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№153: How Can NATO Contribute to Ukraine and Georgia’s Border Security?

№153: How Can NATO Contribute to Ukraine and Georgia’s Border Security?

Author(s): Jeffrey Rathke,Daniel Szeligowski,Konrad Zasztowt / Language(s): English

Conflicts beyond NATO’s borders, such as the Russian occupation of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia and aggression in Ukraine, pose a threat to the security of NATO’s eastern flank states. Therefore, NATO’s ability to provide security to its members depends on the Alliance cooperating closely with its neighbours. In this respect, Ukraine and Georgia, both of which share borders with NATO members, are of special importance. NATO should build on the experience of its own members, and join ranks with the European Union in order to further support the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia. Enhanced border security should be a key element of such partnerships.

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№152: NATO in Libya: A Long-term Plan for Stability

№152: NATO in Libya: A Long-term Plan for Stability

Author(s): Paolo Quercia,Patrycja Sasnal,Julianne Smith,Kurt Volker / Language(s): English

Never was there a better time for NATO’s involvement in Libya than now. The Government of National Accord (GNA) is the only available option for a more stable future of the country. It has already shown it can deliver by defeating the Islamic State (IS) in Sirte, but without urgent support from the international community it may not be able to show more progress in providing security, reform and services to the Libyan people. Once it receives a request from the GNA, NATO can and should assist in SSR, border control and countering people-smuggling as there is no better placed actor to help Libya in this regard.

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№140: The Silence of the Guns: Can the Cease-Fire in Donbass Last?

№140: The Silence of the Guns: Can the Cease-Fire in Donbass Last?

Author(s): Stanislav Secrieru / Language(s): English

For the first time since the outbreak of the war in Donbass, the situation on the frontline is nearly aproper cease-fire. This is the outcome of the interplay of three factors: the political-military balance inDonbass, sanctions and Russia’s military intervention in Syria. Nevertheless, it is premature to assumethat military options in Donbass are no longer in the cards. Russia is likely to use force if needed torepel a Ukrainian attempt to retake parts of the area, to obstruct the Minsk process if it goes in adisadvantageous direction for Moscow, or to seize more territory if there is further political and socialturmoil in Ukraine. To minimise the risks of an eruption of violence in Donbass, the EU and U.S.should prolong the sanctions, fine-tune the diplomatic pressure on both sides to implement and upholdthe Minsk Protocols, and pay more attention to the political and economic transformations in the restof Ukraine.

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№128: Not Really a Coalition: The U.S.–Turkey Deal on the Fight against the Islamic State

№128: Not Really a Coalition: The U.S.–Turkey Deal on the Fight against the Islamic State

Author(s): Pinar Elman / Language(s): English

Turkey’s decision to open Incirlik airbase to the anti-IS coalition could offer a significant advantage inthe fight against the Islamic State, including cutting it off from outside supplies, and changing theregional parameters. However, statements from the U.S. and Turkey still contradict each other, andtheir divergent priorities could hamper their operational capacity. Turkey’s contribution to the coalitionmay potentially reduce cooperation between the U.S. and the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) inthe anti-IS zone. In addition, the absence of a ceasefire between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’Party (PKK) and the domestic polarisation provide a permissible environment for potential provocationsthat may escalate the violence in Turkey, potentially diminishing its contribution. The U.S. and Turkeystill have to overcome their differences in order to become effective coalition partners.

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№126: The YPG and the Changing Dynamics of the Fight against IS

№126: The YPG and the Changing Dynamics of the Fight against IS

Author(s): Dylan O’Driscoll / Language(s): English

Recently, Turkey and the U.S. signed an agreement for Turkey to join the coalition’s fight against the Islamic State (IS, a.k.a. ISIS/ISIL). As part of this agreement an IS-free zone will be created in Syria, but it is not clear yet whether this will encroach on the territory of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the main Kurdish armed group operating in Syria. The YPG has been one of the most successful forces on the ground in the fight against IS and despite the changing dynamics it still remains important. However, Turkey’s entry into the battle will lead to every aspect of the YPG being reassessed, as Turkey deems it to be a terrorist organisation. Nonetheless, the YPG still has a significant role to play and abandoning it now could lead to the situation in Syria becoming even more complex.

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№121: Ready to Go? ISIS and Its Presumed Expansion into Central Asia

№121: Ready to Go? ISIS and Its Presumed Expansion into Central Asia

Author(s): Anna Maria Dyner,Arkadiusz Legieć,Kacper Rękawek / Language(s): English

Although Central Asian states are vulnerable to the activities of radical Islamic organisations due to theweaknesses of their political and social systems—marked by authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism,and ethnic and religious tension, as well as their poor economic circumstances—interest in ISIS amongtheir citizens remains low. These states so far also have not become an area of interest for ISIS,although that may change. When some people in these countries do leave for Syria and Iraq, theirdecision is not rooted just in poverty but also in social exclusion and poor religious education. At thesame time, citizens of far more affluent and often far less authoritarian European and Middle Easterncountries travel in higher numbers to Syria to join ISIS. Nonetheless, a potential increase in thepopularity of radical Islamist factions will not only be a problem for the five countries of the region,where the authorities will try to use the phenomenon to strengthen their special services and raisefunds for border protection, but also for Russia, especially since people from Central Asia are mainlyrecruited to ISIS on Russian territory and traverse it to reach the battlefields. Russia, therefore, willcontinue to support its neighbours in the fight against such organisations by helping to strengthenborder control, support for local special services and by CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces. The EuropeanUnion and the United States should offer not only intelligence support and assistance in protectingthese borders against this threat but also economic programmes and development assistance that canbe used to decrease the factors that may contribute to the radicalisation of those living in Central Asia.

