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Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE RUSSIA UKRAINE CONFLICT

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE RUSSIA UKRAINE CONFLICT

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE RUSSIA UKRAINE CONFLICT

Author(s): Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili,Sanda Svetoka / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; conflict; strategic communications; social media; PSYOPS; cyber attacks; security;

Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili and Sanda Svetoka of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia, in Chapter 12, discuss the role of social media in this conflict. In the Internet era, the battle for hearts and minds has never been more important. Social media is a trust-based network that provides fertile soil for intelligence collection, propaganda dissemination, and psychological operations (PSYOPS) to influence public opinion – or to lead adversaries into harm’s way. ‘Soft’ cyber attacks can be as severe as any attack on critical infrastructure. In Ukraine, they have generated fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the economic, cultural, and national security of Ukraine, while promoting positive messages about Russia’s role in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The authors provide recommendations for defence against such attacks, including how to identify them, challenge them, and how to develop a resilient political narrative to withstand false propaganda.

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RUSSIAN INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA WAR: SOME METHODS AND FORMS TO COUNTERACT

RUSSIAN INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA WAR: SOME METHODS AND FORMS TO COUNTERACT

RUSSIAN INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA WAR: SOME METHODS AND FORMS TO COUNTERACT

Author(s): Volodymyr Ogrysko / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; Crimea; information; propaganda; media; warfare; counteract methods;

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the form of the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas has apart from a military also a powerful informative dimension. The latter is a planned, well-coordinated and well-funded disinformation campaign targeting different audiences. From my point of view and that of other experts of the Centre for Russian Studies, to effectively counteract Russian’s propaganda we must take into account three key factors. First, to clearly identify the audience we are talking about. Second, the messages that Moscow propaganda uses for each audience. Third, the tools the Russian propaganda machine uses for their spread. Within the first factor the Kremlin targets three groups. The first – Russian’s civil society (or what is called “civil society” in Russia). The second – the Ukrainian audience, with particular emphasis on areas occupied by Russians in Ukraine (Crimea and parts of Donbas). The third - the EU and NATO member- states. Obviously, each of Russia’s targets has its own specifics and needs different approaches, forms and methods of research. Only this would allow us to realistically analyze Kremlin’s propaganda and offer practical countermeasures. The limited scope of this article does not allow a thorough analysis of all the factors, hence І will focus only on some of them. According to a survey conducted by the Levada Center in Moscow in March 2015, Russian citizens consider the following three countries (or unions) as main enemies of Russia: the US (73%), the EU (64%) and Ukraine (55%). Instead, “friends” of Russia are Belarus (85%) and China (76%). 50% of Russians believe that Putin acted correctly during his Crimea annexation speech mentioning a possibility to use nuclear weapon. Moreover, 49% believe that Russia’s main foreign policy achievement was its return to the status of “a great power.”

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ROBOTROLLING FAQ

ROBOTROLLING FAQ

ROBOTROLLING FAQ

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: media; communication; information; social media; robotic trolling; fake accounts; algorithm; bots;

What is Robotic trolling? Robotic trolling or ‘robotrolling’ is the coordinated use of fake accounts on social media. It is important to note that the divide between a bot and genuine account, by which we mean human-controlled account, is not a clear-cut one. Bots should be thought of on a spectrum, from fully automated to varying degrees of partially automated accounts. Not all bots claim to be humans. We are especially interested in bots which impersonate people or rely on fake identities. Such accounts may be operated either by human-handlers, or by algorithm. It may be impossible to separate the two. As a result, we refer to bot-like activity, that is, activity that could be performed by a computer. Whether it is a human or an algorithm copy-pasting messages is not important for our purposes: in either case, it is an example of deception.

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ROBOTROLLING (2017-1)

ROBOTROLLING (2017-1)

ROBOTROLLING (2017-1)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: media; social media; communication; information; robot trolling; bots; algorithm; Twitter; Russian language; English language; Estonia; Latvia; Poland; Lithuania;

Two in three Twitter users who write in Russian about the NATO presence in Eastern Europe are robotic or ‘bot’ accounts. Together, these accounts created 84% of the total Russian-language messages. The English language space is also heavily affected: 1 in 4 active accounts were likely automated and were responsible for 46% of all English-language content. Of the four states considered—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—Estonia has disproportionately frequently been targeted by bots, whereas Poland and Lithuania have seen the least automated activity. Our impression is that Twitter in Russian is policed less effectively than it is in English. Despite the high presence of automated activity, the period considered saw no large-scale, coordinated robotic campaigns. The vast majority of bot activity is apolitical spam. For this reason, the polluted state of Twitter conversations about the NATO presence may be indicative of Twitter as a whole. The implications are stark: the democratising possibilities of social media appear—at least in the case of Twitter in Russia—to have been greatly undermined. The findings presented have practical implications for any policy maker, journalist, or analyst who measures activity on Twitter. Failure to account for bot activity will—at best—result in junk statistics. This is the first issue of ‘Robotrolling’, a regular product about automation in social media published quarterly by NATO StratCom COE.

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REDEFINING EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: RUSSIA`S MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUE

REDEFINING EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: RUSSIA`S MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUE

REDEFINING EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: RUSSIA`S MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUE

Author(s): Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; Europe; EU; politics; manipulation; information; communication; media; values;

Since November 2013, when the uprising of the Ukrainian nation set in motion a wide spectrum of events and political process, researchers and policy makers have been questioning the reasoning, consequences, and international implications of those political processes, as well as their impact on the future of the international political environment. This study, Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia`s Manipulative Techniques, is not one of the many investigations published in recent months focusing on Russian information warfare in Ukraine. It is not a study about them. This is a study about us, namely, the ‘transatlantic community’—a community we consider to be based on democratic values. This study seeks to answer an essential question: how can it be that countries, which enjoy leading positions in terms of prosperity, freedom, solidarity, innovation, economic competitiveness, and seemingly unlimited normative power based on the long-standing democratic traditions have neglected or ignored (intentionally and unintentionally) the manipulative redefinition of their core democratic values. By allowing our core democratic values to be deconstructed and reconstituted by values derived from an authoritarian regime makes Western society vulnerable to influence. Russia’s international ambitions are not based on conquering new territories, but on creating mental landscapes susceptible to political manipulation. Russia’s foreign policy goals with regard to the West are clear: ‘to weaken the West economically, to split it politically, and to establish Russia as the hegemonic power on the European continent’1 . Extensive material resources are unnecessary; individuals and societies that question themselves are decisive ‘weapons’ in the battle for influence. Transitioning out of the international relationships that dominated during the Cold War was an eye- and mind-opening exercise for both governments and societies. Most of the countries that left the Soviet bloc, including the Baltic States, joined those that are based on democratic values; however some keep their old values, fashionably redressed in a style called ‘sovereign democracy’.

