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The CSD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs collected the main official documents related to the suppression of terrorism which had been adopted by the Bulgarian government and the UN Security Council. It provided a basis for discussion at the regional policy forum International Cooperation in Countering Terrorism held on June 27, 2002 in Sofia.
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The report was executed for the NATO StratCom COE by the Centre for Applied Research under the Estonian National Defence College. The objective of this research is to identify how the Russian media portrays the Ukrainian military and security structures, including the policies of the Kiev government and their ‘collaboration’ with the West. The research group looks at how messages disseminated in the media attempt to construct attitudes and advocate behaviours in parallel to political and military events on the ground in Ukraine. The research covers the period from 1 April until 31 December 2014 and analyses the following Russian media: Regnum, Komsomolskaya Pravda and TV Zvezda. These media are important because they target not only Russian internal audience but also the Russian-speaking communities in the former territory of the USSR. The researchers used standardised content analysis in accordance to a specially developed Coding Manual and enriched the findings with data from 25 structured interviews with Ukrainian representatives (media, political and military experts, as well as soldiers and officers involved in the military conflict). From December 2014 the Russian military has adopted a new doctrine that explicitly states that information superiority is essential to achieving victory on the physical battleground in the modern war. It is crucial for NATO to draw appropriate conclusions from the on-going conflict in Europe in order to further strengthen the unity of the alliance and avoid such conflict scenarios between Russia and NATO in the future. Russia’s information activities have played a significant role in the overall military operations carried out in the territory of East Ukraine since 2014. Information operations were used at all levels starting with the political level (against the state of Ukraine, state structures, politicians) up to the tactical level for justifying military actions initiated by pro-Russian forces. Information confrontation and a variety of psychological operations continue to play a substantial role in the current crisis in Ukraine. Russia uses various media channels to conduct its operations against Ukraine, including governmental and private TV channels (e.g. Pervyi Kanal, Rossija 1, NTV, Russia Today, LifeNews), radio (e.g. Radio Mayak), mobile phone operators (e.g. KyivStar), Internet sources (including online publications, e.g. Regnum, TV Zvezda, Кomsomolskaya Pravda, Itar Tass, RIA Novosti ) and social media networks (e.g. YouTube, Facebook, Vk.com, odnoklassniki.ru). Some Ukrainian sources hold pro-Russian attitudes and can also be used to spread disinformation (e.g. Vesti). The separatist People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk have their own channels producing anti-Ukrainian propaganda (e.g. dnrnews.com, novorus.info). The current study has focused on the media channels that represent the Russian mainstream—Komsomolskaya Pravda, TV Zvezda, Regnum. These mass media channels are generally critical against the Ukrainian government and armed forces, but do not offer a critical view of the Russian government; they justify Russian policy in Ukraine and see the Ukrainian crisis as a battlefield between Russia and West, referring to the clash of civilisations with the West (primarily the US and NATO, but also the European Union) allegedly intending to advance its sphere of influence towards Russian borders.
