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Anti-Corruption Policies Revisited: WP9 Organised crime and impact on vulnerable groups (ANTICORRP Integrated Report)

Author(s): Salvatore Sberna,Alberto Vannucci,Tihomir Bezlov,Dimitar Markov,Maria Karayotova,Ana Hećimović,Iva Nenadić,Munir Podumljak,Péter Gyimesi,Szidónia Nagy,Boróka Pápay,Zoltán Szántó,István János Tóth,Edona Krasniqi / Language(s): English

This integrated report investigates the link between political corruption and organised crime, by examining the modalities, resources and strategies used by criminal groups to govern and/or capture the market of political corruption. On the one hand, the report looks at the infiltration of organised crime in three main policy sectors where public spending and regulations play a pivotal role: public procurement, the privatization of public services, and management of EU funds. Alongside this, the report also analyses the criminal penetration of electoral politics, by evaluating the influence that criminal organisations can achieve in electoral arenas. As a result, the report provides a general assessment of policy regulations, legal countermeasures and practices adopted to prevent and combat organised crime, especially in interaction with political corruption. The report is drawn from data collected in five European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo) across the above themes, and includes two more countries for the assessment of anti-organised crime legislation and initiatives (Albania and Georgia). The methodology involves both extensive and intensive strategies of investigation. A quantitative assessment of the crime and politics nexus is based on the Organised Crime & Corruption (OCC) events database, in which events data about the link between criminal groups and political corruption have been gathered and assembled1. A qualitative assessment involves in-depth understanding of the mechanisms of corrupt exchanges, presented as single case studies conducted in the countries covered by this study, inclusive of primary and secondary sources (interviews, legal proceedings, academic and policy-oriented reports). Data collection and analyses were conducted by five institutions across Europe (EUI, CSD, BCE, IKS, PSD).

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Bulgaria: National Energy Security Indicators and Policy Challenges (Country factsheet)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The country factsheets present a critical review of the energy security governance in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine, and map the main policy challenges faced by these countries in facilitating more transparent and data-driven decision making. The national and regional energy security of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries has become a hot topic of discussion in the EU recently, focusing the attention of experts, policy makers, and the general public on ongoing and future energy projects but also on the features of energy governance in these countries. The fragile democratic traditions in the CEE countries, the existing networks of political protectionism and economic oligarchy, and the opaque business practices nurtured by corruption and links with organized crime, have been reinforced by the negative implications of Russian economic and geo-political influence. Russia has exploited its dominant position in the energy market and its long-term links with certain political and economic groups to shape political decisions across the region according to its own interests, but often to the detriment of the home country consumers. A major governance challenge for Bulgaria, Serbia and Ukraine is the lack of political agreement on a long-term national energy strategy with supporting financial instruments, which would lower the ad-hoc decision making, often related to suspicions of being influenced by private political and economic interests. Romania championed the group in terms of good energy governance due to the improved independence of the national energy regulator with the adoption of new legislation in 2012, as well as due to the continuing overall strong performance in the fight against corruption in the country. The governance of the state-owned energy enterprises in CEE is heavily influenced by political interference, distorting their investment independence and regulatory oversight. This is particularly visible in Bulgaria and Ukraine. The politically mandated downward pressure on electricity and gas prices in Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia increases further the vulnerability of their energy sectors. The heavy dependence on a single source and route of gas supply is the major energy security risk for all countries. In Bulgaria and Ukraine, it is coupled with heavy dependence on oil import from the same country – Russia. While Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine have undertaken diversification efforts, Serbia seems to favour the status quo, even at the expense of paying one of the highest wholesale prices of natural gas in Europe.

