlin and pro-Ukrainian messaging. The share of automated messages on Twitter and VK about the Baltic states, Poland and NATO dropped, amidst greatly increased overall traffic. Bots accounted for 30% of Russian language and 12% of English-language messages on Twitter; and for 15% of messages about the region on VK. In February 2022, the number of English tweets was seven times higher than Russian tweets.

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Virtual Manipulation Brief: Russia's Struggle to Circumvent Sanctions and Communicate Its War Against Ukraine

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Martha Stolze / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian language conversation; Invasion of Ukraine; Kremlin's messaging and political aims; VKontakte; RuTube; Telegram; Twitter; Social media and politics; NATO; Russia's war against Ukraine;

In this first issue of the Virtual Manipulation Brief, we zoom in on the Russian language conversation, and how it changed as a result of the decision to invade Ukraine. Sanctions hindered the Kremlin’s messaging on Western platforms, while the focus on domestic audiences pulled many propagandists to Telegram, VKontakte, and RuTube. The number of Russian Telegram users has increased by two-thirds, while four in five users of Facebook and Instagram have left Meta’s platforms. The increase in users understates the importance of Telegram. It acts as a reliable hub, where pro-regime voices can post (almost) without fear of platform censorship. Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan’s social media posting patterns reveal how communication has adapted following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In response to sanctions, she, together with many journalists working for RT and Sputnik, moved to posting through Telegram. Telegram posts are automatically cross-posted to her Western platforms, meaning the messaging continues to flow at little or no extra effort. This method has the added benefit of evading attempts by Twitter to prevent the amplification of RT content. Such use of automation means the Kremlin’s messaging will not disappear on Western platforms, even when domestic audiences are the primary focus. The comparison of Russian-language messaging about NATO on VKontakte and Twitter shows how this combination of push and pull factors has dramatically altered the Kremlin’s reach. We estimate that the relative reach of pro-Kremlin messaging on VKontakte in March 2022 was a hundred times more than normal, compared to Twitter. The Virtual Manipulation Brief builds on our Robotrolling reports, tracking how Russian bots and trolls manipulate the flow of information online. It expands the area of focus beyond the conversation about NATO to Russia’s war against Ukraine. And it will look beyond Twitter and VKontakte to track how antagonists use other social media platforms to disinform the public. In this issue, we start by examining how social media usage in Russia changed since February. A comparison of heavily amplified content about NATO on Twitter and VKontakte exposes the Kremlin’s waning ability to control conversations on Western platforms. Finally, we show how the Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan moved her communication to Telegram to evade sanctions directed at RT.

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Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

ROBOTROLLING 2/2021

ROBOTROLLING 2/2021

ROBOTROLLING 1/2022

ROBOTROLLING 1/2022

Virtual Manipulation Brief: Russia's Struggle to Circumvent Sanctions and Communicate Its War Against Ukraine

Virtual Manipulation Brief: Russia's Struggle to Circumvent Sanctions and Communicate Its War Against Ukraine