Bundeswehr 3.0. The political, military and social dimensions of the reform of the German armed forces

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

This reform of the Bundeswehr, launched in 2011, is the latest of the three decisive stages in the post-war transformation of the German armed forces. The reform aims at “constructing” the armed forces anew in the political, military and social dimensions.The present paper presents the evolution of the role of the armed forces in German foreign and security policy and the ongoing process of “constructing” a new Bundeswehr. It analyses the process of redefining the objectives and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s participation in international operations, its current military transformation, and changes in its image and social identity. It also presents the implications of this broader transformation for political and military.

Bundeswehra 3.0. Polityczny, wojskowy i społeczny wymiar reformy sił zbrojnych RFN

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): Polish

Rozpoczęta w 2011 roku reforma Bundeswehry to jeden z trzech przełomowych etapów w powojennej transformacji sił zbrojnych RFN. Ma na celu „skonstruowanie” na nowo niemieckiej armii w wymiarze politycznym, wojskowym i społecznym. Niniejszy tekst przedstawia ewolucję roli sił zbrojnych w polityce zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa RFN i proces „konstruowania” nowej Bundeswehry.W tekście omówiona została redefinicja celów i zasad zagranicznego zaangażowania Bundeswehry, kierunki przekształceń wojskowych, zmian wizerunku i społecznej tożsamości armii oraz konsekwencje tak szeroko pojętej reformy dla współpracy politycznej i wojskowej w ramach NATO i UE.

Closing the gap? Military co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea

Author(s): Tomasz Dąborowski,Mateusz Gniazdowski,Justyna Gotkowska,Jakub Groszkowski,Andrzej Sadecki,Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. // The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.

Sitting on the fence. Swedish defence policy and the Baltic Sea region

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

Sweden finds itself in the midst of the most heated debates about defence policy and the direction of military reforms since the end of the Cold War, as Stockholm faces the challenge of finding a new military security formula.From the Swedish point of view, the post-Cold War strategic timeout in Europe is coming to an end. The international environment is reverting to a situation in which the use of force among states is no longer an improbable scenario. Stockholm cannot rule out the emergence of crises or conflicts in Northern Europe in the future, which could directly or indirectly affect Sweden.In this context, the transformations of Sweden’s defence policy over the past twenty years have become a problem. Sweden has moved from neutrality, i.e. non-involvement on any side of an armed interstate conflict, to non-alignment, whereby it stays outside military alliances and freely shapes its policies during wartime. It has joined the European Union and co-operates closely with NATO on foreign missions. Its ability to defend its own territory, however, has diminished.

Szwedzki szpagat. Polityka obronna Szwecji a region Morza Bałtyckiego

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): Polish

W Szwecji trwają najbardziej burzliwe dyskusje na temat polityki obronnej i kierunku reformy sił zbrojnych od zakończenia zimnej wojny, a Sztokholm stoi przed wyzwaniem znalezienia nowej formuły zapewnienia swojego bezpieczeństwa militarnego. // Z perspektywy Szwecji okres pozimnowojennej przerwy strategicznej w Europie ma się ku końcowi. Następuje powrót do środowiska międzynarodowego, w którym użycie siły pomiędzy państwami nie jest już nieprawdopodobnym scenariuszem. Sztokholm nie wyklucza pojawienia się w przyszłości kryzysów i konfliktów w regionie Europy Północnej, które pośrednio lub bezpośrednio dotknęłyby Szwecję. // W tym kontekście problemem stają się przekształcenia szwedzkiej polityki obronnej w ostatnim dwudziestoleciu. Szwecja przeszła od neutralności, tj. braku zaangażowania po jakiejkolwiek ze stron ewentualnego międzypaństwowego konfliktu zbrojnego, do bezaliansowości, tj. pozostawania poza sojuszami wojskowymi i dowolnego kształtowania polityki w czasie wojny. Stała się członkiem UE oraz ściśle współpracuje z NATO w operacjach zagranicznych. Jednocześnie jednak ograniczyła własne zdolności do obrony kraju. // Utrzymywana do początku lat 90. doktryna neutralności stała się jednak na tyle głęboko zakorzenioną w społeczeństwie i części klasy politycznej składową narodowej tożsamości, że ogranicza pole manewru szwedzkiej polityki w odniesieniu do członkostwa w NATO. Biorąc ponadto pod uwagę konsolidację finansów państwa, która w perspektywie przyszłych lat może ograniczyć wzrost wydatków na obronność, Szwecja stoi więc obecnie przed poważnym wyzwaniem: jak zapewnić bezpieczeństwo militarne państwa w pogarszającym się środowisku bezpieczeństwa regionalnego? Jakie konsekwencje może mieć zmiana dyskursu i polityki obronnej Szwecji dla bezpieczeństwa i współpracy w regionie Morza Bałtyckiego?