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Romania: National Energy Security Indicators and Policy Challenges

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The country factsheets present a critical review of the energy security governance in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine, and map the main policy challenges faced by these countries in facilitating more transparent and data-driven decision making. The national and regional energy security of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries has become a hot topic of discussion in the EU recently, focusing the attention of experts, policy makers, and the general public on ongoing and future energy projects but also on the features of energy governance in these countries. The fragile democratic traditions in the CEE countries, the existing networks of political protectionism and economic oligarchy, and the opaque business practices nurtured by corruption and links with organized crime, have been reinforced by the negative implications of Russian economic and geo-political influence. Russia has exploited its dominant position in the energy market and its long-term links with certain political and economic groups to shape political decisions across the region according to its own interests, but often to the detriment of the home country consumers. A major governance challenge for Bulgaria, Serbia and Ukraine is the lack of political agreement on a long-term national energy strategy with supporting financial instruments, which would lower the ad-hoc decision making, often related to suspicions of being influenced by private political and economic interests. Romania championed the group in terms of good energy governance due to the improved independence of the national energy regulator with the adoption of new legislation in 2012, as well as due to the continuing overall strong performance in the fight against corruption in the country. The governance of the state-owned energy enterprises in CEE is heavily influenced by political interference, distorting their investment independence and regulatory oversight. This is particularly visible in Bulgaria and Ukraine. The politically mandated downward pressure on electricity and gas prices in Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia increases further the vulnerability of their energy sectors. The heavy dependence on a single source and route of gas supply is the major energy security risk for all countries. In Bulgaria and Ukraine, it is coupled with heavy dependence on oil import from the same country – Russia. While Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine have undertaken diversification efforts, Serbia seems to favour the status quo, even at the expense of paying one of the highest wholesale prices of natural gas in Europe.

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Ukraine: National Energy Security Indicators and Policy Challenges (Country factsheet)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The country factsheets present a critical review of the energy security governance in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine, and map the main policy challenges faced by these countries in facilitating more transparent and data-driven decision making. The national and regional energy security of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries has become a hot topic of discussion in the EU recently, focusing the attention of experts, policy makers, and the general public on ongoing and future energy projects but also on the features of energy governance in these countries. The fragile democratic traditions in the CEE countries, the existing networks of political protectionism and economic oligarchy, and the opaque business practices nurtured by corruption and links with organized crime, have been reinforced by the negative implications of Russian economic and geo-political influence. Russia has exploited its dominant position in the energy market and its long-term links with certain political and economic groups to shape political decisions across the region according to its own interests, but often to the detriment of the home country consumers. A major governance challenge for Bulgaria, Serbia and Ukraine is the lack of political agreement on a long-term national energy strategy with supporting financial instruments, which would lower the ad-hoc decision making, often related to suspicions of being influenced by private political and economic interests. Romania championed the group in terms of good energy governance due to the improved independence of the national energy regulator with the adoption of new legislation in 2012, as well as due to the continuing overall strong performance in the fight against corruption in the country. The governance of the state-owned energy enterprises in CEE is heavily influenced by political interference, distorting their investment independence and regulatory oversight. This is particularly visible in Bulgaria and Ukraine. The politically mandated downward pressure on electricity and gas prices in Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia increases further the vulnerability of their energy sectors. The heavy dependence on a single source and route of gas supply is the major energy security risk for all countries. In Bulgaria and Ukraine, it is coupled with heavy dependence on oil import from the same country – Russia. While Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine have undertaken diversification efforts, Serbia seems to favour the status quo, even at the expense of paying one of the highest wholesale prices of natural gas in Europe.

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БЪЛГАРИЯ: ИНДИКАТОРИ ЗА ЕНЕРГИЙНА СИГУРНОСТ И ПРЕДИЗВИКАТЕЛСТВА ПРЕД ПОЛИТИКИТЕ

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Bulgarian

National bulletins present a critical analysis of energy security management in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine, and highlight the major challenges faced by countries in their transition to more transparent and data-driven policy-making processes. The management of state energy enterprises in CEE is strongly influenced by political interference, violating their investment independence and regulatory oversight. This is particularly noticeable in Bulgaria and Ukraine. The political pressure to reduce electricity and gas prices in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia further increases the vulnerability of their energy sectors.Strong dependence on a single source and route for gas supply is the most serious risk to energy security in all countries. In Bulgaria and Ukraine, this risk is exacerbated by their dependence on imported oil from the same source - Russia. While Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine have made efforts for energy diversification, Serbia seems to support the current status quo, although it pays some of Europe's highest natural gas prices.

