The Visegrad Group has fulfilled the tasks it was set when established. It seems unjustified, therefore, to ponder the need for it to function further. However, it is advisable to lay out new tasks, suitable for the group's operation in the new European reality - following EU accession of Visegrad countries in May 2004.
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1989 marked the beginning of a short but intense period of thorough geopolitical changes in the eastern part of Europe. The simultaneous weakening and liberalisation of the communist regime in the USSR led by Mikhail Gorbachev, the gradual limitation of Moscow’s economic and political support but also its shrinking control over the countries in the Soviet bloc and domestic political crises inside these countries led to a rapid downfall of the communist governments in Central-Eastern Europe. The military, economic and political structures of the Soviet bloc were dissolved within a timeframe of just two years, and the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist in December 1991, to be replaced with fifteen new independent states. The Russian Federation became the main successor to the USSR as it, albeit seriously weakened, inherited a large section of the Soviet empire’s resources and had to redefine its interests in the new post-Cold War European and global order that was being formed.
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The political, military and economic parameters of German power influence the vision of the international order that Berlin favours. Politically, Germany is a regional power in the EU with considerable diplomatic potential. Economically, it is the world's third largest power with growing global trade and investment links. At the same time, Germany's military potential is limited and the German strategic culture makes the country sceptical about the use of military instruments. Berlin is thus essentially interested in maintaining peace and stability, both in Europe and globally, and in developing diplomatic mechanisms to manage regional and global crises and conflicts. // The German preference for dialogue and compromise in conflict situations in the regional and global dimensions may increasingly pose a risk to maintaining the cohesion and credibility of NATO – both from the perspective of the USA and Germany’s allies from Central-Eastern and Northern Europe.
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The remarks presented in this paper show the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the techniques referred to as ‘active measures’. The renaissance of this question currently observable today has called their role in causing crises into prominence. This topic also deserves special treatment because the contemporary forms of active measures are largely based on patterns already known and described in the past. A historical perspective may help to assess and identify their covert mechanisms. The current problems with the aggressive actions of the Russian special services are enhanced versions of the old, to which new informational and communication technologies have contributed. // This text is an attempt to clarify this historical concept, by showing the institutional framework of the information-sabotage activities, the conceptual and organisational innovations made since the Cold War, and it also highlights the current challenges and how to identify them.
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Once the West’s ally, Turkey has been an ever more problematic partner in recent years. The Turkish leadership no longer views the alliance with the European Union and membership in NATO as based on shared values; rather, it is now merely a cherry-picked and shaky community of interests. Turkey is also increasingly alienated politically in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the regional developments which followed, Ankara has lost much of the influence it had built in region in previous years. Turkey’s growing international isolation is a consequence of the country ever more fully subordinating its foreign policy to the ideology of the ruling AKP. The world vision offered by that ideology does not square with the diagnoses of Turkey’s partners. The objectives it sets for Turkish foreign policy are incompatible with its partners’ expectations. Moreover, a foreign policy rooted in ideology is less flexible and less capable of adjusting to current international dynamics.
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Under Vladimir Putin's rule, Russia consistently and systematically expanded its activity in Asia, establishing closer political contacts with key countries in the region, rebuilding relations with former allies from Soviet times, and strengthening its presence in the Asian markets, in the energy sphere also. These activities were accompanied by intensive Russian propaganda, the message of which was that relations with the West can be restricted in favour of developing closer relations with Asian states.A justified question concerning the Russian Federation's realistic possibilities arises in this context: To what extent can it make Asia an alternative to theWest in geopolitical, economic and energy terms? Can Russia build an anti-Western alliance with Asian states? Is it able to reduce its dependence on the European market by developing its trade with Asia? Is it possible to redirect a substantial portion of Russian energy resource exports onto Asian markets? A presentation of the existing ties between Russia and theWest (here considered as the USA and the EU) will serve as a starting point for answering these questions. The following chapters will analyse Russia's opportunities in Asia in terms of geopolitical issues, the economy and energy
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Wojny informacyjne mają w Rosji długą tradycję. W ostatnich latach zostały zdefiniowane na nowo na gruncie teorii geopolityki, w myśl której są one środkiem do osiągania celów państwa w polityce międzynarodowej i wewnętrznej oraz jego geopolitycznej przewagi. Geopolityka dostarcza także ideologicznych uzasadnień strategii rywalizacji Rosji z Zachodem. W opozycji do ideologii liberalizmu promuje „neokonserwatywne mocarstwo postliberalne, walczące o sprawiedliwy świat wielobiegunowy, broniące tradycji, wartości konserwatywnych, prawdziwej wolności”. W kontekście rywalizacji „cywilizacji eurazjatyckiej” z „cywilizacją atlantycką pod przywództwem USA” objaśnia kryzys wewnętrzny na Ukrainie oraz przyczyny aneksji Krymu przez Rosję. // Tekst stanowi próbę zrekonstruowania zarysu teorii wojen informacyjnych wyłaniającego się z prac czołowych przedstawicieli rosyjskiej geopolityki, Igora Panarina i Aleksandra Dugina, a także jej praktycznego zastosowania podczas operacji krymskiej.
