Na peryferiach światowego dżihadu. Kaukaz Północny: iluzja stabilizacji

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): Polish

W porównaniu z latami ubiegłymi sytuacja na Kaukazie Północnym uległa stabilizacji, głównie w wymiarze działalności islamskiego podziemia zbrojnego. Przyczyną tego zjawiska są zmiany ideologiczne w obozie bojowników, które doprowadziły do rozmycia walki zbrojnej na Kaukazie w globalnym dżihadzie i jej marginalizacji wobec priorytetowego frontu bliskowschodniego. Stabilizacji sprzyja kryzys organizacyjny Emiratu Kaukaskiego i odpływ bojowników na Bliski Wschód, jak również skuteczność stosowanej przez Moskwę polityki „kija i marchewki”. Uspokojenie sytuacji na Kaukazie jest jednak nietrwałe, ma bowiem charakter sytuacyjny, a nie systemowy. Nie jest efektem rozwiązania nabrzmiałych problemów regionu, generujących chroniczną niestabilność i sprzyjających cywilizacyjnemu oddalaniu się Kaukazu od Rosji. W warunkach kryzysu gospodarczego bądź politycznego w Rosji grozi to odmrożeniem kaukaskich konfliktów, w tym reaktywacją czeczeńskiego separatyzmu i wpisanej w globalny dżihad idei Emiratu Kaukaskiego.

A weak link? Germany in the Euro-Atlantic security system

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

The political, military and economic parameters of German power influence the vision of the international order that Berlin favours. Politically, Germany is a regional power in the EU with considerable diplomatic potential. Economically, it is the world's third largest power with growing global trade and investment links. At the same time, Germany's military potential is limited and the German strategic culture makes the country sceptical about the use of military instruments. Berlin is thus essentially interested in maintaining peace and stability, both in Europe and globally, and in developing diplomatic mechanisms to manage regional and global crises and conflicts. // The German preference for dialogue and compromise in conflict situations in the regional and global dimensions may increasingly pose a risk to maintaining the cohesion and credibility of NATO – both from the perspective of the USA and Germany’s allies from Central-Eastern and Northern Europe.

Potiomkinowski konserwatyzm. Ideologiczne narzędzie Kremla

Author(s): Witold Rodkiewicz,Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): Polish

Od początku trzeciej kadencji prezydenckiej Władimir Putin konsekwentnie odwołuje się do ideologii konserwatywnej. Legitymizuje w ten sposób nową strategię polityczną Kremla, której celem jest stabilizacja reżimu i zablokowanie politycznej mobilizacji społeczeństwa wokół haseł liberalnych. Strategia ta ma też umocnić legitymizację istniejącego modelu władzy, określając go jako „tradycyjny” dla Rosji oraz uzasadnić represyjną i antyzachodnią politykę władz. Obejmuje ona także politykę reintegracji przestrzeni postsowieckiej pod egidą Moskwy, w szczególności aneksję Krymu i projekt Noworosja. Strategia ta została sformułowana jako odpowiedź na aktywizację zwolenników liberalizacji w Rosji – nowej klasy średniej i części elit administracyjnych i biznesowych, które na przełomie 2011/2012 roku otwarcie zamanifestowały rozczarowanie reżimem. Jednak rozdźwięk pomiędzy konserwatywną frazeologią Kremla a realnym postępowaniem elity rządzącej dowodzi, iż „projekt konserwatywny” Kremla ma charakter czysto instrumentalny, co w dłuższej perspektywie podważa jego wiarygodność w oczach rosyjskiego społeczeństwa i stawia pod znakiem zapytania jego skuteczność.

