Publisher: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji

Bosna i Hercegovina - jezgro velikosrpskog projekta

Author(s): Authors Various / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2006

"The international community's recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6, 1991 set into motion the formidably brutal policy of extinction of the Muslim population. From April to August 1991, the Serbs have actually occupied 70 percent of Bosnia's territory. Numerous cases that have been or are still processed by the tribunal in The Hague testify of that. Many have not even been investigated so far, particularly those related to Eastern Bosnia and the Drina River valley. The Serbian troop's blitzkrieg besieged Sarajevo in couple of days only. "The siege of Sarajevo begun earlier in 1991. The fact that the Army entrenched itself all round Sarajevo as early as in autumn 1991 and distributed arms to the Serbian population also testifies that the aggression against Bosnia was planned way back. It was in October 1991 that Radovan Karadzic, preparing the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a plebiscite, said, "You must take over the power energetically and totally. Regardless of what will come out of Bosnia, no foundation for a Muslim house shall be laid in Serbian lands or in a Serbian village. Any foundation laid will be blown to pieces. The world will understand our opposition to any change in demographic structure be it natural or artificial. Our territories belong to us alone. We may be hungry, but we'll stick to those territories. This will be a battle for life or death, the battle for living space." Referring to possible difficulties with the international community, Karadzic said, "Foreign observers will come for sure, they'll keep everything under surveillance. They'll be malevolent. All of them will be malevolent except for those we'll acquire from England - only they will be objective," says the editor in Chapter I - "Destruction of Bosnia." Chapter II presents a chronology of the Bosnian war, Chapter III carries testimonies before the tribunal in The Hague, mostly expert testimonies, Chapter IV stands for a Sarajevo "dossier," Chapter V deals with the media presentation of the war in Bosnia, while Chapter VI carries integral sentences in Galic and Plavsic cases.

Conflict in Numbers

Casualties of the 1990s Wars in the Former Yugoslavia (1991–1999)

Author(s): Ewa Tabeau,Authors Various / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2009

Extremism - Recognizing a Social Evil

Author(s): / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2014

Helsinki Bulletin

Frequency: irregular and other / Country: Serbia

Helsinška povelja

Frequency: irregular and other / Country: Serbia

Helsinki Committee publishes a monthly magazine in 3000 copies which covers all the issues we work on. It has become a valuable way of communication with different with different groups of population from refugees to minorities and individuals facing legal and other problems.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: "Otpor" - više ili manje od politike

Author(s): Vladimir Ilic / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 0

(Serbian edition) The popular movement Otpor (Resistance) is a phenomenon which has left its mark on Serbia’s political stage at the very end of the last decade of the 20th century. Having been established in 1998, it attracted media attention, launched various actions and, especially, grew in numbers and organized structurally at the height of a police crackdown against its members in the spring of 2000. Otpor has played a major part in persuading the ‘silent majority’ to go to the September 2000 polls in order to bring forward the end the neo-socialist regime. Although the full significance of the part played by Otpor can only be assessed on the basis of comprehensive and reliable information about the events and activities leading to the September 24 election results which greatly facilitated the October 5 overthrow, such data as were available fully justify the assessment given above. This study is the result of an empirical questionnaire-type survey carried out in the latter part of October 2000. Irrespective of whether Otpor as such will continue to grow and operate – for the situation has changed radically since its formative days – its organization and the attitudes and frame of mind of its members are a topic which it not without interest. At present, Otpor is highly popular among the general public and is often seen as possessing charismatic attributes. However, it has been pointed out that unreserved praise is sometimes a sign that the recipient is about to perform his swan-song; undivided flattery as a rule is counterproductive in the case of those social actors, especially large political organizations, who are perceived as serious obstacles to groups already controlling large resources of society or at least those who aspire to increase their control of such resources. The absence of any public criticism of Otpor so far may mean that it is regarded as someone who has played his role and is now expected to exit the stage as a relative autonomous political factor; this, of course, does not mean that certain factions and individual members of Otpor may not be recruited by some political parties and other interested organizations. After all, Otpor is still needed as a reserve echelon until the December republican elections in Serbia to throw its weight behind certain political goals such as loosening the grip of the defeated extreme left- and right-wing groupings on these resources, or at least to help the so-called democratic opposition to remain together as the challenge of its political adversaries weakens. However, generally speaking, the absence of any principled opposition to Otpor leads us to the conclusion that its effective influence is less and less; we must bear in mind that the extent of criticism levelled against somebody is a most reliable indicator of his influence on public life. Needless to say, all foretelling is risky; we have all been surprised by events we considered the least likely of a number of possibilities at the time of their prediction. At least we hope that the material presented here will give a true picture of the organization because we believe that it was collected during a period coinciding with the organization’s developed stage.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: "Otpor", in or beyond politics

