Series:OSW Studies

The language issue in Ukraine. An attempt at a new perspective

Problem językowy na Ukrainie. Próba nowego spojrzenia

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Ukraina; ukraiński język; polityka historyczna

Ukraina zaledwie od dwudziestu lat jest państwem niepodległym, a konsekwencją długotrwałego pozostawania ziem ukraińskich w państwie rosyjskim/sowieckim jest mieszany etnicznie charakter społeczeństwa. Na Ukrainie obok Ukraińców mieszkają bardzo liczni Rosjanie i członkowie innych narodowości b. ZSRR, a także wciąż duża grupa ludzi, identyfikujących się jako ludzie sowieccy. Znacząca część Ukraińców posługuje się w życiu codziennym (zwłaszcza zawodowym) językiem rosyjskim, znając ukraiński słabo lub nie znając go wcale. Kwestia językowa jest więc poważnym wyzwaniem dla państwa ukraińskiego i jednym z ważniejszych problemów ukraińskiej polityki wewnętrznej. // Celem tego opracowania jest zarysowanie problematyki językowej Ukrainy i jej kontekstu społecznego, ze zwróceniem uwagi na ważne, a zazwyczaj pomijane w tego rodzaju opracowaniach zagadnienia, jak aspekt handlowy (komercyjny) regulacji językowych w mediach oraz kluczowa rola „kwestii językowej” w ukraińskiej polityce tożsamości (polityce symbolicznej, historycznej etc.).

No change in the Russian Caucasus. The winter olympics amid a local war

No change in the Russian Caucasus. The winter olympics amid a local war

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English

Keywords: The North Caucasus;Russia;Russian Federation (RF);Ramzan Kadyrov;Chechnya; Winter Olympics;Islamisation;

The North Caucasus has been the most unstable region of the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Considering the scale of violence, the conflict in the region should be regarded as a local civil war between the Salafi Islamic armed underground and the secular authorities of the North Caucasus republics, supported by the security services. The Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, who has made himself de facto independent from Moscow, holds a particularly strong position in the region and his ambition is to gain control of the neighbouring territories. The Russian leadership, which sees the security of the Winter Olympics in Sochi as its top priority, is facing a strategic choice between trying to integrate the North Caucasus with the rest of the federation, or isolating the region and accepting the existence of an informal "internal abroad” within Russia. The cultural processes taking place in the region, including Islamisation, de-modernisation and de-Russification, have been driving the North Caucasus ever further away from the rest of Russia, strengthening a mutual sense of foreignness.

No change in the Russian Caucasus. The winter olympics amid a local war

Rosyjski Kaukaz bez zmian. Lokalna wojna na przedpolach olimpiady

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: The North Caucasus;Russia;Russian Federation (RF);Ramzan Kadyrov;Chechnya; Winter Olympics;Islamisation;

Od rozpadu ZSRR Kaukaz Północny pozostaje najbardziej niestabilną częścią Federacji Rosyjskiej, a skala przemocy wskazuje, że mamy do czynienia z lokalną wojną domową. Jej stronami są: odwołujące się do islamu salafickiego zbrojne podziemie oraz świeckie władze poszczególnych republik, wspierane przez struktury siłowe. Wyjątkowo silną pozycję osiągnął lider Czeczenii Ramzan Kadyrow, który w dużym stopniu uniezależnił się od Moskwy i chce podporządkować sobie sąsiednie terytoria. Kreml, dla którego priorytetem jest bezpieczeństwo igrzysk w Soczi, stoi przed strategiczną decyzją, czy próbować integrować Kaukaz Północny, czy też go izolować, godząc się na istnienie nieformalnej „wewnętrznej zagranicy”. Procesy, toczące się w regionie – islamizacja, demodernizacja czy derusyfikacja – mentalnie coraz bardziej oddalają go od reszty Rosji, wzmacniając poczucie wzajemnej obcości.