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Interviews by Želimir Bojević, with: 1. Goati, Vladimir 2. Gojković, Drinka 3. Milosavljević, Bogoljub 4. Mrvić-Petrović, Nataša 5. Šehić, Vehid 6. Nenadić, Nemanja 7. Ahel, Ivan 8. Ranković, Vera 9. Vujadinović, Dragica 10. Tošić, Desimir 11. Perović, Latinka 12. Cetinić, Goran 13. Samardžić, Nikola 14. Hadžić, Miroslav 15. Golubović, Zagorka 16. Minić, Jelica 17. Stojanović, Dubravka 18. Trkulja, Jovica 19. Mappes-Niediek, Norbert 20. Mitrović, Andrej 21. Radić, Radmila 22. Stevanović, Aleksandar 23. Mihailović, Srećko 24. Kuljić, Todor 25. Milenov, Alexandra 26. Delević-Đilas, Milica 27. Beč-Neumann, Janja 28. Kovačević, Marko 29. Trgovčević, Ljubinka 30. Prokić, Nenad 31. Biserko, Sonja 32. Popović, Srđa 33. Stamenković, Stojan 34. Kandić , Nataša 35. Miočinović, Mirjana 36. Stojiljković, Zoran 37. Prokopijević, Miroslav 38. Bogosavljević, Srđan 39. Kovacs-Cerović, Tünde 40. Milivojević, Snježana 41. Vodinelić, Vladimir V. 42. Đogović, Saša 43. Čupić, Čedomir 44. Podunavac, Milan 45. Lukić, Svetlana 46. Vučo, Aleksandar 47. Rak, Pavle 48. Popović-Obradović, Olga 49. Nosov, Andrej 50. Radunović, Desanka 51. Lazić, Mladen 52. Bugarski, Ranko 53. Korać, Nada 54. Rajčić, Biserka 55. Nikolić-Solomon, Dragana 56. Kovačević-Vučo, Biljana 57. Vukomanović, Milan 58. Bugarinović, Nebojša 59. Lilić, Stevan 60. Lukšić-Orlandić, Tamara 61. Timotić, Milorad 62. Stojanović, Lazar 63. Baucal, Aleksandar 64. Milić, Jelena 65. Havelka, Nenad 66. Jakšić, Božidar 67. Lyon, James 68. Ivanišević , Bogdan 69. Licht, Sonja 70. Stambolović, Vuk 71. Rajić, Ljubiša 72. Rakić-Vodinelić, Vesna 73. Daničić, Richard 74. Petrović, Vesna 75. Gajin, Saša 76. Šikman, Siniša 77. Jovanović, Ivan 78. Todorović, Dragoljub 79. Pančić, Teofil 80. Nikolić-Ristanović, Vesna 81. Čanak, Branislav 82. Jevremović, Petar 83. Barać, Verica 84. Ilić, Mirko 85. Matković, Gordana 86. Miletić, Goran 87. Turajlić, Srbijanka 88. Jauković, Milena 89. Miljanić, Ana 90. Vejvoda, Ivan 91. Trifunović, Zorica 92. Gačić-Bradić, Dušanka 93. Popadić, Dragan 94. Bjelić, Dušan Ilija 95. Logar, Svetlana 96. Mandić-Rigonat, Tanja 97. Savić, Obrad 98. Toma, Marijana 99. Jovanović, Miroslav 100. Svilanović, Goran
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Following the military invasion by the forces of the Russian army launched on 24.02.2022 in Ukraine, at the level of its neighboring states and beyond, there was a massive influx of people displaced from this country, the groups of people being made up both from Ukrainian citizens and and from citizens of other states that, at the time of the invasion, were living in or transiting Ukraine. This aspect determined the creation of a mechanism for quick and appropriate measures both at European and national level to manage this phenomenon. At the European level, on 04.03.2023, the Council issued the Decision (EU) 2022/382 and activated the temporary protection provided by Directive 2001/55/EC regarding the minimum standards for granting temporary protection, in the event of a massive influx of displaced persons, and the measures to promote a balance between the efforts of the member states to welcome these people and bear the consequences of this reception, all displaced persons from Ukraine, who entered the territory of the EU after 24.02.2022, benefiting from this measure. At the national level, on 18.03.2022, it was issued the Government Decision no. 367 regarding the establishment of conditions for ensuring temporary protection as well as for the modification and completion of some normative acts in the field of foreigners, which regulated the granting of temporary protection on the territory of Romania. Temporary protection is an emergency mechanism that applies in the event of a massive influx of people and aims to provide immediate and collective protection. The aim is to ease pressure on national asylum systems and allow displaced people to enjoy harmonized rights across the European Union.
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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has disrupted the world’s energy system. The most urgent need was to phase out the EU’s dependence on Russian energy imports and find a quick replacement. In this joint paper, we approach the issue from two different perspectives of the Czech Republic and Norway, looking for intersections and identifying opportunities to strengthen cooperation and facilitate the accelerated energy transition and diversification. We conclude that both countries have taken immediate action in addressing the most pressing energy-related risks. The potential for closer cooperation is obvious. Both countries should maximise the level of collaboration by taking advantage of existing institutional frameworks (NATO and EU/EEA). In the energy dimension, the key to cooperation in the short term is gas (investment in production in Norway, development of export pipelines or protecting critical sub-sea infrastructure). In the longer term, both countries should jointly cooperate on developing of hydrogen market, including production and transportation.
