Twenty-five Sides of a Post-communist Mafia State

Author(s): / Language(s): English

The twenty-five essays accompany, illustrate and underpin the conceptual framework elaborated in Post-Communist Mafia State (CEU Press, 2016), published in conjunction with this volume. Leading specialists analyze the manifestations of the current political regime in Hungary from twenty-five angles. Topics discussed include the ideology, constitutional issues, social policy, the judiciary, foreign relations, nationalism, media, memory politics, corruption, civil society, education, culture and so on. Beyond the basic features of the economy the domains of taxation, banking system, energy policies and the agriculture are treated in dedicated studies. The essays are based on detailed empirical investigation about conditions in today’s Hungary. They nevertheless contribute to the exploration of the characteristic features of post-communist authoritarian regimes, shared by an increasing number of countries in Europe and Central Asia.

Rosja w polityce zagranicznej Polski w latach 1992–2015

Author(s): Mieczysław Stolarczyk / Language(s): Polish

The main research aim of this monograph is to distinguish main stages in the foreign policy of Poland towards Russia between 1992 and 2015 and outline their specifics. The author attempted at a synthesis of major manifestations of Polish-Russian cooperation and most sticking points in the intergovernmental (international) relations during that period. An important objective was to show the sources and examples of a divergence of interests, and point to the goals, which were based on these premises, established by the foreign policy-makers in Poland and Russia and pursued in mutual relations and international affairs.Between 1992 and 2015, in Poland’s foreign policy towards the East and national security policy, the relations with Russia and the Ukraine were of utmost importance. On the economic level, considering the volume of mutual trade turnover, Poland’s main partner in the East was the Russian Federation, whereas on the political level, the Ukraine was seen as a strategic partner. Along with the Ukraine, Russia played a key role in Poland’s security policy in the discussed period. It should be emphasized that Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations were very closely linked, and so was Poland’s policy towards Russia and the Ukraine. In Poland’s foreign policy towards Russia, or in broader terms, in Polish-Russian relations between 1992 and 2015, seven stages can be distinguished; each having their own characteristic. Despite some new specifics in each particular stage, they all shared an element of continuity. The constant theme was a great divergence of interests between Poland and Russia, particularly with regard to the European security system, and the role of NATO in shaping this security, as well as further stages of the alliance’s enlargement, especially by countries of the post-Soviet area; energy security and Poland’s strive for diversification of fuels supplies faced with Russia’s actions aimed at the diversification of routes of sending its gas and crude oil to Western Europe bypassing the Ukraine and Poland; a historic dispute, in which a thorough, satisfying for the Poles, explanation of the Katyn Forest massacre was particularly high on the agenda among other issues; opposing visions of building anorder in Eastern Europe, and first and foremost, in the Ukraine. With the passing of time, especially after Poland’s NATO and the EU accession, the future of Eastern European countries, particularly the Ukraine and Belarus, has become a fundamental issue in Polish-Russian relations. Both Russia and Poland treated Eastern European countries as a sort of a safety buffer. However, the two countries had entirely different visions of how this buffer ought to be shaped. The political leadership in Poland saw the strenghtening of national security in the strenghtening of the Ukrainian buffer through the Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the EU, whereas for the political leadership in Russia, the strenghtening of national security through Ukrainian buffer meant preserving its outside NATO status, or incorporating it in the the security system built under the aegis of Russia on the area of CIS.A characteristic of the Polish-Russian relations in that period was a great imbalance to Poland’s disadvantage, resulting from the differences in broadly understood physical potential of the two countries and, consequently, their international roles (Poland being a medium-size country situated in Central Europe and Russia being a superpower in Central Eurasia). The capacities of Poland to shape the situation in Eastern Europe on its own were incomparably lower than Russia’s. Therefore, Poland was trying to make use of European and Euro-Atlantic multirateral structures, mainly through the Eastern Dimension realized by the EU and NATO, to have as much influence as possible, on the desired developments in Eastern Europe. The eastern policy under successive RP governments was characterized by their overrating, frequently, of their own capacities, lack of objectivity in assessment of the situation across our eastern border, and application of double standards, particularly in the policy towards Russia.Polish-Russian political relations throughout the post-Cold War period were critical, and improvements were relatively short-lasting. Not only Russia, but also Poland is to blame for such a state of events. The Polish side, due to historical reasons and imbalance of potential, expected Russia to take more initiative in coming to an agreement with Poland. However, it has to be admitted that in many activities undertaken by Poland with regard to European security, in particular Eastern European subregion, the interests of Russia were completly disregarded, although they did not have to be accepted fully. An example of this was Polish diplomacy in the second half of 2013 intended not to allow Russia to be included in the negotiations on the EU association agreement with the Ukraine about issues that had economic implications for Russia’s interests. In their policy towards Russia, foreign policy-makers in Poland, forgot, all too often, or, were unwilling to remember, about the principle that in order to meet the security needs of one’s own country, one should also consider the security needs of other countries, the neighbouring ones in the first place. Analyzing the policies under succesive III RP governments on European security and relations with the post-Soviet countries, it is hard to share the view prevailing in our country that Poland did its best to develop partnership and good neighbourly relations with Russia. Among politicians, publicists and the Polish society, there was a large group of people who took a stance, though it was not always formally articulated, that Poland has a right, or even a duty to remain hostile towards Russia. On the other hand, Russia should not act unfavourably towards Poland, regardless of Poland’s anti-Russian policy, although, obviously, it was declared otherwise.One of the few stages showing a distinct improvement in Poland’s policy towards Russia and a mutual willingness to normalize our political relations, was the one between 2008 and 2010, when an unsuccesful attempt was made at pragmatizing foreign policy towards Russia. Since the end of 2007, this new foreign policy, gradually encompassing other areas, led to a greater or lesser modification of the policy to date towards Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia by basing it on the so-called positive realism. These new trends increased cooperation between Poland and Russia and, eventually, a considerable progress was achieved in normalizing our relations. Between 2008 and 2010, Polish policy towards the East not only changed in practice, it was also a conceptual change. The crash of the presidential plane at Smoleńsk (April 10th, 2010), in which 96 peple were killed, including President of RP Lech Kaczyński and His Spouse, was a major, if not primary reason why the normalization process (2008–2010) was seriously hampered to the point of a standstill between 2011 and 2013. The Smoleńsk air disaster, and conflicting stands over its causes in particular, exacerbateddivisions in the Polish society and strenghtened reluctance, if not hostility, towards Russia.A large part of the Polish political class and society did not accept a version of an inadvertent air disaster (plane crash), whose causes, like not following correct procedures, lay on both Poles and Russians. The surveys conducted during the years following the Smoleńsk air disaster showed that over 30% of the Polish society were convinced that it had been an attempt on the life of the Polish delegation en route to a commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn Forrest massacre, and that the Russian government and secret services had been involved. After the Smoleńsk air disaster, foreign policy towards Russia and Polish-Russian relations became a ground for political struggle in our country. For many politicians and conservatist right-wing journalists, a demonstrated degree of anti-Russian sentiment became the main criterion of patriotism. In a large part of the Polish society, a belief was strenghtened that actions should be taken to weaken and isolate Russia, and to minimize, rather than increase cooperation between the two countries. This meant that internal conditions within our country, which could possibly motivate the foreign policy-makers to stop viewing Russia as the main threat and encourage a breakthrough in thinking about that issue, deteriorated markedly. Consequently, Polish-Russian relations between2011 and 2013 remained in a state of deadlock. In the foreign policy of Poland between 1992 and 2015, Russia played the leading role. This, however, stemmed from Russia being perceived by the policy-makers as the main threat to our national security, not a recognized partner in pursuing this security. Throughout that period, in all successive stages of Polish security policy, Russia was regarded as the main threat. Each political leadership in Poland, especially since the mid 1990s, treated Russia in this way, and these were not merelyanti-Russian declarations, but a guiding principle of the foreign policy. Behind it, was a conviction that Russian imperialism was timeless and Russia would never accept the sovereignty of Poland. It was an obvious reference to the classical Polish geopolitical thought about Russia posing main threats to our national security. During the crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine, between 2014 and 2015, the foreign policymakers in Poland revived the stance of a military threat on the part of Russia. