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Po roku od zwycięskiej ofensywy i ogłoszeniu kalifatu Państwo Islamskie krzepnie jako organizacja terrorystyczna mająca armię i parapaństwo, a tym samym kruszy się wątły porządek na Bliskim Wschodzie. Świat fascynuje się fenomenem Państwa Islamskiego, nie zauważając, że Bliski Wschód przeżywa kryzys i właśnie to jest zasadniczym wyzwaniem. PI jest uosobieniem i jednym z przejawów, a nie przyczyną problemów regionu. Bliski Wschód, jaki znamy, przestaje istnieć; zanikają granice i państwa (Irak i Syria), powstają nowe twory parapaństwowe, pojawiają się nowi gracze (od PI po Kurdów), rośnie pokolenie nieznające starego porządku i poszukujące nowych, radykalnych idei i recept. Zanikanie zachodniego/amerykańskiego parasola bezpieczeństwa stymuluje regionalną proxy war i próby gruntowej zmiany postkolonialnego porządku przez regionalne mocarstwa (Iran, Turcję). Dla Zachodu obawy o Państwo Islamskie, to cień obaw o przyszłość całego Bliskiego Wschodu oraz świadomość, że używane w ostatnich dekadach wobec regionu zarówno twarde (interwencje w Iraku), jak i miękkie (promocja zachodnich wartości i modelu rozwoju) metody nie działają.
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Rosyjska interwencja wojskowa w Syrii, rozpoczęta jesienią 2015 roku, wywołała falę komentarzy głoszących, że Rosja odzyskała pozycję wielkiego mocarstwa na Bliskim Wschodzie. Celem niniejszego tekstu jest po pierwsze ustalenie, na czym polega rosyjska mocarstwowość na Bliskim Wschodzie, a po drugie rekonstrukcja motywów, jakimi kieruje się Kreml w swojej polityce bliskowschodniej. Pierwsza część pracy stanowi próbę określenia miejsca polityki bliskowschodniej w globalnej polityce zagranicznej Kremla oraz zidentyfikowania rosyjskich priorytetów w regionie. Część druga pokazuje ewolucję polityki bliskowschodniej postsowieckiej Rosji, zwracając uwagę z jednej strony na jej rosnące zaangażowanie w regionie, a z drugiej na instrumentalny charakter tego zaangażowania. Ze względu na to, że od jesieni 2015 roku interwencja wojskowa w Syrii stała się centralnym elementem rosyjskiej polityki na Bliskim Wschodzie, analizie jej przyczyn i celów jest poświęcona część trzecia tekstu. W części czwartej i piątej analizowana jest polityka Rosji wobec dwóch najważniejszych z jej punktu widzenia regionalnych partnerów – Turcji i Iranu. Część szósta to próba charakterystyki instrumentów, za pomocą których Rosja zbudowała swoją pozycję w regionie, a także dokonania bilansu rosyjskiej polityki bliskowschodniej i identyfikacji wyzwań, które przed nią stoją.
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According to the European Council decision of February 2011, the process of creating the European Union’s internal gas market should be completed by the end of 2014. Therefore, it is worth summarising the changes which have taken place in the gas markets of Central Europe so far. The past few years have seen not only a period of gradual ‘marketisation’ of the national gas sectors, but also the building of new gas infrastructure, a redrawing of the gas flow map, and changes in the ownership of the Central European gas companies. Another change in Central Europe is the fact that individual states and companies are moving away from their traditional focus on their national gas markets; instead, they are beginning to develop a variety of concepts for the regional integration of Central European markets. This publication attempts to grasp the main elements of the ongoing transformation of Central Europe’s gas markets, with particular emphasis on the situation in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.
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This reform of the Bundeswehr, launched in 2011, is the latest of the three decisive stages in the post-war transformation of the German armed forces. The reform aims at “constructing” the armed forces anew in the political, military and social dimensions.The present paper presents the evolution of the role of the armed forces in German foreign and security policy and the ongoing process of “constructing” a new Bundeswehr. It analyses the process of redefining the objectives and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s participation in international operations, its current military transformation, and changes in its image and social identity. It also presents the implications of this broader transformation for political and military.
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Rozpoczęta w 2011 roku reforma Bundeswehry to jeden z trzech przełomowych etapów w powojennej transformacji sił zbrojnych RFN. Ma na celu „skonstruowanie” na nowo niemieckiej armii w wymiarze politycznym, wojskowym i społecznym. Niniejszy tekst przedstawia ewolucję roli sił zbrojnych w polityce zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa RFN i proces „konstruowania” nowej Bundeswehry.W tekście omówiona została redefinicja celów i zasad zagranicznego zaangażowania Bundeswehry, kierunki przekształceń wojskowych, zmian wizerunku i społecznej tożsamości armii oraz konsekwencje tak szeroko pojętej reformy dla współpracy politycznej i wojskowej w ramach NATO i UE.
