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Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

Result 81-100 of 150
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THE KREMLIN AND DAESH INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

THE KREMLIN AND DAESH INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

THE KREMLIN AND DAESH INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Author(s): Antti Sillanpää / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Kremlin; politics; information; communication; strategic communication; media; Daesh; social media;

The paper summarizes discussions held on 24 May 2016 in Riga, Latvia, which focused on exploring the Kremlin and DAESH information activities in order to improve our understanding of the nature of these communications and their effect on Western societies. The questions discussed were: How are the communications and messages of DAESH and the Kremlin constructed and disseminated? Are their methods changing? Why do such messages appeal to youth, even if they are familiar with Western values and consumerism? What are the weakest aspects of our information environment and what can we do to improve? Six items emerged from the discussion as most relevant to the investigation of these issues. 1) Identity and Values Identity and values are in constant flux across time and space. It is easier to attack the values and identity of the other, rather than offering something different and better than the opponent. However, the West should be clear that it cannot simply assume the moral high ground. One of the weakness of the West is that we have allowed some members of society to become isolated and/or marginalised; they are now the ones who are more open and susceptible to the messaging of DAESH and the Kremlin, especially messages that project a sense of pride and/or a feeling of inclusiveness because they appear to offer the opportunity to participate meaningfully in some sort of utopian society. 2) Strategic Communications and the National Narrative There is a distinct need to create and maintain a positive national narrative in which words and deeds align, and to communicate that effectively. A narrative should not be static, but responsive to the environment in which it is based. One idea that came up in discussion was to task a specific governmental entity with coordinating messages concerning the national narrative and the strategic communication approach. This entity should be situated close to the Presidential Administration or the Prime Minister’s Office and have clear operating procedures, goals, and resources that address the identified risks and threats. The highest political backing would ensure sufficient clout to function adequately and carry out the mission. This body should oversee national narrative and strategic communication efforts, and act as an advisory and educational hub for other parts of government. A whole government approach, spanning both civil and military spheres, is required. The increase in the number of stakeholders reduces chances to create and manage coherent but relevant international narratives 3) Messaging and Counter-Messaging There is a continuing discussion as to whether the West should concentrate on counter-messaging or should focus on messaging instead. An argument for engaging in counter-messaging is that lies and harmful messages should not go unchallenged, otherwise falsehoods and partial truths may become accepted as facts and be assimilated into a society’s ‘knowledge base’. An argument against engaging in countermessaging is that this practice is likely to ensure that the West remains in a defensive and reactive posture in the current information confrontation, and adversaries’ harmful messages get unintentionally repeated. However, by actively messaging there is a chance to dictate the informational agenda, thereby forcing the opponent into a reactive position. Irrespective of the focus on messaging or countermessaging, information activities should not be done in isolation, but as an integrated part of a political or policy programme. 4) Perception and Legitimacy Emotional resonance holds greater sway than logical argument as a political or social relationship is formed between an audience and a communicator. Some individuals and groups are more susceptible to messaging than others, often as the result of an unfulfilled need. The motivation to join and/or support DAESH is largely based upon the perception that what is being offered is legitimate and will fulfil some psychological or physical need of the individual recruit. The messenger that communicates a believable response to such needs may well be able to influence that particular individual or group. However, when an individual personally experiences the dissonance between the projected utopia and reality, their trust in the utopian vision soon disappears, and along with it any sense of motivation or commitment to the cause. 5) Measuring Activity and Effect Both DAESH and Russia have adopted Western technologies and understood the audience appetite for infotainment and quick satisfaction. DAESH and the Kremlin employ the tactic of shifting focus and attention away from areas where they are losing or vulnerable. They have the ability to affect our news agenda and our focus through big event news. Even if the Kremlin or DAESH are engaged in harmful or disruptive communication, the activity does not necessarily translate into influence that would weaken the national security of the target state. The measure of an activity, i.e. communicating, does not automatically neatly translate into the measure of its effect, i.e. influence and change of behaviour. There are many variables that can either obstruct or facilitate the level of influence and persuasion that actually takes place when an actor communicates. These differences put pressure on us to achieve a better understanding of human behaviour and develop more meaningful ways of measuring. Observing, let alone measuring, the effectiveness of ‘hybrid warfare’ is particularly challenging. 6) Analytical Tools and Frameworks In addition to traditional historical area studies and social science perspectives, there are a variety of promising frameworks that can be used to investigate the information activities of DAESH and the Kremlin. The potentially fruitful approaches discussed included political and obstruction marketing and psychology.

