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До сих пор речь шла о семиотическом восприятии прошлого. Это восприятие отражается, по-видимому, на восприятии настоящего и будущего. Историческое восприятие прошлого противостоит космологическому. Историческое и космологическое сознания, может быть, не исчерпывают всех возможностей восприятия прошлого, но они могут быть представлены как антитетически противоположные.
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The articles in this issue can be divided into three groups. Krajewski’s article, Yong Cheng’s contribution, and a short note by Rudy Rucker, provide detailed mathematical analysis of Lucas-Penrose type arguments. In the second group, with articles by Arnon Avron, Stepan Holub, Panu Raaikiainen, and Albert Visser, the authors discuss the status and various methodological and technical problems of the anti-mechanist arguments. In essence: what does the problem of “minds vs. machines” really mean, and how can it, and how should it, be formulated? Moreover: How to evaluate the merit of arguments that mix formal mathematics and philosophical considerations? The third group consists of the articles that, while including issues from the other two groups, concentrate of more specific themes: an analysis of Georg Kreisel’s observation that it does not logically follow from the fact that a formal system is subject to the second Gödel incompleteness theorems that there are absolutely no means available to prove its consistency (Jeff Buechner); Per Martin-Löf’s proof that there are no absolute unknowables in constructive mathematics (V. Alexis Peluce); diagonal arguments and Chomsky’s approach to linguistic competence as contrasted with arithmetic competence (David Kashtan); and the role in the anti-mechanist arguments of difficulties in capturing the nature of natural numbers in formal systems (Paula Quinon).
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The alleged proof of the non-mechanical, or non-computational, character of the human mind based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is revisited. Its history is reviewed. The proof, also known as the Lucas argument and the Penrose argument, is refuted. It is claimed, following Gödel himself and other leading logicians, that antimechanism is not implied by Gödel’s theorems alone. The present paper sets out this refutation in its strongest form, demonstrating general theorems implying the inconsistency of Lucas’s arithmetic and the semantic inadequacy of Penrose’s arithmetic. On the other hand, the limitations to our capacity for mechanizing or programming the mind are also indicated, together with two other corollaries of Gödel’s theorems: that we cannot prove that we are consistent (Gödel’s Unknowability Thesis), and that we cannot fully describe our notion of a natural number.
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This paper reassesses the criticism of the Lucas-Penrose anti-mechanist argument, based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, as formulated by Krajewski (2020): this argument only works with the additional extra-formal assumption that “the human mind is consistent”. Krajewski argues that this assumption cannot be formalized, and therefore that the anti-mechanist argument – which requires the formalization of the whole reasoning process – fails to establish that the human mind is not mechanistic. A similar situation occurs with a corollary to the argument, that the human mind allegedly outperforms machines, because although there is no exhaustive formal definition of natural numbers, mathematicians can successfully work with natural numbers. Again, the corollary requires an extra-formal assumption: “PA is complete” or “the set of all natural numbers exists”. I agree that extra-formal assumptions are necessary in order to validate the anti-mechanist argument and its corollary, and that those assumptions are problematic. However, I argue that formalization is possible and the problem is instead the circularity of reasoning that they cause. The human mind does not prove its own consistency, and outperforms the machine, simply by making the assumption “I am consistent”. Starting from the analysis of circularity, I propose a way of thinking about the interplay between informal and formal in mathematics.
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Certain selected issues around the Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments which have received less attention are discussed.
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We argue that thinking of the man-machine comparison in terms of a contest involves, in a reasonable scenario, a criterion of success that is neutral. This is because we want to avoid a petitio principii. We submit, however, that, by looking at things this way, one makes the most essential human things invisible. Thus, in a sense, the contest approach is self-defeating.
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The disciplines of general philosophy, philosophy of language, and linguistics have in common an interest in saying what it is that we can infer: what meaning, what truth; and how those inferences are to be justified. To do this, philosophers and linguists have endlessly discussed the concepts of truth and of meaning, and also the means of inference and its degrees of reasonableness and reliability. These debates do not narrow down to definitive answers, rather they broaden and spread their concerns into ever-widening fields of investigation [...].
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The aims of this paper are to illustrate where previous attempts at the characterisation of slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have gone wrong, to provide an analysis which better captures their true nature, and to show the importance of achieving a clear definition which distinguishes this argument structure from other forms with which it may be confused. The first part describes the arguments of Douglas Walton (2015) and others, which are found wanting due to their failure to capture the essence of the slippery slope and their inability to distinguish SSAs from other consequentialist forms of argument. The second part of the paper puts forward a clear analysis of what is special about SSAs: it is argued that all SSAs, properly so-named, claim that reaching a certain conclusion, A, involves the negation of a thitherto accepted principle, P, and that that principle is necessary to argue against further conclusions (B, C, …, Z) which are considered unacceptable.
