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Otkad je počela pandemija mnogi kažu „Ovo je dobra prilika da se dogodi X“ – gde je X nešto što su oduvek priželjkivali. Ali ovo nije ta prilika. Dosad smo krizu izazvanu korona virusom uglavnom tumačili iz dva ugla, epidemiološkog i ekonomskog, i u oba slučaja slika je bila sumorna. Verujem da isto važi i za pogled iz perspektive geopolitike.
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The paper reviews special electoral regulations designed to facilitate the parliamentary representation of national minorities in several countries. Several types of special measures are identified and two of them are addressed in detail: the exclusion of minority political parties from the electoral threshold and the reservation of special parliamentary mandates for minorities. The study contains information on electoral institutions in 16 countries, in five of them the electoral threshold is not applied to minorities, and in 11 there are reserved mandates. The approach of the subject is primarily from a formal institutional point of view, ie it is based on the analysis of the legislative documents as well as on secondary literature in the field, but within the limits of the possibilities is attempted a more substantial evaluation of the regulations, indicating the advantages and drawbacks of the systems in their functioning in practice.
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This Working Paper is summarizing the main empirical findings presented in the Author’s MA thesis. She defended her thesis at the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen (CIDIN), Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, in June 2006. Looking at the relationship between the Roma and the local authorities, we see that several issues are politicized and discussed in the public sphere. The objectives of this research can be formulated as follows: with this study it aims to make a contribution to the knowledge about social exclusion of the Roma - by describing social processes and explaining how social and political processes shape the relationship between the Roma and local authorities - and to make a contribution to the knowledge on the interaction between formal and informal institutions.
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The paper provides a historical-sociological investigation of post-communist dual citizenship policies in Central and Eastern Europe, proposing to conceive of citizenship as a means of state building. While dual citizenship policies in Western Europe generally took an inclusionary form, generated by the stringent need to incorporate and assimilate foreign immigrants, and to come to terms with their colonial and world expanding capitalist past, in Central and Eastern Europe they have essentially been differentialist, putting emphasis on ethno-cultural distinctions and privileged historical relationship with a state. In an attempt to synthesize the dominant motives governing the strategies chosen by these states, in the second part of the paper dual citizenship practices are inventoried according to a typology that reveals different state rationalities. Finally, an examination of asymmetries in dual citizenship aims both to further the state building argument, and to point to the tensions inherent in dual citizenship legislation.
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Between 18 May and 8 June, 2013 the authors have collected data from a representative sample of 1,232 Hungarians from Transylvania with the purpose to examine the political behaviour of the aforementioned community within the political spaces of both Hungary and Romania. While closely related to a research project (entitled 'Ethnic parties, voting behaviour') carried out within the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, the present research has extended its focus to Transylvanian Hungarians' voting behaviour outside Romania. This change of perspective has been necessary because on 26 May 2010 the Hungarian Parliament adopted the amendment to the 1993 Law on Hungarian citizenship by introducing the simplified naturalization procedure, thus enabling Hungarians from the neighbouring countries of Hungary to obtain Hungarian citizenship without residency. Moreover, the new Hungarian election law adopted in November 2011 allows Hungarian citizens without residency in Hungary to vote in the Hungarian Parliamentary elections (on candidates from national party lists). As a consequence, the political, or voting behaviour of Hungarians from Transylvania needs to be analyzed by taking into account this perspective as well.
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Ministri finansija evrozone okupljeni u Evrogrupi ne uspevaju da se dogovore o makroekonomski učinkovitom i koordinisanom fiskalnom odgovoru na snažan recesioni pritisak pandemije COVID-19. Bojimse da će jedini rezultat njihovih pregovora biti gromoglasna saopštenja i impresivne brojke kojima se skriva irelevantnost i nedovoljnost usaglašenih politika.