Norway and the Bear. Norwegian defence policy - lessons for the Baltic Sea region

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

Norway is currently the only Western European state and ‘old’ NATO member that strongly relies on the traditional dimension of NATO's collective defence. It is also the only ally in Western Europe which perceives Russia as a threat to its military security, in the so-called High North. // In order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and threats in the region, Norway has been pursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence. Cooperation means improving collaboration with Russia in cross-border relations, in the petroleum sector and in the military sphere. The deterrent measures include maintaining NATO’s credibility as a collective defence alliance; increasing military cooperation with the United States; building up Norway’s own military capabilities; and developing military cooperation across Northern Europe. // The primary objective of Oslo’s defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of crises and conflicts emerging in the High North which could prove too ‘big’ for Norway but too ‘small’ for NATO.

Norweski sposób na Rosję. Polityka obronna Norwegii - wnioski dla regionu Morza Bałtyckiego

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): Polish

Norwegia jest obecnie jedynym krajem zachodnioeuropejskim i „starym” krajem członkowskim NATO, dla którego tradycyjny wymiar obrony zbiorowej NATO ma duże znaczenie. Jest również jedynym krajem z Europy Zachodniej, który postrzega Rosję jako zagrożenie dla swojego bezpieczeństwa militarnego – na tzw. Dalekiej Północy. // Aby sprostać potencjalnym wyzwaniom i zagrożeniom w tym regionie, Norwegia prowadzi politykę obronną opartą na strategii współpracy i odstraszania. Współpraca odnosi się do kooperacji z Rosją w relacjach transgranicznych, sektorze paliwowym i w sferze wojskowej. Odstraszanie obejmuje wzmacnianie NATO jako sojuszu obronnego, zwiększanie współpracy wojskowej z USA, budowę własnych zdolności obronnych oraz rozwijanie polityczno-wojskowej kooperacji w Europie Północnej. // Celem norweskiej polityki obronnej jest przede wszystkim zminimalizowanie prawdopodobieństwa wystąpienia kryzysów i konfliktów na Dalekiej Północy, które mogą się okazać „za duże” dla Norwegii, ale „za małe” dla NATO.

Federalna Służba Bezpieczeństwa w zwierciadle rosyjskiego dowcipu sieciowego

Author(s): Jolanta Darczewska / Language(s): Polish

Dzięki mediom społecznościowym rosyjski humor polityczny przeżywa burzliwy rozwój. Problematyzując rzeczywistość polityczną i społeczną, stwarza karykaturalny, metaforyczny obraz instytucji i wydarzeń, które wzbudziły zainteresowanie społeczeństwa. Jako rodzaj echa opinii publicznej, jest przyczynkiem do badań społecznej percepcji Federalnej Służby Bezpieczeństwa. Obraz tej służby w dowcipach jest niekorzystny. Niweczy to działania wizerunkowe samej FSB, jak i wysiłki propagandowe Kremla, mające na celu zjednanie obywateli Rosji do promowanych odgórnie mitów politycznych, takich jak np. mit czekistowski. // Niekorzystny wizerunek FSB jest „rozmywany” dowcipem sztucznym, pisanym na zamówienie i replikowanym w sieci w zorganizowany sposób. Antydowcip jest niewybredny, wykorzystuje narzucone odgórnie stereotypy propagandowe, pełni funkcję dezinformacyjną i demaskatorską, jednoznacznie wskazując przeciwnika politycznego Kremla. // Omówiona problematyka stanowi także przyczynek do charakterystyki relacji między oficjalną propagandą a opinią publiczną. Unaocznia, że propaganda zauważalna staje się nieskuteczna, a sam proces kształtowania opinii jest skomplikowany i długotrwały. Wymaga ponadto stałego poszukiwania nowych, atrakcyjnych technik propagandowych, dostosowanych do gustów i oczekiwań poszczególnych grup społeczeństwa.

