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Business under supervision – pathologies serving the system of power in Russia

Author(s): Maria Domańska,Piotr Żochowski / Language(s): English

The relations between Russia’s authorities and business circles are subordinated not so much to rational economic calculations as to the interests of political elites. The key interest in this case is maintaining the current model of government. The formal and informal supervision of business by law enforcement agencies is an important element of Russia’s economic reality. Despite the rhetoric of high-ranking officials, intended to suggest that the state is taking care of businesspeople’s interests, it is evident that there is no will to devise a systemic solution to the most urgent problems, including the state institutions’ disrespect for the rights of ownership.

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Combating corruption in Ukraine – awaiting the results

Author(s): Piotr Żochowski,Marta Jaroszewicz / Language(s): English

Systemic corruption has been the dominant problem of an independent Ukraine for more than two decades. The takeover of the state by a political-business group led by Viktor Yanukovych had been one of the principal causes for large-scale street protests during the Revolution of Dignity. Following the 2014 power shift, slogans calling for combating corruption and cleaning up the elites have featured among the most important priorities announced by President Petro Poroshenko and two consecutive prime ministers – Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Volodymyr Groysman. Moreover, the fight against corruption remains the West’s main condition to support Ukraine.

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The NSA: the impact of the wiretapping scandal on German-American relations

Author(s): Marta Zawilska-Florczuk,Kamil Frymark / Language(s): English

Edward Snowden revealed that America’s National Security Agency (NSA) had tapped Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone and had collected date en masse. This has caused the largest crisis of confidence in relations between Germany and the US since the Iraq war. Due to the technological advantage which American intelligence services have, Germany wishes to continue close co-operation with the US but is making efforts to change the legal basis of this co-operation dating back to Cold War times.Berlin would like to secure part of provisions similar to the Five Eyes alliance – agreements signed between the US, the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia in the second half of the 1940s, aimed at intelligence sharing and a ban mutual bugging. This could spell the end of the last (not including the military presence) relic of Germany's dependence on the US which emerged following World War II and took shape in the shadow of the Cold War. The process of Germany's emancipation in trans-Atlantic relations, which began after Germany's reunification, would be complete. The US is however opposed to such far-reaching changes as it is interested in continued co-operation with Germany without limiting it. Were it not to sign agreements satisfactory for Berlin, this would lead to a protracted crisis of confidence in German-American relations.

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Big business in Belarus - its genesis, conditions and prospects

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English

Over the past ten to twenty years, Belarus has seen a steep rise in the number of local dollar millionaires. This has somewhat undermined the myth of an egalitarian model of society promoted through the Belarusian state propaganda.There is a small group of businessmen among the top earners who, in exchange for their political loyalty and their consent to share profits with those in power, have enjoyed a number of privileges that allow them to safely conduct business in an environment typically hostile to private enterprise. The favourable conditions under which they are operating have enabled them not only to accumulate substantial capital, but also to invest it abroad. However, since such businesses are seen as providing a financial safety net for the regime, in 2011 and 2012 some of their directors received an EU travel ban, while their companies were subjected to economic sanctions by Brussels. At the same time, fearing that Belarus’s big business could become powerful enough to influence the country’s political scene (as has been the case in Russia and Ukraine), Alexander Lukashenka has actively prevented such players from becoming too independent. Consequently, Belarus has so far not developed its own elite class of oligarchs who would be able to actively influence government policy. The current informal agreement between the government in Minsk and big business has proved stable and is unlikely to change in the near future. Nonetheless, a reordering of state power giving Belarus’s big business significant political influence would be possible should Mr Lukashenka lose power in the next presidential election.