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MAPPING OF STRATCOM PRACTICES IN NATO COUNTRIES - RESULTS OF THE STUDY

MAPPING OF STRATCOM PRACTICES IN NATO COUNTRIES - RESULTS OF THE STUDY

MAPPING OF STRATCOM PRACTICES IN NATO COUNTRIES - RESULTS OF THE STUDY

Author(s): Gerry Osborne / Language(s): English

Keywords: NATO; StratCom; NATO countries; communication; strategic communication; research; interview;

“There is a curious dichotomy concerning StratCom in the NATO Alliance and in its membership nations. The term occupies an inordinately larger space in verbiage and documents than the function is given in the environments in which it is has the most potential to effect. This most recent study not only re-affirms previous results but more importantly, attempts to add to them by seeking to get to the “why”. While it does get to the “why”, the integrity of the results is somewhat diminished by the disappointing level of national participation with only 11 of 28 nations responding. For a function often on the lips of leadership -- both in the Alliance and its nations -- it is rather telling that 17 nations passed over the opportunity to illuminate the function and contribute to the discussion. Nevertheless, the report builds on the baseline understanding of how Allied nations define, organise and implement the StratCom function, and the results are as encouraging as they are concerning. Concerning because the author found that many responding nations still consider Strategic Communication to essentially be another name for what they formerly termed Public Affairs. Encouraging because the authors found that many nations acknowledged that the StratCom function needed to change from a supporting to a supported role – an understanding which is finding traction amongst experienced operators. Having previously written a paper which included Alliance nation mapping with respect to StratCom, I welcome this report for updating and contributing more to NATO’s understanding about how its membership individually considers StratCom. It gives needed insight into NATO policy development on behalf of all nations.”

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INTERNET TROLLING AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF LATVIA

INTERNET TROLLING AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF LATVIA

INTERNET TROLLING AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF LATVIA

Author(s): Alexander Fokin / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; media; internet; information; communication; trolling; tool; hybrid warfare; Latvia; case study;

Social media has been used increasingly to support military actions. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that the fight for hearts and minds is as important as kinetic activity, and social media plays a crucial role in this process. Both state and non-state actors effectively exploit social media to gain support for their actions, recruit new members, deceive and intimidate the adversary, and even use it for traditional military activities such as intelligence collection or command and control. Given these conditions, the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) was tasked to conduct a study on how social media can be used as a weapon of hybrid warfare. The recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict demonstrated how fake identities and accounts were used to disseminate narratives through social media, blogs, and web commentaries in order to manipulate, harass, or deceive opponents. Several reports by investigative journalists have reported about the existence of so called troll farms in Russian cities, employing people to spread disinformation, rumours, or falsified facts, enter into discussions and flood topic-related web spaces with their own messages or abuse. Nevertheless, trolling is still a relatively unexplored phenomenon. Although such activities have been widely identified, their effects have not been measured, particularly due to the fact that is it difficult to distinguish between the paid trolls and people who are simply expressing their opinions. In order to analyse how pro-Russian trolling is used to influence the public opinion in NATOmember countries the NATO StratCom COE commissioned the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: the Case of Latvia. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University, and was aimed at analysing organised proRussian trolling in internet media to measure its impact on public opinion in Latvia. Latvia was chosen for the case study due to the specifics of its information environment (a strong division between the Latvian and Russian language information spaces), as well as the country’s historical background and potentially vulnerability to Russian hybrid warfare tactics. Communication science, social anthropology, political science, and information technology expertise was employed to gain a better understanding of the trolling phenomenon, and to develop methods to identify trolling and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used. This research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and it offers recommendations on how to mitigate the effects of trolling when used as a tool in hybrid warfare, beyond the specific case study.

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ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

Author(s): Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili,Jānis Bērziņš,Aivar Jaeski,Mark Laity,Nerijus Maliukevičius,Aurimas Navys,Gerry Osborne,Robert Pszczel,Stephen Tatham / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; conflict; information; communication; Crimea; media; narratives; warfare; social media;