Słabe ogniwo? Niemcy w zachodnim systemie bezpieczeństwa

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): Polish

Polityczne, gospodarcze i militarne parametry potęgi RFN wpływają na podejście Berlina do kształtowania europejskiego i międzynarodowego ładu. Niemcy są regionalnym mocarstwem w UE o dużych możliwościach dyplomatycznych, są trzecią potęgą gospodarczą świata o globalnych powiązaniach handlowych i inwestycyjnych, jednocześnie posiadają ograniczony potencjał wojskowy. RFN jest więc przede wszystkim zainteresowana rozwijaniem pokojowych i dyplomatycznych mechanizmów zarządzania kryzysami i konfliktami oraz utrzymaniem pokoju i stabilności w obszarze bezpieczeństwa europejskiego i globalnego. // Skłonność Berlina do stawiania na dialog i kompromis w globalnej i regionalnej polityce bezpieczeństwa może stanowić coraz większe wyzwanie dla utrzymania spójności i wiarygodności Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego – zarówno z perspektywy USA, jak i członków NATO z Europy Środkowej i Północnej.

Russia's armed forces on the information war front. Strategic documents

Author(s): Jolanta Darczewska / Language(s): English

The question about the role of the armed forces in the information space is in fact a question about the role of the factor of force in the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy. In Russia, this factor has invariably been treated as a hallmark of the country’s position as a global power, an instrument of deterrence, and a way to exert political pressure and build spheres of influence. The country’s military information strategy is designed to serve those tasks, and envisages multiple battle fronts, including internal and external affairs, the info-psychological front, the cyberspace and other spheres. Its visible consequences include a militarisation of the language of politics and propaganda, the imposition on public opinion of the narrative of an information war against Russia, and a radical change of the Russian army’s image. Today Russia forcefully demands that other countries respect its spheres of influence in the neighbourhood (as seen from its aggression against Ukraine and its armed intervention in Syria). It claims to be the guarantor of peace processes, even as it demolishes the European and global security architecture, and presents itself as a centre of power, asserting the right to co-decide on matters of global security.

Rosyjskie siły zbrojne na froncie walki informacyjnej. Dokumenty strategiczne

Author(s): Jolanta Darczewska / Language(s): Polish

Pytanie o rolę sił zbrojnych w przestrzeni informacyjnej jest w istocie pytaniem o rolę czynnika siły w polityce wewnętrznej i zewnętrznej państwa. W Rosji był on i nadal jest traktowany jako wyznacznik jej pozycji mocarstwowej, instrument odstraszania, nacisków i budowy sfer wpływów. Dostosowana do takich zadań wojskowa strategia informacyjna przewiduje walkę na wielu frontach: wewnętrznym i zewnętrznym, informacyjno-psychologicznym, cybernetycznym i in. Jej widoczne konsekwencje przejawiły się nie tylko w militaryzacji języka polityki i propagandy, narzucaniu opinii publicznej narracji o wydanej Rosji wojnie informacyjnej oraz diametralnej zmianie wizerunku armii. Rosja siłą domaga się respektowania swoich stref wpływów w sąsiedztwie (agresja wobec Ukrainy, interwencja zbrojna w Syrii). Burzy europejską i globalną architekturę bezpieczeństwa, przedstawiając się zarazem jako gwarant procesów pokojowych. Prezentując się jako biegun siły, manifestuje prawo do współdecydowania w kwestiach bezpieczeństwa globalnego.

