Series:OSW Studies

The ‘Tribal Areas’ of the Caucasus. The North Caucasus – an enclave of ‘alien civilisation’ within the Russian Federation

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English

Militant Islam is currently the greatest threat to security and stability in the Russian part of the Caucasus. However, even though the armed Islamic underground is capable of organising terrorist attacks and carrying out actions of sabotage, it seems too weak to bring about any change in the Caucasus’s political status quo. Besides, militant Islam is merely a symptom (albeit the most radical and spectacular) of a much wider process, namely the widening civilisational gap between Russia and the North Caucasus, initiated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The key elements of this process are as follows: the spontaneous re-Islamisation of social life and the dynamic growth of Islam's political influence; the de-Russification of the region; and the ongoing marginalisation of secular intellectuals. As a result, the North Caucasus, and principally Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, are turning into an enclave separated from the rest of the Russian Federation by a growing civilisational gap, and becoming increasingly different from the rest of Russia. This situation may recall the tribal areas of Pakistan inhabited by Pashtuns (FATA) along the Afghan border.

The language issue in Ukraine. An attempt at a new perspective

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English

Ukraine has been an independent state for only 20 years and the consequence of the long-term incorporation of Ukrainian lands into the Russian/Soviet state is an ethnically mixed society. In Ukraine, alongside Ukrainians, there are very many Russians and members of other nationalities of the former Soviet Union as well as a still large group of people who identify themselves as Soviets (in terms of their nationality). A significant part of Ukrainians use Russian in their everyday life (particularly professional) while knowing Ukrainian to only a small degree or not at all. Due to this Kyiv has to implement a language policy (which does not have to be pursued in e.g. Poland or Hungary) in search of solutions to ensure the stable functioning of a modern state for a multilingual society. The language issue is therefore an important challenge for the Ukrainian state and one of the more significant issues in Ukraine’s internal politics. In this text I eschew a detailed analysis of the question of Crimea as its social dynamics (also in the language area) is clearly distinct from the remaining part of Ukraine for four reasons: the short-term character of the region’s links with Ukraine, its relative geographic isolation (Crimea is almost an island), the formal autonomy of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the presence of the Crimean Tatar community which is demanding the recognition of its language rights.

THE MENACE OF A 'BROWN' RUSSIA. Ethnically motivated xenophobia - symptoms, causes and prospects for the future

Author(s): Agata Dubas / Language(s): English,Polish

In late August and early September 2006, Kondopoga, a town of 40,000 inhabitants in Russia's Republic of Karelia, became the scene of ethnic riots. The pretext for the outbreak was one specific incident - a fight in a café between the local Russians and a group of Chechens and Azeris, in which two Russians were killed. Several days later, members of the nationalist organisation Movement Against Illegal Immigration arrived in the town and skilfullymanipulated public sentiments by organising rallies in which the demonstrators' demands included the expulsion of all Caucasian immigrants from the region. At night-time, property belonging to members of the Caucasian community was burned or destroyed. It was only several days later that the tense situation was calmed. This event soon took on a symbolic force and received a great deal of attention throughout Russia. For some, mainly Russian nationalists, Kondopoga became a 'hero city' and a harbinger of national revival, whereas for others, in particular human rights activists, it was a model example of the outbreak of openly chauvinistic sentiments among ethnic Russians. The events in Kondopoga, together with several other widely discussed incidents in 2006 (including the attack on 21 August in Moscow's Cherkizovskiy Market where most of the merchants were immigrants from Asia, and 10 people were killed and nearly 50 injured), put the problem of rising xenophobia in Russian society at the centre of attention. This paper focuses on the ethnic dimension of xenophobia, as understood as aversion, fear or hostility vis-a-vis members of other nationalities, as well as the related radical nationalist ideas founded on the concept of the dominant (and often discriminatory) role of the Russians in the Russian Federation, with reference to racism or neo-Nazism. This text primarily presents xenophobia as an enormous social problem in today's Russia, which is not being addressed at the moment, but is instead being exploited by both the authorities and radical nationalist groups. This paper attempts to describe and understand the causes of xenophobia and the reasons for the popularity of extremely nationalist views among ethnic Russians. It also seeks to estimate the scale of the problem and the potential threat it may create in the future. The first part describes the different manifestations of xenophobia in presentday Russia. It identifies the groups most exposed to ethnically motivated violence and persecution, as well as the most xenophobic communities, and discusses the scale of the problem and its specific characteristics in the context of Russian reality. The second part looks into the underlying causes of xenophobic sentiments among Russians, while the last chapters delve into the authorities' attitude towards the problem and seek to answer the question of whether radical nationalist ideas may in future come to dominate Russia's political scene.