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market

Przeciąganie liny. Rosja wobec zmian na europejskim rynku gazu

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: European gas market; Russian gas;Russia and the West;

Rosja, dostrzegając ewolucję unijnego rynku gazu (w tym niekorzystne dla niej zmiany prawne), próbuje utrzymać na nim swoją pozycję, realizując strategię dychotomiczną. Z jednej strony, Moskwa przyjmuje postawę ofensywną: utrzymuje krytyczną retorykę wobec zmian prawnych i instytucjonalnych; negując zasadność nowych reguł dąży do ich podważenia przy użyciu środków prawnych i politycznych; wykorzystuje tradycyjne środki ekonomiczne, takie jak inwestycje w aktywa czy forsowanie projektów budowy nowych gazociągów. Z drugiej strony, ewolucja rynku gazu w UE wymusiła na Rosji podjęcie określonych działań adaptacyjnych: ograniczone zmiany funkcjonowania wewnętrznego sektora gazowego w Rosji; zapowiedzi dalszego ograniczenia dominującej pozycji Gazpromu; ustępstwa w negocjacjach handlowych z europejskimi partnerami: częściowe dostosowywanie się do reguł tzw. trzeciego pakietu energetycznego. Licząc jednak na nietrwałość trendów liberalizacyjnych w UE i brak postępów państw członkowskich w zmniejszaniu zależności od rosyjskiego gazu, Moskwa nastawia się na długotrwałą rozgrywkę gazową z unijnymi partnerami.

An essential partner in the background. Europe in China's policy during the rule of Xi Jinping

Niezbędny partner drugoplanowy. Europa w polityce Chin w okresie rządów Xi Jinpinga

Author(s): Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: China;the EU;bilateral relations;the European Union;Chinese economy; economic and financial system;global governance;

Chińskie elity nie traktują Europy jako równorzędnego partnera i są przekonane o własnej przewadze oraz narastającej asymetrii we wzajemnych stosunkach. Wewnętrzne podziały w Unii Europejskiej dodatkowo wzmacniają chińskie poczucie siły. Zarazem Europa pozostaje największym partnerem ekonomicznym Chin i „gospodarczym filarem” chińskiego wzrostu na arenie międzynarodowej. Pekin dąży do utrzymania otwartości Europy na chińską gospodarkę, przede wszystkim w odniesieniu do chińskiego eksportu, transferu technologii do Chin, lokowania inwestycji oraz dywersyfikacji posiadanych rezerw walutowych. Współpraca z Europą i poparcie z jej strony są niezbędne dla poprawy pozycji Chin w międzynarodowym porządku gospodarczo-finansowym, przede wszystkim dla uwiarygodnienia chińskich działań w sferze multilateralizmu oraz globalnego zarządzania. Jednocześnie Pekin przywiązuje dużą wagę do utrzymania dotychczasowego niezaangażowania Europy w dwóch kwestiach: chińskich żywotnych interesów oraz stosunków chińsko-amerykańskich.

Russia's armed forces on the information war front. Strategic documents

Russia's armed forces on the information war front. Strategic documents

Author(s): Jolanta Darczewska / Language(s): English

Keywords: armed forces;information space;Russian domestic politics;Russian foreign policy;cyberspace;information war;Russia;

The question about the role of the armed forces in the information space is in fact a question about the role of the factor of force in the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy. In Russia, this factor has invariably been treated as a hallmark of the country’s position as a global power, an instrument of deterrence, and a way to exert political pressure and build spheres of influence. The country’s military information strategy is designed to serve those tasks, and envisages multiple battle fronts, including internal and external affairs, the info-psychological front, the cyberspace and other spheres. Its visible consequences include a militarisation of the language of politics and propaganda, the imposition on public opinion of the narrative of an information war against Russia, and a radical change of the Russian army’s image. Today Russia forcefully demands that other countries respect its spheres of influence in the neighbourhood (as seen from its aggression against Ukraine and its armed intervention in Syria). It claims to be the guarantor of peace processes, even as it demolishes the European and global security architecture, and presents itself as a centre of power, asserting the right to co-decide on matters of global security.