The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy. Over the years, Russia has been drawing lessons from different Allied operations and has worked on adapting its military planning to the realities of a modern conflict. It tested these lessons in the recent August 2008 war with Georgia which marked the first use of cyber warfare and information operations in conjunction with a conventional military operation. Russia has also shown a willingness to modernize Soviet-era tools and adapt them to today’s complex information environment. Critically, it has been willing to afford informationbased activities primacy in operations, using more conventional military forces in a supporting role. Russia’s information campaign has to be analysed in the context of the strategic narrative of the Russian government, reflected in policy documents like the Foreign Policy Review of 2007 and the State Security Review of 2009, and supported by legislative initiatives like the Federal Law on the Russian Federation’s State Policy on Compatriots Living Abroad. The notion of compatriots deserves particular attention as it allows Russia to legitimize the state’s duty to defend its compatriots abroad from any kind of threat to their rights or physical well-being. It also leads to the explanation of the need to sustain the so-called Russian World which implies maintenance of a unified Russian-language information sphere beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (mainly targeting the territory of the former USSR). The Russian government’s long-developed control over the mass media has been an important factor in the effective implementation of the information campaign against Ukraine. Russia’s narrative was instrumentalized with the help of concurrent messaging. For example, the main Russian TV channels were actively involved in framing opinions about the situation in Ukraine from the very beginning of the crisis. Control is exerted directly by the Presidential Administration, including also government-controlled internet ‘trolling’ which is a growing, under-researched phenomenon used to support the Russian government’s narrative. This control over the media has made it difficult for democratic states with free media to compete with the forceful, synchronized messaging of the Russian government. The Russian narrative includes several dominant themes: positioning Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization in opposition to “decadent” Europe; positioning Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union; promoting the Russian World which unites Eastern Slavs, implies that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation, and recognizes the natural supremacy of Russia; portraying Ukrainians as a pseudo-nation who are unable to administer their own country and sustain their statehood; referring to the Great Patriotic War thus bringing out the hatred of Nazism and relating it to the Euromaidan protesters who are labelled as nationalists, Nazis and fascists posing a threat to the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine’s population; dividing the West by utilising the differing interests of EU member states and positioning the USA in opposition to the EU; and using legal and historic justifications to legitimize Russia’s actions in Ukraine (including the Crimea Referendum). The report identifies that Russia’s information campaign was central to Russia’s operations in Ukraine. The information campaign and related military action by Russia corresponds to the characteristics of a new form of warfare where the lines between peace and war, foreign military force and local self-defence groups are blurred and the main battle space has moved from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the populations in question. Crimea may be considered a test-case for Russia in trying out this new form of warfare where hybrid, asymmetric warfare, combining an intensive information campaign, cyber warfare and the use of highly trained Special Operation Forces, play a key role. The crisis in Ukraine has provided valuable lessons for the Ukrainian government, the countries neighbouring Russia (whose Russian-speaking communities were enlarged as a result of Soviet-era policy), and NATO and the EU as organisations. The following are the general conclusions of the report: • Russia was prepared to conduct a new form of warfare in Ukraine where an information campaign played a central role. The characteristics of the new form of warfare which were implemented in Crimea were outlined by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, nearly a year before the crisis in Ukraine. Analysis of the Ukraine conflict suggests that NATO and the EU must adapt to the new reality where information superiority, as opposed to military power, is becoming increasingly important. • Russia’s narrative is largely based on historical memory. Russia’s thorough understanding of its own audiences – including compatriots abroad – was able to leverage historical memory: the Great Russian Empire, World War II and Nazi atrocities, and the might and collapse of the USSR. • Crisis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long term strategy. Learning from the Russian information campaign in Ukraine, it is clear that early detection and analysis of those elements within the Russian narrative signalling potential aggressive behaviour is critical. The report also demonstrates that Russia’s state policy documents contain such indications. • The role of Compatriots Abroad is critical and should be considered carefully in the future. The security implications for countries neighbouring Russia are particularly serious. The kind of strategy that Russia has employed in Ukraine is likely to work best in areas where there are larger communities of Russia’s Compatriots Abroad. They are the targets of Russia’s information campaign and potentially may be ready to provide local support in cases of Russian aggression. The Ukraine and Georgian cases demonstrate that such information campaigns, backed by military means, are easier to carry out in territories bordering Russia – in particular, in those countries which are not members of NATO and therefore not party to the Washington Treaty. • Audience Analysis is critical to operational success. Russia has demonstrated that understanding audiences and what motivates them is critical to operational success that is enduring. • There is “another side of the coin” to Russia’s information campaign. Although Russia’s information campaign has been successful in influencing its audiences (the Russian population and compatriots abroad), it also bears a degree of counter-productivity as it has radicalized and alienated other audiences – West Ukraine and Kyiv, the populations of NATO and EU countries and the USA. • Deception is used by Russia as a tactic to distract and delay. Investigating and disproving the false information, different versions of events and even conspiracy theories rapidly disseminated by Russia requires a lot of time, effort and resources on the part of international organisations like NATO, the Ukrainian government, independent media, experts and even ordinary citizens. • Disinformation campaigns erode over time. The evolution of the crisis in Ukraine beyond Crimea demonstrates that disinformation campaigns erode over time as more and more factual evidence is revealed to negate lies and falsification.