Author(s): Vladimir Ilic / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 0

(English edition) The popular movement Otpor (Resistance) is a phenomenon which has left its mark on Serbia’s political stage at the very end of the last decade of the 20th century. Having been established in 1998, it attracted media attention, launched various actions and, especially, grew in numbers and organized structurally at the height of a police crackdown against its members in the spring of 2000. Otpor has played a major part in persuading the ‘silent majority’ to go to the September 2000 polls in order to bring forward the end the neo-socialist regime. Although the full significance of the part played by Otpor can only be assessed on the basis of comprehensive and reliable information about the events and activities leading to the September 24 election results which greatly facilitated the October 5 overthrow, such data as were available fully justify the assessment given above. This study is the result of an empirical questionnaire-type survey carried out in the latter part of October 2000. Irrespective of whether Otpor as such will continue to grow and operate – for the situation has changed radically since its formative days – its organization and the attitudes and frame of mind of its members are a topic which it not without interest. At present, Otpor is highly popular among the general public and is often seen as possessing charismatic attributes. However, it has been pointed out that unreserved praise is sometimes a sign that the recipient is about to perform his swan-song; undivided flattery as a rule is counterproductive in the case of those social actors, especially large political organizations, who are perceived as serious obstacles to groups already controlling large resources of society or at least those who aspire to increase their control of such resources. The absence of any public criticism of Otpor so far may mean that it is regarded as someone who has played his role and is now expected to exit the stage as a relative autonomous political factor; this, of course, does not mean that certain factions and individual members of Otpor may not be recruited by some political parties and other interested organizations. After all, Otpor is still needed as a reserve echelon until the December republican elections in Serbia to throw its weight behind certain political goals such as loosening the grip of the defeated extreme left- and right-wing groupings on these resources, or at least to help the so-called democratic opposition to remain together as the challenge of its political adversaries weakens. However, generally speaking, the absence of any principled opposition to Otpor leads us to the conclusion that its effective influence is less and less; we must bear in mind that the extent of criticism levelled against somebody is a most reliable indicator of his influence on public life. Needless to say, all foretelling is risky; we have all been surprised by events we considered the least likely of a number of possibilities at the time of their prediction. At least we hope that the material presented here will give a true picture of the organization because we believe that it was collected during a period coinciding with the organization’s developed stage.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Balkanski rašomon

Author(s): Todor Kuljic,Olivera Milosavljevic,Olga Manojlovic-Pintar / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 0