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Under Vladimir Putin's rule, Russia consistently and systematically expanded its activity in Asia, establishing closer political contacts with key countries in the region, rebuilding relations with former allies from Soviet times, and strengthening its presence in the Asian markets, in the energy sphere also. These activities were accompanied by intensive Russian propaganda, the message of which was that relations with the West can be restricted in favour of developing closer relations with Asian states. A justified question concerning the Russian Federation's realistic possibilities arises in this context: To what extent can it make Asia an alternative to theWest in geopolitical, economic and energy terms? Can Russia build an anti-Western alliance with Asian states? Is it able to reduce its dependence on the European market by developing its trade with Asia? Is it possible to redirect a substantial portion of Russian energy resource exports onto Asian markets? A presentation of the existing ties between Russia and theWest (here considered as the USA and the EU) will serve as a starting point for answering these questions. The following chapters will analyse Russia's opportunities in Asia in terms of geopolitical issues, the economy and energy.
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Of the re-integration processes currently taking place in the former Soviet Union, the formation of a Russian-Belarusian so-called 'Union State' is one of the most advanced. A customs union was formally announced between the two countries as early as 1995 and the process of constructing the Union State itself was launched in December 1999. However, both events were largely driven by the perceived need to match societal demands, without much concrete action and the Union State remained largely 'virtual'. Only in the last few years has the Russian initiative allowed for moving from symbolic gestures to political action and since late 2002 debate and policy have intensified on specific issues of economic and political co-operation. However, despite such advances in the integration process, its objectives remain vague and there is little or no agreement on the principles that should govern the process. Furthermore, current bilateral relations questions still dominate the dialogue. The project seems at present to be driven mainly by the political interests of both countries' presidents and also, to a lesser extent, by the interests of business, political, military and security elites, each apparently motivated by self- and group-interest in the emerging dialogue of integration. In contrast to EU integration, the societies of the two countries involved appear to have had little or no say in the process. Thus, several questions naturally arise. What is the real nature of such integration? What motivates the parties involved? What stage has the process reached? What likely future course will it take? What might be the consequences of it for Belarusian independence? Answers to these questions should ultimately determine the stance and policies of the enlarged EU in this area.
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It is generally believed that one sign that the secret services are doing their job well is that the media says nothing about them. In this respect, Russia is a special case: the services receive an excess of media coverage. This is only partly due to the media’s natural interest in an attractive subject, as well as the services’ own selfpromotion (although that is increasingly true around the world). In fact, it is a symptom of Russia’s information warfare, in which the special services’ public image is just one block in building the appearance of a strong state and a strong government. It also justifies and legitimises the high position which the services and elite members of the institutions of force enjoy in the Russian Federation’s political system. However, this artificial, mythologised image of the services conflicts with their non-public practices. These are revealed when their cover is blown, when journalists investigate criminal scandals involving the services, when controlled and uncontrolled leaks of compromising information take place, and when the opposition publicises cases where the special services violate fundamental rights and civil liberties – something they often do under the pretext of fighting the ‘fifth column’ of the West, international terrorists and foreign spies. This produces two different images of the services: the official one and the common one. The former presents the services as professional, patriotic and a stronghold of traditional values, Russia’s ‘sword and shield’; the latter shows them as pampered by the regime, lawless, corrupt and undisciplined, involved in brutal competition with one another, bureaucratised and criminalised.