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In light of recent developments in argumentation theory, we begin by considering the account that Aristotle gives of what he calls sophistical refutations (elenchoi sophistikoi) and of the usefulness of being able to recognise various species of them. His diagnosis of one of his examples of the grouping that he labels epomenon is then compared with a very recent account of the matter, which, like Aristotle, calls on us to attribute a mistake or confusion to anyone who uses this kind of argument. From examination of three other examples that Aristotle himself supplies of epomenon, it appears that there are cases of inferences of this kind that we need not, and perhaps cannot, avoid making. The suggestion is made that this is because the whole family of what Peirce calls abductions have important characteristics in common with epomenon.
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Within the Gricean framework in pragmatics, communication is understood as an inferential activity. Other approaches to the study of linguistic communication have contended that language is argumentative in some essential sense. My aim is to study the question of whether and how the practices of inferring and arguing can be taken to contribute to meaning in linguistic communication. I shall suggest a two-fold hypothesis. First, what makes of communication an inferential activity is given with its calculability, i.e. with the possibility to rationally recover the assigned meaning by means of an explicit inference. Secondly, the normative positions that we recognize and assign each other with our speech acts comprise obligations and rights of a dialectical character; but this fact does not entail nor presuppose an argumentative nature in language or speech. Both inferring and arguing are needed, however, in the activity of justifying and assessing our speech acts.
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In this paper I argue that the notions of speaker’s reference and semantic reference—used by Kripke in order to counter the contentious consequences of Donnellan’s distinction between the referential use and the attributive use of definite descriptions—do not have any application in the interpretive interaction between speaker and hearer. Hearers are always concerned with speaker’s reference. Either, in cases of cooperation, as presented as such by the speaker or, in cases of conflict, as perceived as such by the hearer. Any claim as to semantic reference is irrelevant for the purposes of communication and conversation. To the extent that the purpose of semantic theory is to account for linguistic communication, there is no reason to take definite descriptions to have semantic reference.
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According to the quotational theory of meaning ascriptions, sentences like “‘Bruder (in German) means brother” are abbreviated synonymy claims, such as “‘Bruder (in German) means the same as ‘brother’”. After discussing a problem with Harman’s (1999) version of the quotational theory, I present an amended version defended by Field (2001; 2017). Then, I address Field’s responses to two arguments against the theory that revolve around translation and the understanding of foreign expressions. Afterwards, I formulate two original arguments against both Harman’s and Field’s versions of the theory. One of them targets the hyperintensionality of quotations and the other raises a problem pertaining to variant spellings of words.
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In this paper, I aim to characterize the pragmatist and anti-deflationist notions of truth. I take Habermas’s rather recent discussion (1999) and present the interpretation that his notion of truth relies on the reliabilist conception of knowledge rather than the internalist conception that defines knowledge as a justified true belief. Then, I show that my interpretation is consistent with Habermas’s project of weak naturalism. Finally, I draw some more general implications about the pragmatist notion of truth.
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Mõned aastad tagasi, ühe seminari käigus Quai Branly muuseumis nõudis Philippe Descola, et ma enda kohta selgitust annaksin. “Miks,” küsis ta, “oled sa säärane semiofoob?” Mulle ei meenu, kuidas ma täpselt vastasin, kuid ma mäletan rõõmu tema diagnoosi täpsuse üle. Ma olen tõepoolest paadunud semiofoob, ja selle üle uhke! Pealegi seisneb selles eriarvamuse tuum minu ja mu austatud kolleegi vahel, kes kõikide allikate põhjal on veendunud semiofiil. Me lähtume eri otstest: tema märkide maailmast, mis nõuavad tõlgendamist, mina maailmast, mis end meie jaoks oma vahetus kohalolus laiali laotab. Semiofiilia tõmbab ilmselgelt ligi uurijaid, kes tahaksid määrata iseend meistertõlgendajateks. See annab neile postamendi, mille otsas seista. Semiofoobia aga kontrastina ähvardab tõmmata postamendi nende jalge alt ära, kuid just samal põhjusel võimaldab meil pääseda vahetult juurde maailmale, millest meil on palju õppida, kui me vaid tähelepanelikud oleme. Nagu ikka, jõuab kogu asi välja küsimuse juurde tähendusest. Semiofiili vaikimisi eelduseks on, et tähendus võrdub tähistamisega. Seega ei saa märkideta olla tähendust. Minu semiofoobseks vastuseks on see eeldus küsimuse alla seada. Ma väidan, et tegusõnad “tähendama” [to mean] ja “tähistama” [to signify] ei ole sünonüümid. Tähendus ei seisne mitte märkide tõlgendamises, vaid maailma otseses tajumises. Ja asjad tähendavad midagi tänu viisidele, kuidas nad tõmmatakse tajumuslikult eluvormidesse.