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Turbulence ahead: disputes within the Russian ruling elite are gathering force

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English

The last month has seen a public confrontation between Igor Sechin, the president of Rosneft, and Arkady Dvorkovich, the deputy prime minister, concerning the consolidation of the energy sector. This is the latest in a series of disputes between the Kremlin & businessmen from Putin's inner circle on one side, and the government & Prime Minister Medvedev on the other.These disputes have been wide-ranging in nature, concerning economic policy, the scope of competency of individual members of the elite, but also the 'tough line' adopted by the Kremlin since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency.The Kremlin, which is still the main decision-making centre in Russia, has been effectively forcing its opinions through in its short-term disputes with the government. However, a new element in the ongoing conflicts, which is unfavourable to President Putin, is their exceptional strength, their much more public nature, and their wide range (which has included criticism of the president himself) and ever-changing context, especially the worsening socio-economic situation. These conflicts have been overlapping with signs of dissent among Putin’s business supporters, and their declining political willingness to support the leader unconditionally. The Kremlin's response to the unrest consists of intensifying efforts to discipline the elite and weakening those groups in which Vladimir Putin has limited confidence. The elite’s support is crucial to the stability of his government; to maintain this support, the Kremlin is ready to introduce restrictive and repressive actions against both parliamentarians and government officials. In the short term, such a policy will force the Kremlin’s supporters back into obedience, but fears of a further increase in repression are also starting to be expressed on the sidelines.

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The internet in Russia: the cradle of civil society

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English

In the last decade, along with economic and technological growth, Russia has seen a dynamic development of the internet. Today the net is an everyday tool of work, information and entertainment for 40% of Russians – the most educated, active and affluent part of the society. The spread of the internet (known in Russia as the Runet) has, in turn, brought about significant political and social consequences. With the political and social sphere in Russia strictly controlled by the government, most of this activity has moved to cyberspace. The internet has become an alternative to the state-controlled media, a site for the free exchange of views and a home to numerous social initiatives. In this way, it has become a school of citizenship for Russians, and a kind of ‘test tube’ that has spawned social and political activity. This activity went beyond cyberspace in the election period in 2011/2012, and turned into massive street protests.The potential of the internet has also been used by the Russian government, both to shape public opinion (via loyal online media) and to monitor civil initiatives, especially opposition ones. The state has many instruments of technical control and supervision of the internet and its users’ activity. This control was used in the election period 2011/2012, when selected sites were blocked and pressure exerted on independent websites. These actions were a warning sign from the government, aimed at discouraging internet users from any opposition activity. However, it does not seem feasible that any restriction of such activity can be effective. The scale of this activity is now enormous, and attempts to censor the net and resorting to repression against internet users on a wider scale would only fuel resentment towards the government.

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Systemic crisis in Alexander Lukashenko's regime

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English

Measures undertaken by the Belarusian government in the areas of the economy, internal affairs and foreign policy in recent months have proven increasingly ineffective. Despite the deteriorating macroeconomic situation, Minsk is not implementing the reforms necessary to combat the crisis and its activity is limited only to feigned actions and administrative regulations. As a result, the economic situation is worsening but the chances of obtaining external loans as support, for example from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are decreasing. At the same time there is mounting fear among the regime of social unrest, therefore by raising salaries of the least well-off groups of citizens it is trying to compensate for the increased costs of living. On the other hand, the government is extending the scope of control over society and competences of enforcement bodies.

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'The power gained, we will never surrender' Russian ruling elite versus the succession and economic crisis

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English,Polish

Even though the economic crisis proved harmful to the Russian economy and people's living standards, it has nonetheless failed to make the elite revise its policy. Despite some problems, the government has managed to sustain economic and political stability, thanks to the reserves it amassed in the times of prosperity, and to the propaganda campaign that protected it, above all Vladimir Putin. The crisis failed to force the elite to implement deeper structural and political reforms. Moreover, it has actually reinforced existing tendencies, such as state control over the economy and its oil-oriented character, the elite's economic expansion at the expense of private businesses, and the preservation of political power. Thus, the crisis has so far failed to dismantle Putinism, indeed quite the reverse - it has in fact contributed to its becoming 'set in stone'.

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The invisible hand... of the Kremlin. Capitalism 'a la russe'

Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): English,Polish

This study describes the two main economic processes observed in Russia during President Vladimir Putin's second term; renationalisation, and the concentration of economic assets.As a result of these processes, the share of state-owned property has increased and the position of the state in the economy has strengthened. According to the authorities, the wide-range renationalisation of the assets and the construction of superholdings based on the state enterprises are intended to boost Russia's potential and stimulate the development of the whole economy. However, in practice the current ruling elite are using these superholdings to strengthen Russia's position on the international arena and to promote their vested interests.