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Od marca 2014 roku rosyjska gospodarka zmuszona jest funkcjonować w warunkach sankcji, którymi objęta została przez USA, Unię Europejską i wiele innych państw świata zachodniego w odpowiedzi na agresję na Ukrainę i aneksję Krymu. Sankcje polegały m.in. na wprowadzeniu szeregu ograniczeń współpracy gospodarczej Federacji Rosyjskiej z państwami zachodnimi. Najmniej dotkliwe ekonomicznie, mające jednak znaczenie prestiżowe, były sankcje o charakterze dyplomatycznym, w konsekwencji których Rosja została wykluczona z formatu G8 – grupy najbardziej wpływowych państw świata, zawieszone zostały jej negocjacje akcesyjne z Organizacją Współpracy Gospodarczej i Rozwoju, a przywódcy państw zachodnich początkowo powstrzymywali się od oficjalnych kontaktów z rosyjskimi władzami. Nałożone restrykcje ponadto pozbawiły Rosję dostępu do środków organizacji międzynarodowych, m.in. Bank Światowy i wszystkie jego agendy zawiesiły finansowanie nowych projektów w Rosji, podobną decyzję podjął Europejski Bank Odbudowy i Rozwoju. Rosyjska gospodarka objęta została także sankcjami sektorowymi, które m.in. limitowały dostęp do rynków kapitałowych największym bankom państwowym Rosji, a także kilku państwowym spółkom naftowym i zbrojeniowym; wprowadzały również zakaz eksportu do Rosji uzbrojenia i towarów podwójnego zastosowania; ponadto ograniczały dostęp do wybranych technologii i usług wykorzystywanych w sektorze wydobycia ropy naftowej.
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Po roku od zwycięskiej ofensywy i ogłoszeniu kalifatu Państwo Islamskie krzepnie jako organizacja terrorystyczna mająca armię i parapaństwo, a tym samym kruszy się wątły porządek na Bliskim Wschodzie. Świat fascynuje się fenomenem Państwa Islamskiego, nie zauważając, że Bliski Wschód przeżywa kryzys i właśnie to jest zasadniczym wyzwaniem. PI jest uosobieniem i jednym z przejawów, a nie przyczyną problemów regionu. Bliski Wschód, jaki znamy, przestaje istnieć; zanikają granice i państwa (Irak i Syria), powstają nowe twory parapaństwowe, pojawiają się nowi gracze (od PI po Kurdów), rośnie pokolenie nieznające starego porządku i poszukujące nowych, radykalnych idei i recept. Zanikanie zachodniego/amerykańskiego parasola bezpieczeństwa stymuluje regionalną proxy war i próby gruntowej zmiany postkolonialnego porządku przez regionalne mocarstwa (Iran, Turcję). // Dla Zachodu obawy o Państwo Islamskie, to cień obaw o przyszłość całego Bliskiego Wschodu oraz świadomość, że używane w ostatnich dekadach wobec regionu zarówno twarde (interwencje w Iraku), jak i miękkie (promocja zachodnich wartości i modelu rozwoju) metody nie działają.
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According to the European Council decision of February 2011, the process of creating the European Union’s internal gas market should be completed by the end of 2014. Therefore, it is worth summarising the changes which have taken place in the gas markets of Central Europe so far. The past few years have seen not only a period of gradual ‘marketisation’ of the national gas sectors, but also the building of new gas infrastructure, a redrawing of the gas flow map, and changes in the ownership of the Central European gas companies. Another change in Central Europe is the fact that individual states and companies are moving away from their traditional focus on their national gas markets; instead, they are beginning to develop a variety of concepts for the regional integration of Central European markets. This publication attempts to grasp the main elements of the ongoing transformation of Central Europe’s gas markets, with particular emphasis on the situation in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.
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This reform of the Bundeswehr, launched in 2011, is the latest of the three decisive stages in the post-war transformation of the German armed forces. The reform aims at “constructing” the armed forces anew in the political, military and social dimensions.The present paper presents the evolution of the role of the armed forces in German foreign and security policy and the ongoing process of “constructing” a new Bundeswehr. It analyses the process of redefining the objectives and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s participation in international operations, its current military transformation, and changes in its image and social identity. It also presents the implications of this broader transformation for political and military.
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Rozpoczęta w 2011 roku reforma Bundeswehry to jeden z trzech przełomowych etapów w powojennej transformacji sił zbrojnych RFN. Ma na celu „skonstruowanie” na nowo niemieckiej armii w wymiarze politycznym, wojskowym i społecznym. Niniejszy tekst przedstawia ewolucję roli sił zbrojnych w polityce zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa RFN i proces „konstruowania” nowej Bundeswehry.W tekście omówiona została redefinicja celów i zasad zagranicznego zaangażowania Bundeswehry, kierunki przekształceń wojskowych, zmian wizerunku i społecznej tożsamości armii oraz konsekwencje tak szeroko pojętej reformy dla współpracy politycznej i wojskowej w ramach NATO i UE.