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РУМЪНИЯ: ИНДИКАТОРИ ЗА НАЦИОНАЛНА ЕНЕРГИЙНА СИГУРНОСТ И ПРЕДИЗВИКАТЕЛСТВА ПРЕД ПОЛИТИКАТА

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Bulgarian

National bulletins present a critical analysis of energy security management in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine, and highlight the major challenges faced by countries in their transition to more transparent and data-driven policy-making processes. The management of state energy enterprises in CEE is strongly influenced by political interference, violating their investment independence and regulatory oversight. This is particularly noticeable in Bulgaria and Ukraine. The political pressure to reduce electricity and gas prices in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia further increases the vulnerability of their energy sectors.Strong dependence on a single source and route for gas supply is the most serious risk to energy security in all countries. In Bulgaria and Ukraine, this risk is exacerbated by their dependence on imported oil from the same source - Russia. While Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine have made efforts for energy diversification, Serbia seems to support the current status quo, although it pays some of Europe's highest natural gas prices.

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SERBIA: NATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY INDICATORS AND POLICY CHALLENGES. Country factsheet

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

National bulletins present a critical analysis of energy security management in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine, and highlight the major challenges faced by countries in their transition to more transparent and data-driven policy-making processes. The management of state energy enterprises in CEE is strongly influenced by political interference, violating their investment independence and regulatory oversight. This is particularly noticeable in Bulgaria and Ukraine. The political pressure to reduce electricity and gas prices in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia further increases the vulnerability of their energy sectors.Strong dependence on a single source and route for gas supply is the most serious risk to energy security in all countries. In Bulgaria and Ukraine, this risk is exacerbated by their dependence on imported oil from the same source - Russia. While Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine have made efforts for energy diversification, Serbia seems to support the current status quo, although it pays some of Europe's highest natural gas prices.

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UKRAINE: NATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY INDICATORS AND POLICY CHALLENGES. Country factsheet

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

National bulletins present a critical analysis of energy security management in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine, and highlight the major challenges faced by countries in their transition to more transparent and data-driven policy-making processes. The management of state energy enterprises in CEE is strongly influenced by political interference, violating their investment independence and regulatory oversight. This is particularly noticeable in Bulgaria and Ukraine. The political pressure to reduce electricity and gas prices in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia further increases the vulnerability of their energy sectors.Strong dependence on a single source and route for gas supply is the most serious risk to energy security in all countries. In Bulgaria and Ukraine, this risk is exacerbated by their dependence on imported oil from the same source - Russia. While Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine have made efforts for energy diversification, Serbia seems to support the current status quo, although it pays some of Europe's highest natural gas prices.

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ДОБРО УПРАВЛЕНИЕ И ЕНЕРГИЙНА СИГУРНОСТ В БЪЛГАРИЯ. Policy Tracker: Енергийната политика на ЕС и Русия – предизвикателства и перспективи при спирането на газопровода „Южен поток“

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Bulgarian

The present paper aims at tracking the development of the South Stream gas pipeline project from the perspectives of the EU and Russia, and in the context of the common EU external energy policy. The EU-Russia energy dialogue has become increasingly complicated since the two natural gas crises in 2006 and 2009, when the gas supply was cut for about two weeks due to a gas pricing dispute between Russia and Ukraine. Until then the energy relations between Europe and Russia have run smoothly as Gazprom had been perceived as a reliable supplier operating under long-term, oil-indexed contracts providing predictability of supplied volumes and prices. For producers such as Russia operating in a glut market, the most important goal was to preserve their market share in Europe. An eventual supply disruption would discredit suppliers and will push consumers look for more viable alternatives.

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ЖЕРТВИТЕ НА ПРЕСТЪПНОСТТА СРЕД НАСЕЛЕНИЕТО И БИЗНЕСМЕНИТЕ В БЪЛГАРИЯ

Author(s): Boyan Stankov / Language(s): Bulgarian

In 2000 Bulgaria conducted a survey of crime victims among the population and business people on the initiative of the Turin-based UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), using its methods (the ICVS 2000 and ICBS 2000 questionnaires, face-to-face interviews). The survey was carried out in Sofia. Overall, 1,505 people were willing to participate out of a sample of 1,700, and 532 business people out of a sample of 550. Data collection and processing was assigned to Vitosha Research, a joint contractor of Gallup Hungary. Dr Boyan Stankov was national coordinator of the survey.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - RUSSIAN INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINIAN STATE AND DEFENCE FORCE