The trouble with PESCO. The mirages of European defence

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

The creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017 crowned the series of recent debates and actions aimed at strengthening the common security and defence policy of the EU. However, the compromise around PESCO has revealed strategic divergences among France, Germany and the countries on the eastern flank related to the perceptions of threats and challenges, the development of the EU’s security and defence policy, and the future of trans-Atlantic relations. The debates on PESCO in Western Europe have also highlighted a growing gap between the political narratives and military reality.

Militarne i pozamilitarne aspekty współczesnego bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. Wybrane problemy. T. 2

Author(s): / Language(s): Polish

Documents Talk NATO-RUSSIA relations after the cold war

Author(s): / Language(s): English

(...) regardless of the adopted perspective of an observer or analyst, and optimism/pessimism related to NATO-Russia relations, they will remain a key aspect of international security. This necessitates the search for “source knowledge” and “decoding” numerous stereotypes and simplifications that these relations have overgrown for the last quarter century. One must not forget the calculated and deliberate disinformation that Russia has been practising regarding its relations with the Alliance. It consistently uses the myth of “betrayal of the West”, blaming NATO nations for being the primary cause of the current state of NATO-Russia relations. It is not our task in this volume to explain the nature of these problems exhaustively, nor to discuss the structure of modern Russian political mythology. However, the significant dispersion of “first-hand” sources raises the bar of problems confronting researchers of NATO-Russia relations. Therefore, this volume attempts at gathering key open-source documents produced by both sides and arranging them into a representative whole to provide a better understanding of the “big picture” (...). The emerging picture of political thinking and policy justifications offers the power of beating back many stereotypical opinions (...)

Gândirea militară românească sub amprenta clausewitziană

Author(s): Adrian Lesenciuc / Language(s): Romanian

This book plays two roles: to suggest the possibility of re-reading military thinking - especially the Romanian one - after applying the ideological markers on the dominant schools of thinking, but especially after applying the markers for pointing out Clausewitzianism. These markers paint ideological "-isms" in different colours: Clausewitzianism, Anticlausewitzianism, Neoclausewitzianism and enable the interpretation of the radiography of military thinking outside ideological debris.

NATO after the End of the Cold War

Author(s): Zdeněk Kříž / Language(s): English

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been going through a permanent adaptation process that has changed it beyond recognition. If the Alliance had wanted to survive the Warsaw Pact, it did not have any other choice. As regards the beginning of the permanent NATO adaptation process, it is possible to regard the adopting of the 1990 London declaration. Today’s shape of NATO differs from its form in the Cold War substantially. The Alliance’s tasks have been extended significantly, as well as its territorial range and the number of its members. Rob de Wijk points out that the successful adaptation of NATO to the new post-Cold-War realities is an unprecedented event because traditional military alliances were dissolved together with the expiration of the reason for their existence in the past. (Wijk 1998: 14–18). However, one should pay attention to the fact that NATO has never been a merely military alliance based only on the idea of collective defense. According to Karl Deutsch, the Alliance has been an organization of states sharing common values, which makes war among members impossible. He calls this kind of alliances “security community”. (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler – Barnett 1998) This paper aims to describe and analyze the main tendencies in the NATO transformation after the end of the Cold war and will proceed as follows. The second chapter will pay attention to the changes in the NATO strategic thinking. The third chapter will focus on the NATO enlargement followed by the fourth chapter dealing with the NATO-Russian relations. The fifth chapter is devoted to the NATO expeditionary operations and the sixth will provide a survey of the NATO military adaptation. The last chapter will summarize the main outcomes of the NATO adaptation after the end of the Cold War. As far as methodology is concerned, procedures typical of history science will be used in this paper.