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When 5G meets AI: Next Generation of Communication and Information Sharing
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When 5G meets AI: Next Generation of Communication and Information Sharing

When 5G meets AI: Next Generation of Communication and Information Sharing

Author(s): Katarína Kertýsová / Language(s): English

Keywords: 5G; Communication innovation; power of 5g; wireless technology; information environment; extended reality; digital journalism; digital repression; mass surveillance; privacy; deepfakes;

The adoption of fifth generation (5G) wireless technology will touch nearly every aspect of our lives. While changes brought by 5G will primarily affect sectors that depend on smooth wireless connection – such as transportation, healthcare, or manufacturing – they will also alter the realm of (strategic) communications. In the coming decade, 5G and edge computing will generate new opportunities for how humans interact with each other and experience the world. Greater connectivity and access to information enabled by 5G also promise to bridge the digital divide, improving democratic participation and citizen mobilization. At the same time, there will be more opportunities for misuse of this technology. Events of the last ten years have demonstrated the impact that digital transformation is having on democracy and political life. Consider the role that social media has played in key political events such as the Arab Spring or how the advent of e-voting and e-political participation changed the outcome of some elections throughout the pandemic. The emergence and accelerated adoption of new technologies has seen a concurrent rise in digital repression and disinformation operations. While (online) disinformation is not a new phenomenon, rapid advances in information technologies have altered the ways in which information (and disinformation) can be produced and disseminated. Data capture, speed, and connectivity offered by 5G will equip both state and non-state actors with more effective tools to tighten information control, repress political opponents, and manipulate public opinion online.

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The Role of AI in the Battle Against Disinformation
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The Role of AI in the Battle Against Disinformation

The Role of AI in the Battle Against Disinformation

Author(s): Alfonsas Juršėnas,Kasparas Karlauskas,Eimantas Ledinauskas,Gediminas Maskeliūnas,Donatas Rondomanskas,Julius Ruseckas / Language(s): English

Keywords: Disinformation; Deepfake technology; Fingerprinting data; Authenticity; Social media; Bot detection; AI methods; Machine learning;

Detecting and countering disinformation grows increasingly important as social media sites have become a leading news source for most people. Efficient disinformation campaigns lead to negative real-world consequences on a global scale, both in politics and in society. Machine learning (ML) methods have demonstrated their potential for at least partial automatisation of disinformation detection and analysis. In this report, we review current and emerging artificial intelligence (AI) methods that are used or can be used to counter the spread and generation of disinformation, and briefly reflect on ongoing developments in anti-disinformation legislation in the EU. This overview will shed light on some of the tools that disinformation-countering practitioners could use to make their work easier.

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Communicating Defence in Slovakia and the Czech Republic: Mapping Actors and Narratives online
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Communicating Defence in Slovakia and the Czech Republic: Mapping Actors and Narratives online

Communicating Defence in Slovakia and the Czech Republic: Mapping Actors and Narratives online

Author(s): Martin Brezina,Peter Dubóczi,Matej Kandrík,Veronika Krátka Špalková,Tomáš Kriššák / Language(s): English

Keywords: Slovakia; Czech Republic; anti-Western actors communicating defence themes; information space; social media; geopolitical sentiment; political actor; Russia; Ukraine; War in Ukraine;

Slovakia has a much larger number of anti- Western actors communicating defence themes than the Czech Republic. There is a significantly higher penetration of anti-Western and pro-Russian narratives in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. Slovak anti-Western actors are the best-performing group in our study. They consistently gain significantly more reactions, shares and comments than pro-Western actors in Slovakia or any actor in the Czech Republic. The Czech information space is predominantly negative towards Russia, the Slovak towards the West. Most posts in the Slovak infosphere were anti-Western in their geopolitical sentiment. The Czech infosphere was different in that most posts with negative sentiment were about Russia. The Slovak infosphere is much more clustered than the Czech infosphere. This is because of the stronger anti-Western leaning of Slovakia and because Slovak actors are more effective in communicating defence themes than their Czech counterparts. NATO was a significantly bigger topic in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. While in the Slovak dataset there were almost 600 posts concerning NATO, there were less than 400 in the Czech Republic. But both countries had slightly prevailing negative geopolitical sentiment towards NATO. Following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the war dominated public discourse for most of 2022. Consequently, the majority of the content collected for this research concerned the war in Ukraine. Other prominent defence-related topics included military cooperation (training and weapons deliveries) and NATO, but even these topics were most often mentioned in the context of the war in Ukraine.