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„Strah je pasvord našeg vremena“, napisao je Džerard Padro (Gerard Padró i Miquel), profesor ekonomskih i političkih nauka sa Jejla, u svom eseju „Politika straha“ još 2007. godine. Imao je doduše u vidu autokratske režime koji se služe strahom da bi „izvlačili ogromnu ličnu korist od siromašnih“. Danas ovo važi i za sve ostale. U jednom kaišu stripa Čarli Braun, on mudruje: „Razvio sam sopstvenu filozofiju – plašiću se samo jednom dnevno“. Od dosetke do strašne stvarnosti mali je korak: italijanski sudija Đovani Falkone, koga je likvidirala mafija, kuražio se tvrdnjom da onaj ko se plaši umire svakodnevno, a ako se ne plaši samo jednom. Ovi citati su uvod u razmišljanje o erupciji straha izazvanog epidemijom korona virusa koja je u toku.
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MIKSER, Dušan Grlja: Čija čizma imperijalizma?; ŠTRAFTA, Aleksandra Sekulić: Dani bez datuma; ZID, Apoteka: Svaka slika postaje datum bez dana; VREME SMRTI I RAZONODE, Porša Olajviola: Električni tobogan
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Taking a look at the map it is clear that the countries of the Western Balkans (in this paper Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) are a geopolitically crucial part of Europe that is still missing from the European Union. For political, economic and infrastructural reasons, as well as for the European identity that the Union shares with the Western Balkans, it is vital to reanimate the spirit of the accession process in the region and in the European member states. The EU accession process needs adaptations and improvements to provide more clarity, support and realistic perspectives for the aspiring members. The perspective of the Western Balkans states on the further development of the accession process is comparatively under-represented in the day-to-day debate on EU enlargement. Therefore, representatives of five liberal parties who are active in the above-mentioned states have compiled this short paper on their opinion on possible adjustments in the accession process speaking from their own experience as policy makers.
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The popularity of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) is growing, as confirmed by its second place in the latest opinion polls, putting it on a par with Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s SDP, and that is raising great concern in Germany. The factors which have contributed to the AfD’s success include the public dissatisfaction with the incumbent government and the overlapping consequences of the Ukraine war and the inflation, climate and migration crises. The SPD-Green-FDP government coalition has presented different, often inconsistent approaches to these challenges. This has been coupled with Scholz’s deliberate passiveness as he shuns disputes inside the coalition in an attempt to improve his popularity ratings. This strategy has been successful up to a certain point, but is currently failing, and as a result the Chancellor is being blamed for the situation in the coalition. The AfD is benefitting from this, while also capitalizing on the fears most Germans share about the pace of the changes being implemented as part of the government’s climate policy. The party is also an advocate for voters who oppose the excessive influx of migrants to Germany and further support for Ukraine. Residents of the eastern federal states are particularly sensitive to these issues, where the AfD leads the polls with over 30%, and is viewed as a ‘catch-all’ or mass party, and not merely a fringe movement. This is particularly important given the upcoming elections to the parliaments of Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia scheduled for autumn 2024, which will be the final electoral test before the Bundestag elections in 2025.
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The official visit by Xi Jinping, the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Moscow on 21–23 March was a demonstration of his country’s continued support for Russia in its conflict with the West. It also served as confirmation that Beijing and Moscow will continue to work for the revision of the international order, and therefore they regard each other as indispensable partners. The decisions on economic cooperation announced at the summit, and their intended results, point to a growing asymmetry in Sino-Russian economic relations. Economically, Russia is falling into a deep trade dependence on the PRC, its technology, and the use of the Chinese currency (RMB) for international settlements. Beijing is also showing growing ambitions to shape the security situation in the post-Soviet area, something previously reserved for Moscow.