Russia’s Belarusian Army. The Practical Aspects of Belarus and Russia’s Military Integration

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

We should consider the broadly understood military integration of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation (RF) as the most advanced aspect of the relationship between the two countries, while at the same time it is the element which shows the greatest disproportion. Belarus is fully dependent on its eastern neighbour for military cooperation, and its own armed forces and arms industry are unable to meet the state’s basic defence needs. Moreover, they cannot function efficiently or develop without Russian support or if they are isolated from cooperation with the analogous Russian structures. In the short term, cutting off Minsk’s cooperation with Moscow would result in the collapse of the Belarusian armaments industry and a systemic crisis in the armed forces, which would then have to be recreated from scratch.

Military-Technical Assistance to Ukraine an Assessment of Its Short - And Medium-Term Needs

Author(s): Marcin Piotrowski / Language(s): English

Western military aid has played a key role in Ukraine’s ability to preserve its independence, but it is still insufficient to break Russia’s offensive potential, to recapture Russian-held territory, or even to stop Russia’s next possible offensives - in short, to end the war. Ukraine cannot rely on its own defence industry, a great part of which has been destroyed. For these reasons, it is necessary to increase both the scale and scope of Western military support for Ukraine, which should include more NATO-standard weapons than before. Although the situation on the battlefield became more favourable for Ukraine in autumn 2022, Russia still has an advantage in terms of quantity and reserves of armament. Without breaking the Russian offensive potential, which would bring a conclusion to the war on terms favourable to Ukraine, there is no chance for changing Russia’s strategic ambitions and calculus. Russia will attempt to regain the military initiative, as confirmed by its “partial mobilisation” and placing industry on a war footing. To date, the course of the war has confirmed that the results at the strategic and tactical levels depend on the appropriate concentration and use of heavy conventional weapons. The six essential types of these capabilities are: heavy barrel and rocket artillery, armoured and motorised troops, longer-range missiles, air power, drones (UAVs) and loitering munitions, and air-defence systems. So far, Ukraine has serious gaps in each category, and this asymmetry persists despite Russia’s high losses. Most barriers to providing military assistance to Ukraine are, above all, political in nature. Ukraine’s partners differ in their strategic calculations, scope, scale, and determination to provide assistance. Objectively, obstacles to aid stem from limited reserves of armaments and ammunition and decades-long policies of reducing the production capacity of Western defence industries. In general, the first step for providing military aid to Ukraine is clarifying capability gaps, that is, the disparity with Russia. The next step is to analyse available options for supplying weapons and ammunition. One can consider eastern options (Soviet-made or compatible systems), STANAG options (NATO-standard weapons), and asymmetric options (systems that are not equal to a given capability but make it possible to counter it, for example, anti-tank guided missiles as a partial solution to the issue of Russian numerical superiority in tanks, at the same time substituting for the lack of Western tanks). A third step, especially for Ukraine’s neighbouring partners, could be to use the support of NATO forces and means, or accelerated individual modernisation efforts, to fill the gaps created by the transfer of their weapons to Ukraine. In most of the capability gaps analysed, there are severe limitations to further pursue the eastern options, due to the rapidly depleting reserves of Soviet systems or ammunition in NATO countries. At the same time, asymmetric options must be considered as interim or complementary solutions in the absence of a willingness by some of Ukraine’s partners to supply weapons analogous to Russia’s. Therefore, the most desirable and effective capabilities that can be offered to Ukraine are systems identified in this report as STANAG options, which are produced in NATO countries or by pro-Western Asian states. Within a few months of the war, Ukraine’s heavy artillery almost fully transitioned from Soviet-era systems to howitzers, HIMARS, MLRS launchers, and STANAG ammunition. Moreover, Ukraine already relies almost entirely on Western drones and loitering munitions and on access to commercial drones. A similar transition will also be necessary in Ukraine’s armoured and motorised forces, longer-range guided missiles, air force, and air defence systems. Ukraine’s current artillery capabilities are based on several post-Soviet systems and at least 9-10 different NATO howitzer models. Weakness of such a “patchwork” of systems calls for a gradual rationalisation of assistance to Ukraine, for example the creation of simple and continuous logistics chains, the formation of units using the same standardised systems, and maintaining assistance from smaller groups of states that have supplied identical systems. Such rationalisation would be advisable in 2023-2024 for the majority of other STANAG options, which would also increase the interoperability of Ukrainian forces with NATO in the post-war perspective. Due to probable exhaustion of T-72 tank reserves in Europe in 2023, Ukraine may need to switch to NATO tank models, such as the American M-60 and M-1 Abrams or the German Leopard-1 and Leopard-2. Existing NATO and non-NATO reserves of M-113 armoured personnel carriers also make it possible to fully outfit Ukraine’s land forces with them. Even with positive decisions on tank deliveries, Ukraine will still need a continuous supply of anti-tank missiles, especially of the Javelin or TOW type. Russia has an overwhelming advantage over Ukraine in ballistic and cruise missiles. Currently, Ukraine does not have the capability to strike Russian targets at more than 100-120 km, apart from the selective and improvised use of long-range drones. In 2023-2024, it is necessary to continue supplying Ukraine with HARM anti-radar and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Urgent and binding arrangements between the U.S. and Ukraine are also needed for the possible delivery of ATACMS ballistic missiles with a range of 300 km. Ukraine faces the full degradation of its air force, which is based on MiG-29 and Su-27 multi-role aircraft, as early as in 2023. This requires its transition to a new fleet of aircraft, such as American F-16s or Swedish Gripens. Postponing this decision beyond 2024 will create a dangerous capability gap on the Ukrainian side. There are fewer problems with supplying Ukraine with post-Soviet transport and attack helicopters from Central Europe, so the full transition of this fleet to Western systems can be carried out at a later date. Ukraine’s air defence is responsible for inflicting relatively high losses on Russia’s air force, but in this area eastern options are running out, too. Therefore, in 2023 it will be necessary to build a new network of radars and air interceptor launchers for Ukraine, based on NASAMS, HAWK, and IRIS-T systems. Also during 2023 there is a need to finish studies on the new architecture of Ukraine’s longer-range, integrated air and missile defence, preferably based on Patriot or SAMP-T systems. NATO’s attention should focus on the capability gaps emerging in some Central European members due to their delivery of weapons to Ukraine. The cost and scale of their accelerated armed forces’ modernisation to fill national gaps are now so high that they require support from Western Europeans and the U.S. NATO’s forces and systems on the Eastern Flank must support credible deterrence and defence posture, which to now relies mainly on U.S. efforts. Only synchronised military aid to Ukraine and reinforcement of NATO’s Eastern Flank countries will ensure the complete failure of Russia’s plans in Europe.