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№117: How the Crimean Tatars Spoil Putin’s Annexation Myth

№117: How the Crimean Tatars Spoil Putin’s Annexation Myth

Author(s): Justyna Prus,Konrad Zasztowt / Language(s): English

The annexation of Crimea has been a propaganda gain for the Kremlin, helping to augment supportfor the ruling elites. However, the protests of minorities opposing the annexation—Crimean Tatars andUkrainians—has prompted Russians to begin harsh repressions. On May 18, the Crimean Tatarscommemorate the anniversary of the Stalinist deportation of their nation in 1944, which led to massdeaths among the deported population. Although the Crimean Tatars are a relatively small minority atthe peninsula, they are politically well organised and will not accept the Kremlin’s praise of the Soviet(including Stalinist) era, or the current authoritarian system based on neo-imperial and neo-Sovietideology.

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№115: Prospects for Polish–U.S. Defence Industrial Cooperation

№115: Prospects for Polish–U.S. Defence Industrial Cooperation

Author(s): Anna Pochylska,Marcin Terlikowski / Language(s): English

With the decision to select Patriot as its next medium-range air and missile defence system, Poland is launching a programme considered the most important one out of the $35 billion Armed Forces Technical Modernisation Plan for the years 2013–2022. The sheer value of the contract ($4–6 bln), its strategic and operational significance, and the technologies involved, are all enough to make it a hot topic in popular debates. But this programme is special also because it involves a U.S. contractor, which will be responsible for providing key technologies. While Poland has long been gravitating towards closer defence political ties with the United States, it has also been particularly anxious with regards to defence cooperation with Washington, even despite the fact that the U.S. became the top importer of Polish defence materiel. To make the most out of the AMD selection, and any other possible programmes that may be won by a U.S. contractor, Poland should drop unrealistic or simply false assumptions regarding defence industrial cooperation with the U.S. and push the envelope of collaboration, wherever it is possible, while limiting its ambitions where they are exaggerated.

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№114: Russia’s Use of History as a Political Weapon

№114: Russia’s Use of History as a Political Weapon

Author(s): Justyna Prus / Language(s): English

Russia’s use of history as a political weapon may have long term negative consequences. Themanipulated narrative will be difficult to reverse and, could lead to an even more confrontationalattitude towards immediate neighbours and the West. Western countries cannot remain passive. Tocounter Russian historical propaganda, they will have to adopt and effectively use the narrative basedon truth and common values.

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Overstretched? Denmark’s security policy and armed forces in light of the new Defence Agreement
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Overstretched? Denmark’s security policy and armed forces in light of the new Defence Agreement