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The report was executed for the NATO StratCom COE by the Centre for Applied Research under the Estonian National Defence College. The objective of this research is to identify how the Russian media portrays the Ukrainian military and security structures, including the policies of the Kiev government and their ‘collaboration’ with the West. The research group looks at how messages disseminated in the media attempt to construct attitudes and advocate behaviours in parallel to political and military events on the ground in Ukraine. The research covers the period from 1 April until 31 December 2014 and analyses the following Russian media: Regnum, Komsomolskaya Pravda and TV Zvezda. These media are important because they target not only Russian internal audience but also the Russian-speaking communities in the former territory of the USSR. The researchers used standardised content analysis in accordance to a specially developed Coding Manual and enriched the findings with data from 25 structured interviews with Ukrainian representatives (media, political and military experts, as well as soldiers and officers involved in the military conflict). From December 2014 the Russian military has adopted a new doctrine that explicitly states that information superiority is essential to achieving victory on the physical battleground in the modern war. It is crucial for NATO to draw appropriate conclusions from the on-going conflict in Europe in order to further strengthen the unity of the alliance and avoid such conflict scenarios between Russia and NATO in the future. Russia’s information activities have played a significant role in the overall military operations carried out in the territory of East Ukraine since 2014. Information operations were used at all levels starting with the political level (against the state of Ukraine, state structures, politicians) up to the tactical level for justifying military actions initiated by pro-Russian forces. Information confrontation and a variety of psychological operations continue to play a substantial role in the current crisis in Ukraine. Russia uses various media channels to conduct its operations against Ukraine, including governmental and private TV channels (e.g. Pervyi Kanal, Rossija 1, NTV, Russia Today, LifeNews), radio (e.g. Radio Mayak), mobile phone operators (e.g. KyivStar), Internet sources (including online publications, e.g. Regnum, TV Zvezda, Кomsomolskaya Pravda, Itar Tass, RIA Novosti ) and social media networks (e.g. YouTube, Facebook, Vk.com, odnoklassniki.ru). Some Ukrainian sources hold pro-Russian attitudes and can also be used to spread disinformation (e.g. Vesti). The separatist People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk have their own channels producing anti-Ukrainian propaganda (e.g. dnrnews.com, novorus.info). The current study has focused on the media channels that represent the Russian mainstream—Komsomolskaya Pravda, TV Zvezda, Regnum. These mass media channels are generally critical against the Ukrainian government and armed forces, but do not offer a critical view of the Russian government; they justify Russian policy in Ukraine and see the Ukrainian crisis as a battlefield between Russia and West, referring to the clash of civilisations with the West (primarily the US and NATO, but also the European Union) allegedly intending to advance its sphere of influence towards Russian borders.

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Protecția temporară a cetățenilor ucraineni, ca urmare a invaziei militare ruse din Ucraina

Author(s): Bianca-Ioana Petcu / Language(s): Romanian Publication Year: 0

Following the military invasion by the forces of the Russian army launched on 24.02.2022 in Ukraine, at the level of its neighboring states and beyond, there was a massive influx of people displaced from this country, the groups of people being made up both from Ukrainian citizens and and from citizens of other states that, at the time of the invasion, were living in or transiting Ukraine. This aspect determined the creation of a mechanism for quick and appropriate measures both at European and national level to manage this phenomenon. At the European level, on 04.03.2023, the Council issued the Decision (EU) 2022/382 and activated the temporary protection provided by Directive 2001/55/EC regarding the minimum standards for granting temporary protection, in the event of a massive influx of displaced persons, and the measures to promote a balance between the efforts of the member states to welcome these people and bear the consequences of this reception, all displaced persons from Ukraine, who entered the territory of the EU after 24.02.2022, benefiting from this measure. At the national level, on 18.03.2022, it was issued the Government Decision no. 367 regarding the establishment of conditions for ensuring temporary protection as well as for the modification and completion of some normative acts in the field of foreigners, which regulated the granting of temporary protection on the territory of Romania. Temporary protection is an emergency mechanism that applies in the event of a massive influx of people and aims to provide immediate and collective protection. The aim is to ease pressure on national asylum systems and allow displaced people to enjoy harmonized rights across the European Union.