The role of Central Europe in the German economy. The political consequences

Author(s): Konrad Popławski / Language(s): English

Recent publications allow us to conclude that the economic relations between Germany and Central Europe have come to the ‘end of history’, and nothing new will happen. However, a deeper analysis of these relationships reveals interesting new trends. Since joining the European Union the states of Central Europe have not settled for maintaining the average level of economic development, but have continued to narrow the distance between them and Western Europe, something which the global financial crisis did not prevent. Their improved economic situation also affected their relations with Germany. The latest results from the Visegrád Group states show them to be Germany’s most important trading partner, and their balance of trade in goods is in a state of equilibrium, while many euro area countries have recorded high trade deficits with Germany. The aim of this report is to display the trends in trade and investment between Germany and Central Europe, based on the example of the Visegrád Group. The author will also attempt to answer the question of whether the advancing economic cooperation between Germany and the V4 countries will lead to the further modernisation of those countries’ economies, or whether it will run the risk of leaving them in the ‘middle income trap’.

The End Of The Myth of a brot herly Belarus? Russian soft power in Belarus after 2014: the background and its manifestations

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński,Piotr Żochowski / Language(s): English

The Russian narrative on Belarus changed in 2014, when Russian expert circles and the government elite essentially redefined their perception of their Belarusian ally in the context of the conflict in Ukraine and the escalation of tensions between Moscow and the West. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who was distancing himself from Moscow’s aggressive policy towards Kyiv, finally ceased to be viewed as the only and sufficient guarantor of keeping Belarus within the sphere of Russian influence. This gave rise to growing conviction in Russia that Moscow controls Minsk to an insufficient degree; the instruments of control are the energy sector (oil and gas supplies), trade (preferences on Russian output) and the military sector (close co-operation between the armies of the two countries). As a result, actions to create socio-cultural soft power promoting the ‘Russian World’ values, which had previously been taken on a very limited scale, were intensified.

Bolesna adaptacja. Społeczne skutki kryzysu w Rosji

Author(s): Jan Strzelecki / Language(s): Polish

Rosyjska gospodarka znajduje się w kryzysie, który dla społeczeństwa okazał się szczególnie dotkliwy. Ze względu na wysoką inflację i spadek płac realnych kryzys pogorszył sytuację materialną wszystkich klas społecznych. Uderzył w bytowe podstawy najaktywniejszych politycznie segmentów wielkomiejskiej klasy średniej. Dla dużej części społeczeństwa oznacza trwałą degradację i konieczność koncentracji na fizycznym przetrwaniu w warunkach biedy i ubóstwa. Pogorszenie nastrojów społecznych, które nastąpiło wskutek kryzysu, powoduje niekiedy powstawanie punktowych protestów o podłożu bytowym. W większości społeczeństwo nie manifestuje jednak niezadowolenia, lecz adaptuje się do nowych warunków, koncentrując się na indywidualnych strategiach przetrwania poprzez ograniczenie konsumpcji. Taktyka władz mająca ograniczać prawdopodobieństwo kolejnych protestów polega przede wszystkim na wzmacnianiu aparatu represji i państwowej propagandy, co przyczynia się do atomizacji społeczeństwa i utrudnia jego samoorganizację.

Kryzys w Rosji. Degradacja modelu zarządzania gospodarką

Author(s): Maria Domańska / Language(s): Polish

Aktualny kryzys gospodarczy w Rosji jest warunkowany przede wszystkim politycznie. Stanowi on dowód poważnej dysfunkcjonalności modelu zarządzania sferą ekonomiczną, podporządkowanego partykularnym interesom elity władzy. Utrzymujące się do 2014 roku wysokie ceny ropy naftowej umożliwiały realizację tego modelu przy relatywnie niewielkich kosztach społecznych. Obecnie jednak, z uwagi na utrzymujące się niskie ceny ropy oraz brak wewnętrznych źródeł długofalowego wzrostu gospodarczego, Rosji grozi długotrwała stagnacja. Będzie ona prowadzić do nieuchronnej degradacji rosyjskiej gospodarki, a przede wszystkim – warunków życia społeczeństwa. Władze nie zamierzają jednak przeprowadzać reform strukturalnych, ich celem pozostaje konserwacja aktualnego systemu kontroli nad sferą polityczną i społeczną. Czy w tych warunkach możliwe jest w Rosji przesilenie polityczne? Czy władze powinny się obawiać „kolorowej rewolucji” lub buntu elit?

