Cookies help us deliver our services. By using our services, you agree to our use of cookies. Learn more.
  • Log In
  • Register
CEEOL Logo
Advanced Search
  • Home
  • SUBJECT AREAS
  • PUBLISHERS
  • JOURNALS
  • eBooks
  • GREY LITERATURE
  • CEEOL-DIGITS
  • INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT
  • Help
  • Contact
  • for LIBRARIANS
  • for PUBLISHERS

Filters

Content Type

Keywords (795)

  • media (36)
  • social media (36)
  • Russia (36)
  • communication (34)
  • information (33)
  • politics (28)
  • NATO (25)
  • Russia (19)
  • Ukraine (18)
  • Twitter (14)
  • security (14)
  • disinformation (10)
  • media (10)
  • China (9)
  • propaganda (9)
  • security and defense (9)
  • Kremlin (8)
  • NATO (8)
  • Finland (7)
  • ICT (7)
  • Poland (7)
  • Sweden (7)
  • bots (7)
  • strategic communication (7)
  • Daesh (6)
  • EU (6)
  • Facebook (6)
  • StratCom (6)
  • manipulation (6)
  • strategic communications (6)
  • Robotrolling (6)
  • Estonia (5)
  • Latvia (5)
  • Syria (5)
  • conflict (5)
  • government (5)
  • psychology (5)
  • war (5)
  • COVID-19 (4)
  • Internet (4)
  • Norway (4)
  • Telegram (4)
  • geopolitics (4)
  • information environment (4)
  • international relations (4)
  • military exercise (4)
  • narratives (4)
  • public opinion (4)
  • tool (4)
  • twitter (4)
  • values (4)
  • Arctic (3)
  • Baltics (3)
  • BiH (3)
  • COVID-19 pandemic (3)
  • Denmark (3)
  • English-language (3)
  • Iceland (3)
  • Japan (3)
  • Kosovo (3)
  • Lithuania (3)
  • Montenegro (3)
  • NATO countries (3)
  • Russian-language (3)
  • Social media (3)
  • US (3)
  • VKontakte (3)
  • bot activities (3)
  • deepfakes (3)
  • fake news (3)
  • history (3)
  • hybrid warfare (3)
  • influence (3)
  • information space (3)
  • internet (3)
  • malicious use (3)
  • mass media (3)
  • online manipulation of information (3)
  • operations (3)
  • political power (3)
  • More...

Subjects (96)

  • Media studies (127)
  • Security and defense (110)
  • ICT Information and Communications Technologies (102)
  • Communication studies (92)
  • Politics (85)
  • Politics and communication (70)
  • International relations/trade (64)
  • Politics / Political Sciences (63)
  • Social Sciences (57)
  • Peace and Conflict Studies (57)
  • Government/Political systems (56)
  • Sociology (40)
  • Economy (39)
  • Social Informatics (33)
  • Military policy (30)
  • Geopolitics (28)
  • Political behavior (25)
  • Geography, Regional studies (24)
  • Political Theory (24)
  • Social psychology and group interaction (23)
  • Theory of Communication (20)
  • Comparative politics (15)
  • Psychology (14)
  • Crowd Psychology: Mass phenomena and political interactions (14)
  • Evaluation research (13)
  • Governance (12)
  • Studies in violence and power (12)
  • Russian Aggression against Ukraine (12)
  • Methodology and research technology (11)
  • Health and medicine and law (11)
  • Civil Society (9)
  • EU-Approach / EU-Accession / EU-Development (9)
  • Economic policy (6)
  • Electoral systems (6)
  • Russian war against Ukraine (6)
  • History (5)
  • Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (5)
  • Political Sciences (5)
  • Environmental and Energy policy (5)
  • Politics and society (5)
  • Behaviorism (5)
  • Policy, planning, forecast and speculation (5)
  • Present Times (2010 - today) (5)
  • Sociology of Politics (5)
  • Hybrid Warfare (5)
  • Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence (4)
  • Recent History (1900 till today) (3)
  • Criminology (3)
  • Transformation Period (1990 - 2010) (3)
  • Language and Literature Studies (2)
  • Education (2)
  • National Economy (2)
  • Regional Geography (2)
  • Criminal Law (2)
  • International Law (2)
  • Applied Linguistics (2)
  • Diplomatic history (2)
  • Political history (2)
  • Higher Education (2)
  • State/Government and Education (2)
  • Management and complex organizations (2)
  • Nationalism Studies (2)
  • Economic development (2)
  • Social Norms / Social Control (2)
  • Globalization (2)
  • Politics and Identity (2)
  • Theology and Religion (1)
  • Islam studies (1)
  • Lexis (1)
  • Psycholinguistics (1)
  • Sociolinguistics (1)
  • Baltic Languages (1)
  • Organizational Psychology (1)
  • Social development (1)
  • Social differentiation (1)
  • Victimology (1)
  • Radical sociology (1)
  • Environmental interactions (1)
  • Post-War period (1950 - 1989) (1)
  • Migration Studies (1)
  • More...

