We kindly inform you that, as long as the subject affiliation of our 300.000+ articles is in progress, you might get unsufficient or no results on your third level or second level search. In this case, please broaden your search criteria.

0.00 €

Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska,Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy and its enhanced military activity in the Nordic-Baltic region has led to revaluations in Sweden’s and Finland’s security and defence policies and a rethinking of the formats of their military co-operation. While remaining outside NATO, the two states have been developing closer bilateral defence co-operation and working more closely with the United States, while at the same time developing co-operation with NATO. Sweden and Finland perceive the United States as the guarantor of regional and European security. From their point of view, the United States is currently the country that has both the necessary military capabilities and the political will to react in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region, in which both countries would inevitably become involved despite their non-aligned status. For Sweden and Finland, intensified co-operation with the United States offers an alternative to NATO membership, which is currently out of the question for domestic political reasons. Meanwhile, the US has also become increasingly aware of the strategic importance of the two states, which, for the purposes of contingency planning, are in fact an extension of NATO’s north-eastern flank.

More...

0.00 €

My enemy’s enemy – Turkey’s stance on Islamic State

Author(s): Mateusz R. Chudziak / Language(s): English

In the context of the civil war in Syria, Turkey has been accused of intense co-operation with Islamic State. The accusations have been coming for some time from the West, and also from the Turkish opposition and the Kurds. The Russian government has also joined in the accusations over the past few months. According to the Kremlin’s narrative, Turkey allegedly not only supports this organisation but is also engaged in trading oil with it ‘on an industrial scale’. Ankara, which has categorically denied these reports, has undoubtedly displayed great ambivalence in its attitude towards Islamic State. Accusations of systemic co-operation with radical militants in Syria and Iraq are difficult to confirm. The radicals themselves pose a serious threat to Turkey’s security. The terrorist attacks in Turkey are suspected to have seriously affected its internal stability and international reputation of being a safe country (especially the Istanbul attack on 12 January 2016). The internal characteristics of the Syrian conflict and the engagement of external forces make it difficult to verify the reports on extensive and coordinated co-operation between Ankara and Islamic State. All parties to this conflict receive external support, and the situation in Syria itself is changing. However, this does not change the fact that Turkey has for a long time tactically benefited from the existence and operation of Islamic State, given that its priorities include ending Bashar al-Assad’s regime and preventing a Kurdish autonomous region being established in Syria. Yet, its ambivalent stance on the ‘enemy of its enemy’ poses a serious risk to both Turkey’s internal stability and its international reputation.

More...

0.00 €

China on Russia’s intervention in Syria

Author(s): Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): English

China has reacted positively to Russia’s military intervention in Syria. The Chinese government perceives it as an element of the global fight against terrorism, and has emphasised the fact that Russia was acting in response to a request by the Syrian government. At the same time, Beijing has argued that the Syrian conflict cannot be resolved by military means and that a political compromise is necessary.Reports and comments in the Chinese media have been dominated by several major issues. The Russian operation was presented as a strategic failure of the West, and a fiasco of the unilateral policy pursued by the US. Numerous Chinese observers have considered Russia’s intervention an adequate response to what they saw as a policy of ‘double standards’ pursued by the West. In their view, under this policy the Western states themselves contributed to the emergence of so-called Islamic State. Chinese media have emphasised the fact that Russia has benefited from the operation in Syria in many ways: it has defended its interests in the Middle East, boosted its prestige in the international arena and overcome its partial isolation in relations with the West, which has been ongoing since the war with Ukraine began. At the same time, Chinese commentators disagree as to their assessment of the impact of the Russian intervention on relations between Russia and the West. Some of them view the prospect of Russia’s rapprochement with the West as likely, whereas others point to the risk that the tensions could be aggravated.

More...

0.00 €

Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian military activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in defence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces , speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will depend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

More...

0.00 €

Turkey and the Syrian refugee problem

Author(s): Aleksandra Jarosiewicz,Krzysztof Strachota / Language(s): English

Turkey plays a key role in the crisis caused by the migration of refugees from Syria. The largest number of Syrian refugees are currently on its territory (almost two million have been registered there, according to official figures). Turkey is also the first stop in the main migration route from Syria to Europe, and remains the shortest route to Europe for the anticipated new waves of migrants. Turkey’s involvement in the refugee issue, and more broadly in the war in Syria, is long-term and many-layered. This stems from factors both geographic (its proximity, its long border, the fact that it represents the shortest overland route to Europe) and political, both external and internal. Externally, it is a consequence of the ongoing civil war in Syria, which borders Turkey. The conflict is far from over, and the number of internal refugees in Syria, amounting to 7.8 million people, has the potential to create new waves of migrants. In the political dimension, the Syrian refugees are one element (an effect, an instrument, an important factor) of Turkey’s deep involvement in the Syrian conflict, and more broadly of Ankara’s active Middle East policy and the consequences of this policy for the domestic situation. The failure of Turkey’s political calculations – especially the coincidence of unfavourable internal and external conditions over the last year both in Turkey itself and in its neighbourhood – have had a decisive influence on the outbreak of the current migration crisis within the EU.