THE MENACE OF A 'BROWN' RUSSIA. Ethnically motivated xenophobia - symptoms, causes and prospects for the future

Author(s): Agata Dubas / Language(s): English,Polish

In late August and early September 2006, Kondopoga, a town of 40,000 inhabitants in Russia's Republic of Karelia, became the scene of ethnic riots. The pretext for the outbreak was one specific incident - a fight in a café between the local Russians and a group of Chechens and Azeris, in which two Russians were killed. Several days later, members of the nationalist organisation Movement Against Illegal Immigration arrived in the town and skilfullymanipulated public sentiments by organising rallies in which the demonstrators' demands included the expulsion of all Caucasian immigrants from the region. At night-time, property belonging to members of the Caucasian community was burned or destroyed. It was only several days later that the tense situation was calmed. This event soon took on a symbolic force and received a great deal of attention throughout Russia. For some, mainly Russian nationalists, Kondopoga became a 'hero city' and a harbinger of national revival, whereas for others, in particular human rights activists, it was a model example of the outbreak of openly chauvinistic sentiments among ethnic Russians. The events in Kondopoga, together with several other widely discussed incidents in 2006 (including the attack on 21 August in Moscow's Cherkizovskiy Market where most of the merchants were immigrants from Asia, and 10 people were killed and nearly 50 injured), put the problem of rising xenophobia in Russian society at the centre of attention. This paper focuses on the ethnic dimension of xenophobia, as understood as aversion, fear or hostility vis-a-vis members of other nationalities, as well as the related radical nationalist ideas founded on the concept of the dominant (and often discriminatory) role of the Russians in the Russian Federation, with reference to racism or neo-Nazism. This text primarily presents xenophobia as an enormous social problem in today's Russia, which is not being addressed at the moment, but is instead being exploited by both the authorities and radical nationalist groups. This paper attempts to describe and understand the causes of xenophobia and the reasons for the popularity of extremely nationalist views among ethnic Russians. It also seeks to estimate the scale of the problem and the potential threat it may create in the future. The first part describes the different manifestations of xenophobia in presentday Russia. It identifies the groups most exposed to ethnically motivated violence and persecution, as well as the most xenophobic communities, and discusses the scale of the problem and its specific characteristics in the context of Russian reality. The second part looks into the underlying causes of xenophobic sentiments among Russians, while the last chapters delve into the authorities' attitude towards the problem and seek to answer the question of whether radical nationalist ideas may in future come to dominate Russia's political scene.

The failure of integration. The CIS and other international organisations in the post-Soviet area, 1991-2006

Author(s): Wojciech Konończuk / Language(s): English,Polish

1. Institutional integration processes in the post-Soviet area have ended in failure. It proved impossible to transform the Commonwealth of Independent States into an instrument of real co-operation, even though Russia, which was the most interested in integrating the post-Soviet space, made repeated efforts to this end. The CIS never managed to accomplish its declared objectives and, from this point of view, it does not exist as an integration organisation and de facto never did. 2. Integration within the CIS framework was bound to fail from the start due to objective reasons, in particular the fact that Russia's political, economic, population and territorial potential greatly exceeded those of the other member states. Fifteen years on, the organisation is still nothing more than a forum for periodic top-level meetings that provide an opportunity for bilateral and multilateral consultations. The term 'CIS' has been replaced by 'the CIS area'. 3. As integration within the group of twelve states failed, Russia started to initiate the creation of smaller regional organisations of which it was also a member, such as the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Common Economic Space (CES). Co-operation within these structures remained largely superficial and ineffective, and their main objective was to preserve Russian political influence in the regions concerned. The practice of post-Soviet institutional co-operation proves that the former Soviet countries are still unable to establish effective integration structures, either in the 'twelve' format or in smaller groups. 4. Integration processes in the post-Soviet area failed because the foreign policy priorities of individual CIS members grew increasingly dissimilar, and because the CIS countries strove to become independent of Russia. Any international organisation established in the post-Soviet area in which Russia was a member would inevitably become dominated by Moscow. On the other hand, any organisation excluding Russia but with its centre in the CIS would be seen by Moscow as anti-Russian.