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THE KREMLIN AND DAESH INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

THE KREMLIN AND DAESH INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

THE KREMLIN AND DAESH INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Author(s): Antti Sillanpää / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Kremlin; politics; information; communication; strategic communication; media; Daesh; social media;

The paper summarizes discussions held on 24 May 2016 in Riga, Latvia, which focused on exploring the Kremlin and DAESH information activities in order to improve our understanding of the nature of these communications and their effect on Western societies. The questions discussed were: How are the communications and messages of DAESH and the Kremlin constructed and disseminated? Are their methods changing? Why do such messages appeal to youth, even if they are familiar with Western values and consumerism? What are the weakest aspects of our information environment and what can we do to improve? Six items emerged from the discussion as most relevant to the investigation of these issues. 1) Identity and Values Identity and values are in constant flux across time and space. It is easier to attack the values and identity of the other, rather than offering something different and better than the opponent. However, the West should be clear that it cannot simply assume the moral high ground. One of the weakness of the West is that we have allowed some members of society to become isolated and/or marginalised; they are now the ones who are more open and susceptible to the messaging of DAESH and the Kremlin, especially messages that project a sense of pride and/or a feeling of inclusiveness because they appear to offer the opportunity to participate meaningfully in some sort of utopian society. 2) Strategic Communications and the National Narrative There is a distinct need to create and maintain a positive national narrative in which words and deeds align, and to communicate that effectively. A narrative should not be static, but responsive to the environment in which it is based. One idea that came up in discussion was to task a specific governmental entity with coordinating messages concerning the national narrative and the strategic communication approach. This entity should be situated close to the Presidential Administration or the Prime Minister’s Office and have clear operating procedures, goals, and resources that address the identified risks and threats. The highest political backing would ensure sufficient clout to function adequately and carry out the mission. This body should oversee national narrative and strategic communication efforts, and act as an advisory and educational hub for other parts of government. A whole government approach, spanning both civil and military spheres, is required. The increase in the number of stakeholders reduces chances to create and manage coherent but relevant international narratives 3) Messaging and Counter-Messaging There is a continuing discussion as to whether the West should concentrate on counter-messaging or should focus on messaging instead. An argument for engaging in counter-messaging is that lies and harmful messages should not go unchallenged, otherwise falsehoods and partial truths may become accepted as facts and be assimilated into a society’s ‘knowledge base’. An argument against engaging in countermessaging is that this practice is likely to ensure that the West remains in a defensive and reactive posture in the current information confrontation, and adversaries’ harmful messages get unintentionally repeated. However, by actively messaging there is a chance to dictate the informational agenda, thereby forcing the opponent into a reactive position. Irrespective of the focus on messaging or countermessaging, information activities should not be done in isolation, but as an integrated part of a political or policy programme. 4) Perception and Legitimacy Emotional resonance holds greater sway than logical argument as a political or social relationship is formed between an audience and a communicator. Some individuals and groups are more susceptible to messaging than others, often as the result of an unfulfilled need. The motivation to join and/or support DAESH is largely based upon the perception that what is being offered is legitimate and will fulfil some psychological or physical need of the individual recruit. The messenger that communicates a believable response to such needs may well be able to influence that particular individual or group. However, when an individual personally experiences the dissonance between the projected utopia and reality, their trust in the utopian vision soon disappears, and along with it any sense of motivation or commitment to the cause. 5) Measuring Activity and Effect Both DAESH and Russia have adopted Western technologies and understood the audience appetite for infotainment and quick satisfaction. DAESH and the Kremlin employ the tactic of shifting focus and attention away from areas where they are losing or vulnerable. They have the ability to affect our news agenda and our focus through big event news. Even if the Kremlin or DAESH are engaged in harmful or disruptive communication, the activity does not necessarily translate into influence that would weaken the national security of the target state. The measure of an activity, i.e. communicating, does not automatically neatly translate into the measure of its effect, i.e. influence and change of behaviour. There are many variables that can either obstruct or facilitate the level of influence and persuasion that actually takes place when an actor communicates. These differences put pressure on us to achieve a better understanding of human behaviour and develop more meaningful ways of measuring. Observing, let alone measuring, the effectiveness of ‘hybrid warfare’ is particularly challenging. 6) Analytical Tools and Frameworks In addition to traditional historical area studies and social science perspectives, there are a variety of promising frameworks that can be used to investigate the information activities of DAESH and the Kremlin. The potentially fruitful approaches discussed included political and obstruction marketing and psychology.

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MAPPING OF STRATCOM PRACTICES IN NATO COUNTRIES - RESULTS OF THE STUDY

MAPPING OF STRATCOM PRACTICES IN NATO COUNTRIES - RESULTS OF THE STUDY

MAPPING OF STRATCOM PRACTICES IN NATO COUNTRIES - RESULTS OF THE STUDY

Author(s): Gerry Osborne / Language(s): English

Keywords: NATO; StratCom; NATO countries; communication; strategic communication; research; interview;

“There is a curious dichotomy concerning StratCom in the NATO Alliance and in its membership nations. The term occupies an inordinately larger space in verbiage and documents than the function is given in the environments in which it is has the most potential to effect. This most recent study not only re-affirms previous results but more importantly, attempts to add to them by seeking to get to the “why”. While it does get to the “why”, the integrity of the results is somewhat diminished by the disappointing level of national participation with only 11 of 28 nations responding. For a function often on the lips of leadership -- both in the Alliance and its nations -- it is rather telling that 17 nations passed over the opportunity to illuminate the function and contribute to the discussion. Nevertheless, the report builds on the baseline understanding of how Allied nations define, organise and implement the StratCom function, and the results are as encouraging as they are concerning. Concerning because the author found that many responding nations still consider Strategic Communication to essentially be another name for what they formerly termed Public Affairs. Encouraging because the authors found that many nations acknowledged that the StratCom function needed to change from a supporting to a supported role – an understanding which is finding traction amongst experienced operators. Having previously written a paper which included Alliance nation mapping with respect to StratCom, I welcome this report for updating and contributing more to NATO’s understanding about how its membership individually considers StratCom. It gives needed insight into NATO policy development on behalf of all nations.”