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Chechnya: Between a Caucasian Jihad and 'hidden' separatism

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English

1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. The fighting has become less intensive every year, and the militants, worn out by years of warfare, are unable to take the initiative and seriously challenge the federal troops stationed in Chechnya. However, even if the militants have lost strength, this does not mean that the conflict is over. The region's history and the increasingly tense situation in the other Caucasian republics bordering Chechnya suggest that instability will probably continue for many more years.2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. At present, it is not only a Russian-Chechen conflict, but also an internal clash between the separatist militants and those Chechens who are co-operating with Moscow. The conflict also has an increasingly apparent social background. Finally, the militants' ideology has also changed: today they are fighting not so much for national liberation as for the Islamic cause.3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. The latter seek to 'liberate' the entire North Caucasus and establish sharia law in the region. 354. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism. Today, it manifests itself not through armed struggle, but through demands for ever-wider autonomy within the Russian Federation ('hidden' separatism). Such demands have been raised by the formally pro-Russian government of Chechnya, led by Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. The objective is to acquire real, rather than formal, independence from Moscow, especially in the economic sphere. An analysis of the current situation in the republic leads to the conclusion that this objective has already largely been achieved; today Chechnya in many areas remains outside the Russian legal system and enjoys extensive internal autonomy. 5. A renewed outbreak of the armed conflict in Chechnya seems unlikely in the immediate future, the main reason for this being that the Chechen people are tired of the long war. In the longer term, however, it appears inevitable that the Chechens will rise against Moscow again, fighting either for national liberation or for Islam. In the former case, the movement will be probably led by the current, formally pro-Russian government. However, it is also possible that by that time, the Caucasian Islamists will have gained enough strength to become the driving force behind a new, massive uprising against Russia, whose objective will be to create an Islamic state in the North Caucasus.

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A pseudo-multi-vector policy. Moldova under the Socialists

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): English

In November 2019 a new government took power in Moldova under Ion Chicu as prime minister. Formally non-partisan, the new cabinet is in fact controlled by President Igor Dodon and the pro-Russian Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM). The establishment of this government brought an end to the five-month political experiment of Maia Sandu's coalition government, which was composed of the pro-Western ACUM bloc and the Socialists. In essence, the takeover of power by the latter means a halt to any real reforms, a worsening of relations with the West, and a far smaller chance that the legal proceedings currently underway into the country's biggest corruption scandals will have a positive outcome. Also, the multi-vector foreign policy declared by the government and President Dodon, which is aimed at maintaining good relations with both Russia and the EU, will in practice increase the Kremlin's influence in Moldova.Although President Dodon has gathered quite a significant amount of power, his situation remains uncertain. He does not control the parliamentary majority, and is forced to rely on the support of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), which has been weakened by the crisis. The main challenge for Dodon is the presidential election which is scheduled for the end of this year. However, the weak and increasingly fragmented pro-European opposition plays into the hands of Dodon and his group.

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I have the right to know! - Report on transparency of local selfgovernments on example of capital city Podgorica, Kotor and Pljevlja

Author(s): Mira Popović / Language(s): English

The right of citizens of Montenegro to information of public importance is guaranteed by legal framework. However, in practice, local self-governments still do not show sufficient level of responsibility and transparency in work. This results in often unnecessary complication of citizens’ lives during their efforts to solve numerous current and existential issues, but also hinders overall reform processes and calls into question their legitimacy. Local self-governments still have numerous deficiencies in the part of access to information of importance for citizens, which brings them into a bureaucratized labyrinth, that takes away important time and other resources from parties and bodies of public administration. Considering benefit and awareness of citizens, both those who were or will be parties in proceedings before bodies of state administration or local self-government, it is necessary that work of local self-governments is rendered more transparent which includes also far faster and better availability of data and documents prescribed by laws on municipalities’ webpages. Reform processes in Montenegro, unfortunately, do not progress in a desired pace, hence, even in this area, we identify numerous deficiencies in fulfilment of obligations of local self-governments, especially in the part of transparency of work that is at the same time also one of efficient manners of prevention but also fight of corruption. Numerous reports of international actors and civic sector in Montenegro indicate that even the system established by the Law on Free Access to Information is insufficiently defined in part of monitoring and enacting supervision over respect of the same, and passivity of local self-governments to implement this Law, especially to proactively post information on their work on official Internet pages is also aggravating. Report on transparency of local self-governments, with the focus on municipalities of Kotor, Pljevlja and Podgorica, was created within the framework of project ‘I have the right to know – responsible municipalities in the service of citizens’ that is financed from funds of the European Union and Kingdom of Netherlands through regional project WeBER.