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

In January 2018, Denmark adopted a new Defence Agreement for 2018–2023 – a cross-party strategy for the development of the Danish armed forces. The Agreement, which is adopted by the Danish parliament every five years and implemented regardless of the current governing coalition, provides, for the first time since 1989, for an increase in defence spending of 20 per cent, as well as a greater balance between out-of-area operations and collective defence. The Agreement also provides for the armed forces’ greater assistance to the police in anti-terrorism measures and border control, and investments in cyber capabilities. Despite these changes, the Danish armed forces will remain primarily an expeditionary structure. Moreover, the planned increase in defence spending could turn out to be insufficient to implement the Agreement in full. From minimalism to activismDuring the Cold War, Copenhagen’s defence policy was based on self-imposed restraints in NATO. Denmark refused to host allied bases and certain military exercises on its soil, and distanced itself from the US-Soviet arms race. The objective of not provoking Moscow into increasing military pressure on Scandinavia was achieved, among other things, by not consenting to the deployment of nuclear weapons and medium-range ballistic missiles in Denmark[1].Following the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the ensuing enlargement of NATO to include Poland and the Baltic states, Denmark took a more active role in NATO and its alliance with the US[2]. It ceased being a country on the flank of the Alliance, and did not consider itself to be in danger of direct armed aggression. This enabled Copenhagen to concentrate its resources fully on participation in NATO crisis management operations and US-led coalitions in the Middle East – always having a broad mandate to use force and intense combat engagement[3]. At the same time, its armed forces got rid of armament and military equipment which was unsuited for asymmetric warfare, such as submarines and ground-based air defence systems.The aim of large-scale involvement in out-of-area operations was to enhance Denmark’s standing in the international arena and make its armed forces an important foreign policy asset in relations with its key allies, mainly the US, followed by UK and France. The US is not only a key supplier of armament and military equipment for the Danish armed forces; cooperation with the US is of prime importance to Denmark because Copenhagen sees Washington as a guarantor of freedom of the seas and trade. Safe shipping routes are of fundamental importance to Denmark’s economy due to the operations of the Danish company A.P. Møller-Mærsk, the largest freight shipping company in the world (it has a fleet of 590 ships, and accounts for 15% of total global container trade[4]). The turning point in 2014In 2014 the end of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, which heavily engaged the Danish armed forces for more than a decade, coincided with Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The latter led NATO to focus more on collective defence and deterrence against Russia, particularly in the Baltic Sea region. This new security situation forced Denmark to adjust its defence policy to the changes taking place in NATO. This took the form of Danish engagement in US and subsequently NATO’s reassurance of the Baltic states. Immediately after the annexation of Crimea, Danish F-16s bolstered the policing of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian airspace (BAP), while land forces played a more intensive part in allied exercises in those countries[5]. Denmark also contributed to the land component of the NATO–VJTF (1000 troops under UK command in 2017) and to the enhanced forward presence of allied troops in the Baltics (from 2018, 200 troops in Estonia in the UK-led battalion-size battlegroup).From 2014, Danish military intelligence reports revealed growing challenges from Russia to security in the region. Even though Denmark does not consider a Russian attack on a NATO member state to be a realistic scenario, it does believe that Russia might test the credibility and unity of the Alliance in the Baltic region by putting pressure on the Baltic states. From the Danish perspective the gravest threat to state’ security continues to be terrorism, although in recent years Copenhagen has also paid much attention to illegal immigration and cyber attacks.Measures to strike a balance between a larger military commitment in the Baltic Sea region and providing a significant contribution to remote deployments (since 2014 principally in Syria, Iraq, and Mali), as well as pressure from the US on its European allies to address the issue of low defence budgets, have revived the debate in Denmark on insufficient defence spending and personnel shortages in the armed forces. Some politicians and members of the military have stressed that the level of defence spending and the armed forces’ capabilities are not aligned with Denmark’s’ aspirations regarding its role as a reliable ally to the US and an active member of NATO[6]. In 2017, there were approximately 15,000 professional soldiers and 4200 conscripts in Denmark’s armed forces. The New Defence Agreement – a belated response?The most important subjects discussed during the negotiation of the new Defence Agreement for 2018–2023 were the scale of the increase in defence spending, the need to adapt the expeditionary model of the armed forces to the requirements of collective defence, whether it was reasonable to increase the number of conscripts, and the part played by armed forces in ensuring domestic security. The final wording of the new Agreement published in January 2018 was a consensus reached by six out of the nine parties in the Danish parliament[7]. This represents a compromise between the position taken by the centre-left opposition and the governing liberals, who are in favour of keeping the current model of the armed forces in place, and the suggestions made by the political right. These concern more balance between expeditionary capabilities and engagement in the Baltic region, as well as investments in domestic security[8]. Of the new initiatives provided for in the document, most funds have been allocated to developing a capability to deploy a heavy brigade outside Denmark’s borders, the armed forces’ assistance to the police, and defence against cyber attacks.(1) Increased defence spending. The Agreement provides for a gradual increase in defence spending, which is to rise by 20% of 2017 levels by 2023. However, experts estimate that this spending will only amount to around 1.3% of GDP, which means that Denmark does not intend to honour the Wales 2014 NATO summit commitment for NATO members to increase spending to 2% of GDP by 2024. Nevertheless, in recognition of NATO’s requirements, Copenhagen is planning to allocate a minimum of 20% of its defence budget to purchasing new armament and military equipment. In 2017, Denmark allocated 1.17% of GDP to defence, which is US$4,158 billion (including 12.10% on new military procurements).