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INTERNET TROLLING AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF LATVIA

INTERNET TROLLING AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF LATVIA

INTERNET TROLLING AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF LATVIA

Author(s): Alexander Fokin / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; media; internet; information; communication; trolling; tool; hybrid warfare; Latvia; case study;

Social media has been used increasingly to support military actions. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that the fight for hearts and minds is as important as kinetic activity, and social media plays a crucial role in this process. Both state and non-state actors effectively exploit social media to gain support for their actions, recruit new members, deceive and intimidate the adversary, and even use it for traditional military activities such as intelligence collection or command and control. Given these conditions, the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) was tasked to conduct a study on how social media can be used as a weapon of hybrid warfare. The recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict demonstrated how fake identities and accounts were used to disseminate narratives through social media, blogs, and web commentaries in order to manipulate, harass, or deceive opponents. Several reports by investigative journalists have reported about the existence of so called troll farms in Russian cities, employing people to spread disinformation, rumours, or falsified facts, enter into discussions and flood topic-related web spaces with their own messages or abuse. Nevertheless, trolling is still a relatively unexplored phenomenon. Although such activities have been widely identified, their effects have not been measured, particularly due to the fact that is it difficult to distinguish between the paid trolls and people who are simply expressing their opinions. In order to analyse how pro-Russian trolling is used to influence the public opinion in NATOmember countries the NATO StratCom COE commissioned the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: the Case of Latvia. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University, and was aimed at analysing organised proRussian trolling in internet media to measure its impact on public opinion in Latvia. Latvia was chosen for the case study due to the specifics of its information environment (a strong division between the Latvian and Russian language information spaces), as well as the country’s historical background and potentially vulnerability to Russian hybrid warfare tactics. Communication science, social anthropology, political science, and information technology expertise was employed to gain a better understanding of the trolling phenomenon, and to develop methods to identify trolling and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used. This research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and it offers recommendations on how to mitigate the effects of trolling when used as a tool in hybrid warfare, beyond the specific case study.

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ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

Author(s): Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili,Jānis Bērziņš,Aivar Jaeski,Mark Laity,Nerijus Maliukevičius,Aurimas Navys,Gerry Osborne,Robert Pszczel,Stephen Tatham / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; conflict; information; communication; Crimea; media; narratives; warfare; social media;

The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy. Over the years, Russia has been drawing lessons from different Allied operations and has worked on adapting its military planning to the realities of a modern conflict. It tested these lessons in the recent August 2008 war with Georgia which marked the first use of cyber warfare and information operations in conjunction with a conventional military operation. Russia has also shown a willingness to modernize Soviet-era tools and adapt them to today’s complex information environment. Critically, it has been willing to afford informationbased activities primacy in operations, using more conventional military forces in a supporting role. Russia’s information campaign has to be analysed in the context of the strategic narrative of the Russian government, reflected in policy documents like the Foreign Policy Review of 2007 and the State Security Review of 2009, and supported by legislative initiatives like the Federal Law on the Russian Federation’s State Policy on Compatriots Living Abroad. The notion of compatriots deserves particular attention as it allows Russia to legitimize the state’s duty to defend its compatriots abroad from any kind of threat to their rights or physical well-being. It also leads to the explanation of the need to sustain the so-called Russian World which implies maintenance of a unified Russian-language information sphere beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (mainly targeting the territory of the former USSR). The Russian government’s long-developed control over the mass media has been an important factor in the effective implementation of the information campaign against Ukraine. Russia’s narrative was instrumentalized with the help of concurrent messaging. For example, the main Russian TV channels were actively involved in framing opinions about the situation in Ukraine from the very beginning of the crisis. Control is exerted directly by the Presidential Administration, including also government-controlled internet ‘trolling’ which is a growing, under-researched phenomenon used to support the Russian government’s narrative. This control over the media has made it difficult for democratic states with free media to compete with the forceful, synchronized messaging of the Russian government. The Russian narrative includes several dominant themes: positioning Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization in opposition to “decadent” Europe; positioning Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union; promoting the Russian World which unites Eastern Slavs, implies that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation, and recognizes the natural supremacy of Russia; portraying Ukrainians as a pseudo-nation who are unable to administer their own country and sustain their statehood; referring to the Great Patriotic War thus bringing out the hatred of Nazism and relating it to the Euromaidan protesters who are labelled as nationalists, Nazis and fascists posing a threat to the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine’s population; dividing the West by utilising the differing interests of EU member states and positioning the USA in opposition to the EU; and using legal and historic justifications to legitimize Russia’s actions in Ukraine (including the Crimea Referendum). The report identifies that Russia’s information campaign was central to Russia’s operations in Ukraine. The information campaign and related military action by Russia corresponds to the characteristics of a new form of warfare where the lines between peace and war, foreign military force and local self-defence groups are blurred and the main battle space has moved from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the populations in question. Crimea may be considered a test-case for Russia in trying out this new form of warfare where hybrid, asymmetric warfare, combining an intensive information campaign, cyber warfare and the use of highly trained Special Operation Forces, play a key role. The crisis in Ukraine has provided valuable lessons for the Ukrainian government, the countries neighbouring Russia (whose Russian-speaking communities were enlarged as a result of Soviet-era policy), and NATO and the EU as organisations. The following are the general conclusions of the report: • Russia was prepared to conduct a new form of warfare in Ukraine where an information campaign played a central role. The characteristics of the new form of warfare which were implemented in Crimea were outlined by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, nearly a year before the crisis in Ukraine. Analysis of the Ukraine conflict suggests that NATO and the EU must adapt to the new reality where information superiority, as opposed to military power, is becoming increasingly important. • Russia’s narrative is largely based on historical memory. Russia’s thorough understanding of its own audiences – including compatriots abroad – was able to leverage historical memory: the Great Russian Empire, World War II and Nazi atrocities, and the might and collapse of the USSR. • Crisis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long term strategy. Learning from the Russian information campaign in Ukraine, it is clear that early detection and analysis of those elements within the Russian narrative signalling potential aggressive behaviour is critical. The report also demonstrates that Russia’s state policy documents contain such indications. • The role of Compatriots Abroad is critical and should be considered carefully in the future. The security implications for countries neighbouring Russia are particularly serious. The kind of strategy that Russia has employed in Ukraine is likely to work best in areas where there are larger communities of Russia’s Compatriots Abroad. They are the targets of Russia’s information campaign and potentially may be ready to provide local support in cases of Russian aggression. The Ukraine and Georgian cases demonstrate that such information campaigns, backed by military means, are easier to carry out in territories bordering Russia – in particular, in those countries which are not members of NATO and therefore not party to the Washington Treaty. • Audience Analysis is critical to operational success. Russia has demonstrated that understanding audiences and what motivates them is critical to operational success that is enduring. • There is “another side of the coin” to Russia’s information campaign. Although Russia’s information campaign has been successful in influencing its audiences (the Russian population and compatriots abroad), it also bears a degree of counter-productivity as it has radicalized and alienated other audiences – West Ukraine and Kyiv, the populations of NATO and EU countries and the USA. • Deception is used by Russia as a tactic to distract and delay. Investigating and disproving the false information, different versions of events and even conspiracy theories rapidly disseminated by Russia requires a lot of time, effort and resources on the part of international organisations like NATO, the Ukrainian government, independent media, experts and even ordinary citizens. • Disinformation campaigns erode over time. The evolution of the crisis in Ukraine beyond Crimea demonstrates that disinformation campaigns erode over time as more and more factual evidence is revealed to negate lies and falsification.