The multi-speed Baltic States. Reinforcing the defence capabilities of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

As regards defence policy, the Baltic states are usually treated by experts as forming a single unit. The reasons for this include a similar threat perception, similar military capabilities, and finally similar military modernisation programmes. However, the differences in their demographic and economic potentials as well as strategic cultures have resulted in them adopting different models of their armed forces.

The oligarchic democracy. The influence of business groups on Ukrainian politics

Author(s): Sławomir Matuszak / Language(s): English

The Ukrainian oligarchic system, which developed into its ultimate shape during Leonid Kuchma’s second presidency, turned out to be very durable. The nature of close relations between the government and the oligarchs has not undergone any major changes either as a consequence of the Orange Revolution or following Victor Yanukovych’s victory in the presidential election of 2010. Although reshuffles have taken place inside the political and business elites, nothing seems to be able to change this system, at least in the medium term.This text is aimed at presenting the network of connections existing between big business and politics in Ukraine and at pointing to the key oligarchic groups and the political forces they support. A definite majority of papers concerning contemporary Ukrainian politics as a rule disregard or deal with this subject very superficially, while it is impossible to understand modern Ukraine without understanding a number of dependencies existing between the political and business elites there.

The orange revolution in Ukraine. An attempt to understand the reasons

Author(s): Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin / Language(s): English

1. The Ukrainian society in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election was in a state which political science literature characterises as an almost "ideal" condition for an outbreak of social unrest. Growing expectations, both economic and political, seemed vain due to mounting impediments. The victory of Viktor Yanukovych was perceived by many opinion-makers as a nail in the coffin of such aspirations.2. In Ukraine, almost since the moment of regaining independence, the following two public order models, in which inherent are completely different system-related preferences of the citizens, have co-existed: the decentralised model of a "network" society, where dominate parallel mutual dependences between people who opt for a democratic political system; and the centralist model of social integration, where order is ensured via the vertical relation of power and submission. In the latter case, democracy seems dubious and preference is given to various kinds of systems having a strong central authority. Over the past ten years, the decentralised model has been slowly strengthening, and its influence has been expanding. It operates predominantly in the Western Ukraine and in Kyiv, yet it has won increasingly more areas also in the North and East of the country (except for Donbas). Viktor Yanukovych was in the common opinion a supporter of the centralist vision, and his victory in the election was perceived as an immediate threat to the already known and familiar rules of activity in parallel relations. Yanukovych was believed to be a player who would impose his own rules, without respecting the already existing ones.3. Foreign policy issues, a "pro-European" or "anti- European" approach of the authorities, hardly had any significance during the orange revolution. Its causes were purely internal. However, as the events developed, the stance taken by the international community became important for Ukrainians and could contribute to a significant growth of pro-European sentiments."Revolution" was the favourite word of most commentators in their descriptions of the events in late 2004, connected with the presidential election in Ukraine. Still, some of them - few as they were - protested against this term pointing out to many elements that proved evolutional rather than revolutionary nature of the changes taking place there. I suggest leaving this issue to future political scientists and historians, who will certainly answer the question whether that was a revolution and if it was not, how to name it1. This text is an attempt to reflect on what really happened in Ukraine in the last months of 2004, regardless of whether we call such events revolution, rebellion, social movement or anything else.Any mass social movements mainly draw attention of the mass media, yet soon they also become a subject of analysis for political scientists, sociologists and other specialists in social sciences, who try to answer the question if "this" could have been predicted? Post factum we usually state that there were very many signs of an approaching outbreak but nobody paid sufficient attention to such "harbingers". Even more so because social processes are almost never launched by only one factor.A well-known American political scientist James Davies (1962) noticed in the early 1960's that one of the factors provoking social movements is the discrepancy between social expectations & aspirations and the possibility to satisfy them. Davies initially formulated his theory, which has become classical today, in terms of socioeconomic expectations. Thereafter, he wrote that if such a discrepancy concerns political issues, its "explosive action" can be even stronger.Social expectations usually grow when the economic situation starts improving. Then expectations and hopes concerning both material and non-material issues grow; starting from the possibility to do business in an unrestricted way through such ideas as the freedom of speech. Expectations also grow when the society has managed to develop parallel ways of communication and gaining the awareness of its subjectivity, independently of the existing political system.