(2) Collective defence. The Agreement takes into consideration recommendations made by NATO defence ministers in June 2017 regarding the development of the members’ defence capabilities. Denmark was asked to increase its readiness to participate in collective defence in the Baltic Sea region[9]. To achieve this, from 2024 Copenhagen intends to have the capability to deploy a heavy brigade against a more equal opponent under a NATO collective defence framework, in particular in the Baltic states. This brigade will be equipped with tanks, ground-based air defence, anti-tank weapons and artillery, possessing its own command support, logistics and reconnaissance. It will consume approximately one-third of the extra funds provided for in the Defence Agreement. However, the creation of a new brigade within the army structure will not mean an additional 4000 troops in the armed forces; the brigade is to be formed on the basis of “army’s current operational capabilities” (Denmark has two brigades). In practice, the brigade will be partly composed of mobilisation units and reservists (readiness for deployment within 180 days). Moreover, the brigade’s subunits will be able to participate in out-of-area operations. It is therefore debatable whether the brigade will be ready for a prompt response within the collective defence effort.(3) Armament and military equipment. The priorities in the technical modernisation of Denmark’s armed forces until 2023 will involve strengthening the areas most neglected after the end of the Cold War, namely air defence and anti-submarine warfare. The investments in air defence include procurement of 27 F-35 fighter jets, which is regulated under a separate cross-party agreement from 2016[10], and the deferred purchase of SM-2 surface-to-air missiles for the Iver Huitfeldt frigates[11]; this most likely means that Copenhagen wishes to increase its navy’s interoperability with the US Navy (for example in escorting aircraft carriers). Developing the anti-submarine capabilities of the Danish navy will include the purchase of sonars and anti-torpedo systems for vessels, as well as dipping sonars and torpedoes for Seahawk helicopters. Closer cooperation with other countries on anti-submarine warfare is also envisaged.(4) Conscription and mobilisation capabilities. Although Denmark has been developing its expeditionary armed forces for almost three decades, it has retained limited conscription (at the moment 98% of conscripts volunteer). The aim was not to maintain a trained reserve to be mobilised in the event of a conflict because the system of total defence was dismantled in Denmark after the end of the Cold War. The basic, four-month training period was intended above all to encourage conscripts to join as professionals. The new Defence Agreement increases the number of conscripts by 500 (from 4200 to 4700 annually) and extends training for some of them from 4 to 8 months. This decision was imposed mainly by the nationalist Danish People’s Party. The Danish armed forces did not favour the plans for an increased intake of conscripts, fearing new costs and duties for the professional component. The expansion of conscription in 2018–2023 is intended to broaden the recruitment base for regular troops (Denmark is struggling with a manning deficit, especially in the navy) and to help restore the armed forces’ mobilisation potential. Denmark plans to be able to mobilise 20,000 troops – both reservists and Home Guard members)[12].(5) International missions. Foreign deployments remain a priority for the armed forces. The Agreement provides for an increase in funds of 50% for this purpose (participation in NATO’s battalion-sized battlegroup on eastern flank will also be funded using this money). In addition, Denmark will set up a joint deployable Special Operations HQ with Belgium and the Netherlands.(6) Domestic security. The 2015 migrant crisis, during which a record number of asylum-seekers entered Denmark, and the higher terrorism threat (due to Danish citizens joining ISIS, among other factors), have led Denmark to increase the assistance which the armed forces give to the police in order to ensure domestic security. Under the Agreement, among other things, a light infantry battalion will be formed (500 troops) ready to assist with anti-terrorism operations, and the armed forces will still participate in border control. The Danish police, which has border guard powers, is struggling with a lack of personnel, as it is overstretched due to its new duties connected with the migrant crisis and the risk of terrorism.(7) Cyber security. Cyber security is becoming more important in Denmark as the country becomes more digitalised. The wake-up call for Denmark was an attack by hackers on the defence ministry in 2015–16, and a computer virus which paralysed A.P. Møller-Mærsk in 2017, causing estimated losses of US$300 million. Denmark holds Russia responsible for both of these attacks[13]. Therefore, Denmark will invest 1.4 billion kroner in cyber security by 2023. This will allow, among other things, the creation of a 24-hour national cyber situational centre to monitor cyber security threats[14].(8) The Arctic. The Arctic is of vital importance for Denmark. Copenhagen has retained control over autonomous Greenland, making Denmark a member of the Arctic Council. It enhances Denmark’s international standing, and brings the prospect of extracting Arctic natural resources[15]. The Arctic is also an important area of cooperation with the US because of the latter’s military presence in Greenland (the Thule radar station)[16]. The Defence Agreement provides for the greater activity of armed forces in the Arctic (including patrolling and search & rescue operations). The Agreement also guarantees funds for eliminating environmental contamination in former US military installations in Greenland. Denmark is worried that this matter could inflame anti-Danish feeling and benefit an independence movement. However, the Arctic is low on the list of the defence ministry’s financial priorities. This is due to Denmark’s unwillingness to militarise the Arctic (Denmark is aware that it has insufficient potential to take part in an Arctic arms race), as well as the fact that until now the Arctic has been an area of cooperation based on international law. Question marksWhile the new Defence Agreement provides for the greater involvement of the armed forces in providing domestic security and greater mobilisation capabilities, the Danish army will remain primarily an expeditionary structure until 2023. There will be no fundamental change to the model for the armed forces, and the objective of the new strategy is above all to achieve greater flexibility for the army when responding to various kinds of threat. After more than two decades of focusing on crisis management operations and asymmetric warfare, it will take time to develop a capability to fight in conventional conflict under a collective defence framework.It could prove difficult for Denmark to put these ambitious plans for 2018–2023 into practice for financial reasons. While the Defence Agreement provides for a reversal of the downward trend in defence spending, at the same time there are only plans for a return to the level of spending that existed prior to 2013. Also, the largest share of the planned rise in defence spending has been put off until 2022–2023, and so, despite the armed forces’ urgent needs, the defence budget will continue to stagnate in the coming years. The Ukraine crisis and pressure from the Trump administration have not