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Are municipalities in Montenegro fighting against corruption and how?

Author(s): Ana Nenezić / Language(s): English

Report Are municipalities in Montenegro fighting against corruption and how? gives an overview of results of local self-governments in the application of mechanisms of prevention and fight against corruption at the local level in Montenegro during 2017 and the first half of 2018. In this regard, the report contains new information in relation to application of defined measures and activities through several strategic documents, to which results of application we have given a first review in the previous report Think Locally – Act Locally which has covered the period until 2016. The observed reporting period has been marked by inertness of municipal administrations in relation to undertaken obligations defined by national documents, as well as the lack of initiative for their own designed activities. Activities of the central level of government in establishing of institutionally-normative anti-corruption framework did not influence encouragingly the local level of government in the part of implementation of adequate anti-corruption policies and mechanisms at the local level. Data that local self-governments in Montenegro, in the last two years (2016 and 2017) do not have reported corruption cases is not surprising, considering that the majority has still not passed local action plans for fight against corruption for 2017-2018, that they have not prepared and passed internal instructions for keeping records of reports of corruption inside the institution and conduct upon reports, to which they were obliged according to adopted integrity plans. Also, according to direct experiences of researchers from the field, local self-governments do not have either established systems and clear procedures for reporting corruption by citizens, which altogether points out to system not being functional. Obligations undertaken within the accession negotiations with the European Union, dominantly through the Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) are not being fulfilled, and reporting about them is being done imprecisely, which is causing additional concern. The report of the European Commission for 2018 states: ‘The action plan of Montenegro for Chapter 23 outlines comprehensive reforms to prevent and combat corruption. It is complemented by an ‘operational document’ adopted in 2016 which sets out additional measures to prevent corruption in certain areas particularly vulnerable to corruption, such as public procurement, privatisation, urban planning, education, healthcare, local government and police. The impact of these measures, however, remains limited and Montenegro should develop more effective sector-specific plans for the prevention of corruption.’ Previous recommendations of the European Commission were similar, but obviously with no affect since the local action plans for fight against corruption were not adopted in the majority of Montenegrin municipalities, while integrity plans are being approached to strictly formalistically. Underived system of jurisdiction still remains a problem and it is hard to monitor realisation of anti-corruption documents at the local level due to un-availability of reports on realisation. Precondition of successful fight against corruption is a functional anti-corruption legislative and institutional framework, as well as continuous, consistent and contentfull implementation of strategic documents. Therefore, lack of results should be sought precisely in the inefficiency of the set system, but also in the selected formalistic approach to this issue by the authorised institutions at the national and at the local level. Results of local self-governments in the direction of prevention and fight against corruption, in the observed reporting period are almost non-existent and precisely reflect this impermissible relation. The report covers the period from January 2017 to September 2018 and includes 23 local self-governments in Montenegro. The focus is on two key mechanisms and the effects of their implementation - the local action plan for fight against corruption at the local level and the integrity plan. An overview of the (un)realised measures for the stated period is given, through analysis of the available reports submitted by authorised institutions at the national and local level, as well as through research conducted by utilising the provisions of the Law on Free Access to Information. In addition, the system was tested using the ‘mystery shopper’ method, and results have confirmed the findings obtained by analysing key anti-corruption documents

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A luftojnë komunat në mal të zi kundër korrupsionit dhe si?