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Chinese Arctic Narratives: How Chinese Media is Approaching the Nordic-Arctic States
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Chinese Arctic Narratives: How Chinese Media is Approaching the Nordic-Arctic States

Chinese Arctic Narratives: How Chinese Media is Approaching the Nordic-Arctic States

Author(s): Viesturs Bērziņš / Language(s): English

Keywords: Chinese media; Nordic-Arctic states; Constructivism and identity; Iceland; Sweden; Norway; Finland; Denmark; ‘Near Arctic’ identity;

The world we live in is constantly changing. As Heraclitus once famously stated: ‘The only thing constant is change itself’. History has shown us that certain geographical regions can suddenly become the centre of attention. A territory that has caught international attention recently is the Arctic. A frozen, fairly untamed area that is mostly known for glaciers, polar bears, and endless wilderness is starting to emerge as a centrepiece of the global agenda. Minerals, vast waters for fishing and shipping, as well as strategic importance are some of the Arctic’s key points of attraction. Many states have expressed interest in extending their reach and developments in the Arctic. Yet, one of the states that is actively participating in Arctic endeavours is attracting more scholarly attention than the others – China. Not only is it located nearly 1500 kilometres away from the Arctic Circle, it also has one of the fastest growing economies in the world. This has led some experts to wonder whether it is possible for Arctic states to remain in complete control of the contested region. China’s interest in the region has resulted in it becoming one of thirteen observer states of the Arctic Council. The organisation can be considered the de facto most important intergovernmental forum for Arctic affairs.

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Mask Gate as a Continuous Media Event in a Hybrid Media Space
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Mask Gate as a Continuous Media Event in a Hybrid Media Space

Mask Gate as a Continuous Media Event in a Hybrid Media Space

Author(s): Lilly Korpiola,Petro Poutanen / Language(s): English

Keywords: Mask Gate media event; Finland; dispute between various public health institutions and authorities; COVID-19 pandemic; attention in the media; hybrid media system;

This study examines the evolution of the “Mask Gate” media event that took place in Finland amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and state of emergency in 2020. In March-August 2020, there was a dispute between various public health institutions and authorities as to whether the public should be required to use face masks. This investigation focuses on the construction of the media event, specifically on the interplay and dynamics between social media and mass media, as well as the public reactions evoked by the Mask Gate in Finland. Our aim is to describe the critical turning points in the development of the media event, thus tracing the evolution of such media events in the present media system. We illustrate our case with the help of a data set consisting of 391 033 messages about respiratory masks found on social media and traditional news media outlets. We focus our analysis on a subset of this data set concerning the “Mask Gate”. On the basis of our analysis, we present a timeline of the Mask Gate as well as analyse the most important actors, platforms and affective reactions that played a role in the construction of the event. An autopsy of such a notable media event can assist organisations in developing their communication competencies for risk, strategic and crisis communication situations, in which it is imperative for an organisation to restore its public legitimacy.

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Social Media Monitoring Tools: An In-Depth Look
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Social Media Monitoring Tools: An In-Depth Look

Social Media Monitoring Tools: An In-Depth Look

Author(s): Anna Grizāne,Marija Isupova,Vanessa Vorteil / Language(s): English

Keywords: Social media monitoring tools; AI assistence; Artificial Intelligence tools; Brandwatch; Mediatoolkit; Meltwater; BuzzSumo; Keyhole; Sprinklr;

Information is power and, in this day and age, the Internet is increasingly becoming the primary source and vector for the transfer of information between people. Digital media is an essential source of information for people worldwide. Compared to traditional media, digital media consumption grows rapidly with each year. The COVID-19 pandemic contributed to this process, with most work, learning, entertainment and communication in technologically advanced countries transferring to the online environment. Social media plays a significant role in people’s lives. There are 4.2 billion social media users worldwide, more than 53% of the world’s population. Since 2021, the number of social media users has grown by 490 million, a 13% increase. This means that the number of new social media users grew by more than 900 users per minute. The amount of content generated on social media is tremendous—there are 474,000 Tweets, 69 000 Instagram posts, and 400 hours of new Youtube videos uploaded each minute. On Facebook alone, there are 510,000 comments, 293,000 status updates, and 136,000 photos uploaded per minute.