Demographic situation in Russia

Author(s): Leszek Szerepka / Language(s): English,Polish

Throughout the history of Russia, periods of deep chaos have been accompanied by demographic crises. This was the case during the Time of Troubles, or Smutnoye Vremya, in the seventeenth century, and during the period of wars and revolutions in the early twentieth century, which brought the Bolsheviks to power. Similarly, the break-up of the USSR also coincided with a demographic crisis. However, while the previous crises had been caused by factors such as war, famine, epidemics or repressive policies, and were followed by periods of rapid population growth once these factors had ceased to operate, the current crisis is systemic and structural. To a large extent, it has been occasioned by cultural factors such as changing family models and the roles of women in today's society. In Russia, the effect of these factors on population increase is exacerbated by excessive alcohol consumption, an culture of inadequate working conditions which leads to many accidents at work, and healthcare deficiencies (only c. 3% of the GDP is spent on healthcare annually). // In 2005, the Russian Academy of Sciences concluded a research programme entitled 'The demographic modernization of Russia, 1900-2000'. In the report it indicated that the Russian state had lost c. 140 million people in the twentieth century as a result of bad policies. This means that the present population of Russia would be larger by this number if the development of the state in the previous century had followed similar patterns to that of European states, and if human life had been respected in Russia as much as it was in Western Europe. According to Russian researchers, many current demographic problems in Russia stem from occurrences in the distant past. Development models are difficult to correct within a short timespan. All projections concerning Russia's demographic development predict that the country's population will continue to shrink until at least the middle of the twentyfirst century. The projections only differ as to the speed and nature of the population decrease. // When juxtaposed with the dynamic GDP growth and the government's ambition to reinforce Russia's international position, the demographic problems are a dissonance. The Russian political elite is concerned that if the negative demographic trends prevail, this may eventually stop the country's economic development. It is also worried that with its current population density, Russia will not be able to defend its vast territory and use it adequately. It is frequently emphasised that as a world power, the USSR had always remained among the top three most populous countries in the world after China and India. In 2000, the Russian Federation, as the legal successor of the USSR, dropped to sixth in this ranking, and in the mid-21st century it will struggle to remain in the top twenty. According to Russian analysts, a country with such a small population potential, disproportionate to its territory, will face difficulties preserving its status as a world power, and consequently in defending its international interests. The fact that Russia is a multinational state further complicates the situation. The country used to be dominated by ethnic Russians, but their percentage is shrinking systematically. In the future, this may affect both the country's cohesion and its prevailing cultural models. // The Russian authorities are aware of these threats; President Vladimir Putin mentions them regularly in his addresses to the nation. In his most recent speech, delivered on 10 May 2006, Putin said that the demographic crisis was the most important issue in Russia's internal policy. Demographic problems have been discussed by the parliament, the government and the Russian Federation Security Council. A document entitled 'A concept for the Russian Federation's demographic development to 2015' has been adopted. // The media cover the issue, frequently taking an alarming tone. However, in the policies implemented by the Russian authorities, improving the demographic situation has not been a genuine priority. The measures proposed have frequently been provisional, and have ultimately had little effect on demographic trends. Figures now available fully corroborate the pessimistic projections concerning Russia's demographic development which researchers had presented at the onset of the previous decade.

Wschodnia granica zewnętrzna rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej. Współpraca transgraniczna na nowej granicy wschodniej Unii Europejskiej

Author(s): Rafał Sadowski,Joanna Hyndle-Hussein,Miryna Kutysz,Bartosz Cichocki / Language(s): English,Polish