led the Danish political parties to take measures to gradually increase the defence budget to the target of 2% of GDP. This is mainly because social spending and the welfare state are always priority issues in Danish elections. The fact that there is no perceived threat in Denmark of direct armed aggression is also a factor; according to opinion polls, only one in three Danes believes that Russia poses a threat to their country[17].Denmark will probably continue to try to compensate for the low defence spending in the form of major expeditionary involvement in NATO and US-led operations. However, this policy might be limited in its success due to a current lack of operations on the scale of ISAF. Also, while NATO was focused on out-of-area operations, Denmark’s low defence spending went unnoticed due to the defence budgets of a number of allied countries being lower than Denmark’s in GDP percentage terms. However, the return to the deterrence against Russia since 2014 has led to a gradual rise in the European NATO members’ defence spending; according to forecasts, by 2024 more than half of the allied countries could have reached 2% of GDP[18]. This will make it difficult for Denmark to sustain the image of a sound NATO member, as in the period up until 2023 it only intends to raise its defence budget by 0.1 percentage points (to 1.3% of GDP).In the coming years Denmark wishes to intensify the activity of its armed forces domestically, regionally, and globally – from the Arctic, through NATO’s eastern flank, to the Middle East. In view of the moderate increase in defence spending (and personnel shortages), it could turn out to be impossible to reconcile such activity in so many areas. Especially as the most expensive modernisation programme in the history of Denmark’s armed forces – the purchase of F-35 fighter jets – will be an enormous burden on Denmark’s defence budget in the period to 2026[19]. [1] The self-limiting membership of Denmark and Norway in NATO, together with Sweden’s and Finland’s policy of neutrality were elements of the so-called Nordic balance.[2] The Ellemann-Jensen doctrine (Denmark’s foreign minister 1982–1993). See G. Szelągowska, Dania, Warsaw 2010, pp. 321–322.[3] After the end of the Cold War, Denmark took part in all NATO’s out-of-area operations (in the Balkans, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and Libya). It also contributed to US-led coalitions in the three Iraq wars (1990–1991, 2003–2011 and since 2014). M. R. Olesen, J. R. Nordby, The Middle Eastern Decade: Denmark and Military Interventions in H. Edström, D. Gyllensporre, Alike or Different: Scandinavian Approaches to Military Interventions, Santérus Academic Press Sweden, 2014, pp. 62–102; H. L. Saxi, Norwegian and Danish defence policy: a comparative study of the post-Cold War era, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Defence and Security Studies 1/2010, pp. 29–60.[4] R. Milne, Maersk CEO Soren Skou on surviving a cyber attack, Financial Times, 12 August 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/785711bc-7c1b-11e7-9108-edda0bcbc928[5] Denmark responded favourably to the need for greater military engagement in the Baltic states. The tradition of active support for the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the 1990s still continues in Denmark. The Danish contribution to reassurance the Baltic states in 2014–2015 was one of the largest in NATO. In the Saber Strike 2014 exercises in Lithuania, a Danish mechanised battalion took part (with a tank unit). Danish company-sized units also participated in month-long exercises in Lithuania (2014 and 2015) and in Latvia (2015).[6] To give an example, due to a shortage of technical personnel and the level of wear of its F-16 fighters, Denmark was forced to temporarily halt the participation of its air force in the fight against ISIS (2015). Budget shortages also led to a delay of several years in the purchase of military equipment (self-propelled howitzers, armoured personnel carriers, SM2 missiles).[7] The Danish Ministry of Defence, Agreement for Danish Defence 2018–2023, 28 January 2018, http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/danish-defence-agreement.aspx[8] The nationalist Danish People’s Party criticised the armed forces for being better prepared for battle in the Middle East than for defending Danish territory.[9] Ch. Hyldal, Claus Hjort: Dansk Nato-brigade skal hjælpe med at afskrække russerne, Danmarks Radio, 29 June 2017, https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/claus-hjort-dansk-nato-brigade-skal-hjaelpe-med-afskraekke-russerne[10]The programme cost is DKK20 bn (approximately US$4 bn). Aftale om anskaffelse af nye kampfly, 9 June 2016, http://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Documents/aftale-vedr-kampflyanskaffelse-2016.pdf[11] The navy will also begin preparations to acquire SM-6 missiles. Also, Denmark is examining the purchase of long-range precision guided missiles (potential procurement in 2023–2026, no information was given as to the missile launching platform or the type of missile). Besides, Denmark maintains readiness to be part of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence.[12] Following mobilisation in the event of a conflict in the Baltic Sea region, they would mostly be involved in providing Host Nation Support.[13] C. Hjort (Denmark’s defence minister), ‘Rusland stod bag cyberangreb mod Mærsk’, KrigerenDK, 15 February 2018, http://krigeren.dk/claus-hjort-rusland-stod-bag-cyberangreb-maersk/[14] Denmark will also join the NATO Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn and the Helsinki-based European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.[15] The Act on Greenland Self-Government from 2009 extended island’s autonomy, acknowledging the people of Greenland as a separate nation with a right to self-determination. Under the Act, Greenland can obtain independence by means of economic emancipation from Denmark (two-thirds of Greenland’s budget still consists of subsidies from Denmark) and inter-government negotiations, followed by a referendum. Copenhagen remains responsible for Greenland’s foreign and security policy. See P. Uziębło, Podstawy ustroju Grenlandii (wybrane zagadnienia), Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego, Nr 1(17)/2014, http://www.marszalek.com.pl/przegladprawakonstytucyjnego/ppk17/01.pdf[16] The US military presence on the island is sanctioned under the bilateral agreement with Denmark on the defence of Greenland from 1951.[17] M. Jensen, Russisk trussel bekymrer hver tredje – vores naboer tager det mere alvorligt, TV2, 14 January 2018, http://nyheder.tv2.dk/samfund/2018-01-14-russisk-trussel-bekymrer-hver-tredje-vores-naboer-tager-det-mere-alvorligt [18] J. Ringsmose, Militærforsker: Danmarks rolle som Nato-duks står for fald, Altinget, 18 March 2018, https://www.altinget.dk/eu/artikel/militaerforsker-danmarks-rolle-som-nato-duks-staar-for-fald#.Wqi6XzyC8II.facebook[19] The Danish media are reporting more and more frequently that the value of the contract was underestimated.PDF icon Full text in PDF 160.39 KB Overstretched? Denmark’s security policy and armed forces in light of the new Defence AgreementRELATED TO THE TOPICNATO summit in Brussels: the eastern flank between the USA and EuropeWith Russia right across the border. Finland’s security policy