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Attributing Information Influence Operations: Identifying those Responsible for Malicious Behaviour Online
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Attributing Information Influence Operations: Identifying those Responsible for Malicious Behaviour Online

Attributing Information Influence Operations: Identifying those Responsible for Malicious Behaviour Online

Author(s): James Pamment,Victoria Smith / Language(s): English

Keywords: hybrid threats; online behaviour; cyber frameworks; Proprietary behavioural evidence; Open-source behavioural evidence; Classified behavioural evidence;

By their nature hybrid threats create ambiguity. They are covert, obscuring intent and enabling plausible deniability. This makes identifying both who is behind them and their motives a significant challenge. Attribution must grapple with this challenge. It involves identifying the responsible actors, understanding what they are hoping to achieve and how they are seeking to accomplish it. Without a methodical and consistent approach underpinning attribution, planning and executing effective responses is far more challenging. The online environment has become a rich source of opportunities for a type of hybrid threat, referred to in this report as ‘Information Influence Operations’. These are deliberate attempts at deception, including interference in democratic processes, using disruptive and illegitimate means which are readily available to hostile actors. Those responsible for malicious behaviour online are motivated by a wide range of reasons. Organised, state-sponsored instruments of influence work across borders, furthering strategic aims by reaching directly into a targeted nation’s society and political structures. Others act for simpler reasons such as excitement, financial gain or self-actualisation. Working out who’s who means untangling a variety of evidence and indicators. Threats which occur in the digital domain pose a particular problem. By their very nature, online platforms are susceptible to manipulation, and even though responses such as takedowns are increasingly common, more work is needed to improve the process of identifying those responsible for malicious behaviour. A cat-and-mouse game has developed between hostile actors, governments, researchers and technology companies. The supporting concepts have not always kept pace with emerging threats.

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Disinformation in Democracies: Improving Societal Resilience to Disinformation
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Disinformation in Democracies: Improving Societal Resilience to Disinformation

Disinformation in Democracies: Improving Societal Resilience to Disinformation

Author(s): Jon Hassain / Language(s): English

Keywords: Disinformation; COVID-19 pandemic; Fake news; Media Engagement; Societal Resilience to Disinformation; active citizenship; Infodemiology;

The Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in an array of counter-disinformation communication challenges. In response to this, individuals, governments, civil society, and commercial actors have adapted and evolved their own communications to provide us with tools to fight this ‘infodemic’. This report shares examples of innovative solutions, and hopes to encourage readers to think differently about their own communication challenges. Seven case studies have been selected and described as concisely as possible. Think inspirational coffee table book as opposed to a lengthy academic tome. Case studies presented in this article are notable not only for the interventions themselves, but how their underlying policies and conceptual frameworks allowed them to come to fruition. For example, the Finnish case study, a collaborative social media campaign, demonstrates how government policy can enable a whole-of-society approach to psychological resilience.

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Capability Assessment for StratCom: Using the New Risk Perspective to Inform the Development of Effective Response Capability Assessments for Countering Information Influence Operations
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Capability Assessment for StratCom: Using the New Risk Perspective to Inform the Development of Effective Response Capability Assessments for Countering Information Influence Operations

Capability Assessment for StratCom: Using the New Risk Perspective to Inform the Development of Effective Response Capability Assessments for Countering Information Influence Operations

Author(s): Hanna Lindbom / Language(s): English

Keywords: StratCom; information influence operations; Counter-measures; Capability Assessment; Response capability;

There are no established models for assessing an organisation’s capability to respond to information influence operations (IIOs). While great efforts have been made to improve our knowledge and understanding of IIOs and how to counter them, and measures have been taken to strengthen democratic processes and to decrease societal vulnerabilities, few efforts have been made to measure the impact of IIOs or to assess the efficacy of the countermeasures currently in place—the response capability—to mitigate those consequences. When facing a potential threat, we don’t want to just sit and wait for something bad to happen, experience the impact, and only then consider how best to respond. It is much better to be proactive and seek to develop a response capability that can prevent losses or effectively mitigate the negative impact of an adverse event when it occurs. To assess whether our response capability is sufficient we must be able to 1) clearly identify the critical assets we wish to protect and 2) accurately describe the response we have in place for when those assets are threatened.