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, such loud voices were heard about a possible military attack on Poland. Unlike the earlier periods, when there was an informal presumption that Russia was a threat to the security of Poland, in 2014, for the first time, in III RP’s security policy, Russia was formallypointed to as a direct military threat. It was articulated in official state documents, including Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej from November, 2014, and in addresses delivered by the Polish government officials (for instance in exposé of Foreign Minister R. Sikorski and his follower G. Schetyna).The crisis and conflict in south-eastern Ukraine did not substantially change Poland’s policytowards Russia. What did change between 2014 and 2015, however, was that much more emphasis than ever was placed on Russia being a threat to our national security, and there being a serious risk of a Russian direct invasion of Poland. During 2014 and 2015, the process of politicizing fear (policy of fear) of Russia was at its height. For Poland, a major outcome of the Ukrainian conflict and crisis was decreased national security and growing fears, among them the fear of Russian invasion, which does not mean that such a threat was real. During the years 2014 and 2015, Polish-Russian political relations at the highest level came almost to the point of being frozen. Important direct implications of the Ukrainian conflict forPoland’s security were, apart from a growing fear of Russia, increased desires towards strengthening its own defense capability, strenghtening NATO cohesion, increased involvement of NATO in our sub-region’s security and closer bilateral Polish-American cooperation regarding military security. Resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine as quickly as possible was in the interests of Poland. However, Polish diplomacy did not engage much in the conflict deescalation. They were very skeptical about the successive agreements aimed at ending the military operations negotiated within the frames of the so-called Normandy format (Mińsk I and Mińsk II). It seems that, considering the geopolitical situation in the Ukraine and divisions of the Ukrainian society, this country should remain a buffer state. Alternatively, coming out of this role should occur gradually, through a simultaneous Europeization of the Ukraine and Russia. Poland should not be interested in the „revolutionary” speeding up of the processes occuring in the Ukrainian society. Responsible politicians willing to serve the best interests of their nation should be aware of the limitations in pursuing even the most support worthy goals. The policy of every country, the foreign policy of Poland and the Ukraine included, should be founded on a realistic assessment of one’s own capabilities so that aspirations would not outgrow the real possibilities of their attainment. Poland, aspiring to the role of the EU main expert in Russian and the post-Soviet area affairs, through insisting in the EU on the earliest possible Ukraine association with the EU, contributed in a way to the situation when the Ukraine had to choose between the EU and Russia. Polish politicians did not anticpate the negative outcomes of such acceleration for the Ukraine itself (including theloss of Crimea and strong separatist tendencies in the East of the Ukraine), as well as for Russian-Ukrainian relations and the security of Poland. Therefore, the firm support and involvement of the Polish political class in the so-called democratic revolution in the Ukraine during 2013 and 2014, can hardly be regarded as a succcess. Polish policy towards the East ended in yet another failure, which was shown as confirmation when Poland was not included in the talks aimed at resolving the Ukrainian crisis, which were held by officials from the Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France since the middle of 2014.The Ukrainian crisis and conflict was a turning point in Polish security policy and Polish-Russian relations. The Polish government officially began to treat Russia as the largest threat to the national and international security. A considerable part of the political elites in Poland did not see the threat in excessive dependence of Polish economy on Russian energy resources or other economic threats, but in a direct military attack. Generally speaking, it is unknown to what extent the Ukrainian crisis and conflict will, in the long run, have an impact on changes in Polish policy towards the East, particularly towards Russia and the Ukraine. It exposed the ineffectiveness of our foreign policy to date towards the East. In this context, a question arises: What will be mid- and long-term implications of the Ukrainian conflict forthe modification or a radical alteration to Polish foreign policy towards the East? Another fundamental question pertains to Polish-Russian relations: What policy should Poland pursue towards Russia now and in the future? Will the foreign policy and security policy be directed,like in 2014 and 2015, at instransigence and confrontation, or will the normalization tendency prevail as regards Russia, and will the relations with the Ukraine be redefined? However, at the end of 2015, nothing implied that the foreign and security policy-makers intended to transform in any way the policy towards Russia and the Ukraine to date. It does not mean that changes will not be implemented in the years to come. It will be closely connected with the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the modification of the policy of Germany and the entire European Union as well as the policy of the United States on the post-Soviet area.The crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine strenghtened the legitimacy of argumentation thatthe main player in the post-Soviet area is Russia. None of the serious problems in this area can be resolved without the participation of Russia, and all the more, against Russia, which obviously, does not mean that the proponents of this stance overrate the capabilities of Russia in terms of shaping the closer and farther international environment. On this account, Polish policy will be hardly effective if at least some of Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet area, especially in Eastern Europe, are taken into consideration, as was proven to date. Bearing in mind long-term consquences, the strategic conceptions of the Polish policy towards the East, should opt for the closest possible ties of Russia with political and economic structures of the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures (Europeization of Russia). This, in turn, should result in the evolution of the economic-political system of Russia into liberal democracy.The Ukrainian crisis and conflict classified the effectiveness of the Polish conception aimed atoccidentalizing the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova without simultaneously occidentalizing Russia. As was indicated by the proponents of this conception, its implementation assumed an inevitable cost such as a political conflict with Russia. The crisis and conflict in the Ukraine between 2014 and 2015 should be a good reason to change this stance. The biggest price for its implementation was paid by the Ukraininas themselves. Therefore, in the context of these experiences, Poland should support such conceptions and actions in the Ukraine which attempt at Ukraine’s integration with the West not in opposition to Russia, but together with Russia, which does not imply that this process has to be fully synchronized. The direction of actions in this matter is of key importance. Despite the many contentious issues in Polish-Russian relations and different historical memory of Poles and Russians, in the long-term interests of Poland’s security, lies implementing a cooperative and integrating, not a confrontational conception. For the normalization of Polish-Russian relations, it is essential that the successive governemnets of Poland and Russia should have a political will to a less confrontational approach towards disputable issues and resolve emerging problems in a compromising way, which is one of the „scarcest commodities” in the Polish-Russian relations. A compromise should not be treated as a failure, as is often believed, also by the Poles. It also requires changes in mutual perception. A true normalization of mutual relations between Poland and Russia will not be possible if the majority of political elites, media and society in both countries will see the other not even as a difficult partner of rival, but an enemy. The divergence of interests does not have to lead to hostility. The governing groups inPoland and Russia face a challenge in improving Polish-Russian relations. They can either attempt to broaden the area of common interests or to highlight the discrepancies and divergence of interests, and thus strenghten social attitudes prone to either cooperation or confrontation.