The resource wealth burden - oil and gas sectors in the former USSR

Author(s): Agata Loskot-Strachota / Language(s): English

The former USSR area plays a great role in the international oil and gas market. Russia is a real gas giant, with the richest deposits of this material in the world. Russia is also the main exporter of natural gas to many European countries. Keeping a strong position in this market remains a priority for the Russian Federation's economic policy. Europe is a very attractive region because its demand for gas is expected to grow steadily, while its own gas production keeps decreasing. In the long term, the Far East will be an important market for Russian exports, too. According to estimates, demand there will grow even faster than in Europe. Caspian gas producers, for the time being, can not really compete with Russia in this field, and this status quo will most probably be preserved in the nearest future. The post-Soviet countries also have substantial oil deposits. Among CIS members, Russia has the richest oilfields; Kazakhstan comes second, with large proven deposits of petroleum. In the Eurasian market, raw materials coming from the former USSR area are the major alternative to oil produced by OPEC countries. Russia does not belong to the cartel, and during the last two years, when international oil prices remained high, it continued to substantially increase both the production levels and exports. European countries are the main consumers of Russian petroleum, yet in the future, Russia may strengthen its role in such markets as the USA, Japan and other countries trying to become less dependent on OPEC oil. A boost in production and exports by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, countries situated by the Caspian Sea, should also be expected in the next five years. The significance of this region for the international market is bound to grow when new oil transport routes, independent of Russia, are opened (see chapter Export potential of the post-Soviet region). This collection of papers attempts to give an accurate and clear description of the main characteristics and of the key problems pertaining to the oil and gas sectors in the former USSR. It is aimed at showing the wealth and production and export opportunities on the one hand and at outlining a number of problems that now limit the development of trade in energy materials in this region and might impede it in the future. These issues seem to be of particular importance in the context of the dilemmas facing the Polish and European energy security policy. This report consists of five studies, focusing on: the resources and export potential of the Commonwealth of Independent States countries, Russian policy towards the entire oil and gas sector in the former USSR area and in the countries of the former Eastern bloc, and the role the energy resources potential plays in Russian foreign policy. Also, the studies outline the situation of the so-called transit countries, i.e. the ones controlling major export pipelines for Russian oil and gas, discuss the importance of foreign direct investments for the oil and gas sectors, as well as the opportunities and dangers that natural resource wealth might pose to the development of CIS countries. In terms of geographic coverage, the studies pertain to both key oil or gas producers (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) and the important transit countries for energy resources from CIS area (Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). While working on this project, we used the generally available literature, statistical yearbooks, specialist press and agency and internet news bulletins. We also want to acknowledge the valuable comments from CIS countries oil and gas experts, whom we to talked to while working on this project.

The Russian Economy under Putin. Growth Factors and Impediments to Economic Development

Author(s): Ewa Paszyc,Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): English,Polish