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1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. The fighting has become less intensive every year, and the militants, worn out by years of warfare, are unable to take the initiative and seriously challenge the federal troops stationed in Chechnya. However, even if the militants have lost strength, this does not mean that the conflict is over. The region's history and the increasingly tense situation in the other Caucasian republics bordering Chechnya suggest that instability will probably continue for many more years.2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. At present, it is not only a Russian-Chechen conflict, but also an internal clash between the separatist militants and those Chechens who are co-operating with Moscow. The conflict also has an increasingly apparent social background. Finally, the militants' ideology has also changed: today they are fighting not so much for national liberation as for the Islamic cause.3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. The latter seek to 'liberate' the entire North Caucasus and establish sharia law in the region. 354. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism. Today, it manifests itself not through armed struggle, but through demands for ever-wider autonomy within the Russian Federation ('hidden' separatism). Such demands have been raised by the formally pro-Russian government of Chechnya, led by Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. The objective is to acquire real, rather than formal, independence from Moscow, especially in the economic sphere. An analysis of the current situation in the republic leads to the conclusion that this objective has already largely been achieved; today Chechnya in many areas remains outside the Russian legal system and enjoys extensive internal autonomy. 5. A renewed outbreak of the armed conflict in Chechnya seems unlikely in the immediate future, the main reason for this being that the Chechen people are tired of the long war. In the longer term, however, it appears inevitable that the Chechens will rise against Moscow again, fighting either for national liberation or for Islam. In the former case, the movement will be probably led by the current, formally pro-Russian government. However, it is also possible that by that time, the Caucasian Islamists will have gained enough strength to become the driving force behind a new, massive uprising against Russia, whose objective will be to create an Islamic state in the North Caucasus.
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Russia’s long-term goal is to prevent the reunification of the Korean peninsula under the aegis of the United States and to weaken the US ’s position in the region. Its short-term goal is to avert the danger of an outbreak of armed conflict on the peninsula and the possible collapse of North Korea. Russia’s support for the reunification of the two Korean states is purely declaratory; in practice the Kremlin is striving to maintain the political status quo on the peninsula. At the same time, Russia wants to maximise its influence by developing economic relations and maintaining political contacts with both Koreas. Moscow does not view the denuclearisation of North Korea as one of its priorities. Its approach to Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is instrumental; in Moscow’s eyes, although the program poses certain risks for Russia, it also opens a number of opportunities. The course of the crisis so far has demonstrated that Russia does not have sufficient tools to influence the course of events. As a consequence, it has had to accept a role as China’s ‘junior partner’ in the Korean issue.
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The Kremlin’s foreign policy is subordinate above all to the domestic political aims of the ruling elite. The most important of these is the maintenance and legitimistaion of the Chekist-kleptocratic model of feudalism. In this model, which is fundamentally opposed to the Western model of liberal democracy, the state is the de facto property of a small group of decision-makers, and the rules of international interactions are dictated by the logic of the ‘zero-sum game’. // The Kremlin’s confrontational approach to the West – at the political, economic, social and propaganda levels – is not a transitional phenomenon, but rather a permanent, strategic Leitmotiv of Russia’s foreign policy. It results from the intrinsic features of the Russian authoritarian regime, and from the mentality of the ruling elite included within it. The latter is largely a product of a particular type of society and of the specific path of the state’s historical development. In such conditions, is any real normalisation of relations between Russia and the West possible?
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In 2000, Vladimir Putin came to power after nearly a decade of the rule of the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin. As prime minister, and later as a candidate for president, Putin announced that he would reform the state. The main assumptions of this reform were presented during a congress of the pro-Kremlin Unity movement, in Putin's address entitled 'Russia at the turn of the millennium' which was delivered on 29 December 1999, and later in a open letter to voters published on 25 February 2000. Both declarations were rather general, but they gave a clear picture of the principal directions of and priority areas for the future president's efforts: they outlined Russia's development path as pro-market and democratic.Nearly seven years have passed since Vladimir Putin came to power, a time for a summary of his achievements. In a way, Vladimir Putin has partially delivered on his initial declarations; indeed, Russia has undergone a deep transformation. However, when seen in the light of the president’s initial promises, the changes appear to be no more than 'counter-reforms', because instead of putting into practice the policy he outlined seven years ago, they have largely followed a different, if not entirely opposite direction.
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Even though the economic crisis proved harmful to the Russian economy and people's living standards, it has nonetheless failed to make the elite revise its policy. Despite some problems, the government has managed to sustain economic and political stability, thanks to the reserves it amassed in the times of prosperity, and to the propaganda campaign that protected it, above all Vladimir Putin. The crisis failed to force the elite to implement deeper structural and political reforms. Moreover, it has actually reinforced existing tendencies, such as state control over the economy and its oil-oriented character, the elite's economic expansion at the expense of private businesses, and the preservation of political power. Thus, the crisis has so far failed to dismantle Putinism, indeed quite the reverse - it has in fact contributed to its becoming 'set in stone'.
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