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De Anima Arystotelesa oczami Franza Brentano. Budowa ludzkiej duszy na podstawie Die Psychologiedes Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poietikos oraz w kontekście pozostałych prac ze zbioru Aristotelica

Author(s): Sonia Kamińska / Language(s): Polish Issue: 33/2016

This paper is a part of a project devoted to Brentano’s Aristotelian writings. I concentrate on his habilitation about Aristotle’s psychology, and especially on how he understood Aristotle’s division of mental life into three levels as well as the functions typical for these levels. I analyze two notions that Brentano introduces in his account: Zwischenglieder, meaning intermediary “levels” within the soul enabling smooth passages between the vegetative soul and sensory soul and between the latter and intellectual soul; and Gottverwandtschaft, i.e. human kinship with God, which is possible thanks to the noblest part of the soul. I also introduce two metaphors of the soul: cake-metaphor and fabric-metaphor.

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Logika miejsca i jej zastosowania w analizie niektórych rozumowań prawniczych

Author(s): Anna Kozanecka-Dymek / Language(s): Polish Issue: 33/2016

The subject of the consideration contained in the article is topological logic interpreted as place logic and its possible applications in a logical analysis of legal reasoning. The first part of the article is about significance of widely understood spatial element in a law and about a role of formal logic in legal sciences (especially in dogmatic of law) and in legal discourse. There are also given conditions imposed on logical systems which can be applied to analyse legal reasoning. In the second part there is characterization of topological logic interpreted as place logic. In the third part there are examples of formalization of sentences of legal language and of legal inferences using symbols occurring in place logic. In the article there is shown that such kind of logic can be applied to logical analysis some reasoning conducted in legal language, specifically such reasoning in which there appear sentences including, in an explicit or a hidden way, phrase “in place”, that is, information about that, where certain events are realized.

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Bertranda Russella koncepcja monizmu neutralnego

Author(s): Jacek Jarocki / Language(s): Polish Issue: 33/2016

The metaphysical view of Bertrand Russell, called neutral monism, is not widely known today, although its impact on the contemporary debate over mind-body problem is clearly visible. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: what was Russell’s neutral monism? Firstly, I present the views of Russell’s predecessors – Ernst Mach and William James. Then, I discuss Russell’s own thought which can be divided into three phases. The initial phase is the rejection of neutral monism (mainly because of Russell’s commitments to epistemology). The second phase – I call it the first neutral monism – appears in The Analysis of Mind, where he proposes a deflationary theory of the object and the subject. The last, third phase – called the second neutral monism, initiated in 1927 in The Analysis of Matter and An Outline of Philosophy – introduces the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Finally, I suggest that the agnostic metaphysics of Russell is too reductive for a dualist and too mysterious for a materialist. However, it might be also true that Russell’s view is more epistemological than metaphysical, and the frames of (misleading) Cartesian dictionary of mind/matter may be too narrow for neutral monism to be pertinently interpreted.

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Argumenty na rzecz nieredukcyjnego ujęcia tożsamości osobowej

Author(s): Mariusz Grygianiec / Language(s): Polish Issue: 34/2016

In the debate on personal identity many different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. Criteria of identity are usually taken to state necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are viewed, in their metaphysical interpretation, as providing truth conditions of relevant identity statements. In my paper I argue that this view is misconceived and I present some arguments for the simple view of personal identity, according to which there are no noncircular and informative criteria of identity for persons. In particular, I argue that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which would serve as truth conditions of statements concerning numerical identity. I also try to justify the view that in most cases criteria of identity should be interpreted either epistemically as a means for finding out whether identity holds or not or metaphysically as criteria of genidentity, which provide appropriate persistence conditions for objects of a given kind.

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Intuition and Insight. The Analysis of their selected features with reference to Bernard Lonergan position

Author(s): Monika Walczak / Language(s): English Issue: 34/2016

The paper discusses notions of intuition and insight. The most typical features attributed to intuition in the history of philosophy – receptiveness, passivity, immediateness, directness, self-evidence, infallibility, and indubitability – are analyzed. A variability of the notion of intuition is shown, taking as its example the category of insight, central for the epistemology of Bernard J.F. Lonergan (1904–1984), the twentieth-century philosopher locating between phenomenology, Thomism and hermeneutics. Insight is still in some respects a kind of intuition although it is creative, active, mediated, indirect, fallible and open to revision.