Authors (269)

  • Anna Reynolds (34)
  • Rolf Fredheim (17)
  • Linda Curika (12)
  • Sebastian Bay (10)
  • Monika Izandra Hanley (9)
  • Kristina Van Sant (9)
  • Gundars Bergmanis-Korats (8)
  • Merle Anne Read (8)
  • Author Not Specified (7)
  • James Pamment (7)
  • Sanda Svetoka (6)
  • Iona Allan (6)
  • Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili (5)
  • Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili (5)
  • Tomass Pildegovičs (5)
  • Anton Dek (4)
  • Elina Lange Ionatamishvili (4)
  • Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova (4)
  • Belén Carrasco Rodríguez (4)
  • Rueban Manokara (4)
  • Martha Stolze (4)
  • Tetiana Haiduchyk (4)
  • Leonie Haiden (3)
  • Giorgio Bertolin (3)
  • Juris Benkis (3)
  • Dace Kundrāte (3)
  • Neville Bolt (3)
  • Tihomira Doncheva (3)
  • Troy Bouffard (3)
  • Henrik Twetman (3)
  • Daivis Petraitis (3)
  • Valeriy Akimenko (3)
  • Holger Mölder (2)
  • Dimitar Bechev (2)
  • Richard Turcsányi (2)
  • Vladimir Sazonov (2)
  • Vira Ratsiborynska (2)
  • Nora Biteniece (2)
  • Rafal Zgryziewicz (2)
  • John-Paul Gravelines (2)
  • Brigita Stroda (2)
  • Gerry Osborne (2)
  • Joseph Shaheen (2)
  • Ben Heap (2)
  • Samantha Bradshaw (2)
  • Charlie Winter (2)
  • Baris Kirdemir (2)
  • Rufin Zamfir (2)
  • Jonathan Corpus Ong (2)
  • Kārlis Streips (2)
  • Marina Paramonova (2)
  • Jazlyn Melnychuk (2)
  • Giorgio Bertolini (2)
  • Alvin Lim (2)
  • Alfonsas Juršėnas (2)
  • Kasparas Karlauskas (2)
  • Eimantas Ledinauskas (2)
  • Gediminas Maskeliūnas (2)
  • Julius Ruseckas (2)
  • Marija Isupova (2)
  • Viktoras Daukšas (2)
  • Balys Liubinavičius (2)
  • Marie-Eve Carignan (2)
  • Anneli Ahonen (2)
  • Jonathan Morley-Davies (2)
  • Jem Thomas (2)
  • Graham Baines (2)
  • Yukai Zeng (2)
  • Sara Sörensen (2)
  • Monika Hanley (2)
  • Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv (2)
  • Alexander Brand (1)
  • Māris Andžāns (1)
  • Gregory John Simons (1)
  • Elizabeth Buchanan (1)
  • Tomasz Grzyb (1)
  • Howard Nothhaft (1)
  • Katarína Kertýsová (1)
  • More...

Languages

Legend

  • Journal
  • Article
  • Book
  • Chapter
  • Open Access

Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

Result 81-100 of 183
  • Prev
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • 6
  • 7
  • 8
  • 9
  • 10
  • Next
When 5G meets AI: Next Generation of Communication and Information Sharing
0.00 €

When 5G meets AI: Next Generation of Communication and Information Sharing

When 5G meets AI: Next Generation of Communication and Information Sharing

Author(s): Katarína Kertýsová / Language(s): English

Keywords: 5G; Communication innovation; power of 5g; wireless technology; information environment; extended reality; digital journalism; digital repression; mass surveillance; privacy; deepfakes;

The adoption of fifth generation (5G) wireless technology will touch nearly every aspect of our lives. While changes brought by 5G will primarily affect sectors that depend on smooth wireless connection – such as transportation, healthcare, or manufacturing – they will also alter the realm of (strategic) communications. In the coming decade, 5G and edge computing will generate new opportunities for how humans interact with each other and experience the world. Greater connectivity and access to information enabled by 5G also promise to bridge the digital divide, improving democratic participation and citizen mobilization. At the same time, there will be more opportunities for misuse of this technology. Events of the last ten years have demonstrated the impact that digital transformation is having on democracy and political life. Consider the role that social media has played in key political events such as the Arab Spring or how the advent of e-voting and e-political participation changed the outcome of some elections throughout the pandemic. The emergence and accelerated adoption of new technologies has seen a concurrent rise in digital repression and disinformation operations. While (online) disinformation is not a new phenomenon, rapid advances in information technologies have altered the ways in which information (and disinformation) can be produced and disseminated. Data capture, speed, and connectivity offered by 5G will equip both state and non-state actors with more effective tools to tighten information control, repress political opponents, and manipulate public opinion online.