I. The new eastern border of the European Union // The European Union's new border with Eastern European countries, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, is approximately 3000 km long. It has vital meaning for the Union in terms of security as well as for social and economic reasons. Unlike the southern maritime border of the EU, the eastern land border poses a number of different challenges. These pertain, above all, to issues of ''soft security'' (i.e. smuggling, illegal migration, organised crime, etc.), but also to the fact that all the most important communication and trade routes connecting Europe with Eurasia cross this boundary. // The borderline goes through areas inhabited by people of similar cultural and historical backgrounds, who are, in a way, socially and ethnically related. It therefore plays a much greater role in social terms than the southern border. The northern part of Estonian-Russian borderland on the Estonian side is mostly inhabited by Russians, and in the southern part on both sides by the Setu ethnic group. A Belarussian minority lives in the border regions of Latvia (the Daugavpils and Kraslava regions), Lithuania, and Poland (the area around Bialystok and Biala Podlaska). On the other hand, Poles live in the western part of Belarus (the Hrodna and Brest districts) and Ukraine (the Lviv district). In turn, Ukrainians live in eastern Slovakia. The Trans-Carpathian region of Ukraine is partly inhabited by Hungarians. The EU border also divides communities which used to live in one country in Soviet times and have preserved social ties (the Baltic States' borders with Russia and Belarus). A characteristic of the areas on both sides of the new EU eastern border is its peripheral nature. Mostly rural communities whose economic indicators are much worse than in the rest of the country, they are also undersubsidised regions, with substantially higher unemployment levels than the country average, and lacking large industrial centres (except for the cities of Narva, Hrodna, Brest, Bialystok, Lublin and Lviv). This peripheral character contributes to the development of cross-border contacts and mutual attraction, especially in business terms. Cross-border trade, both legal and illegal, is an important source of income for local inhabitants.

The European Union and Moldova /// Relations between Turkey and the European Union /// European Prospects of the Western Balkans

Author(s): Jacek Wróbel,Adam Balcer,Stanisław Tekieli / Language(s): English,Polish

After the accession of Romania, scheduled for 2007, the European Union will directly border Moldova. As a result, the EU-Moldova relations, which Brussels has rather neglected so far, will gain increased importance. The assumption behind the EU's policy is that Moldova is not going to join the Union, though theoretically, such a development is not precluded. Chisinau does indeed aspire to join the European Union. The EU is interested in Moldova chiefly because of the threat this country may pose to the security of the Union's future south-eastern outskirts. This concern about security stems from Moldova's serious instability, and especially from the existence of the separatist Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, which is involved in various illegal or semi-legal businesses and provides a stronghold to crime. This paper deals with the EU policy towards Moldova and the multiple facets of this policy, the most important of which seems to be the preclusion of Moldova's accession in the foreseeable future. It also discusses Moldova's political responses to the EU policy and the country's own initiatives. Finally, this paper also covers the legal framework of the co-operation between Brussels and Chisinau, the Community's assistance to Moldova and its implementation, the EU policy towards the conflict in Transnistria and the Union's (current and projected) role in its settlement as well as the plans for future co-operation between the two sides.