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PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF SERBIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDST OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

Author(s): Vuk Vuksanović,Luka Šterić,Maja Bjeloš / Language(s): English

The war in Ukraine did not significantly affect the perception of the Serbian public regarding the major issues of Serbian foreign and security policy. In this context, this relates to how Serbian citizens think about the influence of great powers in their country and how the public perceives its relations with Russia and Western security institutions, the EU and NATO. The public opinion surveys also showed that the issue of Kosovo is still being perceived as a major foreign policy priority. There is a powerful cynicism in how the Serbian public views great power influences, as most respondents believe that external great powers bribe Serbian politicians and moguls to further their interests in the country. Russia and China are perceived as close foreign policy partners of Serbia, putting them in clear advantage over those who favour the EU on that front. The respondents also believed that Russia and China are sincere friends of Serbia and not players guided by their self-interest. As opposed to the study conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in 2020, which noted that Serbs perceived Chinese influence in the country as more positive than Russian influence, the latest survey shows that those who believe Russian influence in Serbia is positive have a slight edge over those who believe the same about Chinese influence. This is most likely the result of the fact that China has not been in the spotlight in recent months.

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TODAY AND TOMORROW: SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLICE SERVICES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Author(s): Marko Živković / Language(s): English

Police services in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) are not substantially active on social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube) and are not sufficiently exploiting the advantages of online communication such as: flexibility (accessible 24/7), relevance (provides a place for real-life policing examples and the exchange of experiences), and community building (the police can develop a supportive, stimulating community that is held by participants in high regard). There is a significant possibility for police services to use social media in the WB for strong community engagement and partnership with the aim of providing a crime-free and safe environment for citizens. Internet penetration in the region is 68.1% and there are 12.5 million internet users1 as well as more than 8.5 million Facebook2 account holders. The average Facebook consumer has more than 200 ‘friends’3 , which indicates a high potential for the community engagement and sharing of information. The research analysed the level of police presence in the social media platforms during the period from 1 January to 31 July 2017. It shows that five out of seven police services in the WB that are subject to this analysis use at least one social medium as a communication tool. Four out of seven are present on Facebook and YouTube, while three have Twitter and Instagram accounts. Only the Albanian police are present on all four social networks. The Kosovo Police makes use of three networks, while the rest use two out of four. Montenegrin police and the MoI of the Federation of BiH, however, are not present on any social networks. Police services in the region predominantly use social media to share basic information, and for promotion. Efforts to engage citizens are lacking. The nature of these social networks, as two-way communication tools, is not recognised by police forces of the region. The police in Albania are mostly active on Facebook, with more than 30,000 page-likes. Twitter and YouTube are used considerably less, Instagram not at all. Facebook is used primarily as a communication tool for sharing service information of the Albanian police, mostly through video posts. There is no interaction with the citizens. The language is formal and bureaucratic. The MoI of the Federation of BiH is not actively using social media, while the MoI of the Republic of Srpska has a YouTube account and an official Facebook page with 18,123 page-likes. It is not however present on Twitter. Facebook is primarily a communication tool used for sharing service information, mostly by way of posting photographs. Citizens’ engagement is low, but still better when compared to the practice in Albania and Kosovo. The Kosovo police have Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts, but no Instagram. Facebook is their main online communication tool, with 34,345 page-likes. However, the Kosovo police are not regularly active on Facebook and mostly share links that lead to service information. Interaction with citizens is very low. Original Twitter content is not produced and a low level of activity on YouTube has been noted. The MoI of Macedonia is active predominantly on YouTube, with more than 5,000 subscribers and almost 9.5 million views, which is the best result in the region. Its activity on Instagram is modest. The Facebook page was created in August 2017. There is no Twitter account. The Minister of Interior is not very active on Twitter, and tweets are not strictly related to policing. The MoI of Montenegro is not present on any of the social networks. The police in Serbia are active mainly on Instagram and YouTube.4 Tweeting ceased in February 2010. Instagram is used in accordance with the rules of this social network, with the primary goal to promote the activities of the police and the Minister. The YouTube account of the Serbian MoI had more than 9 million views and boasts 6,483 subscribers, which is the record in the region. Communication in the 21st century has been tremendously changed by new technologies. Social media now provide a completely new communication approach, with different potential and substance. Regardless of whether or not the police want to be present on social media, police issues are being discussed online. Due to this fact, if the police do not use social media many related information can be subjected to spinning and misuse, with no possibility of reacting through the same communication channel. Even though the facts regarding internet and social media users in the WB indicate that conditions for police use of social media do exist, law enforcement agencies of the region are not sufficiently active on social networks. There is significant room for improvement of social media usage by police in the WB to increase effectiveness by engaging citizens, and to build trust in the police by presenting the human side through community policing. Social networks are not just another traditional media channel; they allow greater connectivity and interaction between the web users and encourage contributions and feedback from anyone who is a member of any virtual community