Russia's armed forces on the information war front. Strategic documents

Rosyjskie siły zbrojne na froncie walki informacyjnej. Dokumenty strategiczne

Author(s): Jolanta Darczewska / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: armed forces;information space;Russian domestic politics;Russian foreign policy;cyberspace;information war;Russia;

Pytanie o rolę sił zbrojnych w przestrzeni informacyjnej jest w istocie pytaniem o rolę czynnika siły w polityce wewnętrznej i zewnętrznej państwa. W Rosji był on i nadal jest traktowany jako wyznacznik jej pozycji mocarstwowej, instrument odstraszania, nacisków i budowy sfer wpływów. Dostosowana do takich zadań wojskowa strategia informacyjna przewiduje walkę na wielu frontach: wewnętrznym i zewnętrznym, informacyjno-psychologicznym, cybernetycznym i in. Jej widoczne konsekwencje przejawiły się nie tylko w militaryzacji języka polityki i propagandy, narzucaniu opinii publicznej narracji o wydanej Rosji wojnie informacyjnej oraz diametralnej zmianie wizerunku armii. Rosja siłą domaga się respektowania swoich stref wpływów w sąsiedztwie (agresja wobec Ukrainy, interwencja zbrojna w Syrii). Burzy europejską i globalną architekturę bezpieczeństwa, przedstawiając się zarazem jako gwarant procesów pokojowych. Prezentując się jako biegun siły, manifestuje prawo do współdecydowania w kwestiach bezpieczeństwa globalnego.

The unfinished state. 25 years of independent Moldova

Państwo niedokończone. 25 lat mołdawskiej niepodległości

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Moldova;Moldovan politics;Moldovan identity;Vlad Plahotniuc;oligarchy;

Republika Mołdawii to państwo wyjątkowe. Jako jedyna republika radziecka 27 sierpnia 1991 roku ogłosiła niepodległość nie po to, by budować własną, niezależną przyszłość polityczną, ale by stać się częścią innego państwa – Rumunii. Po wybuchu wojny domowej, rozpadzie państwa, a w efekcie upadku projektu zjednoczeniowego, nowo powstała Mołdawia znalazła się w swoistej próżni ideowej. Pozbawiona doświadczeń państwowości, spójnej historii, odpowiedzialnych elit oraz pewnego swej tożsamości narodu zaczęła długi marsz w poszukiwaniu pomysłu na kształt państwowości i kierunku dalszego rozwoju. Po 25 latach istnienia projekt społeczno-polityczny, jakim jest Republika Mołdawii, przeżywa bardzo poważny kryzys. Mołdawska państwowość niezmiennie pozostaje krucha i sprawia wrażenie tymczasowej. W ciągu tego okresu kolejne ekipy rządzące nie były w stanie zbudować efektywnych instytucji państwowych ani stworzyć warunków do rozwoju gospodarczego. Utrzymująca się przez lata strukturalna i gospodarcza słabość państwa sprawiła, że współczesna Mołdawia stanowi dziś przykład poradzieckiej oligarchii, rządzonej przez wąską grupę, zainteresowaną ochroną własnych interesów polityczno-biznesowych, skupioną wokół najpotężniejszego polityka i biznesmana – Vlada Plahotniuca.

Region specjalnej troski. Rosyjski Daleki Wschód w polityce Moskwy

Region specjalnej troski. Rosyjski Daleki Wschód w polityce Moskwy

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): Polish

Keywords: Russian Far East;Russian political system;Russian economic system;Russian economy;

O ile w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku rosyjski Daleki Wschód nie stanowił ważnego regionu w polityce wewnętrznej władz centralnych Rosji, o tyle po dojściu do władzy Władimira Putina został na poziomie deklaratywnym uznany za strategiczny. Moskwa nie potrafiła jednak dotąd wygenerować rzeczywistych impulsów rozwojowych w regionie. Z jednej strony wynika to z problemów systemowych występujących w całej Rosji – brak spójnej koncepcji rozwoju gospodarczego, nieefektywne zarządzanie; z drugiej strony z barier stricte lokalnych – problemy kadrowe, zdecentralizowany system energetyczny, ograniczone zaangażowanie inwestorów zagranicznych. Nie istnieje obecnie ryzyko marginalizacji regionu na podobieństwo lat dziewięćdziesiątych. Wydaje się jednak, że polityczna reintegracja regionu z federalnym centrum (ściślejsza instytucjonalna kontrola ze strony Moskwy) oraz status stabilnego zaplecza surowcowego państw azjatyckich to obecnie maksimum możliwości rozwojowych rosyjskiego Dalekiego Wschodu.