(Serbian edition) The author presents the main and general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe in the 1990s, drawing attention to the various features of revisionism in former socialist countries (Russia, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) and their attitude to Socialism. The necessary scientific re-examination of the past is separated from its ideological reinterpretation inspired by revived nationalism. The attention focuses on Serb and Croat revisionism, that is, on its moderate versions (‘medium compass’ revisionism), as found in the works of the Yugoslavia historians Branko Petranović and Dušan Bilandžić. Digest: Contemporary historiographic revisionism exhibits a number of components: a critical attitude to historiography on the part of the winner (the communists); a clearer understanding of the essence of past events owing to greater distance from them and to the availability of new sources; a pragmatic reinterpretation of the past inspired by narrow or broad party or national motives. Revisionists in former socialist countries find their principal source in revived nationalism which seeks to play down one’s own fascist past by uncritically attacking anti-Communism and anti-totalitarianism. Instead of being confronted, the dark shadows from one’s own past are being shown in a new light. This paper draws attention to state-sponsored and academic revisionism, and lays bare its chief motives and rhetoric in several European countries. The object of this comparative study is to show up the triviality of domestic revisionism. The revisionism in the works of B. Petranović and D. Bilandžić written in the 1990s is discussed at some length to show up the contradictions characterizing their writings before and after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the pattern of their revision fired by awakened concern for their respective ‘endangered’ nations. Selective memory and orchestrated forgetfulness were major catalysts of the civil war in Yugoslavia, with revisionist historiography enlisted to justify the new national objectives. The author believes that one can master one’s past only by confronting its dark aspects and hopes that a critical appraisal by domestic scholars of own nationalism will not be overly delayed by customary tardiness. Is contemporary historiography in former Yugoslav republics under the prevalent influence of any of the following components: a) an inevitably maturer scientific outlook on the past brought about by sounder theory and improved methods, and made possible by the discovery of hitherto unknown archival material of prime importance; b) a rather understandable shift of accent in interpreting key historical events, that is, a fuller and broader understanding of their historical function resulting from changes in the epochal consciousness and from the disappearance of the authoritarian patterns of the one-party socialist regime, or; c) a pragmatic revision of the past prompted by broader or narrower ideological, party or personal interests or motives? Which of the above components are discernible in the leading historians and can they be differentiated in more detail? In trying to answer these questions we shall take a look at: a) some general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe and in former socialist regimes at the end of the twentieth century as an important aspect of reinterpreting the recent past; b) narrower regional characteristics, that is, the chief nationalistic motives of revisionism in the contemporary historiography of former Yugoslav republics, and; c) concrete revisionist components in the works of the Yugoslavia historians D. Bilandžić and B. Petranović.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Haški Tribunal, naš nesporazum sa svetom

Author(s): Milivoj Despot,Vladimir Ilic / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 0

(Serbian edition) Much was written and said about the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal). And as it usually happens with respect to momentous events, essential things about the Hague Tribunal were committed, notably in view of the fact that in recent wars in the territory of ex- Yugoslavia many crimes were committed and that their perpetrators and accomplices are to be brought to justice and punished. But according to some weird logic, much hyped are opinions of many politicians and some jurists, that the Hague Tribunal is not an institution of justice, but rather a foreign political instrument for trying Serbs, and as such "it should be totally disregarded and vilifed". Exceptions from this general line of thinking were public discussions on the Hague Tribunal staged by some renowned NGOs and institutions and published in some dailies and magazines. The Hague Tribunal was established as an adequate response of international community to drastic violations of international law. During recent wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. The authorities in place hushed up those crimes, downplayed atrocities and covered up the truth. A very small number of people knew what had really happened. As trials were not held before national courts, the International Criminal Tribunal was set up to establish facts in lawful proceedings, to make them public and bring to justice perpetrators of the crimes. There is also another question: Do the trials before the Hague Tribunal have a special significance? Diplomatic means and sanctions were used to put en end to war and ensure peace. But neither were successful. The Dayton and the Paris accord stopped the war, but did not consolidate the peace. Consolidation of peace is not a declaration, but a process. In that process a specific place was accorded to the Hague Tribunal. Within general efforts aimed at re-establishing peace and security in the territory of former Yugoslavia, decisions of the Hague Tribunal have a repressive importance regarding war criminals and a preventive importance regarding every high-ranking politician and military officer. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, international law, thanks to momentous transformation of legal provisions relating to conduct of states and individuals in armed conflicts, and under strong influence of affirmation of human rights stipulated by international covenants, established international individual criminal responsibility of those who gravely violated humanitarian law relating to armed conflicts. If the Hague Tribunal carries out its repressive and preventive tasks and consequently contributes to international justice and legality, stances on war and peace shall be different. In those terms the practice of the Hague Tribunal complements future efficiency of permanent International Criminal Court. Irrefutable legal assumption is that the Hague Tribunal acts as an authorised ad hoc international criminal court and that its decisions should consolidate respect of human rights, peace and international justice. Its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, its orders and warrants transmitted to the states, members of the UN, and obligations of those states to comply with those orders, are in keeping with the international law. Awareness of the obligation that perpetrators of crimes must be handed over to the Hague Tribunal, leads to the replacement of the legal assumption by the truth.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: How to attain european standards - the Situation of Serbian Prisons 2002-2003.