Jedan vrhovni sud za BiH?

Author(s): / Language(s): Bosnian,Croatian,Serbian

Pitanje iz naslova bi se u svakoj evropskoj državi shvatilo kao lakrdijaška pravna dosjetka. U Bosni ono ne stvara reflekse osmijeha; pitanje je ozbiljno i prate ga dramatična upozorenja. Tema je unekoliko izlizana političkim parolama i medijskim eskponiranjem političkih pozicija. No, stručni krugovi (sudije, tužioci, advokati i državni službenici) i akademska zajednica (saradnici univerzitetskih insitucija i naučno-istraživačkih instituta) imaju jasno artikulirine stavove o ovom pitanju. Oni nisu apodiktičke prirode, nego počivaju na analizi pravnog ustrojstva BiH i iznalaze argumente u uporednom pravu, jursidikciji Ustavnog suda BiH i u pozitivnom ustavnom pravu.

STRATCOM LAUGHS - IN SEARCH OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Author(s): / Language(s): English

The study “StratCom laughs. In search of an analytical framework“ is a multidisciplinary effort to design an analytical framework for analysing humour in scenarios where researchers and practitioners find themselves working through large data collections where humour has been used as a potent tool in the construction of messages designed for strategic communication. The research was conducted in four stages. The first stage approaches the concept of humour from the perspectives of cognitive, communication, political science and psychology. The relevant components of humour, namely shared knowledge, target audience, perception, function and message delivery have been factored in.

Biblioteka Uniwersytecka w Warszawie 1817-2017. Miscellanea

Author(s): / Language(s): Polish

The jubilee publication contains the papers describing the University of Warsaw Library at the beginning of its existence (1817–1831) and nowadays (1993–2013). They are accompanied by: the critical study of Joachim Lelewel’s autographs Projekt utrzymania i urządzenia biblioteki [A Project of Maintaining, Classification and Organization of the Library Collection] and Urządzenie Biblioteki [A Scheme of Classification and Organization of the Library Collection], presentation of the sources for the history of the University of Warsaw Library in the archives of Saint Petersburg, as well as the historical timeline of the University of Warsaw Library in the years 1817–2017, and the appendix with biographical notes of all the directors of the library.

Civil Society Impact on the EU Climate Change Policy

Author(s): Selma Şekercioğlu / Language(s): English

“In today’s world climate change has come to a point where national, regional and global actors are forced to re-make or re-design their policies in order to reduce the negative influences of this phenomenon. The European Union (EU) is no exception to these actors that are in need of making new arrangements on climate change. In this book I intended to evaluate the transition in the EU’s energy related climate policies; the changing roles of the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the European institutions. In fact, lobbying taking place at the CSOs level is and must be directly linked with the role of the EU institutions whilst evaluating the new approaches of the EU on climate change matters. More specifically, Brussels based CSOs are particularly important whilst analysing their access to the decision-making mechanisms of the EU as well as the pressure mechanisms they impose on the EU-level policy changes. Readers will see that there is hard evidence that CSOs has some influence on the EU’s energy related climate change policy decisions. Particularly the interviews conducted in this work places this book apart from the rest of the literature. I hope all readers will find this work on the influence of the EU-wide civil society organizations on climate policies of the Union of their interest and appealing.”