Russia’s best ally. The situation of the Russian oil sector and forecast for its future

Russia’s best ally. The situation of the Russian oil sector and forecast for its future

Author(s): Wojciech Konończuk / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; oil sector

Oil is a strategic raw material for Russia and one of fundamental significance for the functioning of the state and its future. Taxes on oil production and exports are the most important source of state budget revenues which guarantee Russia maintains its political and economic stability. Russia is building its international position on the basis of its vast raw material and energy potential. While a great number of various publications have been devoted to Russian gas and Gazprom, surprisingly little research has been done into the present condition and possible future developments of the Russian oil sector, despite the fact that oil has and will have a much greater impact than gas on the functioning and the future of Russia. The main objective of this text is to describe the present situation of the Russian oil sector, its problems and the challenges it is posing, as well as the government’s policy towards this key branch of the Russian economy. This will be an introduction to an attempt to answer to the questions about the possible future production and the export levels of Russian oil, also broken down into the European and Asian directions.

Russia's Afghan Problem. The Russian Federation and the Afghanistan problem since 2001

Russia's Afghan Problem. The Russian Federation and the Afghanistan problem since 2001

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Afghanistan

Russia is facing a difficult choice regarding its further policy towards the Afghan problem. It seems that Moscow has no coherent or consistent strategy. It is likely that the Russian ruling elite, like expert circles, is divided on this issue. In practice, the Russian authorities now seem to be simultaneously implementing elements of various strategies, thus trying to leave themselves the widest possible room for manoeuvre.

One country, two societies? Germany twenty years after reunification

One country, two societies? Germany twenty years after reunification

Author(s): Artur Ciechanowicz,Marta Zawilska-Florczuk / Language(s): English

Keywords: Germany; reunification

3 October 2010 marked the twentieth anniversary of the reunification of the two German states. This is an occasion for summing up and evaluating the changes which have taken place in Germany since 1990. Germany became reunited through the incorporation of the East German federal states to the then Federal Republic of Germany. The West German point of view is predominant in public discourse regarding this issue, which is manifested through grading the new federal states for their progress in assimilation to the western part of Germany. However, this way the positive changes which have taken place in the social, political and economic areas in the eastern federal states over the past two decades are often disregarded. This paper is an attempt to show the changes which have taken place in Germany, involving areas in which new federal states have outperformed the western part of the country.

Russia’s revisionist policy towards the West

Russia’s revisionist policy towards the West

Author(s): Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia

Russia’s actions so far have led to a kind of deadlock. Moscow has managed to stop NATO enlargement into the CIS area, persuade the USA not to deploy the missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, and avoid major consequences after the war with Georgia; nevertheless, the full implementation of its objectives remains unlikely.

Russia's policy in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia

Russia's policy in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English,Polish

1. The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia are priority areas for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Russia mainly sees its influence in both regions as an important factor determining its international stature, and as a precondition for reinforcing its position as a world power. The Caucasus and Central Asia are also important for Russia from the points of view of economy, especially because of those area's natural resource wealth, and security, as both regions generate serious potential threats to the Russian Federation, including Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, the drugs trade and illegal migration. // 2. The policy which Russia has been implementing in the Southern Caucasus is ineffective. Even though its position in the region is still strong, Moscow has suffered painful defeats there and is systematically losing influence. These failings should largely be blamed on Russia's colonial 'divide and rule' attitude which involves inciting conflicts between the various Caucasian nations in order to keep them within the Russian sphere of influence. However, this approach is only effective in the short term. It is based on domination rather than co-operation, and reflects the Kremlin's ambition to keep the Caucasian states dependent on Moscow. For this reason they treat Russia as a 'necessary evil' rather than a constructive partner, and are trying to make themselves independent of their former overlords to as great an extent as they possibly can. This situation is not conducive to the development of lasting influence with sound regional foundations. // 3. The situation is different in Central Asia, where Russia has been scoring tactic victories and shoring up its position, mostly in the economic and military spheres. This is because the Kremlin has made skilful moves and is competently using the changing geopolitical situation in the region to pursue its own interests. Moscow has successfully implemented a 'carrot and stick' tactic in relation to the Central Asian states. Russia's position in the region is also strengthened by the fact that most Central Asian states are weak, and the West has shown relatively little interest in the region (apart from the energy sector). // 4. The weakness of the Kremlin's Central Asian policy is that it has failed to solve the mushrooming political, social and economic problems which the region is struggling with. This particular concerns the support that Moscow has been providing to the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, whose rule is exacerbating those countries' internal problems and leading to the development of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. As a consequence of the Kremlin's approach, the threats that Central Asia poses to Russia and its interests in the region are mounting rather than diminishing. // 5. The Kremlin's policy for the Caucasus and Central Asia has some distinctive features. It is characterised by a post-imperial and post-colonial perception of both regions in the eyes of the Russian power elite. In addition, Russia has no positive development model to offer to the states and societies in Central Asia, such as would buttress economic reforms or encompass projects to solve the mounting internal problems or frozen ethnic conflicts. In both regions, the Russians have failed to promote any values that could appeal to the politically and socially active strata of societies in the two regions, and could compete with Western values in the Caucasus or with Islamic values in Central Asia.