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“WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US” - AN ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2014.

“WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US” - AN ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2014.

“WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US” - AN ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2014.

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Afganistan; NATO; security; military mission; communications; ISAF;

By the time the green International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) flag was lowered for the last time at NATO headquarters in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, over 1 million NATO troops, civilians and contractors had served in theatre and many continue to do so as part of NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan. The financial cost is estimated conservatively to be at least $1 trillion US dollars. Almost 3,500 troops from 29 nations lost their lives, and tens of thousands more suffered serious injury. By any metric it is the longest, most complex, expensive and fractious operation in NATO’s history. The information environment today bears little resemblance to when the ISAF mission began. The past decade has witnessed a transition from the implications of the ‘strategic corporal’ to that of the ‘strategic tweet’ and adversaries have become increasingly more capable at using new communication tools. While it may be unlikely that the Alliance will conduct another mission like ISAF, important lessons can be drawn about policy, doctrine and capabilities to ensure that NATO Strategic Communication (StratCom) is fit for purpose in future operations. The NATO Strategic Communications Centre for Excellence was engaged to carry out an examination of the NATO StratCom effort during the ISAF years 2003-2014, with a particular focus on Public Affairs, Psychological Operations and the coordinating function Information Operations. It is the most extensive study to date of NATO StratCom, drawing from nearly 100 interviews with persons having direct knowledge of the Afghanistan mission from across the full scope of the campaign, representing many different nationalities and responsibilities. Source material includes speeches, NATO and ISAF briefings, extensive media reporting and a substantial collection of published literature. Numerous experts reviewed chapters throughout its development, and the report was peer reviewed by 22 experienced practitioners from 8 nations, from all communications disciplines. The study aims to question the commonly held view that NATO ‘lost’ the communications battle by assessing how effective the collective StratCom effort was and to understand the factors that contributed to its successes and major shortcomings.

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DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: extremist groups; terror; Daesh; information; communication; media; psychology; ICT; social media;

The terrorist organization, Daesh, also known as so-called Islamic State/IS/ISIS/ISIL, has launched an extremely sophisticated information campaign at various target audiences in order to gain support for its expansion in the Middle East. Daesh’s first strategic achievement, drawing considerable attention from various governments and mainstream Muslim groups, was the first public speech given by self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It was devoted entirely to the proclamation of the so-called Caliphate. In order to find out how this campaign is managed, and to propose practical solutions to existing challenges concerning situation on the Middle East, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) conducted research into Daesh’s information strategy. The methodology for analysing Daesh’s information strategy included a number of techniques such as social psychology, the psychology of communication, and social media analysis. The work was done in consultation with social media experts and advisors from NATO member states in order to achieve the best result. This executive summary summarizes three reports - “Type of applied persuasive strategy and its influence on message effectiveness” (Ph. D. T. Grzyb), „Visual framing in the Islamic State” (Ph. D. Shahira Fahmy) and “Network of Terror: How Daesh Uses Adaptive Social Networks to Spread its Message” (Mr. Joseph Shaheen).

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AI in Precision Persuasion - Unveiling Tactics and Risks on Social Media
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AI in Precision Persuasion - Unveiling Tactics and Risks on Social Media

AI in Precision Persuasion - Unveiling Tactics and Risks on Social Media

Author(s): Tetiana Haiduchyk,Artur Shevtsov,Gundars Bergmanis-Korats / Language(s): English

Keywords: AI; digital content; advertising; role of AI models; agriculture; grain crisis; Europe;

Our research describes the role of artificial intelligence (AI) models in digital advertising, highlighting their use in targeted persuasion. First we inspected digital marketing techniques that utilise AI-generated content and revealed cases of manipulative use of AI to conduct precision persuasion campaigns. Then we modelled a red team experiment to gain a deeper comprehension of current capabilities and tactics that adversaries can exploit while designing and conducting precision persuasion campaigns on social media. Recent advances in AI systems have significantly expanded opportunities within digital marketing. The same advances have been exploited by malign actors to conduct hostile communication on social networks, as demonstrated by previous research. Identifying and countering campaigns orchestrated and executed with AI is imperative to mitigate the imminent threats posed by these developments. Consequently, to examine the capabilities of generative AI in precision persuasion, we conducted an in-depth analysis of its application in digital marketing campaigns, specifically within the context of agricultural protests and the grain crisis in Europe. Content generation using AI systems remains challenging, as most of the publicly available tools produce low-quality results. Detectors of AI-generated text and images are more likely to fail at recognising AIgenerated content than at identifying the human-created. Considering the current pace of development in the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) for content generation, an even further decline in the effectiveness of tools designed to recognise such content is anticipated. This underscores the urgent need to develop more robust detection tools and establish requirements for companies producing AI-generated content, ensuring that such content is detectable. Implementing these measures should reduce the potential for manipulation. The presence of AI-generated content varies across social networks, depending on the content predominant on specific platforms. AI-generated images on Facebook, X, and VKontakte typically serve as supplementary content, often accompanying and illustrating human-created text, while AI-generated images and videos constitute the core content on TikTok. However, AI-generated text creates a more significant risk on platforms with less video-focused content, as it is more difficult for the average user to recognise, making manipulation less noticeable. Our research confirmed the use of AI in digital marketing. Specifically, we highlighted traces of AI in TikTok and Facebook advertisements promoting political parties and encouraging agricultural protests. It is worth noting that an account advertised in this way on TikTok was also involved in disseminating misleading content, such as deep fakes with German politicians. On the other hand, AI-generated content was detected in regular posts on agricultural protests and the grain crisis in Europe across all platforms. We found signs of coordinated efforts in the use of AI-generated content in an anti-Ukraine pesticide campaign and the promotion of a controversial website on Facebook, and AI-generated news on TikTok. These instances may have been part of hostile communications, which emphasises the need for immediate detection and reporting of such cases. To mitigate the harmful influence of AI-generated content on platforms, we recommend that platforms adopt transparent policies regarding such content. For instance, TikTok has recently begun labelling AI-generated content, encouraging users to report unlabelled content. While this system still requires refinement and improvement, it represents a crucial first step towards combating manipulation based on AI-generated content. Thus, identifying and analysing potentially artificially generated content on social media is key to understanding the mechanics, i.e. the detailed structure of AI-powered campaigns, including data about the target audience needed to execute the campaign, the message being disseminated and its structure, and the precise methods used to make an AI model generate the desired output. This knowledge is necessary to mitigate the potential risks associated with these campaigns. To address these questions, we designed a red team experiment, which is discussed later in the report. Using AI models to run effective targeting campaigns requires drawing meaningful conclusions about the targeted audience one works with. To do that, however, it is essential to obtain high-quality datasets containing features that would allow us to grasp particular but important information about social media users (features such as following data, posting activity, affiliation, education, or comments). Our experiment has shown that even with a limited amount of data about the targeted audience groups, one can still get insights significant enough to generate powerful messages tailored to a narrow audience. After audience analysis, we explored capabilities, limitations, and risks related to the use of specific commercial and open-source LLMs. When it comes to commercial LLMs, compliance with safeguarding policies against generating malicious or toxic content is more notable than with open-source models, which are more vulnerable to producing such content. Therefore, we recommend keeping and raising safeguarding standards that regulate both commercial and open-source LLMs. The European Union approved and adopted a legal framework that harmonises regulations on AI called the Artificial Intelligence Act (hereafter the AI Act) on 21 May 2024. This legislation is grounded on a ‘risk-based’ approach, meaning that the greater the risk that an AI product poses to harm society, the stricter the regulations that confine its usage. The AI Act can be considered as an important regulatory starting point and the foundation for the global legal regulation of AI in civil domains. However, some elements of it may still allow for ethical risks and the proliferation of harmful applications. For example, the AI Act does not apply to companies developing opensource AI systems, on the condition that these companies do not monetise their products. As we highlighted above, our investigation has shown that current open-source AI models have greater potential to generate content that can be used for malign purposes. Thus, we recommend that open-source tools receive more attention from regulatory commissions and legal authorities to further investigate the risks associated with the usage of these models, and refine the current and future regulatory frameworks accordingly.