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The Eurozone crisis has forced German exporters to speed up their expansion onto the emerging markets, in particular Brazil, Russia, India and China. The development observed in those countries has become an important substitute for the consequences of the economic slowdown in Europe.To illustrate the scale of cooperation between Germany and the BRIC countries, it is enough to quote figures concerning Germany’s trade. Between 2000-2011 the share of trade with the BRIC states in the entire German trade exchange rose from 5.5% to 13.3%. In the same period opposite tendencies were observed in the figures relating to trade with the USA, whose share in German trade fell from 9.6% to 6.2%.The report discusses the major tendencies present in Germany’s cooperation with the BRIC countries, and examines how the German state supports German companies in their business activities on these markets. The main method used to investigate these processes is the economic analysis of trade and capital flows between Germany and the BRIC countries, supplemented by conclusions drawn from discussions with German experts.The main issue discussed in the text is the role of the state in stimulating the expansion of German companies onto the BRIC markets. In the context of these activities, political relations and the proper use of export and investment guarantees and development aid are of major importance.
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The collapse of the USSR brought about conditions conducive to the dynamic development of relations between Central Asia and China. These relations have evolved from deep mistrust to the continually growing Chinese presence primarily in the region’s economy but also increasingly in its politics. Central Asia is playing a growing role in those areas of the economy which China sees as strategic (in particular in energy and communications). China’s ambitions and capabilities with regard to new areas and its geopolitical competitors are also being tested here. For the time being, it can be said that China has achieved vast success: its offer is appealing for the region, and Beijing has outpaced its Western rivals and has seriously challenged Russia’s position in the region. It remains, however, an open question whether China will be able to maintain and secure its present achievements and trends, which will be a serious challenge given the eternal instability in the region and Russia’s reintegration ambitions.
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Russia’s long-term goal is to prevent the reunification of the Korean peninsula under the aegis of the United States and to weaken the US ’s position in the region. Its short-term goal is to avert the danger of an outbreak of armed conflict on the peninsula and the possible collapse of North Korea. Russia’s support for the reunification of the two Korean states is purely declaratory; in practice the Kremlin is striving to maintain the political status quo on the peninsula. At the same time, Russia wants to maximise its influence by developing economic relations and maintaining political contacts with both Koreas. Moscow does not view the denuclearisation of North Korea as one of its priorities. Its approach to Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is instrumental; in Moscow’s eyes, although the program poses certain risks for Russia, it also opens a number of opportunities. The course of the crisis so far has demonstrated that Russia does not have sufficient tools to influence the course of events. As a consequence, it has had to accept a role as China’s ‘junior partner’ in the Korean issue.
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Rozpad ZSRR stworzył warunki do dynamicznego rozwoju relacji między Azją Centralną a Chinami. Ewoluowały one od daleko posuniętej nieufności po stale rosnącą obecność Chin, przede wszystkim w gospodarce, ale również w coraz większym stopniu w polityce regionu. Azja Centralna odgrywa coraz większą rolę w strategicznych dla Chin kwestiach gospodarczych(zwłaszcza energetycznych, ale również komunikacyjnych). Tu także testowane są ambicje i możliwości Chin wobec stosunkowo nowych obszarów i wobec geopolitycznych konkurentów. Jak dotąd można mówić o ogromnym sukcesie Chin: ich oferta jest atrakcyjna dla regionu, Pekin zdystansował rywali zachodnich i poważnie zagroził pozycji Rosji w regionie. Otwartą kwestią pozostaje jednak zdolność Chin do utrwalenia i zabezpieczenia obecnych osiągnięć i trendów, co wobec chronicznej niestabilności regionu, ale także ambicji reintegracyjnych Rosji będzie poważnym wyzwaniem.
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The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.
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The Kremlin’s foreign policy is subordinate above all to the domestic political aims of the ruling elite. The most important of these is the maintenance and legitimistaion of the Chekist-kleptocratic model of feudalism. In this model, which is fundamentally opposed to the Western model of liberal democracy, the state is the de facto property of a small group of decision-makers, and the rules of international interactions are dictated by the logic of the ‘zero-sum game’. The Kremlin’s confrontational approach to the West – at the political, economic, social and propaganda levels – is not a transitional phenomenon, but rather a permanent, strategic Leitmotiv of Russia’s foreign policy. It results from the intrinsic features of the Russian authoritarian regime, and from the mentality of the ruling elite included within it. The latter is largely a product of a particular type of society and of the specific path of the state’s historical development. In such conditions, is any real normalisation of relations between Russia and the West possible?