Author(s): Marija Jelic,Nataša Novakovic,Marijana Obradovic,Milosav Kiurski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2003

(English edition) Throughout the totalitarian rule of the regime of Slobodan Milošević and his henchmen, which lasted for over a decade, the country’s prisons remained shut to public scrutiny. Information about the state of human rights of the prisoners and the conditions in which they served their sentences was the exclusive privilege of the state authorities directly involved and of the individuals and institutions concerned with the matter for purposes of scientific research. The question of prisoners’ human rights was completely marginalized by war, crimes, economic hardship and daily violations of citizens’ human rights and freedoms up to 5 October 2000. For many a convict, being locked away to serve a sentence of imprisonment did not mean mere deprivation of liberty for a set period of time, but also the start of a cruel struggle for survival in the gloom of lawlessness, corruption, torture, inhuman conditions and society’s total lack of interest in his or her life behind bars. It was only after widespread prison rioting broke out in November 2000 that the public’s attention was drawn to the conditions in which the prisoners served their sentences. The prisoners put out announcements throwing light on the substandard and inhuman conditions prevailing in Serbia’s penitentiaries and prisons. During the riots, groups and individual prisoners made statements complaining that the prison conditions were far below the levels set by relevant international standards and domestic prison rules. The prisoners alleged serious violations of their physical and psychological integrity, humiliating and degrading treatment, unjust punishment and general arbitrary treatment by prison personnel. They complained of, among other things, torture by beating, lack of minimum personal hygiene facilities, absence of medical treatment and health care, and corruption among prison administrative staff. Some of the allegations and complaints were partly confirmed by competent officials of the Ministry of Justice. As a palliative for the utterly unsatisfactory prison conditions, federal and republican amnesty laws were duly introduced to be finally adopted respectively on 26 February 2001 and 13 February 2001. Nonetheless, although a number of convicts were fully amnestied and a percentage of sentences commuted, the conditions in which prisoners served their sentenced remained unchanged. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the inhuman conditions in Serbia’s prisons endured and multiplied also owing to the country’s isolation of many years, during which time no international organization other than the International Red Cross was granted access to its prisons. Domestic non-governmental organizations were also kept at arm’s length and only rarely allowed to see what went on inside. In view of the circumstances enumerated above, it was clearly necessary to introduce continuous monitoring of prisons by an independent, non-governmental institution in order to obtain a realistic picture of the prison conditions. The new government is aware that admission to the Council of Europe and to other international organizations depends in part on the conditions in which sentenced persons serve their prison sentences, as well as that the public must be informed about those conditions. So, after presenting the concept and objectives of the Prison Monitoring project, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia was granted permission in May 2001 to visit institutions for the enforcement of criminal sanctions. This meant that for the first time in the history of this state an NGO could apply for and be granted permission to visit places of detention, custody and imprisonment without any restrictions, to interview prisoners with no personnel being present, and to talk to personnel without the presence of administration officers. Between June 2001 and October 2003, the Helsinki Committee paid a total of twenty-one visits to institutions for the enforcement of sanctions entailing the deprivation of liberty. During the period covered by this report (April 2002 to October 2003) the Helsinki Committee visited twelve institutions (one maximum-security prison, two closed prisons, three open prisons, two district prisons, one psychiatric prison, one reformatory, and one juvenile prison). In launching the project, the Helsinki Committee was principally guided by Article 64 of the European Prison Rules which states: ‘Imprisonment is by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself. The conditions of imprisonment and the prison regimes shall not, therefore, except as incidental to justifiable segregation or the maintenance of discipline, aggravate the suffering inherent in this.’ The Helsinki Committee hopes that its efforts to complete the project and publish this book will make a small but valuable contribution towards achieving this goal.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: In the Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units

Author(s): Stipe Sikavica,Budimir Babovic,Miloš Vasic,Filip Švarm / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 0

(English edition) Even if one were to maintain that some psychological, political and professional features of Yugoslav Army resembled those of the armies of some European states undergoing transition, then one must also admit that the Yugoslav Army does not have its counterpart anywhere in the world when it comes to the YA origins, background, war experience and the current political engagement. One could say without any exaggeration that it is a phenomenon among the armies of the world, as much as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a phenomenon among other countries in the world. At least this assertion applies to the state and its army during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. It was created not through transformation, as the versions of the domestic (both active and retired) military professionals imply (see, for example, Veljko Kadijević, My perception of the war, Beograd 1993 page 113) but by simple downsizing and (mere renaming) of the former Yugoslav People's Army to the Serbian-Montenegrin combat and high officers cadres. That process evolved in a frightening wanton war destruction and wandering “of the armed force of all our peoples and nationalities” from Karavanka mountains in Slovenia to Danube and Drina. The Army of Yugoslavia after ten years of its existence is still searching for its own identity.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Između načela i prakse - položaj "malih" i "velikih" manjina u Srbiji.