Russia vs. the European Union: a "strategic partnership" crisis

Russia vs. the European Union: a "strategic partnership" crisis

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak / Language(s): English,Polish

Keywords: Russia; European Union

1. Contrary to both parties' declarations on the development of their "strategic partnership", relations between Russia and the European Union have over recent years been in a state which could be called one of crisis. However, this does not mean that there have been no achievements in EU-Russian relations. The key problem is that Russia and the European Union have essentially different perceptions, aspirations and interests, which causes mistrust and disillusionment. This crisis is manifested in mutual criticism by the two sides, regularly recurring tensions and cooling of relations ("minicrises"), and especially by the "virtualisation of co-operation", i.e. concealing a lack of substantive content in many key areas under increasingly rich layers of dialogue and co-operation. // 2. The causes of the crisis differ, and some of them are profound. Most of them originate from Russia and its policy. These fundamental reasons include a lack of any clear definition of Russia's civilisational identity (whether it is a European or a Eurasian state), a lack of any defined and established vision of Russia's place in the modern world, and of a policy based thereon (the "great power" option vs. the pro-integration option), a crisis in Russia's "European project" (supporters of Russia's actual integration with the European area are in a minority among the Russian ruling elite), a lack of understanding and a negative perception of the EU and its policy by a great part of that Russian ruling elite, and the failure to develop a vision of an ultimate model of relations with the EU by the Russian government. The internal crisis in the EU (its unclear prospects for institutional reform, enlargement and neighbourhood policy) is adversely affecting its policy towards Russia. // 3. Additionally, the crisis is worsened by other factors, which on one hand are linked to the peculiarity of the Russian Federation's policy, and on the other result from the conflict of interests between Russia and the European Union. In the first case, the current Russian authorities are sticking to a model of government (authoritarianism) which is essentially different from European standards, and they resort to negative political tactics in their relations with the EU (including by exploiting differences of opinions within the EU for their own benefit). In the second case, discrepancies between the two sides' respective policies towards a "common neighbourhood" (especially towards the western countries of the CIS situated between Russia and the EU) take prominence. Russia has been attempting to support a specific political and economic model in this area, different from that suggested by the EU, as it perceives the EU's activity as a challenge to its interests. // 4. The future of Russian-EU relations depends on many factors. An analysis of the current key trends leads to the following conclusions: - It should not be expected in the short term that the situation will clearly improve, nor that the crisis will be overcome, mainly due to the fundamental causes thereof and a lack of signs of any essential change in either Russia's domestic policy or its international environment. // - some positive changes (from the European perspective) in Russia's European policy can be expected in the long term; there is a chance for a revival of Russia's "European project", which can be deduced from long-term trends (including the advantage of long-term tendencies to devolution over integration in the CIS area, the growing power of China, the expected growth of the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism and extremism on Russian territory, the asymmetric partnership with the USA which lacks durable foundations, and in particular the strong cultural, political and economic ties which exist between Russia and the rest of Europe).