More...
The Role of AI in the Battle Against Disinformation
0.00 €

The Role of AI in the Battle Against Disinformation

The Role of AI in the Battle Against Disinformation

Author(s): Alfonsas Juršėnas,Kasparas Karlauskas,Eimantas Ledinauskas,Gediminas Maskeliūnas,Donatas Rondomanskas,Julius Ruseckas / Language(s): English

Keywords: Disinformation; Deepfake technology; Fingerprinting data; Authenticity; Social media; Bot detection; AI methods; Machine learning;

Detecting and countering disinformation grows increasingly important as social media sites have become a leading news source for most people. Efficient disinformation campaigns lead to negative real-world consequences on a global scale, both in politics and in society. Machine learning (ML) methods have demonstrated their potential for at least partial automatisation of disinformation detection and analysis. In this report, we review current and emerging artificial intelligence (AI) methods that are used or can be used to counter the spread and generation of disinformation, and briefly reflect on ongoing developments in anti-disinformation legislation in the EU. This overview will shed light on some of the tools that disinformation-countering practitioners could use to make their work easier.

More...
Communicating Defence in Slovakia and the Czech Republic: Mapping Actors and Narratives online
0.00 €

Communicating Defence in Slovakia and the Czech Republic: Mapping Actors and Narratives online

Communicating Defence in Slovakia and the Czech Republic: Mapping Actors and Narratives online

Author(s): Martin Brezina,Peter Dubóczi,Matej Kandrík,Veronika Krátka Špalková,Tomáš Kriššák / Language(s): English

Keywords: Slovakia; Czech Republic; anti-Western actors communicating defence themes; information space; social media; geopolitical sentiment; political actor; Russia; Ukraine; War in Ukraine;

Slovakia has a much larger number of anti- Western actors communicating defence themes than the Czech Republic. There is a significantly higher penetration of anti-Western and pro-Russian narratives in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. Slovak anti-Western actors are the best-performing group in our study. They consistently gain significantly more reactions, shares and comments than pro-Western actors in Slovakia or any actor in the Czech Republic. The Czech information space is predominantly negative towards Russia, the Slovak towards the West. Most posts in the Slovak infosphere were anti-Western in their geopolitical sentiment. The Czech infosphere was different in that most posts with negative sentiment were about Russia. The Slovak infosphere is much more clustered than the Czech infosphere. This is because of the stronger anti-Western leaning of Slovakia and because Slovak actors are more effective in communicating defence themes than their Czech counterparts. NATO was a significantly bigger topic in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. While in the Slovak dataset there were almost 600 posts concerning NATO, there were less than 400 in the Czech Republic. But both countries had slightly prevailing negative geopolitical sentiment towards NATO. Following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the war dominated public discourse for most of 2022. Consequently, the majority of the content collected for this research concerned the war in Ukraine. Other prominent defence-related topics included military cooperation (training and weapons deliveries) and NATO, but even these topics were most often mentioned in the context of the war in Ukraine.

More...
Chinese Arctic Narratives: How Chinese Media is Approaching the Nordic-Arctic States
0.00 €

Chinese Arctic Narratives: How Chinese Media is Approaching the Nordic-Arctic States

Chinese Arctic Narratives: How Chinese Media is Approaching the Nordic-Arctic States

Author(s): Viesturs Bērziņš / Language(s): English

Keywords: Chinese media; Nordic-Arctic states; Constructivism and identity; Iceland; Sweden; Norway; Finland; Denmark; ‘Near Arctic’ identity;

The world we live in is constantly changing. As Heraclitus once famously stated: ‘The only thing constant is change itself’. History has shown us that certain geographical regions can suddenly become the centre of attention. A territory that has caught international attention recently is the Arctic. A frozen, fairly untamed area that is mostly known for glaciers, polar bears, and endless wilderness is starting to emerge as a centrepiece of the global agenda. Minerals, vast waters for fishing and shipping, as well as strategic importance are some of the Arctic’s key points of attraction. Many states have expressed interest in extending their reach and developments in the Arctic. Yet, one of the states that is actively participating in Arctic endeavours is attracting more scholarly attention than the others – China. Not only is it located nearly 1500 kilometres away from the Arctic Circle, it also has one of the fastest growing economies in the world. This has led some experts to wonder whether it is possible for Arctic states to remain in complete control of the contested region. China’s interest in the region has resulted in it becoming one of thirteen observer states of the Arctic Council. The organisation can be considered the de facto most important intergovernmental forum for Arctic affairs.