More...

0.00 €

Germany’s ‘refugee’ problem. The most important test for Chancellor Merkel and the grand coalition

Author(s): Artur Ciechanowicz / Language(s): English

The rapid increase in the number of immigrants from outside of the EU coming to Germany has become the paramount political issue. According to new estimates, the number of individuals expected arrive in Germany in 2015 and apply for asylum there is 800,000, which is nearly twice as many as estimated in earlier forecasts. Various administrative, financial and social problems related to the influx of migrants are becoming increasingly apparent. The problem of ‘refugees’ (in public debate, the terms ‘immigrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘economic immigrants’ have not been clearly defined and have often been used interchangeably) has been culminating for over a year. Despite this, it was being disregarded by Angela Merkel’s government which was preoccupied with debates on how to rescue Greece. It was only daily reports of cases of refugee centres being set on fire that convinced Chancellor Merkel to speak and to make immigration problem a priority issue (Chefsache). Neither the ruling coalition nor the opposition parties have a consistent idea of how Germany should react to the growing number of refugees. In this matter, divisions run across parties. Various solutions have been proposed, from liberalisation of laws on the right to stay in Germany to combating illegal immigration more effectively, which would be possible if asylum granting procedures were accelerated. The proposed solutions have not been properly thought through, instead they are reactive measures inspired by the results of opinion polls. This is why their assumptions are often contradictory. The situation is similar regarding the actions proposed by Chancellor Merkel which involve faster procedures to expel individuals with no right to stay in Germany and a plan to convince other EU states to accept ‘refugees’. None of these ideas is new – they were already present in the German internal debate.

More...

0.00 €

Controlled ‘Europeanisation’? The KMW–Nexter merger and the Germany’s new strategy for the arms industry

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

On 29 July a deal was signed in Paris concerning a merger between Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), Germany’s largest manufacturer of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery systems, and its French counterpart Nexter. The new holding formed as a result of the merger will be Europe’s largest producer of arms systems for land forces, comparable to the Airbus Group in the aerospace industry. While work on finalising the merger was underway, the German government was developing a new strategy for Germany’s arms industry, which was published on 9 June 2015. The strategy’s provisions show that German politicians, despite holding negative opinions on previous mergers between German arms companies and foreign businesses, have concluded that consolidation at the European level is nonetheless the only way to go. However, the strategy also states that the German government should exercise more influence than previously on the terms and conditions of any such consolidation. To this end, it identified key national technologies which will be supported and protected through various instruments, including also the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements on strategic defence co-operation. Such agreements may regulate questions such as the ownership structures of the new companies, the locations for developing technologies and for manufacturing products, subcontractors and exports of jointly developed arms and military equipment. In relation to the KMW–Nexter merger, such a deal between France and Germany is expected to be signed this autumn.

More...

0.00 €

Ukraine’s wartime nationalism

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English

The Euromaidan revolution and the war in Donbas that followed it have brought about deep changes in the way Ukrainian citizens think and have led to a rapid transformation of how people view the concept of national community. It began to be increasingly common for proponents of nationalism to refer to solidarity with the state instead of referring to the nation understood as an ethnic community, as they had previously done. This is due to the fact that an entire young generation has matured which takes the Ukrainian state for granted, but also because in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict most Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine have opted for Ukraine.The war with Russia, which has now been ongoing for over a year, has led to a significant radicalisation of society’s attitudes and to attempts to seek models of military actions from the past that could serve as reference points in contemporary thinking. In Ukraine, the main, if not the only clear-cut model of this type of action, has been the story taught in schools involving fighting carried out by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in 1943–1952 (the narrative omits the crimes perpetrated by this formation—not only those against ethnic Poles). One consequence of this has been the currently observed wide-scale adoption of OUN-UPA symbols including by groups dominated by Russian-speaking residents of central and eastern Ukraine. This, however, is not accompanied by the adoption of the ideology of these historical organisations. Even when activists and columnists refer directly to Stepan Bandera, his actual views remain largely unknown. A new phenomenon has emerged which so far has been of marginal importance, but which has large potential to develop: neo-Nazism which refers to contemporary European neo-Nazism instead of Banderite traditions.

More...

0.00 €

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran

Author(s): Witold Rodkiewicz,Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): English

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

More...