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Climate- and Environmentally Based Information Activities by PRC and Russian Media
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Climate- and Environmentally Based Information Activities by PRC and Russian Media

Climate- and Environmentally Based Information Activities by PRC and Russian Media

Author(s): Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova,Tanya Lim / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; China; PRC; information; activities; security; climate change;

Russia and China have effectively contributed to shifting the debate on climate change into the realm of morals, rights and economic policies, rather than scientific reality. For them, climate change is not only a matter of the factual impact of carbon emissions on weather patterns, as argued by O’Connor and Weatherall1 , but also a question of morality or values. It is not only a scientific reality, but also a socially and politically constructed concept.2 Over the years, China and Russia have consistently shifted and adapted their climate change narratives, reflecting the political nature of the issue. China has undergone a notable transformation, shifting “from a passive participant to a proactive actor” in the global climate arena.3 Meanwhile, Russia has demonstrated a range of positions on the issue, from denial to acceptance to operationalisation of climate change.

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Social Media Manipulation for Sale - 2024 Experiment on Platform Capabilities to Detect and Counter Inauthentic Social Media Engagement
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Social Media Manipulation for Sale - 2024 Experiment on Platform Capabilities to Detect and Counter Inauthentic Social Media Engagement

Social Media Manipulation for Sale - 2024 Experiment on Platform Capabilities to Detect and Counter Inauthentic Social Media Engagement

Author(s): Gundars Bergmanis-Korats,Tetiana Haiduchyk / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; war; media; social media; manipulation;

Two and a half years since the Russian invasion in Ukraine, in addition to newly adopted EU regulations such as the Digital Services Act (DSA)1 and the Digital Market Act (DMA)2 allowed us to continue the series of these reports with high expectations of platforms having developed capabilities to identify and remove commercial manipulations. Although there were minor improvements across most platforms since our last experiment in 2022, our expectations were not fully met, leading us to speculate that EU regulations had minimal impact on detecting inauthentic engagement during our red team experiment. Why was this the case? Several potential reasons, which we explore in detail throughout this report, may address this phenomenon. During the experiment where we purchased inauthentic engagement from commercial social media manipulation services, platforms demonstrated significant variation in resilience to inauthentic activity, with notable differences in the ease of registration and the cost of SMS verification. Most platforms struggled with the removal of fake accounts; X showed good progress by removing 50% of identified fake accounts, while TikTok and VKontakte managed to remove only a small fraction (3% and 2%, respectively). In addition, fake interactions remained prevalent across all platforms, highlighting ongoing challenges. Manipulation services have become increasingly affordable, even from reputable providers in the US and UK, making inauthentic engagement more accessible. While the majority of clients using manipulation services are commercial entities seeking to promote spam, scams, or other commercial topics, we observed the use of bots to amplify political content on a diversity of topics. In the context of the US political environment, we observed bots being utilised to influence public opinion by amplifying divisive content related to the upcoming elections. Bots engaged in promoting and countering narratives about prominent political figures, such as President Joe Biden, Kamala Harris, and Donald Trump, as well as other politically charged content. This trend highlights the ongoing vulnerability of platforms to manipulation in politically sensitive environments, despite efforts to curb inauthentic engagement. The platforms’ efforts to counteract various forms of inauthentic activity, such as fake likes and views, have largely been ineffective, with X standing out as the only platform making significant progress by removing approximately 50% of fake comments and reposts. Most platforms showed a considerable interest in our findings, and many provided insights into their transparency reporting. We reached out to all platforms except VKontakte and received responses from all but X. A key conclusion from our experiment is that, from a red-team perspective, it was successful due to the complex content and behaviour classification systems employed by platforms. These systems rely on multiple indicators to determine whether content should be flagged as problematic, yet our experiment likely remained undetected due to its small scale. X demonstrated that small-scale commercial manipulation can be identified and removed effectively, whereas other platforms continue to struggle with this challenge. A concerning takeaway is that malicious actors can evade detection by breaking large-scale campaigns into smaller micro-scale operations, using different commercial services, and interacting sporadically with platforms. This ability to remain undetected presents a significant threat to the integrity of social media ecosystems.