More...
Mask Gate as a Continuous Media Event in a Hybrid Media Space
0.00 €

Mask Gate as a Continuous Media Event in a Hybrid Media Space

Mask Gate as a Continuous Media Event in a Hybrid Media Space

Author(s): Lilly Korpiola,Petro Poutanen / Language(s): English

Keywords: Mask Gate media event; Finland; dispute between various public health institutions and authorities; COVID-19 pandemic; attention in the media; hybrid media system;

This study examines the evolution of the “Mask Gate” media event that took place in Finland amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and state of emergency in 2020. In March-August 2020, there was a dispute between various public health institutions and authorities as to whether the public should be required to use face masks. This investigation focuses on the construction of the media event, specifically on the interplay and dynamics between social media and mass media, as well as the public reactions evoked by the Mask Gate in Finland. Our aim is to describe the critical turning points in the development of the media event, thus tracing the evolution of such media events in the present media system. We illustrate our case with the help of a data set consisting of 391 033 messages about respiratory masks found on social media and traditional news media outlets. We focus our analysis on a subset of this data set concerning the “Mask Gate”. On the basis of our analysis, we present a timeline of the Mask Gate as well as analyse the most important actors, platforms and affective reactions that played a role in the construction of the event. An autopsy of such a notable media event can assist organisations in developing their communication competencies for risk, strategic and crisis communication situations, in which it is imperative for an organisation to restore its public legitimacy.

More...
Social Media Monitoring Tools: An In-Depth Look
0.00 €

Social Media Monitoring Tools: An In-Depth Look

Social Media Monitoring Tools: An In-Depth Look

Author(s): Anna Grizāne,Marija Isupova,Vanessa Vorteil / Language(s): English

Keywords: Social media monitoring tools; AI assistence; Artificial Intelligence tools; Brandwatch; Mediatoolkit; Meltwater; BuzzSumo; Keyhole; Sprinklr;

Information is power and, in this day and age, the Internet is increasingly becoming the primary source and vector for the transfer of information between people. Digital media is an essential source of information for people worldwide. Compared to traditional media, digital media consumption grows rapidly with each year. The COVID-19 pandemic contributed to this process, with most work, learning, entertainment and communication in technologically advanced countries transferring to the online environment. Social media plays a significant role in people’s lives. There are 4.2 billion social media users worldwide, more than 53% of the world’s population. Since 2021, the number of social media users has grown by 490 million, a 13% increase. This means that the number of new social media users grew by more than 900 users per minute. The amount of content generated on social media is tremendous—there are 474,000 Tweets, 69 000 Instagram posts, and 400 hours of new Youtube videos uploaded each minute. On Facebook alone, there are 510,000 comments, 293,000 status updates, and 136,000 photos uploaded per minute.

More...
Attributing Information Influence Operations: Identifying those Responsible for Malicious Behaviour Online
0.00 €

Attributing Information Influence Operations: Identifying those Responsible for Malicious Behaviour Online

Attributing Information Influence Operations: Identifying those Responsible for Malicious Behaviour Online

Author(s): James Pamment,Victoria Smith / Language(s): English

Keywords: hybrid threats; online behaviour; cyber frameworks; Proprietary behavioural evidence; Open-source behavioural evidence; Classified behavioural evidence;

By their nature hybrid threats create ambiguity. They are covert, obscuring intent and enabling plausible deniability. This makes identifying both who is behind them and their motives a significant challenge. Attribution must grapple with this challenge. It involves identifying the responsible actors, understanding what they are hoping to achieve and how they are seeking to accomplish it. Without a methodical and consistent approach underpinning attribution, planning and executing effective responses is far more challenging. The online environment has become a rich source of opportunities for a type of hybrid threat, referred to in this report as ‘Information Influence Operations’. These are deliberate attempts at deception, including interference in democratic processes, using disruptive and illegitimate means which are readily available to hostile actors. Those responsible for malicious behaviour online are motivated by a wide range of reasons. Organised, state-sponsored instruments of influence work across borders, furthering strategic aims by reaching directly into a targeted nation’s society and political structures. Others act for simpler reasons such as excitement, financial gain or self-actualisation. Working out who’s who means untangling a variety of evidence and indicators. Threats which occur in the digital domain pose a particular problem. By their very nature, online platforms are susceptible to manipulation, and even though responses such as takedowns are increasingly common, more work is needed to improve the process of identifying those responsible for malicious behaviour. A cat-and-mouse game has developed between hostile actors, governments, researchers and technology companies. The supporting concepts have not always kept pace with emerging threats.