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Rebuilding Germany’s air defence capabilities: on the eve of crucial decisions
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Rebuilding Germany’s air defence capabilities: on the eve of crucial decisions

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

As NATO has returned its focus to collective defence since 2014, very short, short-range and medium-range surface-based air defence has become a desirable capability. Germany, which has been recalibrating the Bundeswehr to resume participation in conventional military conflicts, is in the process of re-creating air defence capabilities. In 2018–2019, the German Defence Ministry is expected to take decisions regarding two crucial air defence programmes: the NNbS and the TLVS. || The very short and short-range air defence capabilities have effectively been dismantled within the German Army over the last decade. The Bundeswehr plans to rebuild them in the NNbS programme in order to meet its commitments within the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). The contract for the NNbS is expected to be signed in 2019. However, the plans to quickly rebuild capabilities in this area may stumble on technical, financial and personnel challenges. || As Germany has committed to deploy a fully modernised brigade for NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) duty in 2023, Berlin is also seeking alternative solutions, such as co-operation with The Netherlands, or smaller purchases outside the NNbS programme. In late 2018 or early 2019, the German Defence Ministry is also planning to sign the contract for the medium-range air defence programme, TLVS, three years after it decided to use the results of the MEADS programme that was completed in 2014. The TLVS system will replace the Patriot batteries that have been in use since the late 1980s and have been successively upgraded. Time will tell as to whether the lengthy negotiations will enable the Defence Ministry to avoid delays and financial and technical problems in the complex TLVS programme, of which Germany is going to be the sole user for now.

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Cadres decide everything – Turkey’s reform of its military
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Cadres decide everything – Turkey’s reform of its military

Author(s): Mateusz R. Chudziak / Language(s): English

Over the last two years, the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerı – TSK) have been subject to transformations with no precedent in the history of Turkey as a republic. The process of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) subordinating the army to civilian government has accelerated following the failed coup that took place on 15 July 2016. The government has managed to take away the autonomy of the armed forces which, while retaining their enormous significance within the state apparatus, ceased to be the main element consolidating the old Kemalist elites. However, the unprecedented scale of the purges and the introduction of formal civilian control of the military are merely a prelude to a much more profound change intended to create a brand new military, one that would serve the authorities and be composed of a new type of personnel – individuals from outside the army’s traditional power base. This reflects the reshuffle of the elites that happened during AKP’s rule.

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Kadry decydują o wszystkim – reforma armii w Turcji

Kadry decydują o wszystkim – reforma armii w Turcji

Author(s): Mateusz R. Chudziak / Language(s): Polish

W ostatnich dwóch latach Tureckie Siły Zbrojne (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerı – TSK) zostały poddane przekształceniom niemającym precedensu w historii republikańskiej Turcji. Proces podporządkowywania wojska rządom cywilnym przez rządzącą Partię Sprawiedliwości i Rozwoju (AKP) gwałtownie pogłębił się po nieudanym puczu z 15 lipca 2016 roku. Rząd doprowadził do zniesienia autonomii sił zbrojnych, które zachowując swoje ogromne znaczenie w ramach aparatu państwowego, przestały pełnić rolę zwornika skupiającego stare kemalistowskie elity. Bezprecedensowe w swojej skali czystki oraz ustanowienie formalnej kontroli cywilnej stanowią jednak preludium do znacznie głębszej zmiany – celem jest stworzenie nowego wojska, służebnego wobec władz i złożonego z nowych ludzi, niewywodzących się z tradycyjnego dla armii zaplecza. Odzwierciedla to wymianę elit, jaka dokonała się podczas rządów AKP.