Neispričana povijest

Author(s): / Language(s): Croatian

Tranziciona pravda u post-jugoslovenskim zemljama - Izveštaj za 2006. godinu

Author(s): / Language(s): Croatian,Serbian

U oružanim sukobima u Hrvatskoj (1991.-95.), Bosni i Hercegovini (1992.-95.), i na Kosovu (1998.-99.), najmanje 130,000 ljudi je izgubilo život, milioni su bili prinuđeni da napuste svoje domove, a stotine hiljada kuća su razorene. Prelaz iz stanja oružanog sukoba i državne represije u period mira i izgradnje demokratskih institucija zahteva od ovih društava da se odrede prema masovnim kršenjima ljudskih prava iz bliske prošlosti. Skup mera koje vlasti i civilno društvo preduzimaju radi suočavanja sa ovim kršenjiima prava čini kompleks tranzicione pravde, čiji su osnovni elementi utvrđivanje činjenica, suđenja, reparacije, i institucionalne reforme (lustracija). Ovaj izveštaj se bavi suočavanjem s posledicama ratnih događanja i zločinima počinjenim u periodu od 1991. do 1999. godine. Izveštaj je nastao na inicijativu Fonda za humaritarno pravo (FHP), u saradnji s Istraživačko dokumentacionim centrom (IDC-BiH) i Documentom (Hrvatska). Odnosi se na Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Hrvatsku, Srbiju, Kosovo, i Crnu Goru – u daljem tekstu “post-jugoslovenske zemlje“. U toku 2006. godine, u skoro svim post-jugoslovenskim zemljama suđenja za ratne zločine su dobila na zamahu, ali u drugim oblastima tranzicione pravde jedva da je bilo značajnijih pomaka u odnosu na prethodni period. Nedostajali su konkretni koraci vlasti koji bi vodili ka uspostavljanju tela za utvrđivanje činjenica, na državnom ili regionalnom nivou. Vrlo malo je urađeno kako bi se lica koja pretenduju da obavljaju javnu funkciju podvrgla ispitivanju njihovih postupaka za vreme oružanih sukoba. Napokon, dolazak do reparacija –bilo na osnovu zakona ili sudskim putem – još uvek je teško ostvarivo za mnoge žrtve kršenja prava iz devedesetih godina. SUĐENJA ZA RATNE ZLOČINE: Suđenja za ratne zločine su od samog završetka rata predstavljala najvažniji oblik tranzicione pravde koji se primenjuje u post-jugoslovenskim zemljama. U ranom posleratnom periodu nosilac procesuiranja ratnih zločina u regionu bio je Međunarodni krivični tribunal za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKTJ), prvenstveno zbog toga što nacionalna pravosuđa nisu zatakav zadatak bila spremna. Iako svojim osnivanjem i delovanjem nije uspeo da spreči neka od teških i masovnih kršenja ljudskih prava, kao što je zločin u Srebrenici u julu 1995. godine, tribunal je doprineo obuzdavanju nasilja u još nedovršenom procesu dezintegracije bivše Jugoslavije, procesuiranju odgovornih na najvišim vojnim i političkim funkcijama, te pripremi pravosuđa i javnosti u regionu zasuđenja za ratne zločine. Uspostavljanje specijalnih tužilaštava za ratne zločine, odnosno specijalizovanih veća ili sudova za ovu vrstu slučajeva, u periodu 2003.-05., dovelo je do poboljšanja istraga i suđenja za ratne zločine, u Hrvatskoj, Srbiji, i Bosni i Hercegovini (BiH). U 2006. godini je nastavljen pozitivan trend iz prethodnih godina, naročito potcrtan daljnjim napretkom u saradnji tužilaštava iz BiH,Hrvatske, i Srbije. Ipak, u sve tri zemlje bili su vidljivi značajni problemi u procesuiranju ratnih zločina,uključujući nedovoljnu podršku političkih struktura krivičnom gonjenju osumnjičenih za ratne zločine bez obzira na nacionalnost, kao i neadekvatne mere za podršku i zaštitu svedoka. U Hrvatskoj su pred županijskim sudovima tokom godine održana ukupno 23 suđenja, od čega 18 protiv pripadnika srpskih snaga, a pet protiv pripadnika vojno-policijskih snaga Republike Hrvatske. Doneseno je pet nepravosnažnih presuda, a tri presude su potvrđene od strane Vrhovnog suda RH. Sudovi u BiH su doneli 23 presude u prvom stepenu, i 17 pravnosnažnih (drugostepenih) presuda. Broj započetih i predstojećih suđenja pred Većem za ratne zločine pri Sudu BiH nadmašio je broj suđenja pred svim drugim sudovima. Procesuiranje za ratne zločine započelo je i u Republici Srpskoj, u kojoj je prethodno vladala nekažnjivost za počinioce ratnih zločina. U Srbiji su 2006. godine održana suđenja za ratne zločine u sedam predmeta. Na Kosovu je 2006. godine održano samo jedno suđenje za ratne zločine, protiv šestorice kosovskih Albanaca optuženih za zločine protiv drugih Albanaca. U avgustu je veće, sastavljeno isključivo od međunarodnih sudija, osudilo trojicu bivših oficira Oslobodilačke vojske Kosova (OVK)na sedmogodišnje kazne zatvora, a sud je nakon izricanja presude doneo odluku o puštanju osuđenih na slobodu do pravnosnažnosti. U Crnoj Gori 2006. godine nije održano nijedno suđenje za ratne zločine, kao ni u prethodne četiri godine. Velika praznina u kažnjavanju ratnih zločina proističe iz činjeni-ce da mnogi počinioci ratnih zločina u BiH sada žive i stekli su državljanstvo u Srbiji o Hrvatskoj, gde im je ustavom ili zakonom zagarantovano neizručivanje. Istovremeno, BiH nije voljna da prepusti suđenja ovih lica pravosuđu Hrvatske i Srbije. UTVRĐIVANJE ČINJENICA: U post-jugoslovenskim zemljama ne deluje nijedno zvanično telo koje bi na sistematski način, na nivou pojedine države ili država naslednica bivše Jugoslavije, utvrđivalo činjenice o kršenjima ljudskih prava i humanitarnog prava u proteklom periodu. U 2006. godini, parlamentarne stranke u BiH su po prvi put uzele učešće u konkretnim aktivnostima koje potencijalno vode ka osnivanju državne komisije za istinu, tako što je radna grupa sačinjena od stranačkih predstavnika napravila nacrt zakona o komisiji. Vlada BiH je u junu osnovala Komisiju za utvrđivanje činjenica o stradanjima Srba, Hrvata, Bošnjaka, Jevreja i ostalih u Sarajevu u periodu 1992-95. Iako je