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On May 8, 2018, US President Donald Trump went through with his threat and, this time, has not submitted his certification of the implementation of the Iranian nuclear agreement to the US Congress for approval. According to Trump, the document is the “worst deal” of Obama Democratic administration. He made his negative decision despite Iranʼs positive performance in the inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
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Somewhat surprisingly, in a relatively short time interval, approximately over the course of one month in the middle of this year, two important meetings of the American President Donald Trump were held with the highest representatives of two countries which pose long-term security problems to the USA: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter the DPRK) and the Russian Federation (hereinafter the RF). The meeting with the North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un was held on June 12, 2018 in Singapore, and that with the Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 16, 2018 in Helsinki.
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Will the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the American-Soviet INF Treaty of 1987 become a possible reality? The Treaty prohibits ground-launched shorter and the middle-range missiles (500–5,500 kms) with nuclear or conventional warheads. The Treaty´s security significance and its main parameters, the legal framework of the withdrawal and the reasons of both parties for accusing each other of violating the Treaty, are discussed in the article as well. In its conclusion the article, among other things, explains the context of the possible termination of the Treaty, and its consequences for the U.S.-Russia arms-control architecture.
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Nuclear weapons are an existential threat to humanity, as are the increasingly intense manifestation of climate change. The Reflection describes more broadly the main risk factors of this threat, including artificial intelligence (AI). In this context, it highlights the impasse which the US-Russian arms control process and strategic dialogue have reached as a result of their strained relations and the ongoing war in Ukraine. It also analyses the expected developments in the nuclear weapon field, taking into account the US Pentagon’s warning about the possible growth of China’s nuclear arsenal. In particular, it concludes by noting the main dilemmas for further development in this area: either the initiation of arms control and risk reduction negotiations by the major nuclear powers or the growing spiral of a costly and security-risk-laden nuclear arms race. The possibility of an ethical and moral commitment by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the so-called P5 (the US, Russia, China, France and the UK), to “responsible nuclear behaviour“, which is promoted by the US administration, appears as a temporary solution to this security crisis.
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We proudly present you the ‘BSC Trends: Reconstructing the Global (Dis)Order,’ the companion publication to the Belgrade Security Conference 2023, held in Belgrade from October 11th to 13th, 2023. This publication aims to shed light on and discuss, following the style of BSC discussions, the most significant global, regional, and local events, phenomena, and developments that have marked this year. These topics were part of the panel discussions in this year’s BSC conference program.
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The main policy purpose of the Balkan Defence Monitor remains the same as in the last year. In recent years, the local elites have misused the lack of transparency related to defence policies in the Western Balkans, turning the military into a tool of domestic political promotion rather than a public good. This model of behaviour did not cause an armed conflict, and it is unlikely that it will do so in the future. However, it has poisoned the already fractious political ties between the countries of the region and fostered an atmosphere of distrust. To counter these negative occurrences, data on the defence sector needs to be made accessible to the citizens of Western Balkan countries and the international community. The ongoing war in Ukraine and the destabilisation of the European security environment make such an approach even more relevant.
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Defence system capturing is done in various ways. The authorities are using the procurement of armament from different parties to achieve foreign policy goals in order to reduce the external pressure on the authoritarian regime. Insisting on military neutrality and foreign policy balancing, Serbia is trying to keep access to both the Eastern and Western armament markets. Also, through non-transparent contracts, individuals and companies close to the government opulently profit at the expense of the military industry, as well as through exporting weapons often times conducted in contravention of both domestic and international law and norms.
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In the last six years, Serbia and Croatia have been upgrading their military arsenals, leading to the conclusion that the two countries are spearheading a new arms race in the Western Balkans. This narrative is misleading as the strategic environment makes inter-state war unlikely and the process is actually about Serbia and Croatia replacing old equipment from the Yugoslav days. However, the two countries use arms procurement as leverage in their respective foreign policies and tools of domestic promotion for their rulling elites. The return of hostility is highly unlikely, but there is a political threat of cementing an atmosphere of mistrust in the region.
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