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In November 2022, China’s leader Xi Jinping embarked on a wide-ranging diplomatic campaign to prevent an uncontrolled breakdown of relations with the West, which should be considered a short-term success, at least in terms of reopening channels of communication with Western countries. This move has succeeded owing to Beijing’s instrumental use of the West’s hopes that it can secure China’s opposition to Russia’s possible use of weapons of mass destruction, and belief that China might be willing to mediate peace in Ukraine. The PRC’s actions have also met the expectations of its Western partners as they look for ways to stabilise relations with Beijing in the face of a looming global economic crisis. At present, we can say that the escalation has been halted, although the negative trend in China’s relations with the West –in particular with the United States – has not been reversed. Faced with economic and social challenges at home, the PRC will make further efforts to avoid economic confrontation with the West in the immediate future, by using more or less veiled suggestions of possible mediation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
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The war in Ukraine forcefully evoked the question of Turkey’s international position and political strategy in its neighbourhood, but also in its relations with the West and Russia. In the first months of the aggression, Turkey reaffirmed its alignment with the West and its fear of Russian power and ambitions. The war also provided an opportunity for another attempt, not only to strengthen but also to redefine Turkish-Western relations – the lifting of sanctions imposed on Ankara and a stronger consideration of its security interests. Both the relative weakness of Russia, as revealed in the first period of the war, and the absence of the desired breakthrough in relations with the West have reinforced traditional and contentious tendencies in Turkish politics. The first is the desire to exploit Moscow’s weakness to deepen cooperation with it on better terms, which is reflected in the development of trade, including cooperation on the grain supply problems caused by the war. The second is aggressively manifesting Turkey’s interests in NATO. Included in this attitude is Ankara’s demand that some Alliance countries drop sanctions on the import of selected armaments by Turkey and adopt its counter-terrorism perspective, including on Kurdish groups affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and radical opposition organisations (including the Gülen Movement/FETO) that enjoy protection or support in the West. A demonstration of this policy was and still remains – despite the formal launch of the accession process by Sweden and Finland at the Madrid summit –Turkey’s continuing threat to block the enlargement of the Alliance by its national parliament.
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On 5 June Kazakhstan held a constitutional referendum. Almost 80% of the voters (on a turnout of 68%) supported the adoption of a package of amendments that covered more than a third of the articles of the Basic Law (a total of 56 amendments were introduced). The declared goal of these reforms is to move the country from a ‘super-presidential’ system to a presidential republic in which the dominant position of the head of state is curbed by a strong parliament. The aim is to improve the management of the country and, in the strategic perspective, to strengthen Kazakh statehood. The fact that a new constitution was not adopted, but the existing one was modified, indicates that despite the wide range of changes, the intention of its creator – President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev – is not to build a new system, but to try to rebuild the existing one – a form of ‘perestroika’.
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Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has put the problem of how to manage the territories it has occupied onto the agenda. The first phase of the land operation did not lead to the capture of any significant areas, destroy the enemy’s army, force the Ukrainian government to flee Kyiv or suppress civil resistance, so it ended in failure – not only militarily, but also politically. The plans to force the inhabitants of the occupied territories into supporting the invaders and establish so-called ‘people’s republics’ there in order to further fragment the Ukrainian state have also ended in failure. The Kremlin, acting according to its modus operandi from 2014, has once again failed to take into account the changes in the attitudes of Ukrainian society, which does not see Russia as a civilizational alternative. Despite the risks associated with doing so, the locals have been protesting in large numbers, and cases of collaboration with the occupiers have been sporadic, which has made it impossible for the latter to exert their full and undisturbed control over the captured territories. And as the invaders see that their actions are ineffective, they take revenge on the civilians: they use terror and pacification, commit war crimes, and bring about humanitarian catastrophes in the occupied towns. The results of the operation so far show that its initial aim was to destroy the civilian population in the north, and to force the Ukrainians to cooperate in the south.