The resource wealth burden - oil and gas sectors in the former USSR

Author(s): Agata Loskot-Strachota / Language(s): English

The former USSR area plays a great role in the international oil and gas market. Russia is a real gas giant, with the richest deposits of this material in the world. Russia is also the main exporter of natural gas to many European countries. Keeping a strong position in this market remains a priority for the Russian Federation's economic policy. Europe is a very attractive region because its demand for gas is expected to grow steadily, while its own gas production keeps decreasing. In the long term, the Far East will be an important market for Russian exports, too. According to estimates, demand there will grow even faster than in Europe. Caspian gas producers, for the time being, can not really compete with Russia in this field, and this status quo will most probably be preserved in the nearest future. The post-Soviet countries also have substantial oil deposits. Among CIS members, Russia has the richest oilfields; Kazakhstan comes second, with large proven deposits of petroleum. In the Eurasian market, raw materials coming from the former USSR area are the major alternative to oil produced by OPEC countries. Russia does not belong to the cartel, and during the last two years, when international oil prices remained high, it continued to substantially increase both the production levels and exports. European countries are the main consumers of Russian petroleum, yet in the future, Russia may strengthen its role in such markets as the USA, Japan and other countries trying to become less dependent on OPEC oil. A boost in production and exports by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, countries situated by the Caspian Sea, should also be expected in the next five years. The significance of this region for the international market is bound to grow when new oil transport routes, independent of Russia, are opened (see chapter Export potential of the post-Soviet region). This collection of papers attempts to give an accurate and clear description of the main characteristics and of the key problems pertaining to the oil and gas sectors in the former USSR. It is aimed at showing the wealth and production and export opportunities on the one hand and at outlining a number of problems that now limit the development of trade in energy materials in this region and might impede it in the future. These issues seem to be of particular importance in the context of the dilemmas facing the Polish and European energy security policy. This report consists of five studies, focusing on: the resources and export potential of the Commonwealth of Independent States countries, Russian policy towards the entire oil and gas sector in the former USSR area and in the countries of the former Eastern bloc, and the role the energy resources potential plays in Russian foreign policy. Also, the studies outline the situation of the so-called transit countries, i.e. the ones controlling major export pipelines for Russian oil and gas, discuss the importance of foreign direct investments for the oil and gas sectors, as well as the opportunities and dangers that natural resource wealth might pose to the development of CIS countries. In terms of geographic coverage, the studies pertain to both key oil or gas producers (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) and the important transit countries for energy resources from CIS area (Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). While working on this project, we used the generally available literature, statistical yearbooks, specialist press and agency and internet news bulletins. We also want to acknowledge the valuable comments from CIS countries oil and gas experts, whom we to talked to while working on this project.

A summary of the politico-economic changes taking place during Vladimir Putin's first term of office // Chechnya and Russia: The significance of the Chechen problem for contemporary Russia

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża,Iwona Wiśniewska,Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English,Polish

Following his rise to power in 2000, Vladimir Putin presented a comprehensive socio-economic program for the development of Russia through to 20101. This program was prepared by a team of economic experts from the Centre for Strategic Studies (CS S )2 led by St. Petersburg's German Gref. In spite of the fact that this document was never accepted in its entirety, and only its main assumptions were approved, as of 2000, short- and medium-term socio-economic government program have been based on the same principles.The medium-term goal of this development strategy through to 2010 was the reduction of the widening gap between Russia and developed nations. The long-term goal, on the other hand, was the restoration and strengthening of Russia's position as a leader on the global scale. The reforms of Russia's political system, social policy and the modernisation of the economy were intended to help achieve these goals.The aim of this study is to describe and analyse political and socio-economic reforms, as well as non-legislative changes initiated under Vladimir Putin's presidency. New reform activities will probably not be initiated over the six months remaining until the presidential elections. For this reason, it is already possible to summarise the changes achieved in the political, economic and social spheres during President Putin's first term of office.A description of the political and economic reforms and also of non-legislative changes, which took place in the Russian Federation over the past three and a half years, has been included in Part I of this study. The conclusion hereof attempts to summarise the actual achievements of President Putin's team, and to answer the question concerning perspectives of the reform process and factors determining the shape there of.

Konflikty zbrojne na obszarze postradzieckim. Stan obecny, perspektywy uregulowania. Konsekwencje