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Neutralność światopoglądowa

Author(s): Arkadiusz Chrudzimski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 34/2016

In this paper I focus on the concept of neutrality taken in the meaning typical for political discussions concerning e.g. the religious neutrality of the state. I take it for granted that the huge majority of educated people belonging to the so called “western culture” would agree that the most important institutions of our social life – such as schools, courts, and parliaments – should be neutral in this sense. But on the other hand it is extremely difficult to formulate a set of precise and reliable criteria allowing us to exclude particular statements, arguments or kinds of discourse as violating this principle of neutrality. The sad truth is that the term “neutrality”, even if restricted to the meaning that is relevant to this paper, is rather vague. Nevertheless I want to propose three types of criteria that can be helpful in attaining this goal. They will be termed: (i) content criterion, (ii) epistemic criterion, and (iii) pragmatic criterion. It seems that if we apply all these criteria together, we will be able to secure a reasonable degree of neutrality in our public debates.

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Problem sceny w Tischnerowskiej filozofii dramatu

Author(s): Witold P. Glinkowski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 34/2016

The paper aims to pinpoint one of the main interpretational problems of Józef Tischner’s philosophy – the dispute around the notion of scene, which is the basic concept in Tischner’s ‘philosophy of drama’. It is as well strongly connected with theatre studies. That is why it is common to regard Tischner’s philosophy in a theatrical context. On the other hand, Tischner’s scene is also referred to world of entities, which in traditional philosophy was a field of ontological investigates. Both abovementioned tendencies are a result of misunderstanding Tischner’s thought and they lead to the wrong interpretation of his philosophy of man. Yet according to Tischner man does not play in a drama as an actor on the scene, but rather he is a dramatical being. Proper understanding of Tischner’s notion of scene is essential to understand his philosophical project and to recognize its value and novelty.

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Człowiek w imperium czasu, sens w imperium znaków. Hermeneutyka a sens historii

Author(s): Katarzyna Szkaradnik / Language(s): Polish Issue: 34/2016

The linguistic turn has emphasized the linguistic aspect of history as a kind of a tale, unveiling its ideological foundations and rhetorical structure. This article’s aim is, however, to prove how seeing history as a collection of texts enables us to regain its subjective sense. The authoress considers the fears of historians’ manipulations as well as the validity of »the sense of history«’s question and shows that hermeneutics restores that validity in the epoch after metanarratives’ defeat. Referring to Ricoeur, Gadamer, Marquard, Vattimo and also a sociologist Jan Szczepański, this paper displays that we could be perceived as a product of history, but the interpretation of historical texts, sources and traditions, deepens our “being-in-the-world”. History appears to be the dialectics of being a product and creating, it relies on decision and obligation. Having understood, how the past mediated by texts – historical interpretations – influences our conduct, we could give it new senses.

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Czy przyjaźń etyczna nie jest przyjaźnią pozorną? – rozważania wokół drugiego rozdziału siódmej księgi Etyki eudemejskiej

Author(s): Maciej Smolak / Language(s): Polish Issue: 34/2016

In The Eudemian Ethics 1237b6–7 Aristotle seems to suggest that if the ethical friend has an unpleasant odour, he is left by his friend. The article is devoted to demonstrating that the ethical friendship is not the apparent friendship. For this purpose author presents the characteristics of the true friend and distinguishes two types of the ethical friendship, the first between good men, i.e. men with a typical mixture of good and bad traits of character, the second between noble men, i.e. the best men who are heroes of intellect and character – intellect because prudent, character because noble. On this basis author shows three interpretations which neutralize controversial statement. According to the first interpretation – called “superhuman stink” – unpleasant odour is impossible to endure for the men, even good or noble. Therefore ethical friend must leave his friend in such circumstances. According to the second interpretation – called “one-dimensional courage” – ethical friend, who has an unpleasant odour is left by ethical friend, since one, who leaves can not endure stinking friend. The reason is that he has one-dimensional courage and apart from direct hostilities he does not cope with own weakness. According to the third interpretation – called “heroic solitude” – ethical friend, who has an unpleasant odour does not want to grieve his friend. Therefore decides to heroic solitude – heroic, since a human being is a civic being and one whose nature is to live with others – and leaves his friend.