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The northern tandem. The Swedish-Finnish defence cooperation
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The northern tandem. The Swedish-Finnish defence cooperation

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

In response to the change in the security environment after 2014, militarily non-aligned Sweden and Finland are developing their defence cooperation with NATO and the USA and strengthening their bilateral defence relationship. Although a bilateral alliance is unlikely, the two states are suggesting that, were a situation of a conflict in the Nordic-Baltic region to occur, the hypothetical aggressor will need to take into account their cooperation and joint actions with NATO. The Northern Wind 2019 exercises carried out in March 2019, whose scenario includes the defence of northern Sweden, are a display of the interoperability of the Swedish and Finnish armed forces. However, the military synergy between Sweden and Finland is limited by the differences in their respective models of armed forces, years-long insufficient defence expenditure, and military personnel cuts.

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Północny tandem. Współpraca obronna Szwecji i Finlandii
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Północny tandem. Współpraca obronna Szwecji i Finlandii

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): Polish

W odpowiedzi na zmianę środowiska bezpieczeństwa po 2014 roku bezaliansowe Szwecja i Finlandia rozwijają stosunki wojskowe z NATO i USA oraz zacieśniają dwustronną współpracę obronną. Choć bilateralny sojusz jest mało prawdopodobny, oba państwa sygnalizują, że w razie konfliktu w regionie nordycko-bałtyckim agresor musi się liczyć z ich współdziałaniem i współpracą z Sojuszem Północnoatlantyckim. Demonstracją interoperacyjności szwedzkich i fińskich sił zbrojnych są odbywające się w marcu br. ćwiczenia Northern Wind 2019, których scenariusz zakłada obronę północnej Szwecji. Efekt militarnej synergii Szwecji i Finlandii jest jednak ograniczony przez różnice w modelach sił zbrojnych, ich wieloletnie niedofinansowanie i redukcje personelu.

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US-German clash over international order and security. The consequences for NATO’s Eastern flank
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US-German clash over international order and security. The consequences for NATO’s Eastern flank

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

This year’s Munich Security Conference has laid bare the differences in the US and German visions of international order and security in speeches given by Chancellor Angela Merkel and US Vice President Mike Pence. Germany fundamentally disagrees with the Trump administration both on the paradigm of inter-state strategic competition with China and Russia (and Iran) and on the redefinition of the political, economic and military terms of the alliance with Europe. Berlin, aware of the growing challenges to European and global order and security, rejects the American ‘peace through strength’ policy, but at the same time has failed to present any real alternative. Merkel’s defence of the multilateral approach and of the liberal international order (understood as shaping the policy with partners and allies, above all the USA, but also in dialogue with China and Russia) is not a viable alternative any more. Nor is developing comprehensive European strategic autonomy in the French spirit, independent of the United States. Berlin is still aware that the alliance with the USA form the foundations of German and European security and prosperity even if Washington is becoming an increasingly difficult partner and ally. Given the long-term domestic limitations that shape German foreign and security policy, it is difficult to expect any major change in Germany’s in-between course in the coming years. The continued disagreements between the two biggest allies over key security issues will present an increasing challenge to NATO’s Eastern flank countries.

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Niemiecko-amerykańskie spory o bezpieczeństwo. Konsekwencje dla wschodniej flanki
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Niemiecko-amerykańskie spory o bezpieczeństwo. Konsekwencje dla wschodniej flanki

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): Polish

Tegoroczna Monachijska Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa, na której kluczowe przemówienia wygłosili kanclerz Niemiec Angela Merkel i wiceprezydent USA Mike Pence, obnażyła różnice w amerykańskiej i niemieckiej wizji europejskiego i globalnego ładu i bezpieczeństwa. Niemcy fundamentalnie nie zgadzają się zarówno z paradygmatem strategicznej rywalizacji z Chinami i Rosją (oraz z Iranem), jak i z redefiniowaniem przez administrację Donalda Trumpa politycznych, gospodarczych i wojskowych warunków sojuszu z Europą. Berlin, dostrzegając rosnące wyzwania dla europejskiego bezpieczeństwa, odrzuca amerykańską politykę „pokój przez siłę”, ale jednocześnie nie proponuje realnej alternatywy dla zagwarantowania europejskiego bezpieczeństwa. Nie jest nią „powrót do przeszłości”, czyli wezwanie do obrony bazującego na multilateralizmie „liberalnego porządku międzynarodowego”, rozumianego jako kształtowanie polityki wraz z partnerami i sojusznikami na czele z USA, ale także w dialogu z Chinami i Rosją. Nie jest nią również rozwijanie niezależnej od Stanów Zjednoczonych całościowej autonomii strategicznej UE w duchu francuskim. Waszyngton staje się dla Europy coraz trudniejszym partnerem i sojusznikiem, ale Berlin nadal zdaje sobie sprawę, że podstawą niemieckiego i europejskiego bezpieczeństwa stanowi NATO i współpraca z USA. W związku z długofalowymi niemieckimi ograniczeniami wewnątrzpolitycznymi trudno liczyć na zasadniczą zmianę polityki Niemiec w najbliższych latach. Oznacza to kontynuację tarć pomiędzy największymi sojusznikami w najważniejszych kwestiach bezpieczeństwa – reakcji Zachodu na wyzwania ze strony Chin i Rosji.