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Kraje poradzieckiej Azji Centralnej są dla Moskwy istotne jako potencjalne źródło zagrożeń, jako obszar jej relacji z Chinami, Zachodem i światem islamu, wreszcie jako przestrzeń objęta rosyjskimi inicjatywami integracyjnymi. Po rozpadzie ZSRR rosyjskie wpływy w tym regionie uległy daleko idącej erozji. Podjęcie przez Kreml konsekwentnych działań na rzecz budowy Unii Eurazjatyckiej, a także groźba destabilizacji regionu po zakończeniu w 2014 roku operacji ISAF w Afganistanie, przyhamowały ten proces, choć jego odwrócenie nie wydaje się realne. Obecny „stan posiadania” (instrumenty i aktywa, jakimi dysponuje Rosja) zapewnia jeszcze Moskwie minimalny poziom kontroli nad regionem, czemu sprzyja ograniczona aktywność innych światowych graczy. Sytuacja może ulec zmianie wraz ze wzrostem ich ambicji, zwłaszcza z ewentualnym zaangażowaniem Chin w obszarze „twardego” bezpieczeństwa.
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I. The new eastern border of the European Union The European Union's new border with Eastern European countries, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, is approximately 3000 km long. It has vital meaning for the Union in terms of security as well as for social and economic reasons. Unlike the southern maritime border of the EU, the eastern land border poses a number of different challenges. These pertain, above all, to issues of ''soft security'' (i.e. smuggling, illegal migration, organised crime, etc.), but also to the fact that all the most important communication and trade routes connecting Europe with Eurasia cross this boundary. The borderline goes through areas inhabited by people of similar cultural and historical backgrounds, who are, in a way, socially and ethnically related. It therefore plays a much greater role in social terms than the southern border. The northern part of Estonian-Russian borderland on the Estonian side is mostly inhabited by Russians, and in the southern part on both sides by the Setu ethnic group. A Belarussian minority lives in the border regions of Latvia (the Daugavpils and Kraslava regions), Lithuania, and Poland (the area around Bialystok and Biala Podlaska). On the other hand, Poles live in the western part of Belarus (the Hrodna and Brest districts) and Ukraine (the Lviv district). In turn, Ukrainians live in eastern Slovakia. The Trans-Carpathian region of Ukraine is partly inhabited by Hungarians. The EU border also divides communities which used to live in one country in Soviet times and have preserved social ties (the Baltic States' borders with Russia and Belarus). A characteristic of the areas on both sides of the new EU eastern border is its peripheral nature. Mostly rural communities whose economic indicators are much worse than in the rest of the country, they are also undersubsidised regions, with substantially higher unemployment levels than the country average, and lacking large industrial centres (except for the cities of Narva, Hrodna, Brest, Bialystok, Lublin and Lviv). This peripheral character contributes to the development of cross-border contacts and mutual attraction, especially in business terms. Cross-border trade, both legal and illegal, is an important source of income for local inhabitants.
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Aktywowanie mechanizmu stałej współpracy strukturalnej (tzw. PESCO) w grudniu 2017 roku zwieńczyło debaty i działania z zakresu wzmacniania wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony UE. Wypracowanie kompromisu dotyczącego PESCO pokazało strategiczne rozbieżności pomiędzy Francją, Niemcami a państwami wschodniej flanki UE w zakresie percepcji wyzwań i zagrożeń, wizji rozwoju polityki bezpieczeństwa UE oraz przyszłości relacji transatlantyckich. Zaś zachodnioeuropejskie debaty wokół PESCO unaoczniły stopień oderwania politycznych narracji od wojskowej rzeczywistości.
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In this text, I will examine the main trains of thought in the narrative of the historical memory of the Russian Federation’s special services, which demonstrate the attempts to reconcile the traditions of the Tsarist-era services with those of the Soviet services. I will proceed from the assumption that the history of the special services is part of the history of the state apparatus, and more broadly, of the state’s political systems. In this context, the work of Russian historiographers focuses not only on combining these two, in many respects contradictory identities of Russia – the Tsarist and the totalitarian – but above all on the creation of parallels between the historical and contemporary situations. This is because the historical legitimisation of the services is an important factor that gives legal validity to the current ruling elite, whose roots largely lie in the KGB, and which operates under the conditions of a new system of governance based on state capitalism.