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Shaftesbury as a Popperian: critical rationalism before its time? Part I

Author(s): Lydia Amir / Language(s): English Issue: 35/2016

Shaftesbury has assigned humor an unparalleled role within philosophy, which may be encapsulated in the following tenets: (1) ridicule is the test of truth; (2) humor and good humor have a habilitating function with regard to truth; (3) the most effective criticism is humorous; and (4) humor is the mark of rationality. In the present article, I introduce Shaftesbury’s views on ridicule, good humor and humor in order to assess both the originality and viability of Shaftesbury’s contribution. I argue, first, that Shaftesbury’s views on ridicule as a test of truth and on good-humor as habilitating truth are thoroughly original, but cannot be implemented without adhering to his metaphysics and epistemology. Second, Shaftesbury’s views on humor are only partially original, though these can be implemented independently of metaphysical and epistemological assumptions for the greatest benefit of philosophers in general and critical rationalists in particular. I conclude that not only does Shaftesbury anticipate the view that critical thinking is the core of rationality, the main principle of the view known as critical rationalism associated with the renown 20th century philosopher of science and social philosopher, Karl Popper, but he also offers a viable means to enhance criticism as rationality by taking into consideration the psychological resistance to criticism that Popper acknowledges but refuses to address.

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Czy istnienie może być lepsze albo gorsze od nieistnienia? Część I: Ustalanie wartości w ramach dobrostanu

Author(s): Mirosław Rutkowski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 35/2016

The aim of this paper is to examine whether there is any possibility to compare the value of someone’s existence with his nonexistence. The final conclusion is that such a comparative evaluation can never be made in a meaningful and valid manner. Nobody can know as well whether he would be better off or worse off created than he would have been had he never existed.

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Sfera niczyja jako źródło życia psychicznego: Nietzsche, Scheler, Wittgenstein, Goffman

Author(s): Katarzyna Gurczyńska-Sady / Language(s): Polish Issue: 35/2016

Traditionally mental life of the person goes into “seclusion” called his/her interior. It is believed that because of its secret nature of the it and because it is not immediately given to other subject who may – at best – guess of what “goes in”. Free access one has got only to his/her own experiences (feelings, emotions, thoughts etc.). In the twentieth century (and a bit earlier) this traditional view is criticized and changed. As a fruit of this criticism emerged the opposite trend: the knowledge of both my and his/her inner experience is explain by introducing an element that allows this knowledge and is placed outside any of them. I call it the impersonal sphere of nobody – supra-individual matrix of the knowledge of my and his/her mental life. In this article I try to indicate the origin of the idea of this sphere giving its main characteristics. A description is based on the views of known philosophers: Nietzsche, Scheler and Wittgenstein and one sociologist – Goffman.

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Podmiot jako wewnętrzny biegun symbolizmu. Antymentalistyczna wykładnia „Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego”

Author(s): Jakub Gomułka / Language(s): Polish Issue: 35/2016

The purpose of this paper is to offer a radical anti-mentalistic interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs Tractatus. Contrary to mentalistic approaches postulating that the task of projection must be performed by a subject (transcendental or psychological), the author claims – after Rhees, Diamond and McGinn – that the projection itself is an intrinsic relation within the symbol. The main point of the paper is the thesis that the transcendenal subjectivity – or, as Wittgenstein calls it, the metaphysical subject – is the inner pole of the symbol, and since the meaning of the symbol is itʼs other inner pole (as anti-realist interpretations point out), the whole intentional relation of symbolizing is intrinsic to the symbolism.

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Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji

Author(s): Paweł Zięba / Language(s): Polish Issue: 35/2016

This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly expressed without the employment of disjunction.