0.00 €

Prime Minister Fico’s Russian card

Author(s): Jakub Groszkowski / Language(s): English

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, however, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections.Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, therefore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter list of feasible cooperation initiatives.

More...

0.00 €

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict

Author(s): Tomasz Piechal / Language(s): English

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals.

More...

0.00 €

The Kharkiv oblast: a fragile stability

Author(s): Tomasz Piechal / Language(s): English

Kharkiv oblast, which is located in the immediate vicinity of the Donbas region, and which shares a 315-km stretch of Ukraine’s border with Russia, was one of the regions where attempts were made to kindle separatist sentiments during the spring of last year. Some central government buildings were briefly occupied by pro-Russian demonstrators who declared a ‘Kharkov People’s Republic’, but efficient countermeasures by the Ukrainian institutions of force quickly calmed the situation in the region. However, the oblast still remains a target for acts of sabotage, which are probably directed by Russian secret services. Nevertheless, the situation in the region is now stable, both in terms of public sentiment and local politics. The main competitors in the arena of local politics are Hennadiy Kernes, the mayor of Kharkiv, and Arsen Avakov, the current head of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry. Despite many years of hostility, neither of the politicians appears to have initiated a power struggle as yet – Kernes retains his influence on the city council, and Avakov controls the local security services.

More...

0.00 €

NATO’s presence in the Baltic states – reassurance of allies or deterrence for Russia?

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

In late March and early April, the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) held an exercise in Estonia, during which US F-16s destroyed ground targets in an Estonian firing range. Around the same time the Americans held a drill with the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces over the Baltic Sea. The United States has been playing a leading role in the process of strengthening NATO’s presence in the Baltic states. As far as the Western European allies are concerned, Germany will follow in the footsteps of Denmark and the United Kingdom, both of which made significant military contributions to the strengthening of the allied presence in 2014, and will deploy the largest number of troops in 2015. Non-aligned Sweden and Finland, key for the performance of NATO operations in the Baltic states, have been emphasising their military and political readiness to co-operate with NATO in the event of potential crises or conflicts. Comparing NATO ‘s military presence in the Baltic states before and after the outbreak of the Russian intervention in Ukraine, it is clear that NATO has stepped up its engagement considerably. However, its scope is still relatively small, given the much larger military potential and mobilisation capacity of Russia. Moreover, the message sent by NATO’s actions may be diminished by the political, military and financial constraints faced by the allies and Sweden and Finland. It seems that the greatest risk to the military security of the Baltic states currently appears to be the possibility that Russia could wrongly assess the reliability of NATO’s security guarantees.

More...

0.00 €

The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have triggered a debate about the main directions of defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic region. In the Baltic states, but also in the Nordic countries and Poland, much attention is being paid to questions of Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). TDF are viewed as one of the elements in the national defence systems’ response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. The Baltic states have decided to adapt their Territorial Defence Forces to new threats by making a number of changes to their functioning, depending on the local conditions in each case. Given the growing uncertainty in the region, they have opted not to undertake any in-depth reforms of TDF at this stage, as that could entail a temporary disorganisation in the armed forces. In the coming years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will invest in increasing the size and combat readiness of their Territorial Defence Forces, providing them with better training and equipment, and creating a system of incentives to encourage more people to serve in volunteer formations.

More...

0.00 €

The Baltic states on the conflict in Ukraine

Author(s): Joanna Hyndle-Hussein / Language(s): English

Before Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had felt a higher level of security due to their membership in NATO and the EU. This has now changed. The authorities of these states claim that Russia has been pursuing an aggressive policy towards them for a long time, using various instruments of pressure. They claim that Russia is now able to organise acts of sabotage against them in several areas and that these could threaten both their internal stability and the territorial integrity of the region. The Baltic states’ reaction to the threat from Russia has demonstrated that the level of cooperation between them is low. It has also revealed certain weaknesses in several areas of how these states function, which Moscow may be willing to use for its own purposes. Paradoxically, this has created a chance for the Baltic states’ governments to take measures which in different political circumstances would meet with resistance from society, such as strengthening the military sector and the level of energy security.

More...