1. After a dramatic economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial breakdown of 1998, the Russian economy has begun to emerge from its deep crisis. The years 1999-2004 were a period of dynamic development in all sectors of Russian economy, and saw a rapid growth in GDP of over 7 per cent per year. 2. Russia owed the excellent macroeconomic results of that period to a combination of favourable factors. The key factors were: high hydrocarbon prices on the global markets; an increase in Russia's international competitiveness thanks to the "rouble devaluation effect" (following the 1998 financial crash); and the market reforms carried out within that period. 3. In 2004, despite very high oil and gas prices on world markets, a slowdown of the GDP growth took place. Even though the economy is still developing fairly rapidly, we are able to say that Russia is exhausting those traditional mechanisms (apart from oil and gas prices) which have hitherto stimulated GDP growth. Moreover, there are no new mechanisms which could replace the old ones. In the longer term, these unsolved structural problems may seriously impede Russia's economic growth. 4. The favourable economic situation has nevertheless failed to bring about the modernisation of the manufacturing sector. Nor has it made Russia give up the "oil-oriented" economy model. Institutions of a civic society, which are essential for achieving and maintaining stable economic growth, have not developed either. There are still no firm guarantees of ownership in Russia. The prosecutor's office, the courts and the militia are all subordinate to the Kremlin. The courts' verdicts at all levels (from district courts to the Arbitration Court and Constitution Court) demonstrate their political dependence. Despite tax reform, Russian state institutions still remain instruments of administrative and legal repressions. 5. Since the times of the Soviet Union, relatively low production costs (the raw material, energy and labour costs) have invariably been the only advantage of most sectors of Russian industry. Still, it is worth mentioning that in recent years (2003-2004) the production costs have been increasing systematically, which has in turn slowed down the growth rate. A common problem of almost all sectors is their technological backwardness and the low quality of produce. These factors actually exclude Russia from European and global markets of major manufacture production (e.g. in the automotive and aircraft industry). 6. Another factor impeding economic growth is the exhaustion of extensive growth possibilities. The reserves and capacity of the old post-Soviet industry base have been almost completely exploited in nearly all sectors. Further growth now depends on investments in infrastructure and new technologies. However, the political and economic processes taking place in Russia in recent years have discouraged potential investors. 7. The Kremlin's economic policy as of 2003 has also contributed to the slowdown in economic growth by increasing state interference in the economy and expanding state presence in the strategic sectors (oil, gas and finance). Another impediment is the evident change of relations between business and the authorities (best illustrated by the Yukos affair). A direct result of such situation is the limitation of business activity and Russia's damaged image on the global arena.

The Silk Railroad. The EU-China rail connections: background, actors, interests

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Konrad Popławski,Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): English

The report discusses the current state and future prospects of rail connections between China and the countries of the European Union. Special emphasis is placed on the role of Central Europe. It presents the goals and the policy adopted by the Chinese side in the process of building rail connections with European countries, compares the current and the planned transport corridors, offers an analysis of the economic potential of the China-Europe rail connections. It also discusses various business models of cooperation with China in rail transport. The report has been drawn up based on the desk research and interviews with representatives of European and Chinese companies involved in developing rail connections, as well as interviews with Chinese analysts dealing with Belt and Road issues.

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): English

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

The twilight of the oil Eldorado. How the activity of Russian oil companies on the EU market has evolved

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): English

The European Union has traditionally been the most important outlet for Russian oil exports. At the same time, during the period 2011-2014 a systematic decline was observed in crude oil supplies to the EU, while at the same time the export of petroleum products increased. It is now difficult to say that Russia is following a coherent oil strategy vis-a-vis the EU. The current shape of Russian activity is more the result of the business interests of individual companies, rather than the result of activities coordinated by the state.Although in the short term (up to 2020), the negative trend in crude oil exports to the EU could be halted (as confirmed by the figures for 2015), the long-term prospects for Russia's position on the EU market are pessimistic. This is because the importance of factors unfavourable to Russia is rising, such as the decrease in consumption of oil in the EU, the increased competition among exporters to the EU market, and the deterioration of the climate of Russian/EU cooperation in the context of the anti-Russian sanctions, as well as unclear prospects for the development of the upstream sector in Russia.

The unfinished reform. An assessment of the energy transformation in Germany

Author(s): Rafał Bajczuk / Language(s): English

In its time in power, which is shortly to end, the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition introduced key legislative changes enabling a further transformation of the energy sector. Due to a reduction in the amount of subsidies offered to renewable energy sources (RES), further rises in electricity prices could be brought to a halt. To date, this increase in electricity costs has been the major problem associated with the energy transformation. Despite this, many other problems surrounding the energy policy remain unresolved. This mainly concerns the overly slow pace of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the future of the coal energy sector, the energy transformation in the transport sector and the extension of electricity networks, which is of key importance for the development of RES. For the new German government, the energy transformation will continue to pose a major challenge. Moreover, Germany will need to redefine its role in the international arena. At the beginning of this decade, Germany was a leader in both the field of climate policy promotion and in low emission technologies. In spite of this early advantage, other countries – China in particular – are now equal competitors in the fight for leadership of international climate policy. For German companies, these new entrants represent a genuine threat across an increasing number of markets.