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2004

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Kako do evropskih standarda - zatvori u Srbiji 2002-2003.

Author(s): Marija Jelic,Milosav Kiurski,Nataša Novakovic,Marijana Obradovic / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2003

(Serbian edition) Throughout the totalitarian rule of the regime of Slobodan Milošević and his henchmen, which lasted for over a decade, the country’s prisons remained shut to public scrutiny. Information about the state of human rights of the prisoners and the conditions in which they served their sentences was the exclusive privilege of the state authorities directly involved and of the individuals and institutions concerned with the matter for purposes of scientific research. The question of prisoners’ human rights was completely marginalized by war, crimes, economic hardship and daily violations of citizens’ human rights and freedoms up to 5 October 2000. For many a convict, being locked away to serve a sentence of imprisonment did not mean mere deprivation of liberty for a set period of time, but also the start of a cruel struggle for survival in the gloom of lawlessness, corruption, torture, inhuman conditions and society’s total lack of interest in his or her life behind bars. It was only after widespread prison rioting broke out in November 2000 that the public’s attention was drawn to the conditions in which the prisoners served their sentences. The prisoners put out announcements throwing light on the substandard and inhuman conditions prevailing in Serbia’s penitentiaries and prisons. During the riots, groups and individual prisoners made statements complaining that the prison conditions were far below the levels set by relevant international standards and domestic prison rules. The prisoners alleged serious violations of their physical and psychological integrity, humiliating and degrading treatment, unjust punishment and general arbitrary treatment by prison personnel. They complained of, among other things, torture by beating, lack of minimum personal hygiene facilities, absence of medical treatment and health care, and corruption among prison administrative staff. Some of the allegations and complaints were partly confirmed by competent officials of the Ministry of Justice. As a palliative for the utterly unsatisfactory prison conditions, federal and republican amnesty laws were duly introduced to be finally adopted respectively on 26 February 2001 and 13 February 2001. Nonetheless, although a number of convicts were fully amnestied and a percentage of sentences commuted, the conditions in which prisoners served their sentenced remained unchanged. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the inhuman conditions in Serbia’s prisons endured and multiplied also owing to the country’s isolation of many years, during which time no international organization other than the International Red Cross was granted access to its prisons. Domestic non-governmental organizations were also kept at arm’s length and only rarely allowed to see what went on inside. In view of the circumstances enumerated above, it was clearly necessary to introduce continuous monitoring of prisons by an independent, non-governmental institution in order to obtain a realistic picture of the prison conditions. The new government is aware that admission to the Council of Europe and to other international organizations depends in part on the conditions in which sentenced persons serve their prison sentences, as well as that the public must be informed about those conditions. So, after presenting the concept and objectives of the Prison Monitoring project, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia was granted permission in May 2001 to visit institutions for the enforcement of criminal sanctions. This meant that for the first time in the history of this state an NGO could apply for and be granted permission to visit places of detention, custody and imprisonment without any restrictions, to interview prisoners with no personnel being present, and to talk to personnel without the presence of administration officers. Between June 2001 and October 2003, the Helsinki Committee paid a total of twenty-one visits to institutions for the enforcement of sanctions entailing the deprivation of liberty. During the period covered by this report (April 2002 to October 2003) the Helsinki Committee visited twelve institutions (one maximum-security prison, two closed prisons, three open prisons, two district prisons, one psychiatric prison, one reformatory, and one juvenile prison). In launching the project, the Helsinki Committee was principally guided by Article 64 of the European Prison Rules which states: ‘Imprisonment is by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself. The conditions of imprisonment and the prison regimes shall not, therefore, except as incidental to justifiable segregation or the maintenance of discipline, aggravate the suffering inherent in this.’ The Helsinki Committee hopes that its efforts to complete the project and publish this book will make a small but valuable contribution towards achieving this goal.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Manjine i izbeglice u vojvodini

