Publisher: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia

(Nie)realna neutralność. Próby redefinicji białoruskiej polityki zagranicznej

Author(s): Kamil Klysinski / Language(s): Polish / Publication Year: 2018

Trwający konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński i wzrost napięcia w stosunkach Rosji z Zachodem skłonił władze białoruskie do podjęcia próby redefinicji polityki zagranicznej w kierunku zaakcentowania neutralności wobec skonfliktowanych stron. W rezultacie w okresie ostatnich kilkunastu miesięcy w retoryce Białorusi zaczęła wyraźnie dominować narracja niezaangażowania. Mińsk usiłuje odgrywać rolę neutralnego mediatora, licząc, że taka strategia będzie zabezpieczeniem przed skutkami eskalacji napięcia między Rosją a Zachodem, co postrzegane jest obecnie jako największe zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa państwa. Tym samym Mińsk powraca do dyskutowanej na początku lat 90. idei dążenia Białorusi do neutralności, która wciąż jest formalnie zapisana w białoruskiej konstytucji. Skuteczność nowej strategii poważnie ograniczona jest jednak pozostawaniem Mińska w ścisłym sojuszu wojskowym z Moskwą. W związku z czym Białoruś jako państwo aspirujące do neutralności nie będzie w stanie uzyskać pełnej wiarygodności na arenie międzynarodowej.

2002 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine. Events, Results, Consequences

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszanski / Language(s): English,Polish / Publication Year: 2003

On 31 March 2002, parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine. As expected, they were a major success for the centrist-rightist coalition focused around former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko. The communists emerged significantly weaker from the vote, and the "party of power" achieved a poor result. Yet, due to the mixed electoral law (half of the deputies were elected in single-mandate districts), the latter block, firmly supported by President Leonid Kuchma, resulted as the main force in Parliament. The results of particular parties and blocks were as follows: Viktor Yuschenko's Block received 23.57% of votes and 112 seats, the Communist Party of Ukraine - 19.98% of votes and 66 seats, the "For One Ukraine" block - 11.77% of votes and 101 seats, Yulia Tymoshenko's Block - 7.26% of votes and 22 seats, the Socialist Party of Ukraine - 6.87% of votes and 22 seats, and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) - 6.27% of votes and 24 seats. This shows how the mixed electoral regulations favour "For One Ukraine" and act against Yuschenko's block. One should note, however, that the latter gained the support of less than one quarter of voters.

A closely watched basin. The Russian–Ukrainian tensions in the Sea of Azov

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

The construction and opening in May 2018 of the Crimean Bridge, which connects the territory of the Russian Federation with the Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula, has contributed to a worsening of Russian–Ukrainian relations in the Sea of Azov. Since April 2018, Russians have halted merchant ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch, which is greatly limiting the operation of Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. Russia’s actions are affecting Ukraine’s economy in that they make the export of goods that account for a major portion of Ukraine’s state budget revenue increasingly difficult. According to estimates by the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure, total financial losses due to shipping limitations stand at US$ 20–40 million annually.Russia’s activity in the Sea of Azov and in the Strait of Kerch seems to confirm Moscow’s ambitions to make this basin a fully Russian-controlled internal area. Increased concentration of the Russian armed forces near the Crimean Bridge proves that this piece of infrastructure is of strategic importance for the Russian Federation. Access to the Sea of Azov and control of the ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch enables Russia to exert economic blackmail on Ukraine. The measures Russia has launched are of a permanent nature and are also intended to exacerbate Ukraine’s difficult economic situation. In this way, the Russian leadership is trying to influence the public mood in the southern part of the Donbas (which is controlled by Kyiv) to persuade the local residents that any further confrontation with Russia would be senseless.

A new Visegrad Group in the new European Union - possibilities and opportunities for development

Author(s): Mariusz Bocian,Patrycja Bukalska / Language(s): English,Polish / Publication Year: 2003

The Visegrad Group has fulfilled the tasks it was set when established. It seems unjustified, therefore, to ponder the need for it to function further. However, it is advisable to lay out new tasks, suitable for the group's operation in the new European reality - following EU accession of Visegrad countries in May 2004.

A quarter-century of independent Ukraine. Dimensions of transformation

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszanski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2017

On 24 August 1991, the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR proclaimed independence, and on 1 December the same year, the Ukrainian people ratified that proclamation in a referendum. The new Ukrainian state had some very important assets, such as the peaceful path that led to its independence, the fact that its territory was uncontested and its civilian administration was established. They downside, which determined Ukraine’s fundamental weaknesses, was that like the other former Soviet republics, it had been part of the Soviet state and had no central state bodies of its own, such as a general staff, a bank of issue, or most of the necessary ministries. After nearly a quarter century of peaceful development, interrupted by the outbreak of the war in 2014, Ukraine is still weak, but at the same time it has consolidated internally and internationally, demonstrated its capacity to withstand armed aggression, and is actively looking for its place in the world. The country’s greatest success has been to raise a new generation of ‘natural-born citizens’ of Ukraine, while its greatest failure has been to succumb to the dramatic population decline with irreversible consequences, and to allow the impoverishment of the lower strata of society, typical for all the post-Soviet states. The present paper is not a history of independent Ukraine, but an attempt to present the main mechanisms by which the former Soviet republic has transformed itself into an independent state with a market economy. It is therefore mainly focused on internal developments in Ukraine.