The unfinished state. 25 years of independent Moldova

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): English

The Republic of Moldova is an exceptional state. It was the only Soviet republic to proclaim independence, on 27 August 1991, in order to become part of another state, i.e. Romania, rather than building its own independent political future. After the civil war, the break-up of the common state and the de facto collapse of the unification project, the newly established Moldova found itself in an ideological vacuum. With no experience of statehood, no coherent historical narrative or responsible political elites, and with a nation that was unsure of its identity, it set off on a long march in search of an idea that could define the shape of its statehood and the direction of its future development. Twenty-five years on, the social and political project called the Republic of Moldova is experiencing a grave crisis. The Moldovan statehood remains fragile and seemingly impermanent. The country’s successive governments have not been able to build effective state institutions or create adequate conditions for economic development. After years of structural and economic weakness, today’s Moldova as led by Vlad Plahotniuc, the country’s most powerful politician and businessman, is a typical post-Soviet oligarchy ruled by a narrow clique interested mainly in protecting its own political and business interests.

Troublesome Investment. The Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant in Astravyets

Author(s): Joanna Hyndle-Hussein,Szymon Kardaś,Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English

When Belarus embarked on the construction of its first nuclear power plant in Astravyets in 2012, the official objective was to significantly reduce the share played by imported Russian gas in the country’s electricity production. However, the Belarusian leadership’s decision to build the plant in close co-operation with Russian partners defeated that purpose. Russia has in fact taken over full control of its implementation as it is financing the US$ 10 billion project almost entirely. Russia is the project’s contractor, is providing the technology and will also provide the nuclear fuel. The plant will thus diversify the fuel mix in electricity production, but not the source of imports. Moreover, as Poland and Lithuania have refused to buy electricity from the plant, Belarus now faces the challenge of utilising the energy surplus that will emerge.

Troublesome Investment. The Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant in Astravyets

Author(s): Joanna Hyndle-Hussein,Szymon Kardaś,Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English

Belarus’s first nuclear power plant has been under construction in the city of Astravyets for a decade now. The project was able to start when Belarus signed an intergovernmental agreement with Russia in 2012, under which the Russian side agreed to finance the project almost fully and provide the technology. The nuclear power plant in Astravyets signals the first time that ground has been broken on a nuclear power project in Europe since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Although the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant (Belarusian NPP), as the project is officially called, is being built just 200 km from the Polish border, it rarely appears in Polish or European news and a wider debate about its safety is yet to take place. Lithuania is the only country where the Astravyets project has stirred major controversy. The project is not only debated there – it has become a key issue in Lithuania’s relations with its allies in the European Union and NATO. Lithuania is concerned about the plant’s location, less than 50 km from Vilnius, while Lithuanian experts believe that the project’s execution does not comply with international safety standards. As a result of the efforts made by Vilnius, the Belarusian-Russian investment has now been noticed internationally.

Turkey - an energy transit corridor to the EU?

Author(s): Agata Loskot-Strachota / Language(s): English

1. The priority of Ankara's energy policy is to make Turkey an important transit corridor for energy resources transported to the EU. Turkey wishes to play an active role in the distribution and sale of gas and oil flowing across its territory.2. Transit and sale of energy resources, and gas in particular, are expected to provide a major source of income for Turkey and a tool by which Ankara will be able to build its position in the region and in Europe.3. Since Turkey is an EU candidate country, Brussels will probably welcome Turkey's role as a transit corridor as much as Ankara will.4. The success of Ankara's energy strategy hinges on developments in Turkey's internal energy market.5. It also depends on a number of external factors including:- Export policies and internal situation in producer countries.Most importantly, it depends on:a. Russia and its energy policy prioritiesb. Stability in the Middle East.- Policies of consumer countries, including the EU in particular.- Policies of world powers present in the region (USA).

Ukraine and Russia: mutual relations and the conditions that determine them /// The Republic of Belarus or the Belarussian republic?