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The Use of Russian Proxy Actors in the Media Environment in Ukraine: A Comparison between Occupied and Non-Occupied Areas, 2017–2023
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The Use of Russian Proxy Actors in the Media Environment in Ukraine: A Comparison between Occupied and Non-Occupied Areas, 2017–2023

The Use of Russian Proxy Actors in the Media Environment in Ukraine: A Comparison between Occupied and Non-Occupied Areas, 2017–2023

Author(s): Maryna Vorotyntseva,Olena Yurchenko,Andryi Dikhtiarenko,Serhii Pakhomenko,Viacheslav Husakov,Denys Kaplunov / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; war; proxy actors; media; areas comparison;

After Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory in 2014 (the ARC and Sevastopol, and parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions), a Russian proxy media system was established. There was direct involvement of Russian personnel, who migrated between the occupied regions and were interconnected with each other and with FSB handlers. Russian FSB officers and Russian citizens were present in different occupied territories, generally managing a few media outlets simultaneously, while local collaborators typically carried out assigned tasks. After the full-scale invasion started in 2022 and Russia occupied parts of two additional regions (Kherson and Zaporizhzhia), the system of coordination and personnel involvement became even more visible. For example, in high-level managerial positions in the media in the occupied part of the Luhansk region, there were (most probably) agent of Russian special services Vyacheslav Matveyev (‘Akademik’) and FSB officer Aleksandr Shingiryov (‘Arbat’). Russian citizen Aleksandr Malkevich – associated with the former owner of the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC Wagner), Evgeniy Prigozhin, and the Olgino troll factory – managed TRC Tavria in the occupied part of the Kherson region, headed the supervisory board of the TRC Za!TV in the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region, and was the founder of the Mariupol 24 TV channel in the occupied part of the Donetsk region. The media holding ZaMedia (occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region) was run by Vadim Kucher, a native of St Petersburg (Russia), and the director of Za!TV was initially a journalist from Novgorod (Russia), and a former employee of the Russian state media VGTRK, Vadim Ivanov. Later the Za!TV channel was headed by a Russian citizen, Yuliya Shamal. Also working in the occupied territories of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions were Evgeniy Glotov (associated with the head of the NewsFront website Konstantin Knyrik, based in occupied Crimea), Ismail Abdullaiev (formerly director of Oplot TV in occupied Donetsk), and Vladimir Andronaki (a Crimean propagandist, until 2014 a citizen of Ukraine). This indicates that proxy media in the occupied territories are coordinated centrally and among themselves. After the ban on the Russian social networks Odnoklassniki and VKontakte, as well as the Mail.ru email service, the Yandex search engine, and all associated services (news, taxis, delivery, navigation) in Ukraine in 2017, Russian special services lost the ability to use them for disseminating disinformation, collecting personal data, and targeting the population on Ukrainian territory, except the occupied parts. In 2017–18 Russian special services established a strictly centralised proxy media management in the occupied territories and started to develop a system of informational and political influence in Ukraine – through television, YouTube, and Telegram. A pool of three pro-Russian TV channels was formed in Ukraine (112, NewsOne, and ZIK), under the political control of pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk, and financial support for these TV channels came from the occupied territories. Another TV channel was founded by pro-Russian politician Yevhenii Muraiev. Another Russian proxy, YouTube blogger Anatoliy Shariy (a Ukrainian citizen who lives in Spain), was also a part of this influence system. Medvedchuk, Muraiev, and Shariy created pro-Russian political parties and ran elections using TV and YouTube channels as a tool to gain power in Ukraine. Russian proxy media in the occupied territories of Ukraine and Russian proxy TV channels in Ukraine disseminated essentially identical metanarratives and promoted a Russian political agenda. But the proxy media in Ukrainian-controlled territory were much more careful in their rhetoric because of TV licensing restrictions. For instance, both in the occupied and the free territories of Ukraine, Russian proxy media spread narratives on ‘Ukraine’s loss of agency’, ‘the dependence of Ukraine on the West/USA’, ‘the corruption and incompetence of the Ukrainian authorities’, ‘Ukraine’s refusal to comply with the Minsk agreements’, and ‘the suppression of the Russian language and Russian-speaking population in Ukraine’. In the occupied territories, proxy media promoted a narrative that ‘Russia is helping the Donbas republics’, while in the free territory of Ukraine, proxy media reported ‘Russia’s readiness’ to help Ukraine, which appeared in the form of promises. In the occupied territories, proxy media propagated a narrative about ‘Nazis’ and ‘fascists’ who had seized power in Ukraine. In contrast, in the free territory of Ukraine, proxy media spoke of how ‘the authorities support right-wing radicals and nationalists’ and about ‘rewriting history’ (which in most cases was associated with the history of the Second World War, i.e., Nazism). Additionally, Russian special services launched a large network of Telegram channels coordinated by the Main (Intelligence) Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (known as the GRU), in particular the Main Centre of the Special Service No 85. The network of proxy Telegram channels operated autonomously to discredit Volodymyr Zelenskyy since he became president in 2019 and conducted informational-psychological operations on a narrow, specialised target audience – the political one. The network operated from the territory of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and so-called Transnistria (the part of Moldova politically controlled by Russia). According to official data from the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), the network’s administrators were Ukrainian citizens who were also involved in espionage and the collection of Ukrainian military personnel’s personal data. The processes of centralisation and structuration of the media in the occupied territories of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in 2017–18 overlapped with the formation of a pool of proxy television channels and a network of Telegram channels in Ukraine’s free territory (2018–19). These processes were strategically linked. The proxy leaders and handlers of the occupied territories of Ukraine were aware that there was a business operating in the occupied territories, the profits from which went towards maintaining the pool of three proxy television channels on the territory of Ukraine. So, Russia occupied Ukrainian territories, established proxy ‘governments’ and proxy media, and after that used natural resources from the occupied territories to fund the Russian proxy media in Ukraine to bring the pro-Russian political parties to power.

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Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Arctic States, China, NATO, and the EU
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Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Arctic States, China, NATO, and the EU

Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Arctic States, China, NATO, and the EU

Author(s): Troy Bouffard,Whitney Lackenbauer,Elizabeth Buchanan,Adam Lajeunesse,Marc Lanteigne,Sergey Sukhankin / Language(s): English

Keywords: Arctic narratives; EU; China; Nato; politics; values;

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has sent shockwaves across the Arctic. While Russia has not signalled any similar aspirations for military conquest in neighbouring Arctic countries, the world has witnessed further spill-over of international tensions into circumpolar affairs, and the Kremlin has shattered its credibility as a peaceful, law-abiding actor. Maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic, within a world of heightened uncertainty, has forced NATO Allies to re-evaluate threats, strategic responsibilities, and opportunities for deeper collaboration as Arctic partners.