0.00 €

The Zapad-2017 exercises: the information war (for now)

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

The Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2017 (West-2017) exercises, scheduled for 14–20 September, have for many months been the core of an information war between Russia and NATO, in which Ukraine and Belarus have also participated. The media have presented these exercises as allegedly the biggest military undertaking carried out in recent years by the armed forces of the Russian Federation (together with its Belarusian ally) in the immediate vicinity of the borders of NATO states, which could form the basis for the annexation of Belarus and/or a strike at Ukraine. And although it is hard to dispute the scale and breadth of these exercises, they are only a small part of Russia’s preparation for a potential military showdown with NATO. The real engagement of troops in these exercises will not be the largest, in terms of the scale and the force employed, or the most important in the Russian army’s preparation to carry out its plans during wartime in (from its perspective) the western strategic direction. The training exercises reported in the media, which have mainly been carried out on Russian training grounds from May to August this year, have not been an essential element of these preparations in 2017. These exercises, held jointly with the Belarusian component (in operational terms the Belarusian army should be considered as an integral part of the Russian armed forces in the western strategic direction), were nominally merely a preparatory stage to the Zapad-2017 exercises. The exercises involving Russian troops alone should be considered as more important, especially those checking the combat readiness of the units which have been newly created or expanded in the last three years. Compared to the period in which the previous exercises (Zapad-2013) were held, Russia’s military potential in the western strategic direction, especially its land forces, has doubled in size.

More...

0.00 €

Ćwiczenia Zapad-2017 – wojna (na razie) informacyjna

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): Polish

The Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2017 (West-2017) exercises, scheduled for 14–20 September, have for many months been the core of an information war between Russia and NATO, in which Ukraine and Belarus have also participated. The media have presented these exercises as allegedly the biggest military undertaking carried out in recent years by the armed forces of the Russian Federation (together with its Belarusian ally) in the immediate vicinity of the borders of NATO states, which could form the basis for the annexation of Belarus and/or a strike at Ukraine. And although it is hard to dispute the scale and breadth of these exercises, they are only a small part of Russia’s preparation for a potential military showdown with NATO. The real engagement of troops in these exercises will not be the largest, in terms of the scale and the force employed, or the most important in the Russian army’s preparation to carry out its plans during wartime in (from its perspective) the western strategic direction. The training exercises reported in the media, which have mainly been carried out on Russian training grounds from May to August this year, have not been an essential element of these preparations in 2017. These exercises, held jointly with the Belarusian component (in operational terms the Belarusian army should be considered as an integral part of the Russian armed forces in the western strategic direction), were nominally merely a preparatory stage to the Zapad-2017 exercises. The exercises involving Russian troops alone should be considered as more important, especially those checking the combat readiness of the units which have been newly created or expanded in the last three years. Compared to the period in which the previous exercises (Zapad-2013) were held, Russia’s military potential in the western strategic direction, especially its land forces, has doubled in size.

More...

0.00 €

Rosyjski nacjonalizm trzy lata po aneksji Krymu

Author(s): Jan Strzelecki / Language(s): Polish

The annexation of Crimea and Russia’s military action in the Donbas in 2014 have revealed a major potential for a revival of nationalist sentiments in Russian society. The wave of ‘patriotic’ attitudes that swept through the country back then has enabled the government to co-opt the rhetoric that is typical of nationalist groups. The Kremlin has used this period to shore up its legitimacy among the public and step up control of specific organisations. This has resulted in changes to the structure of the nationalist movement. A weakening was recorded mainly in relation to nationalist organisations that are independent from the government and those organisations which had been involved in the fighting in the Donbas in the initial stage of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. For the Kremlin, nationalist ideology and nationalist organisations that are unable to act independently are a handy political instrument. They are mainly being used to build support for the government and to consolidate power in Russia. At the same time, the fear that independent nationalist movements may become empowered and organisations that are dependent on the authorities may become emancipated poses a potential threat to the country’s internal stability. This makes the Kremlin strive for greater control of those nationalist groups that still remain somewhat independent.

More...

0.00 €

Iracki Kurdystan – początek nowego kryzysu na Bliskim Wschodzie?

Author(s): Krzysztof Strachota,Józef Lang / Language(s): Polish

Against the backdrop of the ongoing dismantling of Islamic State (IS) and the preparations for the independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan scheduled for 25 September, Iraq as a whole is facing a new conflict which is likely to result in a thorough revision of the present balance of power in this part of the Middle East. A serious risk has emerged that the conflict may rapidly escalate, and its consequences may be more serious for the Middle East and Europe than the fight against Islamic State.

More...

Odbudowa obrony powietrznej Niemiec: w przededniu kluczowych decyzji

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): Polish

Gdy po 2014 roku NATO ponownie skoncentrowało się na wzmacnianiu obrony zbiorowej, naziemna obrona powietrzna bardzo krótkiego, krótkiego oraz średniego zasięgu okazała się pożądaną (i brakującą) zdolnością w siłach zbrojnych państw Sojuszu. Niemcy, które ponownie przystosowują Bundeswehrę do udziału w konwencjonalnych konfliktach zbrojnych, również nadrabiają braki w tym zakresie. W latach 2018–2019 niemieckie Ministerstwo Obrony ma podjąć przełomowe decyzje dotyczące dwóch najważniejszych programów obrony powietrznej – NNbS i TLVS.

More...