More...
A Look Into WeChat – Enabling an Analyst to Search and Monitor Content
0.00 €

A Look Into WeChat – Enabling an Analyst to Search and Monitor Content

A Look Into WeChat – Enabling an Analyst to Search and Monitor Content

Author(s): Alvin Lim / Language(s): English

Keywords: WeChat; Mobile application; Chinese chat app; Weixin; multifunctional app; public subscription accounts; news source; Censorship; influencing ability; keywords; in-app searches;

WeChat, or Weixin (微信) in Mandarin, is a multi-function mobile application (app), first launched by China’s Tencent Holdings in 2011. A distinction between WeChat and Weixin must be drawn because they are two separate products, with WeChat intended for the international market while Weixin is aimed at the domestic Chinese market (Tencent, 2020). For this report, the names WeChat and Weixin are used to describe the internationally and domestically oriented products, respectively.

More...
Russian Civilian Outreach and Information Operations in Syria
0.00 €

Russian Civilian Outreach and Information Operations in Syria

Russian Civilian Outreach and Information Operations in Syria

Author(s): Jan Daniel,Dominik Presl / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Syria; Information operations; soft power; Syrian media ecosystem; Government-Affiliated Social Media; Russian goals in Syria;

The large-scale Russian military intervention in Syria entered its seventh year in 2021. Major military operations seem to be halted for now and the Syrian government, together with its allies, has been able to reconquer significant portions of the country’s territory. Nevertheless, the Syrian territory continues to be fragmented and the Syrian government faces a wide range of challenges, from the collapsing economy to simmering local opposition in certain regions. Russian involvement in the conflict, and in the country more broadly, is far from over and it is still requested by the Syrian regime. Even though Russia might be involved in various power-struggles inside the Syrian governmental apparatus and economic structures and there are several important differences between Russian and Syrian visions of the future political development, the dependence of the Syrian government on Russian support means that its presence in the country is, thus far, secured.

More...
Strategic Communications Hybrid Threats Toolkit - Applying the principles of NATO Strategic Communications to understand and counter grey zone threats
0.00 €

Strategic Communications Hybrid Threats Toolkit - Applying the principles of NATO Strategic Communications to understand and counter grey zone threats

Strategic Communications Hybrid Threats Toolkit - Applying the principles of NATO Strategic Communications to understand and counter grey zone threats

Author(s): Monika Gill,Pia Hansen / Language(s): English

Keywords: Hybrid threat environment; strategic communications; Hostile narrative strategies; Hostile measures; vulnerabilities; nation weaknesses; Direct influence of public opinion; societal divisions; Agitation and civil unrest; Interference in elections;

This research is for people who want to develop their understanding of dangers to national security that come under the umbrella of ‘hybrid threats’. Such threats involve a combination of different hostile measures, furthering an adversary’s strategic goals while occuring in the ‘grey zone’ which exists between peace, crisis and war. The report builds on our publication Hybrid Threats - A Strategic Communications perspective, which analysed 30 scenarios featuring hybrid activities by state actors. Data from the case studies is exploited further, deepening our understanding of hybrid threats and how they might be countered by applying the principles of NATO Strategic Communications. It aims to help the reader develop ways of looking at hybrid threats and then to appreciate how the Strategic Communications process might be applied at the national level. This involves understanding the information environment, then developing a plan which provides coherence to the various instruments a nation can use to leverage strategic influence. Strategic Communications is a realm which suffers from a divergence of definitional interpretations. While NATO Strategic Communications has arguably come of age, there is understandably a lack of commonality across the NATO nations as to how the term is used. Popular usage has Strategic Communications simply as being highly effective at what an organisation says. This confines communication to a narrow arena. Our report builds on NATO’s approach to Strategic Communications - a mindset or philosophy which is underpinned by process and supported by capabilities. When applied at the national level it provides a function of basic statecraft at the intersection of strategy and action.

More...
How Did The Nordic-Baltic Countries Handle The First Wave of COVID-19?
0.00 €

How Did The Nordic-Baltic Countries Handle The First Wave of COVID-19?

How Did The Nordic-Baltic Countries Handle The First Wave of COVID-19?

Author(s): Iselin Engebretsen,Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili,Miranda Karin Michélsen Forsgren,Rakin Sayed / Language(s): English

Keywords: Covid-19 pandemic; Nordic-Baltic countries and the pandemic; first wave of the pandemic; Sweden; Estonia; Finland; Denmark; Iceland; Norway; Latvia; Lithuania;

What is this project? When the Covid-19 virus struck Europe in 2020 with the full force of a pandemic, eight countries allied in the Nordic-Baltic region immediately faced a challenge to their hard-won partnership. For three decades Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden had been building a common purpose. How would that friendship respond to the greatest health scare in a hundred years? This report aims to answer this question by looking at developments in the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) through a Strategic Communications lens. Why a Strategic Communications lens? To understand fully the pandemic that gripped these eight partner states is to paint a picture that goes beyond the number of human lives lost or the rise in unemployment, fall in national economic growth, and assumption of state debt so punitive to their taxpayers. Any complete picture would also tell the story of how governments chose to speak to their electorates, and how civil society would respond to unprecedented measures imposed in peace time: curbing individual freedoms, it may be assumed, would elicit a consequent questioning of trust between government and governed.