North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia

North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English

Keywords: North Caucasus; Russia

1. North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. // 2. There are many reasons for the instability in the region; they stem from numerous political, religious and socioeconomic problems and conflicts. They all overlap, interweave and create a complex network. The most difficult problem is the war in Chechnya, lasting since the early 90's, which is spilling over the neighboring republics, takes increasingly more drastic shapes and poses a threat to the security and stability of the entire country. The conflict stimulates dangerous tendencies and processes all over Caucasus: it is one of the reasons for the intensifying anti-Russian sentiments in the local communities, and it accelerates their drifting towards radical Islam, etc. Moreover, the region is a scene of numerous ethnic conflicts (the conflicts in Dagestan, the western part of Caucasus, the Ingush- -Ossetian conflict), religious (mainly inside Islam) and conflicts between the indigenous Russian people and immigrants from Caucasus and Central Asia in Stavropol and Krasnodar Krais as well as acute socioeconomic problems (poverty, unemployment, overpopulation, growing crime). // 3. Since the collapse of the USSR, the Kremlin has failed to frame a consistent and long-term concept for development of North Caucasus and its integration with the rest of Russia. The Russian authorities' policy towards Caucasus is limited to emergency actions, responding to crises instead of preventing them. It consists in abortive attempts to liquidate the effects of negative tendencies and events and not on counteracting the causes thereof. The authorities are still making the same mistakes, unwilling to recognize their obvious failures. The key elements of the policy include: preventing any interference of other countries and international organizations in the region, conducting the "antiterrorist operation", supporting the puppet regimes in particular republics, marginalisation of the opposition and the far-flung propaganda in the mass media, which shows a false picture of the reality. A great role in the Caucasian policy of the Kremlin is played by law enforcement structures, whose interests often collide with the interests of the Russian state. Such a policy does not lead to resolving problems and conflicts, on the contrary, it leads to deepening and escalation thereof. // 4. The future of North Caucasus depends on either settlement or worsening of the existing problems; if they intensify, Caucasus will be plunging in chaos. The instability in the region is accompanied by further-reaching processes, i.e. gradual drifting apart of Caucasus from Russia, its derussification and increasingly faster Islamisation. Such tendencies, which in the prospect of several decades could end in a high degree of autonomy or even separation of the region from the Russian Federation, could be slowed down through working out of a comprehensive concept for development of the region. However, for the time being, the Kremlin has neither political will nor ability to develop and implement such a concept: the main reasons for that are the views of the Russian ruling elites and the general condition of the Russian state (the lack of sufficient financial means, lack of proper staff, resistance of the law enforcement structures, degeneration of the state structures, etc.). // 5. North Caucasus is a region where many serious problems are concentrated. The future of Russia will depend on their resolution (the Chechen war, other ethnic and religious conflicts, rapid growth of non-Russian and Muslim population, decreasing number of ethnic Russians, etc.). So long as Moscow is unable to resolve them, Russia will be an unpredictable and instable country, in danger of terrorism and convulsed by internal conflicts. Unless the Kremlin copes with the issue of Caucasus, it will not be possible for Russia to enter on the path of democratic reform, to make the attempt to create a modern country, open to global cooperation. Caucasus is today a source of disintegration of the Russian state, of its structures and society; unless this is held back, in the longer term, it may become a source of its collapse. Russia's position in the post-Soviet area and, above all, in South Caucasus will also depend on the way the situation in North Caucasus develops.

Putin after re-election. The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term

Putin after re-election. The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English