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The purpose of the article is to identify the features of non-verbal etiquette signs in the context of international business etiquette of the XXI century. Methodology. The method of cultural analysis was applied (to identify the features of the representation of culture by means of intercultural communication in the context of business etiquette); method of structural, functional and system analysis (to identify the features of international business etiquette as a multi-component system); semiotic method (for the study of non-verbal international business etiquette as a complex sign system), etc. Scientific novelty. Business etiquette in the context of international communicative competence is investigated; analyzed an important component of international business etiquette - non-verbal etiquette as a complex system that functions in the global socio-cultural space and consists of non-verbal etiquette signs, relations between them, and non-verbal rules of international etiquette; the non-verbal international business etiquette is considered in a semiotic aspect. Conclusions. International business etiquette is a dynamic system, some aspects of which are constantly changing with the development of international business and globalization. However, despite the fact that cultural differences in business communication in the context of globalization trends in the world socio-cultural space are minimized, certain delicate aspects remain in force, which must be taken into account in intercultural communication. The study revealed that the rules of non-verbal international business etiquette and its semiotic system have remained unchanged for many centuries and are largely due to the specifics of national cultural codes. Intercultural skills are essential to achieve effective and productive international negotiations. Facial expressions, gestures, and other non-verbal cues characteristic of a particular culture are an important part of the international non-verbal business etiquette of the 21st century.
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Defining reality and the mechanisms people use to perceive it is a difficult and challenging task in this age of post-truth, where everything is relative, interpretable and dynamic, without generally accepted norms. However, there is a close relationship between the individual and the social environment. This binomial is a construction that integrates the human mind, body, spirit and environment. The continuous interaction between the individual and the social environment creates the reality that manifests itself as a continuous process of coding and decoding. The way we interpret a situation determines the consequences of our actions and even the way things can evolve, so starting from the wrong premises, from a wrong interpretation of a situation, people behave accordingly. Therefore in this paper I shall review the main aspects of the social construction of reality starting with the way the representation of the individual about the environment, society, world is formed from the perspective of neuroscience, social psychology, cognitive sociology.
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Defining reality and the mechanisms by which people perceive it is a difficult and challenging task in this age of post-truth, where everything is relative, interpretable, and dynamic, without generally accepted norms. However, there is a close relationship between the human and the social environment. This binomial is a construction that integrates the human mind, body, spirit and environment. The continuous interaction between the human and the social environment creates the reality that manifests itself as a continuous process of coding and decoding. But, the way we interpret a situation determines the consequences of our actions and even the way things can evolve, so starting from the wrong premises, from a wrong interpretation of a situation, people behave accordingly. Therefore, in this material starting from the way the representation of the individual is formed about the environment, society, world from the perspective of neuroscience, social psychology, cognitive sociology, the main aspects of how to construct reality will be reviewed.
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Ülevaates Jüri Talveti seitsmekümnenda sünnipäeva puhusest konverentsist kirjutas Brita Melts (2016: 329): Kultuurisemiootilise pilgu Talveti fenomenile heitis Peeter Torop. 1993. aastal Andaluusia Semiootikaassotsiatsiooni ajakirja Tartu semiootikakoolkonnale pühendatud erinumbris ilmunud hispaaniakeelse artikliga “Tartu kui märk” (Talvet 1993) sai Talvetist muuhulgas kultuurisemiootika vahendaja. Tartu–Moskva semiootikakoolkonna vastu tunneb hispaaniakeelne maailm rohkem huvi kui mõni muukeelne kultuur – ja see on Talveti, tema sõprussuhete, kontaktide, missioonitunde teene, et Tartu on jäänud märgiks tänini. Ettekanne rõhutas, et kultuur on mitmekeelseim süsteem ja tema universaalseim tunnus on võime end kirjeldada, ning kultuur on seda rikkam, mida rohkem enesekirjelduslikku keelt tal on. Talveti peamised keeled on lektori, luuletaja, ränduri, kriitiku, teaduse keel, tõlkimise keel (kojutoomine), vahendamise keel (eesti kultuuri eneseesitus), universaalne keel (esperanto). Sellest näeme, et Jüri Talvetil on päris mitmeid semiootika-suhteid. Püüame neile oma 2020. aasta suvel esitatud ja samas kirjalikult vastatud küsimustega täpsemalt jälile saada.
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Tekno-muusika on juba vähemalt kaks aastakümmet püsinud teiste levimuusika žanrite seas absoluutses tipus. Teknole on pühendatud lugematuid reive, festivale ja pidude sarju, rääkimata spetsiaalsetest ööklubidest, kus seda žanrit ainult mängitaksegi. On ilmne, et need, kellele tekno südamelähedaseks on saanud, mitte ainult ei kuula seda muusikat, vaid elavad seda (Ala 2017).
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It is seen that individuals are exposed to many stimuli in daily life. These stimuli contain many meanings and functions such as existing images and symbols. This is where Baudrillard's concept of simulation comes into play. Because many images can be obtained with such images. In this sense, the confusion of real world and images and virtual habituses are encountered especially in the playground. In this framework, games have become an industry and players have become customers in the simulation universe.
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