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Do(n't) Shoot the Messenger: Psychological Responses to Kremlin Narratives in Nordic - Baltic Audiences
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Do(n't) Shoot the Messenger: Psychological Responses to Kremlin Narratives in Nordic - Baltic Audiences

Do(n't) Shoot the Messenger: Psychological Responses to Kremlin Narratives in Nordic - Baltic Audiences

Author(s): Aiden Hoyle,Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv,Bertjan Doosje,Charlotte Wagnsson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Kremlin; politics; security; messages; Nordic-Baltic; region; psychology;

This report is co-authored by Aiden Hoyle, Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Charlotte Wagnsson, and Bertjan Doosje. The report is a product of the PhD research fellowship by Aiden Hoyle, who did part of his experimental research on emotional responses to Kremlin’s narratives at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (COE) in Riga. Aiden Hoyle’s work made an important contribution to the Centre’s Nordic-Baltic project, which has been running since 2016. This ongoing effort monitors and analyses Russian and Chinese influence operations in the NordicBaltic region, which includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. Since its inception, the project has published several reports mapping and comparing narratives hostile to national interest, regional cohesion, and the realisation of strategic interests within the European Union and NATO. Drawing on the expertise of subject matter experts representing the eight countries and research conducted by the COE, this project has significantly advanced the understanding of a common threat. But what about its impact? Aiden’s research offers a rigorous novel approach to understanding how hostile narratives affect audiences and suggests what nations can learn from these findings in terms of their own strategic communications. Implementation of this research would not have been possible without partnerships. We would like to thank the UiT The Arctic University of Norway, the Swedish Defence University, the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), and the Dutch Defence Academy for their cooperation.

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Russia's Information Influence Operations in the Nordic - Baltic Region
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Russia's Information Influence Operations in the Nordic - Baltic Region

Russia's Information Influence Operations in the Nordic - Baltic Region

Author(s): Anneli Ahonen,Arsalan Bilal,Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv,Juris Jurāns,Martin Kragh,Kristofers Kārlis Krūmiņš,Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili,Balys Liubinavičius,Kamil Mikulski,Holger Mölder,Jón Gunnar Ólafsson,Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir,Vladimir Sazonov,Jeanette Serritzlev / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Nordic-Baltic region; information; operations; influence;

This publication has been prepared in the framework of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence’s (NATO StratCom COE) project, which explores foreign hostile influence in the Nordic-Baltic region since 2016. This paper looks at Russia’s information influence operations in each of the eight countries (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden – the NB8) by explaining the historical context and drawing on a number of case studies (2018 – 2023). The authors have dived into nuances of their own domestic sociopolitical environments and their country’s relationship with Russia, and incorporated the effects of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. The publication explores the factors for the success or failure of Russia’s information influence in the respective countries, as well as assessing the measures countries are taking to mitigate the hostile influence. The introductory chapter of the publication, co-authored by Kamil Mikulski, research fellow at the NATO StratCom COE, and Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili, a senior expert at the NATO StratCom COE, looks at the term ‘information influence operations’ and its relationships with other concepts such as hybrid threats, hybrid warfare, influence operations, and cognitive warfare. The authors explore existing definitions and usage in Western scholarship, look at security strategies of the NB8, and compare those with the interpretations found in Russia’s strategic thinking. The chapter on Denmark by Jeanette Serritzlev of the Royal Danish Defence College reveals that instead of directly targeting the Danish population, Russia mostly focuses on spreading disinformation about Denmark. Although Denmark has not been among the top targets of Russia’s influence, Russia has attempted to exploit discussions on the future status of Greenland, to challenge Denmark’s stance on Ukraine, and to damage its international image. The author has also looked at how old disinformation networks (a common trend in Europe), such as the Covid-19 vaccine sceptics, have turned towards supporting anti-Western or anti-Ukraine narratives, which plays to the Kremlin’s advantage in domestic information spaces. The author concludes that Danish society is rather resilient against Russian malign influence operations due to the strong democratic institutions of the country, its stable political landscape, and its lack of proximity to Russia both geographically and linguistically. Professor Holger Mölder of the Tallinn University of Technology and Vladimir Sazonov of the Estonian Military Academy and the University of Tartu in their chapter about Estonia pay special attention to how Russia is using local alternative political movements and Russian media channels to exert influence on Estonian society. The authors conclude that, while blocking access to Russian state media channels in 2022 made direct interference more difficult, it did not prevent them from reaching Estonian audiences via other information channels, social media in particular. The authors discuss how turbulence in geopolitics and subsequent economic rifts have caused Estonian far-right and far-left political forces to adopt pro-Kremlin narratives. Although their influence can be deemed as minimal compared with the consistent support of the majority of the population towards Ukraine and the West, some parts of Estonian society remain susceptible to Russia’s influence attempts, faced with domestic and international socio-economic challenges. Finland, as noted by author Anneli Ahonen, former head of EEAS East StratCom Task Force and research associate at Cardiff University, stands out as an example of where Russia has adapted its influence campaigns to suit different strategic objectives. Russia has historically framed Finland as a friendly neighbour, while at the same time making repeated intimidating statements to deter Finland from joining NATO. As the geopolitical reality changed with Finland’s application to NATO in May 2022, Russia had to adapt its narrative frameworks and influence tactics. The case studies about migrants on the Finnish border, Finland’s aid to Ukraine, and the process of accession to NATO illustrate Russia’s current approach. While there is strong resilience in Finnish society against Russia’s malign influence, the author notes the intensification of hybrid threats in the region and against Finland in particular, signalling a future trend. Professor Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir and Assistant Professor Jón Gunnar Ólafsson of the University of Iceland use the case study of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Icelandic response to it to analyse the level of societal resilience against hostile information influence campaigns. While they point to the often reactive and small media landscape in Iceland and high reliance on social media, strong support for NATO and Ukraine has been consistent, thus making the population less prone to accept Russia’s purported narratives. In addition, the authors note the unique nature of the Icelandic language and the geographical distance from Russia act as deterrents to Russia’s broader information influence operations. Yet, continuous caution should be exercised, as it would require little resources for a hostile foreign actor to penetrate Iceland’s information ecosystem. The case study on Latvia by Juris Jurāns, researcher at the Centre for East European Policy Studies, takes a thorough look at Russia’s influence operations vis-à-vis Latvia in the political, diplomatic, economic, and media domains. The author discerns the main narratives undermining Latvian national interests and describes how those are promoted in society. Against the historical background of deteriorating diplomatic relations between Latvia and Russia, the author outlines the increasing aggressiveness in portraying Latvia as a failed state and efforts to divide society over the problem of integrating the Russian-speaking population. Some of the most frequent narratives and tactics used by Russia are explored through case studies of Covid-19 disinformation networks and political forces that mirror pro-Kremlin propaganda. The author also points to the continuous threats stemming from the Kremlin’s agents of influence and the instrumentalisation of Soviet heritage to incite contentious memory politics. The Lithuanian case study by Balys Liubinavičius, former senior analyst at Debunk. org, explores current trends of Russia’s information influence operations in light of the long history of such influence in the Baltic States. The author considers various local proliferators of Russian messaging and domestic-facing and foreign-facing Russian media, to better comprehend the complex media landscape. The chapter explores factors for Lithuania’s resilience against information influence operations by referring to case studies of Russian disinformation campaigns, such as the use of social media and domestic-facing media channels, portraying Lithuania as a morally depraved and failed state. A common trend is established to be Russia’s opportunism in exploiting situations like the Belarus – EU border crisis and aid provision to Ukraine. In the case study about Norway, Professor Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv and doctoral research fellow Arsalan Bilal of UiT The Arctic University of Norway discuss Russia’s increasing ambitions towards the Arctic and how this affects Norway, taking a closer look at the cases of Svalbard and Kirkenes. They find that there is a strong centre – periphery relationship in these parts of Norway vis-à-vis the rest of the country, which makes them more vulnerable to Russian influence operations. They note the primary tools currently employed by Russia are disinformation and distortion of events, exploitation of academic cooperation and science diplomacy, and soft economic power and memory politics, particularly in the regions geographically proximate to Russia. The Swedish case study by Dr Martin Kragh of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs introduces the history of Russian information influence operations in Sweden and outlines the ways the Kremlin has managed to insert itself into contentious areas, such as immigration, crime, and Sweden’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, among others. In addition, this chapter points to Russia’s strategic failure in preventing Sweden’s NATO accession, while emphasising the Kremlin’s consistent efforts to undermine public trust in Sweden’s institutions and its alignment with the West. According to the author’s assessment, Swedish society overall is not susceptible to Russian influence. However, this does not mean that Russia does not have ambitions to target Sweden also in the future.