More...
Russia's Strategy in Cyberspace
0.00 €

Russia's Strategy in Cyberspace

Russia's Strategy in Cyberspace

Author(s): Janne Hakala,Jazlyn Melnychuk / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia's impact in cyberspace; information confortation; national security interests; digital sovereignty;

Headlines connecting Russia to the vague notion of ‘cyber’ have become daily bread for Western publics and decision makers alike. From the damage done by NotPetya or attacks against Ukraine and Georgia, to Russia’s hacking and leaking operations in US and European elections, Russia’s offensive operations are consistent threat. An increasingly important tool in what Russia views as the ongoing “information confrontation,” Russia utilizes cyber operations alongside other military and non-military means to pursue strategic objectives. On the other hand, recent years have seen Russia’s attempts to close and secure its own digital information space. By using a combination of legal and technical means, the Kremlin tries to impose control both over digital infrastructure and content, efforts which are aimed at ensuring independence from the global Internet network and thus enhancing their information security. Russia sees activities in cyberspace as a subset to the all-encompassing framework of ‘information confrontation,’ which is derived from the Russian understanding of relations between states and, more specifically, a subset of the struggle between great powers for influence in the world. According to Russian thinkers, the information confrontation is constant and ongoing, and any means can be used to gain superiority in this confrontation.

More...
Georgia’s Information Environment through the Lens of Russia’s Influence
0.00 €

Georgia’s Information Environment through the Lens of Russia’s Influence

Georgia’s Information Environment through the Lens of Russia’s Influence

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: Georgia; Strategic interests; Russia and its political impact in Georgia; May 9 - Victory Day; COVID-19; media in Georgia;

The executive summary provides a brief overview of the key ideas discussed in the publication. It also highlights questions for further discussion. Since the dissolution of the USSR, one of Russia’s main objectives has been to keep former Soviet republics under its informational, economic, and military influence. In the case of Georgia, its persistent westward outlook has triggered openly hostile rhetoric and action from Russia. In August 2008, Russia demonstrated its readiness to take military action to obstruct Georgia’s NATO integration and assert its dominance in the region. This, however, has only strengthened Georgia’s desire to pull away from Russian influence and integrate more closely with the European Union and NATO. In fact, Georgia plans to formally apply for EU membership in 2024. Georgia’s geopolitical setting is not one to be envied. Aside from NATO member Turkey, Georgia does not have Western-integrated allies in the region. It also cannot escape the economic and military influence of its larger neighbour. Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States are Georgia’s main trade partners. Twenty per cent of Georgia’s territory has been occupied since the 2008 war, and creeping occupation, including regular kidnappings along the administrative borderline, continues. Apart from other factors, such as growing Chinese influence in Georgia, which are beyond the scope of this publication, Russia remains the main threat to Georgia’s stability and development. In terms of Georgia’s information environment, the Kremlin tries to exploit the following vulnerabilities: Georgia’s fragile economic situation, painful social issues, high political polarisation, media-party parallelism, conservativism and traditionalism, as well as certain Euro-Atlantic integration fatigue, where Georgians wish to see more progress. In addition, the occupied territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, as well as conflicts elsewhere in the region, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, remain additional pressure points.

More...
A Capability Definition and Assessment Framework for Countering Disinformation, Information Influence, and Foreign Interference
0.00 €

A Capability Definition and Assessment Framework for Countering Disinformation, Information Influence, and Foreign Interference

A Capability Definition and Assessment Framework for Countering Disinformation, Information Influence, and Foreign Interference

Author(s): James Pamment / Language(s): English

Keywords: foreign interference; counter-foreign interference; alliances; security policy;

This report proposes a capability assessment framework for countering disinformation, information influence, and foreign interference. At present, much emphasis is placed on the capability to counter disinformation and other associated phenomena. However, few have attempted to systematically define what those countermeasures are, and how they could be placed within a single, coherent capability assessment framework. This lack is not least because countries do not, and should not, approach these challenges in the same way. Geography, history, political systems, areas of expertise, and relative power explain to some extent why countries use different terminologies, organisational structures, and policies for dealing with foreign interference. Furthermore, friendly actors at times share capabilities–such as tech platforms, researchers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and private-sector intelligence companies. There is no perfect template for assessing capabilities, but rather only organisations and systems designed to cope with different threats based on their mandates, interests, and available resources. Since there is no one-size-fits-all solution to this problem, this report provides a flexible approach to capability assessment based on simple principles that can be applied by different types of actors. In support of this, and drawing upon previous research in this subject area, four capability assessment tools are established as tools to solve different assessment problems: Objectives are a cluster of capability measures associated with the explicit or implied purpose of an activity. Assessment can be developed, for example, from policy announcements, norms and expectations, and archetypical examples.