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Defying America. Russia’s policy towards Iran
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Defying America. Russia’s policy towards Iran

Author(s): Witold Rodkiewicz / Language(s): English

Russia’s relations with Iran are almost entirely based on geopolitical considerations. The Russian elite perceives Iran as an essential, albeit difficult partner, with whom it shares a number of interests; a partner who understands the language of power politics, and has demonstrated a willingness to seek pragmatic compromises where the interests of Moscow and Tehran diverge. The foundation of the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership is both countries’ common interest in reducing American power and influence, both in the Middle East and globally. The partnership with Iran is also important for Russia because it helps to stabilise the geopolitical situation in the south of the post-Soviet area (the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia) and minimise the influence of Western countries in the region. Since the Russian Federation began its military intervention in Syria (September 2015), Iran has become its de facto ally in its war against the armed anti-Assad opposition. Since the United States withdrew from the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) in 2018, Russia has become a major advocate of maintaining it, and has undertaken active diplomatic efforts to persuade its Western European signatories to resume economic relations with Iran – in defiance of the American sanctions. In response to the escalation in the conflict between Iran and the United States and its Arab allies in summer 2019, Russia has provided diplomatic and propaganda support for Iran. It has also undertaken initiatives aimed at easing tensions in the region and creating a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf, based on the logic of a concert of powers and limiting the importance of bilateral relations in the security sphere between the US and the region’s Arab monarchies.

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European strategic autonomy or European pillar in NATO? Germany’s stance on French initiatives
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European strategic autonomy or European pillar in NATO? Germany’s stance on French initiatives

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

In February this year, at the École de Guerre in Paris and at the Munich Security Conference, France’s President Emmanuel Macron again reiterated the need to strengthen European autonomy in foreign and security policy and presented yet another proposal in this area. This time he offered to launch a strategic dialogue on the role of the French nuclear deterrence in Europe’s collective security. Although the proposal is addressed to all of France’s European partners, the most important response will come from Germany. Official reactions in Berlin have so far been consistent with the German approach to French defence initiatives – Germany declared it is ready for such a dialogue but remains cautious about ist goals. Berlin does see the need to boost Europe’s role in foreign and security policy and recognises Paris as its most important partner in this field. However, Germany’s approach differs considerably from that of France. Berlin prefers to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy and the European pillar in NATO, rather than build European strategic autonomy under French leadership. At the same time it does not necessarily have the required political will and military means to back up its own rhetoric. || With regard to nuclear deterrence Germany’s stance on the French proposal might not be the most important challenge Berlin is currently facing. The upcoming decision on the replacement of the aged German Tornado combat aircraft, able to carry nuclear weapons under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, might be much more significant for the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe.

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Krymski worek bez dna: koszty aneksji półwyspu przez Rosję
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Krymski worek bez dna: koszty aneksji półwyspu przez Rosję

Author(s): Ewa Fischer,Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): Polish

The annexation of Crimea brought significant dividends to the Russian authorities, in particular in the domestic arena, causing unprecedented socio-political consolidation and strengthening the position of Vladimir Putin after several years of declining support. It also provided Russia with strategic advantages, giving it wide access to the Black Sea and to the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as natural gas and oil resources. Russia has also taken over numerous facilities (including tourist facilities) owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the very decision to annex Crimea was made by Moscow ad hoc, without calculating the costs of integrating the peninsula with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic system. // Russia has taken over the region previously subsidized from the Ukrainian budget, and the annexation has hit the most important branch of the Crimean economy - tourism. The process of Crimea's integration with Russia will be complex and will entail high financial, organizational and social costs, including multi-billion-dollar outlays for the modernization and expansion of infrastructure, covering the region's budget deficit, and the payment of social benefits. // For reasons of prestige and politics, Moscow treats the issue of Crimea's integration as a priority; is determined to prove that the annexation of the peninsula will be beneficial for the Crimean economy and will raise the standard of living of the inhabitants. However, the expenses related to the integration of Crimea will coincide with the deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by the US and EU sanctions, which may lead to the abandonment of some ambitious investment plans or their postponement. Part of the integration costs will be borne by the Russian regions, even though they are struggling with major financial problems, which force them to limit their own investment programs. The fulfillment of the hopes of the inhabitants of Crimea for an improvement in the standard of living is also questionable, including due to the problems of the tourism sector (which is one of the main sources of income for the inhabitants), the increase in the cost of living and problems with supplies, and finally due to restrictions on civil rights after the introduction of more restrictive Russian legislation.

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