Author(s): Vladimir Ilic / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 0

(Serbian edition) Presence of over half a million refugees and displaced persons in Serbia is a palpable and live criticism of our recent national program and its implementation. Their fate demonstrates that the nation is not homogenous, that there are no common national interests, but rather different goals with different price tags. It bears stressing that the price paid by the aforementioned population groups was the highest one. Conduct and fate of refugees and their choices, if any, in a drastic way indicate disastrous failure of the idea of annexation of so-called Western Serb countries to the ethnic Serb state. In those terms they are the most convincing critique of domestic nationalism, for they indicate consequences thereof better than any other population groups. If one is to believe different facts and figures, more than three fourth of refugees and displaced persons until recently wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, and only one fifth expressed their wish to return to their homes. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia through its continuing project "I want to go home" helped a sustained return of a large number of refugees, in the face of inertia and political obstacles in several involved countries. Moreover the NGO through this survey tried to look into ways of future return of refugees and displaced persons from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Minorities and Refugees In Vojvodina

Author(s): Vladimir Ilic / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 0

(English edition) Presence of over half a million refugees and displaced persons in Serbia is a palpable and live criticism of our recent national program and its implementation. Their fate demonstrates that the nation is not homogenous, that there are no common national interests, but rather different goals with different price tags. It bears stressing that the price paid by the aforementioned population groups was the highest one. Conduct and fate of refugees and their choices, if any, in a drastic way indicate disastrous failure of the idea of annexation of so-called Western Serb countries to the ethnic Serb state. In those terms they are the most convincing critique of domestic nationalism, for they indicate consequences thereof better than any other population groups. If one is to believe different facts and figures, more than three fourth of refugees and displaced persons until recently wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, and only one fifth expressed their wish to return to their homes. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia through its continuing project "I want to go home" helped a sustained return of a large number of refugees, in the face of inertia and political obstacles in several involved countries. Moreover the NGO through this survey tried to look into ways of future return of refugees and displaced persons from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Nacionalne manjine i pravo

Author(s): Jan Briza,Mikloš Biro,Mirej Grcki,Nataša Novakovic,Ljiljana Palibrk,Pavel Domonji / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2002

(Serbian edition) October 2000 political changeover did not produce the fundamental break with Milosevic's policy. There are numerous examples thereof, notably as regards Republika Srpska, Kosovo and Montenegro. Insistence on that orientation in the face of factual defeat had a negative impact on status of inter-ethnic relations in Serbia proper. National policy aiming at creating an ethnically pure Serb state ended with a catastrophic balance: hundreds of thousands of dead, several million displaced persons and refugees. In the past decade minorities, notably Croats (during the war in Croatia), Bosniaks (during the war in B&H) and Albanians (during the whole decade) bore the brunt of "ethnic-cleansing" policy. By extension, relations between the majority people and some minorities were exacerbated. In the meantime minorities have radicalised their stands and are waiting for resolution of their problems by dint of international community brokerage. Most conspicuous example of the aforementioned was South Serbia, in which the danger of conflict spill-over was great for a while. But thanks to NATO and other international organisations actions and efforts tension has eased and cooperation and revival of economy have been initiated owing to enormous political and financial support of the West. Serbia has entered the period of facing up to difficult and long-term consequences of nationalistic and war policy of the former regime. The entire society has been devastated, and institutions of system destroyed. Long wars, international isolation and bombardment campaign have impacted the general social mood, which is marked by high intolerance, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and emergence of neo-Nazi groups. This is all due to the political vacuum and absence of vision of Serbia's future. Such a general atmosphere affects national minorities, who feel increasingly threatened. The last census, according to unofficial information, indicates that Serbia remains a markedly multi-ethnic country. This may be explained by massive emigration or brain-drain of young and educated Serbs. About 400,000 refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, contrary to some expectations, have not to a larger extent changed the demographic structure of the country. Despite emigration of minorities, their percentage remained the same, in view of de-assimilation of Vlahs and Romany (they stopped identifying with Serbs). This means that the minority issue would remain the hot issue, notably if the nationalistic block continues to persist on realisation of ethnically pure state. Some ethnic communities have been territorially homogenised, hence some of them, in some areas constitute the majority population. Some national minorities, notably Albanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Hungarians, Bosniaks/Muslims, and Romanians inhabit border areas. Thus their territorial homogenisation is a complex political fact. Despite current authorities efforts to fine-tune national minorities-related domestic legislation to the European standards, situation in that regard is slowly changing because of badly impaired inter-ethnic relations in the last decade. Ethnic distance had been increased, but as of late it started dwindling, but not everywhere and not with respect to all minorities.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: National minorities and law