Author(s): Ana Nenezić / Language(s): Albanian

Raporti A luftojnë komunat në mal të zi kundër korrupsionit dhe si? jep përmbledhjen e rezultateve të vetëqeverisjeve vendore në zbatimin e mekanizmave për parandalimin dhe luftën kundër korrupsionit në nivel lokal në Mal të Zi gjatë vitit 2017 dhe në gjysmën e parë të vitit 2018. Në këtë kontekst, raporti përbenë informata të reja për zbatimin e masave dhe aktiviteteve të përcaktuara me një sërë dokumentesh strategjike. Përmbledhjen e parë të zbatimit të tyre e kemi bërë në raportin paraprak, Mendo lokalisht – vepro lokalisht, i cili mbuloi periudhën deri në vitin 2016. Periudhën e analizuar raportuese e karakterizoi plogështia e administratave vendore ndaj obligimeve të marra përsipër dhe të definuar me dokumentet kombëtare, si dhe mungesa e iniciativës për aktivitetet e menduara vet. Aktivitetet e nivelit qendror për vendosjen e kornizës institucionale dhe normative antikorruptive nuk nxitën nivelin vendor të pushtetit në pjesën e zbatimit të politikave dhe mekanizmave adekuate antikorruptive në nivel lokal. Prandaj nuk befason fakti që vetëqeverisjet vendore në Mal të Zi, në dy vitet e fundit (2016 dhe 2017) nuk kanë raste të denoncimit të korrupsionit, duke marr parasysh se shumica e tyra akoma nuk i miratoi planet lokale të veprimit për luftë kundër korrupsionit për vitin 2017 - 2018, që nuk kanë përgatitur udhëzimet e brendshme për evidentimin e denoncimit të korrupsionit brenda institucioneve dhe veprimit në bazë të denoncimeve, e që ishin të obliguar ta bëjnë sipas planeve të integritetit. Po ashtu, sipas eksperiencave të drejtpërdrejta të hulumtuesve në terren, vetëqeverisjet vendore nuk i kanë të përcaktuar sistemet dhe procedurat e qarta për denoncimin e korrupsionit nga ana e qytetarëve/eve, që tregon se sistemi nuk është funksional. Obligimet e marra përsipër në kuadër të negociatave anëtarësuese në Bashkimin Evropian, sidomos përmes kapitullit 23 (Gjyqësori dhe të drejtat themelore), nuk plotësohen, ndërsa për to vazhdon raportimi i jo precizë, që shkakton brengosje shtesë. Në raportin e Komisionit Evropian për vitin 2018 shkruan: “Plani i Veprimit i Malit të Zi për kapitullin 23 përfshinë elementet bazë të reformave gjithëpërfshirëse në fushën e parandalimit të korrupsionit dhe luftës kundër korrupsionit. Atë e plotëson “Dokumenti operativ”, i miratuar në vitin 2016, në të cilin përcaktohen masat shtesë për parandalimin e korrupsionit në fusha të caktuara, të cilët janë në veçanti të ndjeshëm ndaj korrupsionit, siç janë prokurimet publike, privatizimet, planifikimi hapësinor, arsimi, mbrojtja shëndetësore, vetëqeverisja vendore dhe policia. Mirëpo, ndikimi i këtyre masave vazhdon të jetë i kufizuar dhe Mali i Zi duhet të zhvillojë plane më të efektshme për parandalimin e korrupsionit të cilët do të jenë të lidhur konkretisht me sektorët individual”. Të ngjashëm ishin edhe rekomandimet e mëparshme të Komisionit Evropian, por siç duket pa ndikim sepse planet lokale të veprimit për luftë kundër korrupsionit nuk janë miratuar në shumicën e komunave malazeze, gjersa qasja ndaj planeve të integritetit është tërësisht formaliste. Mungesa e përcaktimit të sistemit të kompetencave mbetet problem dhe është shumë vështirë të përcillet realizimi i dokumenteve antikorruptive në nivel lokal për shkak të mungesës së raportit për realizim. Parakusht i luftës së suksesshme kundër korrupsionit është korniza legjislative dhe institucionale funksionale antikorruptive, si dhe zbatimi i vazhdueshëm, konsistent dhe i cilësor i dokumenteve strategjike. Prandaj, arsyen e mungesës së rezultateve duhet kërkuar pikërisht në jo-efikasitetin e sistemit të vendosur, por edhe në qasjen e zgjedhur formaliste ndaj kësaj çështje nga ana e institucioneve kompetente në nivel kombëtar dhe lokal. Rezultatet e vetëqeverisjeve lokale në parandalimin dhe luftën kundër korrupsionit, në periudhën e analizuar raportuese, pothuajse nuk ekzistojnë dhe pikërisht pasqyrojnë këtë qasje të papranueshme. Raporti mbulon periudhën prej janarit të vitit 2017 deri në shtator të vitit 2018 dhe përfshinë 23 vetëqeverisje lokale në Mal të Zi. Fokusi u vendos në dy mekanizma kyç dhe efektet e zbatimit të tyre – planin lokal të veprimit për luftë kundër korrupsionit në nivel lokal dhe planin e integritetit. U dha pasqyrimi i masave të (pa)realizuara për periudhën e përmendur, përmes analizës së raporteve ekzistuese të dorëzuara nga ana e institucioneve kompetente në nivel kombëtar dhe lokal, por edhe përmes hulumtimit duke shfrytëzuar dispozitat e Ligjit për qasje të lirë në informata. Përveç kësaj, sistemi u testua edhe me zbatimin e metodës “blerësi sekret” (ang. Mystery shopper), ndërsa rezultatet kanë vërtetuar gjetjet e fituara me analizën e dokumenteve kyçe antikorrupitive.