More...
Exploratory research report on the information environment in a political and security crisis context in the Sahel Region
0.00 €

Exploratory research report on the information environment in a political and security crisis context in the Sahel Region

Exploratory research report on the information environment in a political and security crisis context in the Sahel Region

Author(s): Adib Bencherif,Marie-Eve Carignan / Language(s): English

Keywords: Political and security crisis; Sahel Region; Terrorism; Coups d’État; Disinformation campaigns in Africa;

It can be daunting to describe media dynamics at the scale of a country, or even a group of bordering countries, such as those in the Sahel, given the profusion of what can be considered media productions and the complexity of the connections between them. The countries of the Sahel region are also strongly influenced by external media productions that are often locally accessible. Indeed, these external productions have an impact on the international understanding of the region’s issues. This fact in turn has a significant impact on the sources selected in the monitoring on the Sahel region. We are talking about a media ecosystem rooted in complex and fragile relationships of trust toward different epistemic sources and a relative understanding of the media world, characterized by practices of re-appropriation and information-sharing. Media systems in the Sahel did not wait for the emergence of the Internet to become decentralized, but intrinsically featured rumours and orality. The importance of local radio stations across the region is a manifestation of this today. Understanding this complex world requires an examination of the uses of the media, the messages they convey, the sources they utilize, processes of interpreting content, and the socio-political impact of the content in question.

More...
Information Laundering via Baltnews on Telegram: How Russian State-Sponsored Media Evade Sanctions and Narrate the War
0.00 €

Information Laundering via Baltnews on Telegram: How Russian State-Sponsored Media Evade Sanctions and Narrate the War

Information Laundering via Baltnews on Telegram: How Russian State-Sponsored Media Evade Sanctions and Narrate the War

Author(s): Martha Stolze / Language(s): English

Keywords: Baltnews; Telegram; information laundering; information influence campaigns; Weaponised information;

Information has long been used as a foreign policy tool by the Kremlin. Most recently the Russian attack on Ukraine has prompted a new wave of research into the way pro-Kremlin messaging is spread in Western countries and to what effect. This study examines a specific form of information influence campaigns (IICs): information laundering (IL). IL is a compilation of deception techniques and thus has the potential to change readers’ beliefs and attitudes. Overall, the study presents a refined, systematic, and reproducible way to identify which current IL attempts target the audience of a specific Telegram channel, and which networks of websites are behind these attempts. It also asks which potential framing biases the audience could be influenced by and with what strategic aim.

More...
The Ethics of Outsourcing Information Conflict: Outlining the Responsibilities of Government Funders to their Civil Society Partners
0.00 €

The Ethics of Outsourcing Information Conflict: Outlining the Responsibilities of Government Funders to their Civil Society Partners

The Ethics of Outsourcing Information Conflict: Outlining the Responsibilities of Government Funders to their Civil Society Partners

Author(s): James Pamment,Anneli Ahonen / Language(s): English

Keywords: Information conflict; NGOs; Disinformation and influence operations; contested truths;

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), researchers, journalists, and the private sector are often the main actors actively countering disinformation and influence operations. While governments maintain some counter-disinformation capabilities, they tend to outsource much of the day-to-day work through, for example, programmatic funding. It is more cost-effective and credible to fund independent, non-partisan NGOs to debunk disinformation than for a government to get caught up in trying to correct the sensitive issues that disinformation often entails. Indeed, in a recent Washington Post op-ed, former Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty President Thomas Kent lauds the role of NGOs in countering disinformation and urges governments to keep finding funding for them: “Volunteer activists fight it out with trolls online, penetrate and disrupt conspiracy chat rooms, campaign for companies to stop advertising on disinformation sites, and post memes ridiculing Russian propaganda.”1 They do all the things, in other words, that governments can’t or won’t do at scale.