A revolution in instalments. Whither Pashinyan’s Armenia now?

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

In mid-August, a hundred days passed since Nikol Pashinyan took office as Armenia’s Prime Minister, which is an office of key importance for the Armenian political system. Formerly an opposition MP, Pashinyan rose to power as a result of a bloodless revolution. He replaced Serzh Sargsyan, whose camp had ruled Armenia for the last two decades. The country’s domestic situation is stable and its economy is growing. However, the parliamentary majority and significant business assets remain in the hands of the old elite, which considerably reduces the present leadership’s room for manoeuvre.

A stinking business. Environmental issues, protests and big money in the waste business in Russia

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoza / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

In recent months, Moscow oblast has seen a series of social protests against environmental problems caused by municipal waste landfills. The waste disposal sites are overloaded, lack adequate safeguards, emit toxic gases and contaminate the groundwater with harmful effluent. The situation is most severe in Moscow oblast because the capital city generates the largest volumes of waste; however, the problem itself extends beyond environmental concerns into the economic and social spheres. Waste management in Russia is marked by notorious overloading of legal waste disposal sites and the emergence of illegal waste dumps, inadequate waste disposal practices leading to air pollution and groundwater contamination which affect local residents, and bad practices by businesses with links to President Vladimir Putin which have monopolised the waste collection sector.

A summary of the politico-economic changes taking place during Vladimir Putin's first term of office /// Chechnya and Russia: The significance of the Chechen problem for contemporary Russia

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoza,Iwona Wisniewska,Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English,Polish / Publication Year: 2003

Following his rise to power in 2000, Vladimir Putin presented a comprehensive socio-economic program for the development of Russia through to 20101. This program was prepared by a team of economic experts from the Centre for Strategic Studies (CS S )2 led by St. Petersburg's German Gref. In spite of the fact that this document was never accepted in its entirety, and only its main assumptions were approved, as of 2000, short- and medium-term socio-economic government program have been based on the same principles.The medium-term goal of this development strategy through to 2010 was the reduction of the widening gap between Russia and developed nations. The long-term goal, on the other hand, was the restoration and strengthening of Russia's position as a leader on the global scale. The reforms of Russia's political system, social policy and the modernisation of the economy were intended to help achieve these goals.The aim of this study is to describe and analyse political and socio-economic reforms, as well as non-legislative changes initiated under Vladimir Putin's presidency. New reform activities will probably not be initiated over the six months remaining until the presidential elections. For this reason, it is already possible to summarise the changes achieved in the political, economic and social spheres during President Putin's first term of office.A description of the political and economic reforms and also of non-legislative changes, which took place in the Russian Federation over the past three and a half years, has been included in Part I of this study. The conclusion hereof attempts to summarise the actual achievements of President Putin's team, and to answer the question concerning perspectives of the reform process and factors determining the shape there of.

A test of strength. The escalation of the crisis in Russian-American relations

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak,Witold Rodkiewicz / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

On 6 April, the Trump administration introduced additional, more severe sanctions against Russia, covering 24 people and 14 companies: Russian oligarchs, the businesses they run, senior government officials and heads of state corporations, and (again) the Russian state arms company Rosoboroneksport. The immediate consequence of the new sanctions has been a downturn on the Russian stock market and the weakening of the rouble, as well as financial problems for the companies sanctioned, especially those belonging to the oligarch Oleg Deripaska. In the longer term the Russian oligarchs and their companies which conduct extensive activity abroad will find that the sanctions hamper their operations, and as a result, their dependence on the Kremlin will increase. On the other hand, the Kremlin will have increasing difficulty in recouping the affected oligarchs’ losses, which will lead to an increase in tensions within the elite, as well as a rise in social discontent, which will make the functioning of Putin’s regime more costly.

AfD – the alternative for whom?

Author(s): Artur Ciechanowicz / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2017

When in 2013 a group of professors of economics founded Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland – AfD) it seemed that the name of the new grouping was exaggerated. Taking into account its slogans and its leaders, the AfD could at that time be an alternative for disenchanted voters of the CDU/CSU and the FDP alone. The party’s ‘founding fathers’, among whom there was a large group of former CDU members, did not conceal the fact that their ambitions were not particularly far-reaching. Their basic goal was to influence the CDU so that it would return to its former conservative values.