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The NATO member states do not have a common position concerning sending arms supplies to Ukraine. In January, under increasing military pressure from Russia, it was the US, the UK, the Baltic states, the Czech Republic and Poland which decided to deliver weapons and ammunition to Kyiv free of charge. Apart from being a political demonstration of solidarity, these supplies are intended to show to Russia that further military actions against Ukraine will incur increased costs. Moreover, these deliveries will strengthen Ukrainian ground forces if the Russian military operation in Donbass is expanded, but will not play a major role in the event of a full-scale invasion or missile attacks on Ukraine. Germany and some other member states are still rejecting arms supplies to Ukraine due to the fear of a further deterioration of the relations with Moscow.
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Turkey’s official attitude towards the Russia-Ukraine war is essentially in line with NATO’s position on the conflict (it has shown support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including in the UN, and provided material aid), but it has also avoided any actions or rhetoric which would clearly strike at Russia’s interests (no sanctions, its airspace remains open, etc.). Turkey has officially called for a political solution to the conflict (it initiated and hosted talks between the Ukrainian and Russian foreign ministers on 10 March). This policy resembles Ankara’s traditional approach: nurturing and protecting its extensive political, economic and military relations with both Kyiv and Moscow, while balancing and playing off the West’s and Russia’s interests without formally breaking ties with either side. In the current situation, this attitude appears as an expression of Turkey’s alarmed stance at the prospect that the conflict between Russia and the West might escalate; that the Turkish economy could collapse; and above all, that the war might have disastrous results for Turkey’s security in the Middle East.
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Chinese-Ukrainian relations are still defined by the events of 2014: the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Their consequences continue to block high-level political dialogue between Kyiv and Beijing, which Washington (and to a certain extent Moscow as well) also does not want. However, Sino-Ukrainian economic cooperation is expanding rapidly, with trade as its main driver. In 2019 the PRC became Ukraine’s most important trading partner due to the rapid rise in Ukrainian exports. Beijing itself is sceptical of Ukraine’s post-2014 political transition and its turn to the West, but it is interested in Ukraine’s military technologies, raw materials and agricultural potential. Since President Volodymyr Zelensky came to power, Ukraine has clearly been seeking a new opening in its relations with China, looking to widen the foreign policy space in the game between the West and Russia. However, it remains essentially excluded from financial and investment cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. Any significant deepening of relations between Kyiv and Beijing would first and foremost require a resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, the existing dynamic economic cooperation ‘under the radar’ of great-power politics still has considerable potential.
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Since Sputnik V was registered in Russia in August 2020, a major global promotional campaign for the vaccine has been under way with the involvement of the state authorities, led by President Vladimir Putin. Recent weeks have seen the intensification of such a campaign in the European Union, which has been backed up by disinformation activities targeting Western vaccines. However, Sputnik V production levels have been low so far, and they do not meet the needs of either Russia or the countries that have signed up for it. Russian announcements that its production would soon begin outside the country, including in Europe, have also failed to come true. Available information shows that about a third of all Sputnik V doses delivered to the market are exported. However, an analysis of the contracts signed and the volume of deliveries made places Russia at the bottom of the global list of producers and suppliers. Like other manufacturers, it has to keep choosing who to send vaccines to first (and in what quantities). In effect, Europe and Latin America have been the priority destinations for shipments abroad, although even those contracts are not being fulfilled on time. Bulk quantities of Sputnik V are unlikely to arrive in Europe before autumn 2021.
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International interest in Greenland has been growing for several years. This trend is a result of the increasing global competition between the US, China and Russia (including in the Arctic)and the acceleration of climate change, which is opening the region up to commercial and military activity. The independence aspirations of the island’s inhabitants are also of note in this context. Copenhagen seeks to maintain sovereignty over Greenland because it strengthens Denmark’s significance in the world and provides access to the Arctic. The US has increased its visibility in Greenland due to Chinese investments, and has even considered buying it. For Beijing, the island represents a potential area of economic expansion, providing a valid argument for China to become a major player in the Arctic. This growing interest pleases Greenlanders, who see balancing between Denmark, the US and China as an opportunity for new investments and building the economic foundations of sovereignty.
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