More...
Seeking Legitimacy: Considerations for Strategic Communications in the Digital Age
0.00 €

Seeking Legitimacy: Considerations for Strategic Communications in the Digital Age

Seeking Legitimacy: Considerations for Strategic Communications in the Digital Age

Author(s): Emily Harding,Harshana Ghoorhoo,Julia Dickson / Language(s): English

Keywords: National Messaging Strategies; COVID-19; Ukraine; Sweden; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Finland; media environment; disinformation;

While the Soviet Union in particular developed well-honed strategies for propaganda during the Cold War, the last ten years have seen an explosion in the speed and reach of a new breed of disinformation. Messages now travel far and wide on social media at the speed of thought, as people look to Twitter and TikTok for news. Governments find themselves attempting to sort out which stories will pass and which stories will stick, as they struggle to bet limited resources against emerging problems. Democracies are particularly vulnerable to disinformation because laws are designed to protect free speech, not to protect the state from speech. Propaganda spreads easily across borders in the digital age. One recently uncovered web portal served multiple potential sympathizers in several languages; it provided pro-Kremlin activists from many countries with templates for letters opposing the destruction of Soviet monuments, including offers to help write and translate the letters into English and French. By one estimate, dozens of well-crafted pieces of pro-Kremlin disinformation appear every week—more than any country can handle alone.

More...
Trends in AI from Red and Blue Team Perspectives: Synthetic Data in a Data-Driven Society vs Sentiment Analysis
0.00 €

Trends in AI from Red and Blue Team Perspectives: Synthetic Data in a Data-Driven Society vs Sentiment Analysis

Trends in AI from Red and Blue Team Perspectives: Synthetic Data in a Data-Driven Society vs Sentiment Analysis

Author(s): Gundars Bergmanis-Korats,Alec Winshel,James Ostrowski,Kevin Zerussen,Omar Ali,Anastasija Cuikina,Alexander Gegov,Djamila Ouelhadj / Language(s): English

Keywords: AI; Data-driven society; synthetic data; deepfakes; malicious and harmful data; NATO; Toxic language; microaggression; dependency parsing;

In today’s world, much of what we do, from exercising to texting, is measured and tracked. This data is constantly harvested by data brokers and social media to create behavioural profiles, later used by artificial intelligence (AI) powered services. The overwhelming abundance of data has ushered in an age of analytics, and the rise of AI has enabled big-data decision making. However, the training of AI models is often challenging due to a supervised training strategy that requires a large amount of labelled data. Synthetic data is a possible solution to various challenges, including data labelling and, more importantly, data privacy problems. Synthetic data can be generated by using advances in rendering pipelines, generative adversarial models, and fusion models. It is predicted that most online-generated content will be AI created.

More...
Virtual Manipulation Brief 2023/1: Generative AI and its Implications for Social Media Analysis
0.00 €

Virtual Manipulation Brief 2023/1: Generative AI and its Implications for Social Media Analysis

Virtual Manipulation Brief 2023/1: Generative AI and its Implications for Social Media Analysis

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim / Language(s): English

Keywords: Generative AI; Social media; Large Language Models; GPT-4; psyops; Russia’s Propaganda; NATO;

This Virtual Manipulation report explores the impact of generative AI on social media analysis. Large Language Models (LLMs), such as the powerful GPT-4, can create highly convincing content that appears legitimate and unique. This makes it nearly impossible to distinguish between real and fake accounts. But, defenders can employ the same tools to more effectively monitor social media spaces. Careless implementations by adversaries introduce weaknesses that can result in accounts inadvertently disclosing that they are bots. As LLMs rely on prompts to shape their output, targeted psychological operations (‘psyops’) can provoke chatbots to reveal their true identities. The fight against manipulation is entering a new phase, but it remains unclear whether, in the long run, defenders or attackers will derive greater benefit from AI systems.

More...
Result 81-100 of 183
  • Prev
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • 6
  • 7
  • 8
  • 9
  • 10
  • Next

About

CEEOL is a leading provider of academic eJournals, eBooks and Grey Literature documents in Humanities and Social Sciences from and about Central, East and Southeast Europe. In the rapidly changing digital sphere CEEOL is a reliable source of adjusting expertise trusted by scholars, researchers, publishers, and librarians. CEEOL offers various services to subscribing institutions and their patrons to make access to its content as easy as possible. CEEOL supports publishers to reach new audiences and disseminate the scientific achievements to a broad readership worldwide. Un-affiliated scholars have the possibility to access the repository by creating their personal user account.

Contact Us

Central and Eastern European Online Library GmbH
Basaltstrasse 9
60487 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Amtsgericht Frankfurt am Main HRB 102056
VAT number: DE300273105
Phone: +49 (0)69-20026820
Email: info@ceeol.com

Connect with CEEOL

  • Join our Facebook page
  • Follow us on Twitter
CEEOL Logo Footer
2025 © CEEOL. ALL Rights Reserved. Privacy Policy | Terms & Conditions of use | Accessibility
ver2.0.428
Toggle Accessibility Mode

Login CEEOL

{{forgottenPasswordMessage.Message}}

Enter your Username (Email) below.

Institutional Login