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Russian information operations outside of the Western information environment (Revised version)
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Russian information operations outside of the Western information environment (Revised version)

Russian information operations outside of the Western information environment (Revised version)

Author(s): Jonathan Morley-Davies,Jem Thomas,Graham Baines / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; information; operations; security; Western information environment;

In February 2023, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) held an event ‘How to Lose the Information War’ detailing the Kremlin’s failed efforts to decisively sway Western populations to its narrative in the initial phase of its war of aggression in Ukraine. But while the Western community’s resilience to Kremlin narratives has been strong, the invasion has exposed deep rifts in perspectives between the West and the Multi-aligned Community (previously known as the Global South)1 that the Kremlin aims to exploit through Information Influence Operations (IIOs). The March 2022 UN vote condemning the Kremlin’s war of aggression in Ukraine had 35 abstentions, 17 of them from African states. Multiple statespeople and diplomats outside the Western environment have either hesitated to condemn the Kremlin or espoused its talking points. Afrobarometer found that in 24 of 30 African countries, approval of authoritarian governance has risen since 2014. On average, across 36 countries, more Africans (53%) would be willing to consider a military government than would rule it out (42%) “if elected officials abused their power” demonstrating a developing disillusionment that removing corrupt elected officials can be done through democratic institutions.2 Furthermore, just 38% expressed satisfaction with “democracy”, the lowest share since at least 2014, and in the Africa Youth Survey, just 39% of respondents said that Africans should emulate “Western democracy”.3 Meanwhile, there has been a 41% rise in Russian Embassy social media followers from February 2022 – March 2023 and the embassies have increased their messaging output.4 RT Arabic has seen 10 million more users since the invasion, and the frequency with which RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic published on social media platforms increased by 30-35% and 80% respectively.5 This report, drawing from research, qualitative and quantitative data, Key Insight Interviews (KIIs), digital tools, and Russian information and deception doctrine, explores the Kremlin’s IIOs in non-Western environments using five selected countries as case studies: Egypt, Mali, Kenya, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. The initial set of countries were selected based on their international importance and to represent a cross-section of critical national issues pertinent to Russian information operations, which include food insecurity (Egypt, Mali, Kenya), energy security (UAE), trade and investment relationship with Russia (Mali, Egypt, UAE), military aspects (Mali), and political relevance to the West and Ukraine. The political regime of the countries concerned and stability of governments was also considered. Central to understanding and explaining the process and potential threat of these operations has been the Theory of Reflexive Control (TORC), a Soviet era methodical framework for shaping perceptions via information inputs based on a cultural and psychological profile or ‘model’ of the target and disseminated via propaganda, maskirovka (masquerade, i.e., deception), and provokatsiya (provocation, such as false-flag attacks and hoaxes) to create voluntary decision-making (a ‘reflexive action’) that is favourable to the practitioner (see Annex A for the full description). Despite being the subject of increased scrutiny in the West since the Crimea Crisis of 2014, it has rarely been used as a guiding framework to analyse ongoing Russian IIOs. This report adapts the existing framework to provide clarity to an intentionally complex and obscure process. Each country report uses the TORC to provide a clarifying overview of Kremlin IIOs and their potential outcomes. Full analysis is provided in Annex A.

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Democratising Data Integration. Standardising Communication Protocols for Interoperable Data Processing and Analytics Tools in Strategic Information Environments
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Democratising Data Integration. Standardising Communication Protocols for Interoperable Data Processing and Analytics Tools in Strategic Information Environments

Democratising Data Integration. Standardising Communication Protocols for Interoperable Data Processing and Analytics Tools in Strategic Information Environments

Author(s): Hadley Newman,Gundars Bergmanis-Korats / Language(s): English

Keywords: data; collection; integration; democratisation; standardisation; analytic tools;

Data integration is an often-overlooked foundation of NATO’s strategic communications, yet the challenge remains substantial due to highly fragmented implementation across systems and organisations. Without standardised data models, semantic structures, and API protocols, information exchange is delayed, hindering intelligence processing and impeding timely decisions. This report underscores that the issue is not necessarily one of technology, effective tools already exist, but rather one of policy. Achieving seamless interoperability requires coordinated action, enforcement of standards, and the adoption of structured frameworks through well-defined policies that ensure consistent implementation across NATO allies and partners. NATO’s operational superiority depends on prioritising standardisation, governance, and innovation. Adopting AI-driven solutions enhances NATO’s capacity to manage complex data environments, foster agility and resilience. Standardised communication protocols reduce complexity, improve efficiency, and strengthen security across integrated systems, particularly during crises when rapid and accurate data sharing is critical. The report’s recommendations highlight the importance of structured interoperability frameworks in enhancing institutional resilience, reducing procurement costs through efficient technology integration, and enabling coordination, improved response times, reduced workload and enhanced operational efficiency. Timely access to structured data ensures that NATO can respond swiftly to hostile narratives and dynamic operational challenges, reinforcing proactive communication strategies and safeguarding strategic coherence. This report provides analysis and practical recommendations for establishing unified data standards, securing communication frameworks, and enabling multinational collaboration. It offers a clear pathway for NATO allies and partners to build resilient, cost-effective, and responsive data ecosystems that support sustained operational readiness and adaptability in an evolving information environment.

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