Author(s): Jan Briza,Mikloš Biro,Mirej Grcki,Nataša Novakovic,Ljiljana Palibrk,Pavel Domonji / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2002

(English edition) October 2000 political changeover did not produce the fundamental break with Milosevic's policy. There are numerous examples thereof, notably as regards Republika Srpska, Kosovo and Montenegro. Insistence on that orientation in the face of factual defeat had a negative impact on status of inter-ethnic relations in Serbia proper. National policy aiming at creating an ethnically pure Serb state ended with a catastrophic balance: hundreds of thousands of dead, several million displaced persons and refugees. In the past decade minorities, notably Croats (during the war in Croatia), Bosniaks (during the war in B&H) and Albanians (during the whole decade) bore the brunt of "ethnic-cleansing" policy. By extension, relations between the majority people and some minorities were exacerbated. In the meantime minorities have radicalised their stands and are waiting for resolution of their problems by dint of international community brokerage. Most conspicuous example of the aforementioned was South Serbia, in which the danger of conflict spill-over was great for a while. But thanks to NATO and other international organisations actions and efforts tension has eased and cooperation and revival of economy have been initiated owing to enormous political and financial support of the West. Serbia has entered the period of facing up to difficult and long-term consequences of nationalistic and war policy of the former regime. The entire society has been devastated, and institutions of system destroyed. Long wars, international isolation and bombardment campaign have impacted the general social mood, which is marked by high intolerance, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and emergence of neo-Nazi groups. This is all due to the political vacuum and absence of vision of Serbia's future. Such a general atmosphere affects national minorities, who feel increasingly threatened. The last census, according to unofficial information, indicates that Serbia remains a markedly multi-ethnic country. This may be explained by massive emigration or brain-drain of young and educated Serbs. About 400,000 refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, contrary to some expectations, have not to a larger extent changed the demographic structure of the country. Despite emigration of minorities, their percentage remained the same, in view of de-assimilation of Vlahs and Romany (they stopped identifying with Serbs). This means that the minority issue would remain the hot issue, notably if the nationalistic block continues to persist on realisation of ethnically pure state. Some ethnic communities have been territorially homogenised, hence some of them, in some areas constitute the majority population. Some national minorities, notably Albanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Hungarians, Bosniaks/Muslims, and Romanians inhabit border areas. Thus their territorial homogenisation is a complex political fact. Despite current authorities efforts to fine-tune national minorities-related domestic legislation to the European standards, situation in that regard is slowly changing because of badly impaired inter-ethnic relations in the last decade. Ethnic distance had been increased, but as of late it started dwindling, but not everywhere and not with respect to all minorities.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Potencijal za promene

Author(s): Slobodan Inic,Vladimir Ilic / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2000

(Serbian edition) This report contains the analysis of data collected during the month of October 1999. One should have in mind this time frame-when considering the findings, drawing different generalizations or setting guidelines for possible actions. Sets of values of members of the observed generation, their social awareness, perception of the past and present, their stance on the West, and above all their potential to bring about changes are essentially determined by some long-standing and less intensive structural factors. To put it simply a generation of people who today have between 25 and 35 years, and who represent the future of the country, was to a large extent formed under the influence of structural features of the society eroded by constant wars and war threats, protracted economic crisis, internal conflicts and strife and total confusion in the sphere of social awareness and public moral. The generation which in the last decade came of age in such a society per force had to reflect its essential characteristics, despite a relative autonomy which each age groups had as its inherent characteristic. Young people and even relatively young people, to which the respondents of this survey belong, have a determined biological and psychological potential which can help them partially overcome the given moment of time and which usually indicates some of their future contents and values in the present day. In that sense one could expect that the mind-set of the observed generation substantially differs from so-called social conscience. But in conditions of an ever-deepening social crisis, in which the process of coming-of-age unfolded under pressure of retrograde, rather than progressive social factors, the aforementioned advantages of such a generation are less manifest, since their potential crumbles under pressure of a regressive society. One must bear in mind the aforementioned and thus avoid to treat unjustly the observed age group: they are expected to be the creators of the Serbian society at the beginning of the Twenty-first century, but it is pretty obvious that their social actions will be affected by a sorry legacy of the social and moral collapse. In fact they were not less predestined than the earlier generations to be unequipped for the contemporary world. They simply developed under much less favorable conditions. But this should not minimize their responsibility for the future development of society in Serbia. On the other hand such adverse development factors should be borne in mind if one truly wishes to understand the traits of this generation, instead of bluntly condemning them. My intention is not to prejudge results evidenced by this survey, but it bears mentioning that it is easier to reject the middle generation in Serbia, like Serbia proper, than to try to understand and render assistance to both.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Potential For Changes