vlada utvrdila jednogodišnji rok za završetak rada ove komisije, u periodu između njenog osnivanja i kraja 2006. godine nije otpočeo rad na prikupljanju informacija. U drugim post-jugoslovenskim zemljama nije bilo ozbiljnijih rasprava unutar parlamenta ili vlada o osnivanju bilo kog tipa komisije za istinu. Umesto toga, na skupovima nevladinih organizacija učesnici su razmatrali moguće osnivanje regionalnog tela koje bi utvrđivalo činjenice o prošlosti i omogućilo žrtvama da neposredno iznose svoja iskustva. U 2006. godini, u raspravama koje su u parlamentima Srbije i Hrvatske vođene o događajima iz vremena rata, dominirala je jednostrana nacionalistička interpretacija ratnih događanja. Naročito je ovo bilo primetno u Srbiji, gde predstavnici umerenih stranaka nisu reagovali na brojne istupe nacionalističkih ekstremista. Krajem 2006. godine, u regionu je bilooko 17.000 nerešenih zahteva za pronalazak nestalih lica. Odnosi između predstavnika raznih komisija za nestala lica, na nivou post-jugoslovenskih zemalja još su opterećeni nepoverenjem. Još su češće i oštrije kritike koje udruženja porodica nestalih javno upućuju na račun državnih tela. Sve ovo doprinosilo je utisku o ispolitizovanosti jednog eminentno humanitarnog pitanja, i umanjivalo je efikasnost napora za traženje nestalih lica. Komisija za traženje nestalih Federacije BiH je 2006. godine ekshumirala oko 2.250 posmrtnih ostataka ne području Republike Srpske, a Kancelarija Republike Srpske zatraženje nestalih i zarobljenih lica je ekshumirala 126 tela. U Hrvatskoj je u toku 2006. godine ekshumirano 180 tela. Krajem godine još uvek se 2.050 državljana Republike Hrvatske vodilo kao nestalo, a uz to vlasti Srbije su tražile nešto više od 400 svojih državljana koji su nestali tokom sukoba u Hrvatskoj. Na Kosovu je krajem 2006. godine bilo 2,137 lica za kojima se i dalje traga, a nadležne agencije su u toku godine ekshumirale 59 tela. LUSTRACIJA: Bosna i Hercegovina ostaje jedina od post-jugoslovenskih zemalja u kojoj je, iako u ograničenom obimu, mogućnost da lice obavlja javnu funkciju uslovljena ispitivanjem njegovih postupaka za vreme oružanih sukoba. Između 1999. i 2002. godine, Misija Ujedinjenih nacija je ispitivala postupanje 24.000 aktivnih policajaca u prethodnom (ratnom) periodu; 4 odsto policajaca je kao rezultat procesa uklonjeno iz službe. Između 2002. i 2004. godine u BiHje sprovedena sudska reforma, u toku koje je Visoki sudski i tužilački savet odlučio da oko 200 sudija i tužilaca, od 1.000, ne treba da budu ponovo izabrano. Iako u Srbiji postoji zakon koji na sveobuhvatan način predviđa utvrđivanje činjenica o aktivnostima lica za vreme oružanih sukoba i u periodu komunizma, zakon nikada nije bio primenjen. U periodu 2004.-06., većinu poslanika u parlamentu činili su poslanici Srpske radikalne stranke, Demokratske stranke Srbije, i Socijalističke partije Srbije, koje su u vreme donošenja zakona o odgovornosti za kršenje ljudskih prava (2003.) bile protiv njegovog usvajanja. REPARACIJE: U toku 2006. godine, u post jugoslovenskim zemljama primenjivane su sledeće vrste reparacija: naknade (na osnovu zakona i na osnovu sudskih odluka), restitucija, utvrđivanje sudbine nestalih, i otkrivanje spomen-obeležja. Povrat i obnova imovine, te novčane reparacije suuglavnom najpre obezbeđeni za pripadnike većine, odnosno žrtve na pobedničkoj strani rata, dok u odnosu na pripadnike manjine proces još uvek traje, ili tek treba da počne (u Hrvatskoj je desetinama hiljada Srba sudskim putem oduzeto stanarsko pravo s obrazloženjom da su napustili stanove, a vlada nije pokazala spremnost da im obezbedi pravičnu restituciju ili kompenzaciju). Spomen-obeležja se takođe podižu u znak sećanja na žrtve većinskog naroda. U koncipiranju i primeni zakona o reparacijama, u svim post-jugoslovenskim zemljama upadljivo su privilegovana vojna lica, odnosno članovi njihovih porodica, u odnosu na civile. U svim delovima bivše Jugoslavije, izvestan broj civilnih žrtava rata i osoba čija su ljudska prava ozbiljno kršena u prethodnom periodu nastojao je da ostvari naknadu štete sudskim putem. U Srbiji su, u njihovo ime, nevladine organizacije za ljudska prava podnosile tužbe za naknadu štete, i u većini slučajeva sudovi su presudili u korist žrtava. U drugim zemljama,broj tužilaca je bio relativno mali, zbog nepostojanja delotvornih sistema besplatne pravne pomoći i zakonskih rešenja kojima bi se žrtve izuzele od plaćanja sudskih taksi i troškova postupka u slučaju gubitka spora. U svim post-jugoslovenskim zemljama karakter spomen-obeležja i način na koji se podižu jasno reflektuje političku i društvenu klimu u datoj sredini. U Srbiji, spomen-obeležja izražavaju potrebu većinskog dela društva da interpretira ulog u Srbije u ratovima 1990-ih, inače žestoko kritikovanu u međunarodnoj zajednici i u drugim delovima bivše Jugoslavije, kao jednoznačno pozitivnu. U Hrvatskoj i na Kosovu, gotovo potpuno odsutstvo spomen-obeležja o stradanjima manjinskog (srpskog) naroda izražava rasprostranjen stav da uloga pravedne žrtve isključivo pripada većinskom (hrvatskom, odnosno albanskom) narodu. U Bosni i Hercegovini postoji nešto veća spremnost da se,kroz simboličku formu spomenika, prihvate svedočanstva o stradanju “druge strane”, iako takvi primeri predstavljaju izuzetak pre nego pravilo. U Crnoj Gori, tenzija između vlasti koja je zagovarala samostalnost Crne Gore, s jedne strane, i onih sektora u društvu koji su naklonjeni Srbiji, s druge strane, prelama se i kroz praksu podizanja spomen-obeležja. Ono što je zajedničko spomen-obeležjima u svim delovima bivše Jugoslavije je prihvatanje, na simboličkom nivou, privilegovanog položaja vojnih žrtava u odnosu na civilne.