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Throughout the history of Russia, periods of deep chaos have been accompanied by demographic crises. This was the case during the Time of Troubles, or Smutnoye Vremya, in the seventeenth century, and during the period of wars and revolutions in the early twentieth century, which brought the Bolsheviks to power. Similarly, the break-up of the USSR also coincided with a demographic crisis. However, while the previous crises had been caused by factors such as war, famine, epidemics or repressive policies, and were followed by periods of rapid population growth once these factors had ceased to operate, the current crisis is systemic and structural. To a large extent, it has been occasioned by cultural factors such as changing family models and the roles of women in today's society. In Russia, the effect of these factors on population increase is exacerbated by excessive alcohol consumption, an culture of inadequate working conditions which leads to many accidents at work, and healthcare deficiencies (only c. 3% of the GDP is spent on healthcare annually). In 2005, the Russian Academy of Sciences concluded a research programme entitled 'The demographic modernization of Russia, 1900-2000'. In the report it indicated that the Russian state had lost c. 140 million people in the twentieth century as a result of bad policies. This means that the present population of Russia would be larger by this number if the development of the state in the previous century had followed similar patterns to that of European states, and if human life had been respected in Russia as much as it was in Western Europe. According to Russian researchers, many current demographic problems in Russia stem from occurrences in the distant past. Development models are difficult to correct within a short timespan. All projections concerning Russia's demographic development predict that the country's population will continue to shrink until at least the middle of the twentyfirst century. The projections only differ as to the speed and nature of the population decrease. When juxtaposed with the dynamic GDP growth and the government's ambition to reinforce Russia's international position, the demographic problems are a dissonance. The Russian political elite is concerned that if the negative demographic trends prevail, this may eventually stop the country's economic development. It is also worried that with its current population density, Russia will not be able to defend its vast territory and use it adequately. It is frequently emphasised that as a world power, the USSR had always remained among the top three most populous countries in the world after China and India. In 2000, the Russian Federation, as the legal successor of the USSR, dropped to sixth in this ranking, and in the mid-21st century it will struggle to remain in the top twenty. According to Russian analysts, a country with such a small population potential, disproportionate to its territory, will face difficulties preserving its status as a world power, and consequently in defending its international interests. The fact that Russia is a multinational state further complicates the situation. The country used to be dominated by ethnic Russians, but their percentage is shrinking systematically. In the future, this may affect both the country's cohesion and its prevailing cultural models. The Russian authorities are aware of these threats; President Vladimir Putin mentions them regularly in his addresses to the nation. In his most recent speech, delivered on 10 May 2006, Putin said that the demographic crisis was the most important issue in Russia's internal policy. Demographic problems have been discussed by the parliament, the government and the Russian Federation Security Council. A document entitled 'A concept for the Russian Federation's demographic development to 2015' has been adopted. The media cover the issue, frequently taking an alarming tone. However, in the policies implemented by the Russian authorities, improving the demographic situation has not been a genuine priority. The measures proposed have frequently been provisional, and have ultimately had little effect on demographic trends. Figures now available fully corroborate the pessimistic projections concerning Russia's demographic development which researchers had presented at the onset of the previous decade.
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For years, development policy has attracted the attention of public opinion in Germany and been strongly supported by the public. It takes the form of an agreement between equal partners who draw mutual benefits from this co-operation. German development policy is structured to support the German economy. This policy and the state’s significant share in development projects reduces the investment risk incurred by German entrepreneurs who engage their assets in developing countries. Furthermore, bilateral co-operation successfully builds the made in Germany brand as regards both development policy and further economic co-operation, making the beneficiaries of development co-operation indirectly dependent on German goods and services. Development co-operation, along with diplomacy and defence policy, is the third pillar of German foreign policy. In this context it plays above all a preventive function in the case of international conflicts. Investing funds as part of development projects in areas affected by military conflicts or facing a high risk of military conflict is viewed by Germany as its contribution to overcoming crises or removing their causes. This goes hand in hand with the conviction that international conflicts, wherever they appear, adversely affect the German economy, which heavily relies on exports.
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Uwypuklając zagrożenia informacyjne i nadając im wymiar militarny, autorzy doktryny wojennej FR zarysowują kontury koncepcji walki informacyjnej. Stanowi ona rodzaj walki stron, prowadzonej metodami konwencjonalnymi i niebezpośrednimi, jawnymi i niejawnymi, przy wykorzystaniu struktur wojskowych i cywilnych. Ma dwa wymiary: szerszy („powstrzymywania niejądrowego”, tj. walki prowadzonej na różnych płaszczyznach – politycznej, ekonomicznej, dyplomatycznej, humanitarnej, wojskowej) oraz węższy (jako element wsparcia działań zbrojnych). Analiza tej problematyki umożliwia ponadto zidentyfikowanie kilku pogłębiających się w latach 2000-2014 tendencji w polityce bezpieczeństwa FR. Sprowadzają się one do rozmywania granic między zagrożeniami wewnętrznymi i zewnętrznymi, wprowadzania do walki zbrojnej niewojskowych metod i struktur organizacyjnych oraz nadawania tej walce charakteru ideowego. Prowadzi to do zacierania konturów konfliktów międzypaństwowych, umożliwiając Rosji uczestniczenie w konfliktach zbrojnych, w których oficjalnie nie jest stroną.
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Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.
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