Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji
Disjunctivism and the nature of perceptual relation
Author(s): Paweł ZiębaSubject(s): Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Epistemology, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy, Existentialism, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Hermeneutics
Published by: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Keywords: alternative-denialism; disjunctivism; causal relation; co-constitutive relation; perception; hallucination; epistemic justification
Summary/Abstract: This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly expressed without the employment of disjunction.
Journal: Analiza i Egzystencja: czasopismo filozoficzne
- Issue Year: 2016
- Issue No: 35
- Page Range: 87-111
- Page Count: 25
- Language: Polish