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański,Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga / Language(s): English,Polish

Ukraine's Parliamentary System after the Elections

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English,Polish

The dominant force in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, elected in March 2002, are the deputies of "One Ukraine", a fraction of the pro-presidential centre. "One Ukraine" has refused to admit any of the opposition's representatives (either from the right or left wings) into the parliament's presidium, but has accepted opposition-appointed heads of many parliamentary commissions. Viktor Yuschenko's "Our Ukraine", which has been the largest parliamentary fraction since June, attempted to proclaim itself the centre of the parliamentary majority, but its policy was awkward and inconsistent, and the main success of this club was that it didn't break up. Viktor Yuschenko's moves have been particularly incoherent and they undermined the image of Yuschenko as Ukraine's future leader, created throughout the course of the electoral campaign.In autumn, the main oligarchic groups and their representative fractions ("One Ukraine", which proved to be a useless instrument, was dissolved in June), reached a compromise with the president. It was agreed that the new prime minister should be a Donetsk clan representative (Viktor Yanukovych), and that the Dnipropetrovsk clan should appoint the president of the National Bank of Ukraine (this position went to Serhij Tihipko). The Kyiv clan obtained the President's Administration (Viktor Medvedchuk was appointed in spring) and a considerable number of parliamentary commissions. The president's interests in the government are to be protected by Mykola Azarov, former Head of the State Tax Administration. This compromise "package" was designed to secure the shares of the main oligarchic clans in the power and the president's strong position as mediator.

W cieniu historii. Stosunki rumuńsko-mołdawskie

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): Polish

Rumunię i Mołdawię łączą bardzo silne więzy wynikające przede wszystkim z wielu lat wspólnej historii (w tym wspólnej państwowości), języka oraz dorobku kulturowego. Ta bliskość z jednej strony sprzyja budowaniu stosunków dwustronnych, z drugiej zaś stanowi dla nich także poważne obciążenie. Mołdawska państwowość oraz tożsamość budowana jest bowiem niejako w opozycji do państwowości i tożsamości rumuńskiej. Część społeczeństwa (szczególnie mniejszość rosyjskojęzyczna) obawia się bliższej współpracy z Bukaresztem, widząc w niej zagrożenie utratą niepodległości i zapowiedź zjednoczenia z zachodnim sąsiadem. Historyczny sentyment znajduje także odbicie w polityce Bukaresztu wobec Mołdawii. Oficjalnie stosunki z Kiszyniowem uważane są za szczególne, a przedstawiciele rumuńskiej klasy politycznej prześcigają się w deklaracjach pomocy i poparcia dla wschodniego sąsiada, odwołując się przy tym do wspólnoty narodowej, kulturowej i językowej. W praktyce jednak polityka Rumunii wobec Mołdawii (a co za tym idzie, także wzajemne stosunki) kształtowana jest najczęściej nie przez sentymenty, lecz przez polityczny pragmatyzm wynikający m.in. z chęci zdobycia poparcia rumuńskiego elektoratu.

W poszukiwaniu nowych szlaków. Handel zagraniczny Ukrainy po rewolucji godności

Author(s): Sławomir Matuszak / Language(s): Polish

Prowadzona przez Ukrainę od uzyskania niepodległości polityka wielowektorowości, czyli manewrowania między Zachodem i Rosją bez angażowania się w projekty integracyjne którejkolwiek ze stron, miała też swój wymiar gospodarczy. Dla Kijowa jednakowo ważna, choć z różnych przyczyn, była wymiana handlowa z Rosją i innymi państwami poradzieckimi, Unią Europejską oraz resztą świata. Niechęć Ukrainy do podjęcia wiążących decyzji co do kierunku zacieśniania współpracy z Rosją bądź z UE wynikała w dużej mierze z obawy przed negatywnymi konsekwencjami takiego kroku dla stosunków gospodarczych z pozostałymi obszarami. Także ukraińscy oligarchowie, będący głównymi beneficjentami dochodów z eksportu, nie zajmowali wspólnego stanowiska wobec procesów integracyjnych w regionie, zadowalając się stanem zawieszenia, w którym znajdowała się Ukraina.