Keywords: Putin; Russia

1. Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life. // 2. Since Putin's re-election no return to wide-ranging economic reforms can be observed; previously, the reformist impetus of the President's team had been checked halfway though his first term of office, with a view to the approaching parliamentary and presidential elections). Thus, the concentration of power in the President's hands (which had been repeatedly named as a sine qua non for the implementation of unpopular reforms) has not brought about any continuation of economic reforms. The authorities have limited themselves to selected actions in the social sphere and have made no attempts to reform the area of the natural resource monopolies. Nor have they guaranteed to put into practice the pro-market acts which had been passed during Putin's first term of office. Instead, one may observe the consumption of the fruits of the boom in the raw material markets, and the demonstration of Russia's remarkable economic indicators (which in fact mostly derive from high oil prices). Meanwhile, unfavourable conditions for long-term economic development in Russia are growing: the archaic structure of the economy is being strengthened (the overwhelming dominance of big businesses over small- and medium-sized enterprises in GDP production); the raw-material profile of the Russian economy is being reinforced (at the cost of services and technologies), the Kremlin's political control and "manual steering" of the economy is growing, and corruption (the which is a serious problem for the effective functioning of the Russian economy) has not been reduced. // 3. The elections and the beginning of Vladimir Putin's second term of office were a period which saw an increase in the Kremlin's control over both state and private property. This was done by strengthening the position of big state companies (especially in the raw materials sector), by increasing the amount of state regulation over the strategic sectors of the economy, and by tightening control of private companies. At the same time, the right to private property is being violated by the ruling elite. Under the pretext of collecting delinquent tax demands, the authorities are attempting to take over the assets of Russia's biggest private company, the oil concern Yukos. Such actions have already lead to an increased flight of capital from Russia, and to a general deterioration of the country's image as a stable, predictable economic partner which encourages foreign investments. // 4. In the last few months Russian political life has witnessed a visible intensification of Kremlin propaganda, based on the ideology of security. The authorities are trying to create an image of Russia as a country besieged by the hostile outside world (especially the West), and undermined from within by a democratic "fifth column". The Russian authorities, using the media, are requiring a unification of forces in the battle against terrorism. In practice, this means a strengthening of the President's powers at the cost of other centres of public life, as well as an intensification of xenophobia and distrust towards all forms of dissidence and dissent. Moreover, the Kremlin is trying to involve the Russian Orthodox Church in the struggle for people's minds. The authorities have appealed to Orthodox hierarchs for "active participation in fighting terrorism by boosting society's morale". // 5. Since the very beginning of Vladimir Putin's rule, we have witnessed a visible expansion in the appointment of security service representatives (the so-called "chekists"), as well as their increasing influence on politics, the economy and social issues. This tendency has been maintained since Putin's re-election. At the moment, the "chekists" have influence not only on state government issues, but also have increasing access to financial resources. At the present stage of Putin's rule, a wider process can be noted of appointing Putin's close colleagues from the security services to key posts in state-controlled companies. Also, the "chekists" activity keeps growing in the sphere of ideology.

Relations between Russia and NATO before and after the 11th of September /// Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's aspirations to integrate with NATO and the EU in the context of these countries' relations with Russia

Relations between Russia and NATO before and after the 11th of September /// Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's aspirations to integrate with NATO and the EU in the context of these countries' relations with Russia

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak,Miryna Kutysz,Joanna Hyndle-Hussein / Language(s): English,Polish

Putin: the first year /// The Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of EU enlargement

Putin: the first year /// The Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of EU enlargement

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak,Bartosz Cichocki,Andrzej Wilk,Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz / Language(s): English,Polish

Russia’s Middle Eastern policy. Regional ambitions, global objectives

Russia’s Middle Eastern policy. Regional ambitions, global objectives

Author(s): Witold Rodkiewicz / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Middle East; foreign policy; Middle Eastern policy; Russian military interventions; Syria; geopolitics; conflicts;

The Russian military intervention in Syria began in autumn 2015 and was met with a wave of comments claiming that Russia had regained its global power position in the Middle East. The purpose of the present paper is to identify the nature of Russia’s position as a power in the Middle East and to trace the motives guiding the Kremlin’s Middle Eastern policy. The first part attempts to identify the place Middle Eastern policy occupies in the Kremlin’s overall foreign policy and Moscow’s priorities in the region. The second part describes the evolution of post-Soviet Russia’s Middle Eastern policy, pointing to its growing involvement in the region on the one hand, and the instrumental nature of that involvement on the other. Because the Russian military intervention in Syria has been the central element of Russia’s Middle Eastern policy since the autumn of 2015, the third part is devoted to analysing the reasons for and objectives of that intervention. Parts four and five delve into Russia’s policy towards the countries it considers its most important regional partners, i.e. Turkey and Iran. Part six attempts to analyse the instruments with which Russia has built its position in the region and to assess the outcomes of its Middle Eastern policy and the challenges ahead of that policy.