Prava civilnih žrtava rata

Author(s): Vesna Teršelič,Milena Čalić-Jelić / Language(s): Croatian

Žrtvama se smatraju osobe koje su, pojedinačno ili unutar skupine, pretrpjele štetu koja uključuje fizičku ili mentalnu povredu, emotivnu patnju, materijalni gubitak ili ozbiljnu povredu njihovih temeljnih prava putem akata ili propusta koji predstavljaju teška kršenja međunarodnog prava o ljudskim pravima ili ozbiljne povrede međunarodnog humanitarnog prava, u skladu s Rezolucijom Opće skupštine Ujedinjenih naroda 60/147 Temeljna načela i smjernice o pravu na pravni lijek i reparaciju za žrtve teških kršenja međunarodnog prava o ljudskim pravima i ozbiljnih povreda međunarodnog humanitarnog prava. Gdje je to primjereno te u skladu s unutarnjim pravom, pojam žrtva uključuje i članove uže obitelji ili štićenike neposredne žrtve i osobe koje su pretrpjele štetu u nastojanju da pomognu žrtvama u nevolji ili da spriječe njihovu viktimizaciju.

Jedna povijest, više historija - dodatak udžbenicima s kronikom objavljivanja

Author(s): / Language(s): English,Croatian

The Supplement to Textbooks of Current Croatian History is a handbook for history lectures, which was ordered by the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education, and Sports after the five-year moratorium on teaching current history in the Podunavlje region expired in the 2002/2003 school year. This easternmost region of Croatia remained under the control of local Serbs after the end of the 1991-1995 conflict, and was returned to Croatian sovereignty in 1998 after a transitory period under UN administration and the signing of an agreement between the Croatian government and the local Serb population. Part of the agreement included the decision that instruction in Podunavlje for Croat and Serb children would take place in separate classrooms, and that a five-year moratorium on teaching contemporary Croatian history in classes taught in the Serbian language would be imposed. At the end of 2002, the Ministry, headed by Minister Vladimir Strugar, in cooperation with the representatives of the Serb community and several history teachers, decided to form the „Commission for developing proposals regarding the teaching of history of the former Yugoslavia since 1989 in the schools of the Croatian Podunavlje,“ as well as produce a handbook which would cover the period of contemporary Croatian history after 1989. It was concluded that the handbook needed to function as an appendix for existing textbooks, and that it would serve as the first step in eliminating the moratorium and as a temporary solution until new textbooks could be chosen that would be translated into the Serbian language and script. After failing to find a publishing company to produce the handbook during 2003, work continued in the fall of 2004, under Minister Dragan Primorac. The Commission chose Tvrtko Jakovina and Snježana Koren from the Department of History at the Philosophy Faculty, University of Zagreb, as well as Magdalena Najbar-Agičić, the author and editor of a number of elementary and high school history textbooks, to complete the handbook. The authors finished the handbook in April 2005. In the meantime, the Commission decided that the text would not only serve the students in Podunavlje, but other students across all of Croatia as additional material for studying contemporary history. Once the work was completed, the manuscript was given to reviewers who needed to evaluate the quality of the methodology as well as the historical content of the material. However, before the reviews — some of which were subsequently shown to be very positive while others were extremely negative — reached the authors of the handbook, the content of the negative reviews appeared in the media and sparked a public debate that lasted for several months. The actual text of the Supplement remained, for the most part, inaccessible to the public, and the content of the Supplement, other than what was posted on the internet site of the Croatian Information Center without the authors’ knowledge or permission, was available only to those interested individuals who showed initiative and directly contacted the authors to see the material. Only a few of the journalists who were writing about this issue at the time actually did this. The situation which ensued was symptomatic for the mentioned time period in Croatia. The issue was overtly politicized, especially because this all occurred within the context of the tenth anniversary of the military-police action „Operation Storm.“ The authors were subjected to newspaper articles in which the Supplement was often described in an explicitly sensationalistic manner. Moreover, the authors were most often called out for allegedly relativizing wartime events, because for some media, politicians, and veterans’ organizations, the multi-perspective approach to teaching about the conflict developed in the Supplement was considered to be „a distortion of the historical truth about the Serbian aggression“ and „an attempt to equalize guilt for the war.“ A number of the reviewers recruited by the Ministry were also involved in this campaign against the authors. Already in the actual process of reviewing the material it was clear that some of the reviewers did not hesitate to stray outside of academic boundaries or resort to using primarily political disqualifications in their negative evaluations. In the course of the polemics raised over this issue, it also became evident that a number of the participants involved in the debate were not ready for thoroughly coming to terms with the past, nor did they support a systematic and academically based investigation of the recent historical events in Croatia. Despite the fact that in 2003 the Croatian Parliament approved the „Textbook Standard“ in which a number of conditions, formulated as „ethic requirements,“ needed to be met by textbooks in order to achieve certain universal values (which include raising students in a spirit of peace, tolerance, and democracy, and teaching them to respect racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious, differences, etc.), the debate over the Supplement revealed various and mutually exclusive concepts about the purpose and goals of history education, especially because of its potential role in shaping a student’s identity. Along with the fact that the universal values mentioned above are consistent with the educational policies of the European Union, there exist serious and deep-seated reasons in the past and present of this region why these values need to become an integral part of Croatian educational policies and practice. A second, specific framework of values that needs to be met by textbooks, according to the „Textbook Standard,“ is that Croatian textbooks must „nurture Croatian national identity“ and „encourage patriotic feelings towards the Republic of Croatia as a community of equal citizens, regardless of ethnicity or religious affiliation.“ The authors of the handbook unquestionably expressed a tendency to include elements from the first group of „ethic values“ mentioned in the „Textbook Standard,“ as well as to apply new methodologies in teaching history in which the students are transformed from passive recipients of information into active participants who draw their own conclusions. These goals in contemporary methodologies can be achieved by applying, among other strategies, a multi-perspective approach, which is a precondition for history education free of ideology. Ultimately, the debate influenced the Ministry of Science, Education, and Sports’ decision to not publish the Supplement. We believe that our decision to place the Supplement to Textbooks of Current Croatian History in our publishing program follows our goals and activities tied to encouraging the public to come to terms with the past and objectivizing recent Croatian history.