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Czy emocje mogą być racjonalne? Analiza wybranych aspektów filozofii emocji Ronalda de Sousy

Author(s): Andrzej Dąbrowski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 35/2016

In the paper I examine the three aspects of Ronald de Sousa’s philosophy of emotions: intentionality, objectivity, and rationality of emotions. In the beginning, I put up the basic question, how he sees emotions? De Sousa argues that emotions are a kind of perception (perception of axiological properties). At the same time he defends an objectivist approach to emotions. It implies that emotion apprehends something in the world that exists independently of us. The fundamental question, how emotions relate to their objects, leads to the inquiry on the intentional structure of emotion and, then, to the study of the truth of emotion. Finally, I reconstruct a very important study concerning rationality: cognitive rationality, strategic rationality, and axiological rationality. The latter one is specific to the emotions.

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Czy istnienie może być lepsze albo gorsze od nieistnienia? Część II: Wartości osobowe a obiektywne racje moralne

Author(s): Mirosław Rutkowski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 36/2016

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Zwierzę jako absolutny Inny – otwieranie nie/możliwości

Author(s): Patryk Szaj / Language(s): Polish Issue: 36/2016

The starting point for consideration is to put the Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy into question whether the status of “absolute Otherness” may also belong to the Other other than man. On the basis of the thought of Levinas it receives a negative response and it is because of his involvement in the so-called anthropological machine (which he shares with Martin Heidegger and some other critics of metaphysics). But it is, however, possible to open the (broadly defined) phenomenological ethical thought drew on the achievements of Levinas to the question of the animal. This attempt might be centered around the proposals of Jacques Derrida, the author of the essay The Animal That Therefore I Am (More To Follow), where he spoke about the singularity of each animal, the problematic status of border between man and animal, and the being-with animals as a full-fledged modality of being. This is a provocative thought which asks us about our attitude to such issues as “responsibility” and “responsiveness”, “carno-phallogocentrism”, or the status of non-human animals. Derrida’s thought is here very close to some kind of phenomenological language, but it is rather the phenomenology of the otherness than the phenomenology of intentional subject. The same phenomenology that we find in Bernhard Waldenfels’s or John D. Caputo’s writing.

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Jak czytać/pisać historię? Wobec sztuki, literatury i przeżycia

Author(s): Dominika Gruntkowska / Language(s): Polish Issue: 36/2016

The author of the article tries to describe the most important issues in thoughts of Frank Ankersmit, Hayden White and Dominic LaCapra. The author of the article wants to analyze, how Ankersmit and White treat connection between historiography and literature and other fields of art. The object of the article was also to describe the problem of memory in history studies, this problem is united with trauma and her influence to the memory of the experience (LaCapra). This article tries also to describe the most important assumption of microhistory in thoughts of Ankersmit and White.

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„Bezstronny obserwator” Adama Smitha a neutralne kryteria oceny w etyce społecznej

Author(s): Cezary Kalita / Language(s): Polish Issue: 36/2016

Ethical theory for Adam Smith is first of all the basic mechanism of social controls. Going out from decisions of the matter of the moral feelings, which the ‘sympathy’ states the foundation; it tries to work out the neutral criteria of ethical opinions introducing the ‘impartial spectator’ figure. Superiority of this category in relation to John Rawls ‘veil of ignorance’ depends on this, that the Smith places his philosophical theory in the strong empirical context (the kind of sociological philosophy). Social ethicist is the base to build more folded regulators of community life, or social, such as economy and politics. The neutral criteria of ethical opinions are the foundation of different derivative social workings (economy, politics).

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(Nie)obiektywna podmiotowość

Author(s): Piotr Piotrowski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 36/2016

In this article, I analyze the issue of subjectivity in the form in which it appears in Charles Taylor’s and Richard Rorty’s writings. Positions of these philosophers are generally regarded as contradictory. I will, however, argued that the position on subjectivity represented by Rorty finds its complementation in Taylor’s concept. To do this, I will show firstly that both Rorty and Taylor use the category of contingency, presenting some common thesis about subjectivity. This way I will show that the location of the category of subjectivity and the scope of its use in each of them concept is closely related to the understanding of objectivity accepted by each of them. This will allow then to reconstruct the concept of subjectivity presented by Taylor and Rorty. Next, in the conclusion, I will present such a summary of those two standpoints, which will include justification of the thesis of their complementarity.

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