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Elections in Serbia 2022 and conflict in Ukraine

Author(s): Not Specified Author / Language(s): English

Attitudes of electoral participants in online portals and on Facebook

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Balkan Defence Monitor 2024

Author(s): Helena Ivanov / Language(s): Serbian

We proudly present you the ‘BSC Trends: Reconstructing the Global (Dis)Order,’ the companion publication to the Belgrade Security Conference 2023, held in Belgrade from October 11th to 13th, 2023. This publication aims to shed light on and discuss, following the style of BSC discussions, the most significant global, regional, and local events, phenomena, and developments that have marked this year. These topics were part of the panel discussions in this year’s BSC conference program.

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Balkan Defence Monitor 2023

Author(s): Not Specified Author / Language(s): English

The main policy purpose of the Balkan Defence Monitor remains the same as in the last year. In recent years, the local elites have misused the lack of transparency related to defence policies in the Western Balkans, turning the military into a tool of domestic political promotion rather than a public good. This model of behaviour did not cause an armed conflict, and it is unlikely that it will do so in the future. However, it has poisoned the already fractious political ties between the countries of the region and fostered an atmosphere of distrust. To counter these negative occurrences, data on the defence sector needs to be made accessible to the citizens of Western Balkan countries and the international community. The ongoing war in Ukraine and the destabilisation of the European security environment make such an approach even more relevant.

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They melted down our tanks, we are creating the strongest power in the region – militarist narratives serving the purpose of state capturing

Author(s): Luka Šterić / Language(s): English

Defence system capturing is done in various ways. The authorities are using the procurement of armament from different parties to achieve foreign policy goals in order to reduce the external pressure on the authoritarian regime. Insisting on military neutrality and foreign policy balancing, Serbia is trying to keep access to both the Eastern and Western armament markets. Also, through non-transparent contracts, individuals and companies close to the government opulently profit at the expense of the military industry, as well as through exporting weapons often times conducted in contravention of both domestic and international law and norms.

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Security sector in a captured state: act two

Author(s): Predrag Petrović,Jelena Pejić Nikić,Luka Šterić / Language(s): English

Due to the damage that state capture causes to the public interest, it is very important to investigate and closely monitor this process in the security sector of Serbia. The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy was the first organisation in the country to point out this negative process and the role that the security sector plays in it. It has conducted its first research on this topic, the findings of which can be found in a study entitled “Capturing the Security Sector of Serbia”. The study in front of you is a continuation of that research. In it, we monitored and documented further state capture and the role of security institutions in that negative process. The research covered the period from the beginning of 2020 to November 2021. It explained the political context of capturing the state, the security services, the police, the army and the Ministry of Defence, within which we analysed the capture of special-purpose [arms] industry and parliamentary oversight of the security sector. Considering the fact that actors who participate in state capture are trying to secure international support for their endeavor, and that they are also making use of the experiences of other captured states, we have analysed the foreign policy aspect of capturing the state, which is a novelty compared to earlier research.

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A Quasi-Arms Race: Serbia and Croatia

Author(s): Marija Ignjatijević,Vuk Vuksanović / Language(s): English

In the last six years, Serbia and Croatia have been upgrading their military arsenals, leading to the conclusion that the two countries are spearheading a new arms race in the Western Balkans. This narrative is misleading as the strategic environment makes inter-state war unlikely and the process is actually about Serbia and Croatia replacing old equipment from the Yugoslav days. However, the two countries use arms procurement as leverage in their respective foreign policies and tools of domestic promotion for their rulling elites. The return of hostility is highly unlikely, but there is a political threat of cementing an atmosphere of mistrust in the region.

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