Author(s): Ryo Murakami / Language(s): Japanese
/ Issue: 66/2019
Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty of 1878 recognized the Austro-Hungarian (Habsburg) Empire’s occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This provisional status of the two provinces ended with their annexation in October 1908. The rationale behind the decision by Alois Lexa Aehrenthal, common foreign minister of the Habsburg Empire (1906-1912), was concern about possible repercussions of the Young Turk Revolution in July 1908 including the subsequent end of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was also alert to the Serbian nationalistic ambition towards this territory. As these provinces were a common administrative district under a dual system (Ausgleich), the parliaments of both Austria and Hungary had to enact the Annexation Law (Annexionsgesetz) that would legitimize the new status of the provinces. Moreover, the Habsburg leadership had to tackle predicaments arising from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution (February 1910) and from the provincial diet. They were forced to concede to local demands for self-government with a view toward reducing public discontent with the central government as well as the current state structure. In other words, the annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina triggered disputes around the sustainability of the dual system and national questions, the South Slav Question in particular. The relevant scholarship, however, has not paid sufficient attention to either the legal procedure of incorporating the annexed territory into the empire or the implications of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution for the Ausgleich. To fill the lacuna of historiography, I find it useful to address the views of Josef Redlich (1869-1936), professor of public law and constitution at Vienna Technical University and a member of the Austrian Parliament. Well-informed about questions of autonomy, he recognized the importance of autonomy for stability of the Habsburg Empire. As such, he was Aehrenthal’s private adviser concerning domestic and diplomatic affairs. With his understanding of the specific ethno-religious circumstances in the territory, Redlich prepared several reports concerning the Annexation Law and memoranda to a draft of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution, which were submitted to Aehrenthal and Richard von Bienerth-Schmerling, prime minister of Austria (1908-1911). Yet many scholars have dismissed Redlich’s role in the discussions around the annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and its self-government. Using Redlich’s standpoint, I explore the impacts of disputes over the Annexation Law and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution upon Habsburg’s dual system. Redlich had diplomatic and domestic contexts in mind. Out of diplomatic consideration, Redlich was completely in tune with Aehrenthal’s active diplomacy, namely the expansion of the Donau Monarchy to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Like Aehrenthal, Redlich was so wary of the Serbian national movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina that he determinedly rebuffed Serbia’s protest against the annexation. As concerns his domestic consideration, Redlich saw the annexation as an opportunity to reinforce the empire’s unity. His reasoning is clearly visible in his criticism of Hungarian centrifugal policies in the early twentieth century. According to him, it was Hungary that gradually undermined the solidarity of the Habsburg’s dual system. In the case of the annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, legal argumentation diverged between Austria and Hungary. The Hungarian Annexation Law argued for Hungary’s historic right to the territory, based on the Habsburg’s law of succession (Pragmatische Sanktion) for recovery of former provinces. The Austrian Annexation Law, meanwhile, basically aimed at maintaining the status quo. Naturally, Redlich opposed Hungary’s assertion. The Annexation Law was never passed in the Austrian Parliament. Redlich also proposed amendments to a draft of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution prepared by István Burián, common finance minister of the Habsburg Empire (1903-1912). Redlich’s main points were 1) the political status of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the dual system; 2) fundamental human rights of the inhabitants in the annexed lands; and 3) competence of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Diet. Redlich agreed with Burián regarding the relationship between the Habsburg Empire and Bosnia-Herzegovina overall. According to their understanding, the Diet of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be involved in decision-making on local affairs, but it would not be allowed to encroach upon imperial issues, such as military and foreign policies. There are some discrepancies between them, however. We should take seriously Redlich’s view of the strict separation of the three branches of government, the recognition of the fundamental human rights of Bosnian inhabitants, and the rejection of the Bosnian Diet’s interference in the local administrative authority. Moreover, Redlich proposed diminishing the Hungarian influence on railway policy, which had been a long-pending question for Austria. To sum up, he aimed at reinforcing the local administrative power rather than expanding the provincial diet. The motivation behind his ideas was a certain distrust of Bosnian-Herzegovinian political power and caution against Serbian nationalism. What Redlich wanted to achieve was to maintain the status quo of legal basis of the annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. While Redlich attempted to give political leeway to the annexed provinces, he intended to reconcile the empire’s dual system and the existing political status of the annexed territory. Yet he was forced to place Bosnia-Herzegovina as a third unit under the dual system in terms of railway, post, and telegraph affairs. In short, Redlich’s scheme deviated from his basic aim. From Redlich’s arguments, we can conclude that the Habsburg’s political system was incompatible with the concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s full self-government.
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