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China's Influence in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment: Latvia and Sweden
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China's Influence in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment: Latvia and Sweden

China's Influence in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment: Latvia and Sweden

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: China's influence on the information space of Sweden and Latvia; Russia; Economic policy; Public communication; Nordic-Baltic countries; exposure to Chinese market; security threat; vaccine diplomacy; politics of pressure;

Given its rapid economic growth and expanded geopolitical ambitions, China’s influence projection has grown globally. The World Economic Forum projected that China may overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2024. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed at optimising and expanding China’s economic cooperation with the Eurasian continent, makes Europe a prime destination for Chinese investment. Countries in Europe have largely treated economic cooperation with China as an opportunity, and the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8) has not been an exception to this trend. However, several European countries have grown apprehensive regarding China’s intents, as economic cooperation has become a backdrop to undesirable political influence via bilateral and multilateral fora. At the same time, buoyed by pride from its rapid economic growth, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become more assertive in defending its national interests, including in the South China Sea region and in response to Western critics of China’s expansionist foreign policy, undemocratic practices and human rights violations. In reaction to these developments, a growing number of European countries have started to look at China’s activities as a challenge or threat to national security. This shift has also become increasingly visible among the countries of the Nordic-Baltic region.

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A Look Into WeChat – Enabling an Analyst to Search and Monitor Content
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A Look Into WeChat – Enabling an Analyst to Search and Monitor Content

A Look Into WeChat – Enabling an Analyst to Search and Monitor Content

Author(s): Alvin Lim / Language(s): English

Keywords: WeChat; Mobile application; Chinese chat app; Weixin; multifunctional app; public subscription accounts; news source; Censorship; influencing ability; keywords; in-app searches;

WeChat, or Weixin (微信) in Mandarin, is a multi-function mobile application (app), first launched by China’s Tencent Holdings in 2011. A distinction between WeChat and Weixin must be drawn because they are two separate products, with WeChat intended for the international market while Weixin is aimed at the domestic Chinese market (Tencent, 2020). For this report, the names WeChat and Weixin are used to describe the internationally and domestically oriented products, respectively.

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Russian Civilian Outreach and Information Operations in Syria
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Russian Civilian Outreach and Information Operations in Syria

Russian Civilian Outreach and Information Operations in Syria

Author(s): Jan Daniel,Dominik Presl / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Syria; Information operations; soft power; Syrian media ecosystem; Government-Affiliated Social Media; Russian goals in Syria;

The large-scale Russian military intervention in Syria entered its seventh year in 2021. Major military operations seem to be halted for now and the Syrian government, together with its allies, has been able to reconquer significant portions of the country’s territory. Nevertheless, the Syrian territory continues to be fragmented and the Syrian government faces a wide range of challenges, from the collapsing economy to simmering local opposition in certain regions. Russian involvement in the conflict, and in the country more broadly, is far from over and it is still requested by the Syrian regime. Even though Russia might be involved in various power-struggles inside the Syrian governmental apparatus and economic structures and there are several important differences between Russian and Syrian visions of the future political development, the dependence of the Syrian government on Russian support means that its presence in the country is, thus far, secured.

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Strategic Communications Hybrid Threats Toolkit - Applying the principles of NATO Strategic Communications to understand and counter grey zone threats
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Strategic Communications Hybrid Threats Toolkit - Applying the principles of NATO Strategic Communications to understand and counter grey zone threats

Strategic Communications Hybrid Threats Toolkit - Applying the principles of NATO Strategic Communications to understand and counter grey zone threats

Author(s): Monika Gill,Pia Hansen / Language(s): English

Keywords: Hybrid threat environment; strategic communications; Hostile narrative strategies; Hostile measures; vulnerabilities; nation weaknesses; Direct influence of public opinion; societal divisions; Agitation and civil unrest; Interference in elections;

This research is for people who want to develop their understanding of dangers to national security that come under the umbrella of ‘hybrid threats’. Such threats involve a combination of different hostile measures, furthering an adversary’s strategic goals while occuring in the ‘grey zone’ which exists between peace, crisis and war. The report builds on our publication Hybrid Threats - A Strategic Communications perspective, which analysed 30 scenarios featuring hybrid activities by state actors. Data from the case studies is exploited further, deepening our understanding of hybrid threats and how they might be countered by applying the principles of NATO Strategic Communications. It aims to help the reader develop ways of looking at hybrid threats and then to appreciate how the Strategic Communications process might be applied at the national level. This involves understanding the information environment, then developing a plan which provides coherence to the various instruments a nation can use to leverage strategic influence. Strategic Communications is a realm which suffers from a divergence of definitional interpretations. While NATO Strategic Communications has arguably come of age, there is understandably a lack of commonality across the NATO nations as to how the term is used. Popular usage has Strategic Communications simply as being highly effective at what an organisation says. This confines communication to a narrow arena. Our report builds on NATO’s approach to Strategic Communications - a mindset or philosophy which is underpinned by process and supported by capabilities. When applied at the national level it provides a function of basic statecraft at the intersection of strategy and action.