Život s njima

Author(s): Nenad Popović / Language(s): Croatian

A book of essays Living with Them is the anatomy of the last Yugoslav decade, and the first three decades of Croatian reality. As an autonomous observer, and an analyst of cultural and ideological patterns, Nenad Popović creates a sketch for the typology of Croatian intellectuals, artists and politicians’ public personae. He creates sketches of mindsets that harbour religious fundamentalism, Yugonostalgia, or partake in the phenomena of mass culture. As in his previous books and public interventions, Popović is a pessimistic chronicler of his time, and his essays are qualified testimonies of a disjointed, crazy time in which Croatia and Europe are looking for themselves - spiritually, politically and economically. This book is a kind of Popović’s “private encyclopaedia” of Croatia. Although the author sees only caricatures and dramas of the big Croatian self-deception and its continuous blindness, from the late communism until this day, we can still discern his invitation to take a mirror in our hands. Publisher, translator, and writer Nenad Popović was born in Zagreb in 1950. He attended colleges in Zagreb and Bonn, and Freiburg with the scholarship Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst. He graduated in German Language and Literature and South Slavic Languages and Literature from the Zagreb Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. In 1980. he became an editor, and afterwards the head editor of the publishing house Graphical Institute of Croatia. In 1990. he co-founded the publishing house Durieux, one of the first independent private publishing houses in Croatia, where he worked as the head editor until 2013. In 1999. he participated in founding of the literary Group 99. In 2002 he became one of founders of the Croatian Writers’ Society, becoming its vice-president afterwards. Since 1978, he has occasionally written for newspapers, magazines and radio, and since 1985 for the media of German speaking countries (Manuskripte, Literatur und Kritik, Kulturaustausch, Frankfurter Rundschau, Die Zeit, Weltwoche, et al.). For theatre he translated such authors as Sternheim, Bruckner, Bernhard, Fassbinder among others. He also translated books by Erwin Piscator, Kazimir Malevič, Boris Kelemen, Benn Meyer-Wehlack, Tilla Durieux and Rainer Werner Fassbinder. During Bosnian wars, he translated articles by Bosnian writers (Karahasan, Lovrenović, Filipović, Jergović) for German newspapers and magazines. He published books A World in Shadow (2008), A Treatise on Population (2014), Diary from the City of P. (2017), and Living with Them (2021). For his work he received many awards and accolades: Premio '92 per il lavoro letterario from the Italian Cultural Institute in Zagreb (1992), The Leipzig Book Award for European Understanding (1999), and, with Freimut Duve, Bruno Kreisky Award (1999). He was also awarded the Hermann Kesten Medal by the German PEN Centre in 2000. The same year he became an honorary citizen of Sarajevo. He is a member of the following organisations: Croatian PEN Centre, Cap Anamur - German Emergency Doctors, Cologne; Journalisten helfen Journalisten, München; International Forum Bosnia, Sarajevo; Association of Literary Translators of Croatia. He lives in Pula.

Na penězích záleží: České neziskové organizace v 21. století

Author(s): Jiří Špalek,Vladimír Hyánek,Laura Fónadová,KLÁRA Placier,Markéta Matulová,Marie Jakubcová,Marie Hladká,Tomáš Katrňák,Zuzana Prouzová / Language(s): Czech

The text of this book is framed by several major phenomena and economic processes. The main framework is represented by the nonprofit organizations economy. This field has been narrowed down to the nonprofit revenues, and to the ways these revenues are obtained. Moreover, we focused on the question how the Czech nonprofit organizations respond to the real or potential failure of particular resource stream. Our investigation covers the turbulent times of financial and economic crisis (2008-2013), as we searched for deeper understanding of the ways nonprofit organizations cope with the loss of income and change their structure when such loss occurred.

Honouring the Past and Celebrating the Present

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Published on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of English Studies at the University of Warsaw, this book documents the academic and institutional development of the discipline and its academic seat. It pays tribute to scholars whose contribution made this development possible, and showcases research areas currently explored by academics employed at the Institute of English Studies.

The Russian Street. The Place and Significance of Immigrants From the Former USSR in Israel

Author(s): Marek Matusiak / Language(s): English

The arrival of more than one million immigrants from the former USSR, back in the 1990s and post-2000, has resulted in a surge in Israel’s demographic and economic potential, sealed the domination of right‑wing parties on the Israeli political scene and in public discourse, left its mark on Israel’s historical policy, and finally, contributed a new language and previously unfamiliar customs to the country’s cultural mosaic.The arrival of more than one million immigrants from the former USSR back in the 1990s and post-2000 has resulted in a surge in Israel’s demographic and economic potential, sealed the domination of right-wing parties on the Israeli political scene and in public discourse, left its mark on Israel’s historical policy, and finally, contributed new elements to Israel’s cultural mosaic. Russian-speaking newcomers from the former Soviet republics have retained their language, customs and contacts with their countries of origin, and have adapted to the new reality in their own unique manner, while maintaining many elements of their former identity. Despite the fact that three decades after the break-up of the USSR, the Russian-speaking Israelis continue to be less affluent and underrepresented in many spheres of life, struggle with negative clichés and in some cases are still not fluent in Hebrew, they should be viewed as a group which has largely been well-integrated into society and (as a general rule) manifests ardent patriotism towards their new homeland. This text is an attempt to sum up the process of the Russian-speaking immigrants’ adaptation to Israeli society (and vice versa); to assess this group’s place and importance in the Israeli state’s life; to determine how it has changed the country; and finally, how it has affected Israel’s relations with the newcomers’ countries of origin.