An Asian alternative? Russia's chances of making Asia an alternative to relations with the West

Author(s): Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2008

Under Vladimir Putin's rule, Russia consistently and systematically expanded its activity in Asia, establishing closer political contacts with key countries in the region, rebuilding relations with former allies from Soviet times, and strengthening its presence in the Asian markets, in the energy sphere also. These activities were accompanied by intensive Russian propaganda, the message of which was that relations with the West can be restricted in favour of developing closer relations with Asian states.A justified question concerning the Russian Federation's realistic possibilities arises in this context: To what extent can it make Asia an alternative to theWest in geopolitical, economic and energy terms? Can Russia build an anti-Western alliance with Asian states? Is it able to reduce its dependence on the European market by developing its trade with Asia? Is it possible to redirect a substantial portion of Russian energy resource exports onto Asian markets? A presentation of the existing ties between Russia and theWest (here considered as the USA and the EU) will serve as a starting point for answering these questions. The following chapters will analyse Russia's opportunities in Asia in terms of geopolitical issues, the economy and energy

Armed Conflicts in the Post-soviet Region. Present Situation, Prospects for Settlement. Consequences

Author(s): Krzysztof Strachota / Language(s): English,Polish / Publication Year: 2003

1. Unresolved conflicts continue to smoulder in Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. "Para-states" have formed in most conflict-affected areas. These have grown to become permanent players in the region. In Chechnya, guerrilla fights continue in the wake of the Russian army's siege of the republic. The conflict in Tajikistan ended in 1997 and the normalisation process is currently under way. 2. Each of these conflicts has entailed profound political, social, ethnic and economic changes, as well as affecting other spheres of life. Presently, it is impossible to return to the pre-conflict situation. The "para-states" have fortified their independence and are no longer controlled by the external powers on which they depended in the initial phases of the conflicts. 3. Unresolved conflicts, including those of Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and, until recently, Tajikistan, have an adverse effect on the situation in the region. They hinder political and economic development of the affected countries, lead to the brutalisation of political life and breed instability by providing save havens for organised crime, terrorism, etc. They are also the cause of large-scale migration problems. However, with time, these negative effects become less and less turbulent. 4. So far, attempts at solving most of the conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia) have failed to produce results other than cease-fires. Permanent settlement could not be achieved, neither through the use of force nor by way of negotiation. The power and independence of the "para-states", hard-line leaderships on both sides, and finally, military weakness of the metropolises consolidate the state of suspension. The conflict in Tajikistan was settled using political methods, and the normalisation process is progressing in a satisfactory manner. Chechnya has been conquered militarily by Russian troops and Moscow is now implementing its model of imposed "normalisation", but it does not have full control over the republic and cannot contain the growing problems induced by the conflict, such as the emergence of Chechen terrorism. 5. Some of the negative consequences of the conflicts are gradually being abated by the evolution in Russia's policy towards them (Russia is gradually ceasing playing on the conflicts as foreign policy instruments and is shifting towards political and economic measures). Also instrumental to this are the increasing involvement of the US and, to a smaller extent, the EU, in regional security (as part of their struggle against terrorism), as well as the growing strength of state systems and the development of political and economic co-operation between the conflict-affected republics (for example, the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the TRACECA programme). In the longer term, these tendencies may also help in resolving the actual conflicts themselves.

Beijing’s mistaken offer: the ‘16+1’ and China’s policy towards the European Union

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2017

Despite China’s growing political and economic involvement in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Beijing has not succeeded in making an attractive offer to the region’s EU member states – who make up the majority of the participants in the ‘16+1’ format. The financing model proposed by China, based on loans and favouritism towards Chinese companies, has proved to be unsuitable to local conditions. Therefore, the much-discussed infrastructure cooperation has not even started. Consequently, Beijing has failed to obtain the political tools which could have weakened policy coherence at the European level, or even divided the EU. In this context, the allegations appearing in the public debate that the countries of the ‘16+1’ have been fostering divisions within the EU seem to be substantially incorrect. As long as Central and Eastern Europe remains capable of pursuing its economic and developmental interests within the architecture of the European Union, the political risks coming from China’s capital inflow will remain limited. At the same time, the EU has room to facilitate constructive economic relationships between China and the Central European region. For example, it could reduce Beijing’s political pressure on CEE to use the specific, Chinese model for financing and building infrastructure. Cooperation at the EU level could also help to adapt the Chinese offer to the European business and regulatory environment.

