(Non)objective subjectivity Cover Image

(Nie)obiektywna podmiotowość
(Non)objective subjectivity

Author(s): Piotr Piotrowski
Subject(s): Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Epistemology, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy, Existentialism, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Hermeneutics
Published by: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Keywords: Rorty; Taylor; self; idiosyncrasy; contingency; good; objectivity; subjectivity; sense of the situation

Summary/Abstract: In this article, I analyze the issue of subjectivity in the form in which it appears in Charles Taylor’s and Richard Rorty’s writings. Positions of these philosophers are generally regarded as contradictory. I will, however, argued that the position on subjectivity represented by Rorty finds its complementation in Taylor’s concept. To do this, I will show firstly that both Rorty and Taylor use the category of contingency, presenting some common thesis about subjectivity. This way I will show that the location of the category of subjectivity and the scope of its use in each of them concept is closely related to the understanding of objectivity accepted by each of them. This will allow then to reconstruct the concept of subjectivity presented by Taylor and Rorty. Next, in the conclusion, I will present such a summary of those two standpoints, which will include justification of the thesis of their complementarity.

  • Issue Year: 2016
  • Issue No: 36
  • Page Range: 113-131
  • Page Count: 19
  • Language: Polish