The Gordian Knot of the Caucasus. The Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English

The conflict over the state affiliation of Nagorno‑Karabakh, which has been ongoing since 1987 (and led to full‑scale war in 1992–94) has determined Armenia and Azerbaijan’s post‑Soviet history. It remains the greatest security challenge for both states, and still has a serious impact on their entire foreign and domestic policies. In both states the conflict has brought political elites to power who in the case of Armenia ruled the state until 2018, and in the case of Azerbaijan are still in power, and who have pre‑determined the homogenous nature of both Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s societies. This latter is a result of mass expulsions and forced migrations, as well as intensive propaganda presented by both governments, who have exploited the struggle for Nagorno‑Karabakh in their state‑building narratives and have deliberately cultivated the images of their mutual enemy.

The Long Shadow of the Treaty of Trianon. Hungary’s Struggles With the Past

Author(s): Andrzej Sadecki / Language(s): English

The 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which sealed Hungary’s loss of a third of its territory, is perceived as the country’s greatest national tragedy. The breakup of the multi-national Kingdom of Hungary, as a result of which large Hungarian-speaking populations found themselves in neighbouring countries, was a pivotal event which influenced Hungary’s national identity as well as its internal and foreign policies for the next one hundred years. Hungary responded to the Treaty of Trianon by developing various concepts to reclaim the lost territories, but also with efforts to build good relations with neighbours and develop policies towards the Hungarian minorities in other countries.

G20 Ülkeleri İçin Finansal Baskının Ölçülmesi ve Finansal Baskı Yayılım Etkisinin İncelenmesi

Author(s): Hande Çalişkan Terzioğlu / Language(s): Turkish

The study aims to calculate a financial stress index for the G-20 countries, which are of great importance for the global economy, and to examine the transmission of financial stress between the countries in question. In this context, the study aims to reveal the vulnerability and stability of G-20 economies against external financial stress shocks. The financial stress index for each country is calculated by considering five sub-market indicators (monetary, bond, stock exchange, foreign exchange, and banking sector). Accordingly, whether the financial stress indices are sufficient to track recessions has been evaluated from a historical perspective. Then, by considering the integration among countries, the financial stress transmission relationship between the countries is examined between 2006 and 2020 by using the dynamic connectedness analysis suggested by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). Accordingly, it is determined that the financial stress in these countries increased during the crisis periods. Empirical results show the financial stress transmitter and receiver countries during financial crisis periods. According to the net directional spillover analysis results, as financial stress receiver, while Indonesia ranks first among the countries in question, Japan ranks last. On the other hand, as financial stress transmitter, while the UK ranks first among the countries in question, Argentina ranks last. Finally, while the net spillover analysis results highlight the UK, the US, and France as the most important countries that transmit financial stress to the rest of the countries, Argentina, Turkey and Indonesia are determined the countries that most important financial stress receiver.

Genişletici Politikalarda Mekansal Etkiler

Author(s): Sinan YILDIRIM / Language(s): Turkish

In an analysis, if cross-sections consist of geographical regions, the existence of spatial interactions of contiguous units should be investigated. Because it is thought that close areas affect each other. In this study, it is investigated that how government expenditures affect the GDP growth per capita in Europe for the period 1997-2016, via models considering spatial dependency. Eventually, increases in government expenditures increase economic growth in all models. Fixed effects panel data, random effects panel data, fixed effects spatial lag, random effects spatial lag, fixed effects spatial Durbin, random effects spatial Durbin, fixed effects spatial error, random effects spatial error, generalized random effects spatial error and general spatial models are examined. As results of Hausman tests, it was seen that random effects model is efficient in all models. Lagrange Multiplayer (LM) test showed that not only spatial lag and spatial error models are significant, but also the general model is significant. Between these models, the general model which contains also spatial lag and spatial error model either, has the maximum Lagrange Multiplayer (LM) test statistic. As for spatial Durbin model, the coefficient estimates of explanatory variables multiplied by spatial weight matrix are found statistically insignificant. Consequently, the politicians who want to achieve full employment in Europe, can increase the government current expenditures. Besides, they should take into account the situation in neighbor countries. Because, the coefficients indicating spatial autocorrelations are positive. As areas approach to each other, they more affect each other.

Svjetski etos Dokumenti – utemeljenja – primjene

Author(s): / Language(s): Bosnian

Knjiga „Svjetski etos: Dokumenti – utemeljenja – primjene” nastala je u sklopu projekta TPO Fondacije iz Sarajeva „Integracija svjetskog etosa u odgojno-obrazovne strukture i procese u Bosni i Hercegovini” iza kojeg je svojom stručnom i financijskom pomoći stala i Zaklada svjetskog etosa iz Tübingena. Za sada jedinstvena u našoj regiji, ova knjiga pruža sustavan uvid u temeljne dokumente na kojima počiva projekt svjetskog etosa, pri čemu je posebna pozornost posvećena različitim načinima utemeljenja i primjene svjetskog etosa u suvremenim društvima sučeljenim s globalizacijom koja prepuštena sebi prijeti ugroziti ne samo humanistička dostignuća naše civilizacije nego i sam planet Zemlju.

Bouřlivý příběh: Postavení katolíků v Čínské lidové republice

Author(s): Magdaléna Rychetská / Language(s): Czech

The book introduces the situation and development of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China from its foundation in 1949 to the present (2022). It provides both historical context and contemporary information about the Chinese Catholics. It examines the diverse groups of Catholics established in the territory of the People’s Republic of China belonging to both the official state-run Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and believers in the so-called underground church, which is not sanctioned by the Chinese authorities. The book examines the political and social dilemmas facing the church under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.