Bezpowrotnie utracona przewidywalność: niemiecka scena partyjna po wyborach

Author(s): Artur Ciechanowicz / Language(s): Polish / Publication Year: 2017

Zarówno w samych Niemczech, jak i za granicą komentarze dotyczące wyborów w RFN zdominowane były przez analizę wyników uzyskanych przez antyimigrancką i antyislamską Alternatywę dla Niemiec (AfD), zwłaszcza na wschodzie i południu kraju. To, że partia wejdzie do Bundestagu, było niemal pewne na długo przed 24 września: wynik ugrupowania był tylko nieznacznie lepszy niż w przedwyborczych sondażach. Dużo gorzej niż w badaniach wypadły natomiast dwie partie masowe: CDU/CSU i SPD. I to właśnie ich wyniki mówią więcej o ewolucji politycznych tożsamości niemieckich wyborców oraz są kluczowe w ocenie i przewidywaniu wydarzeń na tamtejszej scenie politycznej. W najbliższej kadencji co prawda nie dojdzie do rozpadu starych partii i powstania w ich miejsce nowych, ale tradycyjne ugrupowania masowe nadal będą tracić bazę wyborczą. Zyskiwać mogą natomiast ideologicznie wyraziste ugrupowania, jak AfD, która będzie opozycją bezkompromisową. Jej obecność w Bundestagu spowoduje, że język debaty publicznej w Niemczech zaostrzy się, a narracje AfD i reszty ugrupowań staną się jeszcze bardziej rozbieżne.

Big business in the Russian economy and politics under Putin's rule /// The Russian power industry shortly before reforms /// Ukrainian metallurgy: the economic link in the oligarchic power system

Author(s): Iwona Wisniewska,Ewa Paszyc,Arkadiusz Sarna / Language(s): English,Polish / Publication Year: 2002

Cadres decide everything – Turkey’s reform of its military

Author(s): Mateusz R. Chudziak / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

Over the last two years, the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerı – TSK) have been subject to transformations with no precedent in the history of Turkey as a republic. The process of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) subordinating the army to civilian government has accelerated following the failed coup that took place on 15 July 2016. The government has managed to take away the autonomy of the armed forces which, while retaining their enormous significance within the state apparatus, ceased to be the main element consolidating the old Kemalist elites. However, the unprecedented scale of the purges and the introduction of formal civilian control of the military are merely a prelude to a much more profound change intended to create a brand new military, one that would serve the authorities and be composed of a new type of personnel – individuals from outside the army’s traditional power base. This reflects the reshuffle of the elites that happened during AKP’s rule.

Cautious and rotational – US military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank

Author(s): Piotr Woyke / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2016

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 put a stop to the gradual scaling down of US military engagement in Europe, a policy that the United States had pursued since the end of the Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a watershed for the US perceptions of European security as Washington started to see the threat of a conflict between Russia and a NATO member as more probable. The United States decided that – despite the mounting challenges in the Pacific region and its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East – it had to invest more in European security. The US has stepped up the intensity of joint drills with the allies and the activities of its forces in Europe. However, its support for the allies has been subject to various limitations and should be treated as a political signal to Moscow, rather than an element in a broader strategy. The future of the policy of strengthening the eastern flank will depend on the outcome of the US presidential elections in November and on developments in the bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow.

Chechnya: Between a Caucasian Jihad and 'hidden' separatism

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2007

1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. The fighting has become less intensive every year, and the militants, worn out by years of warfare, are unable to take the initiative and seriously challenge the federal troops stationed in Chechnya. However, even if the militants have lost strength, this does not mean that the conflict is over. The region's history and the increasingly tense situation in the other Caucasian republics bordering Chechnya suggest that instability will probably continue for many more years.2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. At present, it is not only a Russian-Chechen conflict, but also an internal clash between the separatist militants and those Chechens who are co-operating with Moscow. The conflict also has an increasingly apparent social background. Finally, the militants' ideology has also changed: today they are fighting not so much for national liberation as for the Islamic cause.3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. The latter seek to 'liberate' the entire North Caucasus and establish sharia law in the region. 354. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism. Today, it manifests itself not through armed struggle, but through demands for ever-wider autonomy within the Russian Federation ('hidden' separatism). Such demands have been raised by the formally pro-Russian government of Chechnya, led by Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. The objective is to acquire real, rather than formal, independence from Moscow, especially in the economic sphere. An analysis of the current situation in the republic leads to the conclusion that this objective has already largely been achieved; today Chechnya in many areas remains outside the Russian legal system and enjoys extensive internal autonomy. 5. A renewed outbreak of the armed conflict in Chechnya seems unlikely in the immediate future, the main reason for this being that the Chechen people are tired of the long war. In the longer term, however, it appears inevitable that the Chechens will rise against Moscow again, fighting either for national liberation or for Islam. In the former case, the movement will be probably led by the current, formally pro-Russian government. However, it is also possible that by that time, the Caucasian Islamists will have gained enough strength to become the driving force behind a new, massive uprising against Russia, whose objective will be to create an Islamic state in the North Caucasus.