Women's side of war

Author(s): / Language(s): English

This book, an anthology of women’s records about the wars waged on the soil of the former Yugoslavia in 1991-1999, is the product of a yearlong exploration in cooperation with many women’s organizations, human rights organizations, organizations which deal with the past and reconciliation, and the individual women who bravely voiced their experiences, recorded their experiences and/or endorsed these experiences. We made our selections from the sources within our reach. The available sources are listed in the Bibliography. We hope that this book will not remain the only one of its kind and that it will encourage further research and more books. With the exception of some inevitable abridgements marked (…), we have reproduced all of the texts faithfully.

Cesta z Ruska: Ruská agrese proti Ukrajině a její důsledky

Author(s): Zdeněk Kříž / Language(s): Czech

Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has so far displaced around 7.5 million people, claimed around 200,000 lives and cost hundreds of billions of dollars in material damage. It is the worst armed conflict in Europe since 1945. To mark the sad anniversary of this war, Masaryk University Press is publishing a book “Journey from Russia”, with the subtitle “Russian aggression against Ukraine and its consequences”. The book is the fourth volume in the “Between the Genres” series and its author, Zdeněk Kříž, a professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, presents the historical context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and analyses its course and consequences. The book begins with an important context for understanding the Russian-Ukrainian crisis: the process of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Subsequent chapters deal with the intensification of military reforms on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides, following the illegal annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the 2014–2015 war in Donbass. A chapter on diplomacy on the eve of the outbreak of war precedes a detailed description of the course of military operations in 2022, coupled with extensive foreign assistance to Ukraine. Finally, the book discusses the possible prospects for conflict during 2023.