Author(s): Krzysztof Strachota / Language(s): English,Polish

1. Unresolved conflicts continue to smoulder in Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. "Para-states" have formed in most conflict-affected areas. These have grown to become permanent players in the region. In Chechnya, guerrilla fights continue in the wake of the Russian army's siege of the republic. The conflict in Tajikistan ended in 1997 and the normalisation process is currently under way. // 2. Each of these conflicts has entailed profound political, social, ethnic and economic changes, as well as affecting other spheres of life. Presently, it is impossible to return to the pre-conflict situation. The "para-states" have fortified their independence and are no longer controlled by the external powers on which they depended in the initial phases of the conflicts. // 3. Unresolved conflicts, including those of Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and, until recently, Tajikistan, have an adverse effect on the situation in the region. They hinder political and economic development of the affected countries, lead to the brutalisation of political life and breed instability by providing save havens for organised crime, terrorism, etc. They are also the cause of large-scale migration problems. However, with time, these negative effects become less and less turbulent. // 4. So far, attempts at solving most of the conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia) have failed to produce results other than cease-fires. Permanent settlement could not be achieved, neither through the use of force nor by way of negotiation. The power and independence of the "para-states", hard-line leaderships on both sides, and finally, military weakness of the metropolises consolidate the state of suspension. The conflict in Tajikistan was settled using political methods, and the normalisation process is progressing in a satisfactory manner. Chechnya has been conquered militarily by Russian troops and Moscow is now implementing its model of imposed "normalisation", but it does not have full control over the republic and cannot contain the growing problems induced by the conflict, such as the emergence of Chechen terrorism. // 5. Some of the negative consequences of the conflicts are gradually being abated by the evolution in Russia's policy towards them (Russia is gradually ceasing playing on the conflicts as foreign policy instruments and is shifting towards political and economic measures). Also instrumental to this are the increasing involvement of the US and, to a smaller extent, the EU, in regional security (as part of their struggle against terrorism), as well as the growing strength of state systems and the development of political and economic co-operation between the conflict-affected republics (for example, the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the TRACECA programme). In the longer term, these tendencies may also help in resolving the actual conflicts themselves.

2002 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine. Events, Results, Consequences

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English,Polish

On 31 March 2002, parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine. As expected, they were a major success for the centrist-rightist coalition focused around former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko. The communists emerged significantly weaker from the vote, and the "party of power" achieved a poor result. Yet, due to the mixed electoral law (half of the deputies were elected in single-mandate districts), the latter block, firmly supported by President Leonid Kuchma, resulted as the main force in Parliament. The results of particular parties and blocks were as follows: Viktor Yuschenko's Block received 23.57% of votes and 112 seats, the Communist Party of Ukraine - 19.98% of votes and 66 seats, the "For One Ukraine" block - 11.77% of votes and 101 seats, Yulia Tymoshenko's Block - 7.26% of votes and 22 seats, the Socialist Party of Ukraine - 6.87% of votes and 22 seats, and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) - 6.27% of votes and 24 seats. This shows how the mixed electoral regulations favour "For One Ukraine" and act against Yuschenko's block. One should note, however, that the latter gained the support of less than one quarter of voters.

Big business in the Russian economy and politics under Putin's rule /// The Russian power industry shortly before reforms /// Ukrainian metallurgy: the economic link in the oligarchic power system

Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska,Ewa Paszyc,Arkadiusz Sarna / Language(s): English,Polish

The multi-speed Baltic States. Reinforcing the defence capabilities of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

As regards defence policy, the Baltic states are usually treated by experts as forming a single unit. The reasons for this include a similar threat perception, similar military capabilities, and finally similar military modernisation programmes. However, the differences in their demographic and economic potentials as well as strategic cultures have resulted in them adopting different models of their armed forces.

Bałtowie wielu prędkości. Wzmacnianie potencjału obronnego Litwy, Łotwy i Estonii

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): Polish

As regards defence policy, the Baltic states are usually treated by experts as forming a single unit. The reasons for this include a similar threat perception, similar military capabilities, and finally similar military modernisation programmes. However, the differences in their demographic and economic potentials as well as strategic cultures have resulted in them adopting different models of their armed forces.

Odpowiedzialność karna w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka i Trybunału Konstytucyjnego

Author(s): Emil Śliwiński / Language(s): Polish

The publication explores the term of “criminal liability” (and the concepts relating to punishment) in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Constitution of the Polish Republic. The author analyses over 300 decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Tribunal, relating to the application of Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention, Articles 2–4 of Protocol no. 7 to the Convention, as well as Article 42 of the Polish Constitution, which attempt to establish a boundary between the act of punishment and the application of another, non-punitive sanction. The analysis is carried out in abstracto and in concreto with reference to several dozen Polish legal institutions, which can be perceived as punishments. Legal status as of August 1, 2022. The book is addressed to law scholars and law professionals: judges, lawyers, legal advisors and prosecutors, who every day have to decide if they are or are not confronted with punishment.