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How Did The Nordic-Baltic Countries Handle The First Wave of COVID-19?
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How Did The Nordic-Baltic Countries Handle The First Wave of COVID-19?

How Did The Nordic-Baltic Countries Handle The First Wave of COVID-19?

Author(s): Iselin Engebretsen,Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili,Miranda Karin Michélsen Forsgren,Rakin Sayed / Language(s): English

Keywords: Covid-19 pandemic; Nordic-Baltic countries and the pandemic; first wave of the pandemic; Sweden; Estonia; Finland; Denmark; Iceland; Norway; Latvia; Lithuania;

What is this project? When the Covid-19 virus struck Europe in 2020 with the full force of a pandemic, eight countries allied in the Nordic-Baltic region immediately faced a challenge to their hard-won partnership. For three decades Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden had been building a common purpose. How would that friendship respond to the greatest health scare in a hundred years? This report aims to answer this question by looking at developments in the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) through a Strategic Communications lens. Why a Strategic Communications lens? To understand fully the pandemic that gripped these eight partner states is to paint a picture that goes beyond the number of human lives lost or the rise in unemployment, fall in national economic growth, and assumption of state debt so punitive to their taxpayers. Any complete picture would also tell the story of how governments chose to speak to their electorates, and how civil society would respond to unprecedented measures imposed in peace time: curbing individual freedoms, it may be assumed, would elicit a consequent questioning of trust between government and governed.

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Russia's Strategy in Cyberspace
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Russia's Strategy in Cyberspace

Russia's Strategy in Cyberspace

Author(s): Janne Hakala,Jazlyn Melnychuk / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia's impact in cyberspace; information confortation; national security interests; digital sovereignty;

Headlines connecting Russia to the vague notion of ‘cyber’ have become daily bread for Western publics and decision makers alike. From the damage done by NotPetya or attacks against Ukraine and Georgia, to Russia’s hacking and leaking operations in US and European elections, Russia’s offensive operations are consistent threat. An increasingly important tool in what Russia views as the ongoing “information confrontation,” Russia utilizes cyber operations alongside other military and non-military means to pursue strategic objectives. On the other hand, recent years have seen Russia’s attempts to close and secure its own digital information space. By using a combination of legal and technical means, the Kremlin tries to impose control both over digital infrastructure and content, efforts which are aimed at ensuring independence from the global Internet network and thus enhancing their information security. Russia sees activities in cyberspace as a subset to the all-encompassing framework of ‘information confrontation,’ which is derived from the Russian understanding of relations between states and, more specifically, a subset of the struggle between great powers for influence in the world. According to Russian thinkers, the information confrontation is constant and ongoing, and any means can be used to gain superiority in this confrontation.

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Georgia’s Information Environment through the Lens of Russia’s Influence
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Georgia’s Information Environment through the Lens of Russia’s Influence

Georgia’s Information Environment through the Lens of Russia’s Influence

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: Georgia; Strategic interests; Russia and its political impact in Georgia; May 9 - Victory Day; COVID-19; media in Georgia;

The executive summary provides a brief overview of the key ideas discussed in the publication. It also highlights questions for further discussion. Since the dissolution of the USSR, one of Russia’s main objectives has been to keep former Soviet republics under its informational, economic, and military influence. In the case of Georgia, its persistent westward outlook has triggered openly hostile rhetoric and action from Russia. In August 2008, Russia demonstrated its readiness to take military action to obstruct Georgia’s NATO integration and assert its dominance in the region. This, however, has only strengthened Georgia’s desire to pull away from Russian influence and integrate more closely with the European Union and NATO. In fact, Georgia plans to formally apply for EU membership in 2024. Georgia’s geopolitical setting is not one to be envied. Aside from NATO member Turkey, Georgia does not have Western-integrated allies in the region. It also cannot escape the economic and military influence of its larger neighbour. Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States are Georgia’s main trade partners. Twenty per cent of Georgia’s territory has been occupied since the 2008 war, and creeping occupation, including regular kidnappings along the administrative borderline, continues. Apart from other factors, such as growing Chinese influence in Georgia, which are beyond the scope of this publication, Russia remains the main threat to Georgia’s stability and development. In terms of Georgia’s information environment, the Kremlin tries to exploit the following vulnerabilities: Georgia’s fragile economic situation, painful social issues, high political polarisation, media-party parallelism, conservativism and traditionalism, as well as certain Euro-Atlantic integration fatigue, where Georgians wish to see more progress. In addition, the occupied territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, as well as conflicts elsewhere in the region, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, remain additional pressure points.

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