Author(s): Slobodan Inic,Vladimir Ilic / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2000

(English edition) This report contains the analysis of data collected during the month of October 1999. One should have in mind this time frame-when considering the findings, drawing different generalizations or setting guidelines for possible actions. Sets of values of members of the observed generation, their social awareness, perception of the past and present, their stance on the West, and above all their potential to bring about changes are essentially determined by some long-standing and less intensive structural factors. To put it simply a generation of people who today have between 25 and 35 years, and who represent the future of the country, was to a large extent formed under the influence of structural features of the society eroded by constant wars and war threats, protracted economic crisis, internal conflicts and strife and total confusion in the sphere of social awareness and public moral. The generation which in the last decade came of age in such a society per force had to reflect its essential characteristics, despite a relative autonomy which each age groups had as its inherent characteristic. Young people and even relatively young people, to which the respondents of this survey belong, have a determined biological and psychological potential which can help them partially overcome the given moment of time and which usually indicates some of their future contents and values in the present day. In that sense one could expect that the mind-set of the observed generation substantially differs from so-called social conscience. But in conditions of an ever-deepening social crisis, in which the process of coming-of-age unfolded under pressure of retrograde, rather than progressive social factors, the aforementioned advantages of such a generation are less manifest, since their potential crumbles under pressure of a regressive society. One must bear in mind the aforementioned and thus avoid to treat unjustly the observed age group: they are expected to be the creators of the Serbian society at the beginning of the Twenty-first century, but it is pretty obvious that their social actions will be affected by a sorry legacy of the social and moral collapse. In fact they were not less predestined than the earlier generations to be unequipped for the contemporary world. They simply developed under much less favorable conditions. But this should not minimize their responsibility for the future development of society in Serbia. On the other hand such adverse development factors should be borne in mind if one truly wishes to understand the traits of this generation, instead of bluntly condemning them. My intention is not to prejudge results evidenced by this survey, but it bears mentioning that it is easier to reject the middle generation in Serbia, like Serbia proper, than to try to understand and render assistance to both.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE: Prošlost kao izazov pravu

Author(s): Vladimir V. Vodinelic / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 2002

(Serbian edition) Societies in whose present time the authoritarian past is still a socially relevant thing may be placed in two opposing manners in front of this morally, politically and legally compromising past: there is a distinct difference between the policy of coping with the past and the policy of non coping with the past. In German, the only language with a specific expression for the complex phenomenon of the former, for ‘cope with’ the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), one can also use the synonym Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung. However, ‘to cope with’ is a bet-ter expression. The expression, as well as ‘to prevail over’ the past and ‘to get control over’ the past – indicates more clearly that at issue is a process by which the past is dealt with: to im- pose over, to get control over the past that imposed over us, and it would impose over us again, if we do not impose over it. The extreme patterns of the reactions to the authoritarian past by which it cannot be prevailed are on one side retaliation and pure vendetta and on the other side the 'as-if-nothing-has-happened' pattern: closing your eyes before the authoritarian past. By neither method, it must be emphasized, can the past be prevailed over. Retaliation is an authoritarian fight with the authoritarian past, but not the prevailing over it. Fire cannot be fought with fire here. The authoritarian fight with the past, even if it was authoritarian, is just a repetition, but with the opposite roles.