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Work of prosecutions and courts in fight against corruption at the local level - Analyses

Author(s): Bojan Božović / Language(s): English

Corruption is a social problem which has existed since ancient times and which is devouring the society from inside at various levels. It is a problem that exists in all modern societies. The perception of citizens, both laic and professional public, is that corruption in Montenegrin society exists at a worrying level, which has spread to the extent that it creates negative matrixes of relations in everyday life. The consequences of this are felt both through moral aspects in the form of ‘distorted consciousness and system of values’, as well as through legal, economic and other parameters. Although corruption exists in society from ancient times, all societies in a principle are always negating the existence of corruption and corruptive practise in general. Especially their holders of public functions and official ‘statistics’. Un-readiness of authorised institutions to deal with problem is certainly one of the most important ailments. Fight against corruption is possible exclusively at all levels. However, for this purpose it is necessary to set also an adequate legal basis in terms of adoption of quality legal acts but also through acceptance of relevant international-law sources. When it comes to Montenegro, this matter is stipulated via certain international sources but also via positive-law regulations (laws)

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How much are Montenegrin local self-governments (non)transparent? - Analysis of transparency of the work of 23 local self-governments in Montenegro

Author(s): Mira Popović / Language(s): English

The public administration system in Montenegro is undergoing reform interventions for decades with the aim of harmonizing with the best European standards and practices, which should, among other things, make public administration more accessible to citizens. An important parameter of improving public administration work is transparency, which is also the focus of this research. In assessing the level of transparency of local self-governments, two cross section points were chosen. The first is a crosscheck of manner of local self-governments’ resolving issues and their one-year performance in resolving requests for free access to information, with proceedings upon complaints that have arisen as a result of initiated and cases which have been resolved unfavourably for the party, including those relating to the administration silence, therefore, in accordance with the Law on Free Access to Information these data were requested from all local self-governments. The second cross-cutting point is an assessment to which extent the 23 local self-government’ websites in Montenegro contain information that must be accessible to citizens under the provisions of Article 12 of the Law on Free Access to Information. Transparency of work of local self-governments in Montenegro chronically represents one of the weaker points of the system. There is a high degree of tolerance to non-compliance with the provisions of the Law on Free Access to Information by authorised bodies, there are also numerous different interpretations of the same provisions of this Law by the officials who deal with the requests, and inadequate staff solutions are notable with the ever-increasing administration silence. All this causes a large number of complaints filed to the Agency for Personal Data Protection and Free Access to Information, which itself as well, due to a lack of staff, has the problem of resolving cases within a reasonable time. The latest amendments to the Law on Free Access to Information that have further restricted access to information and closed the system by giving discretionary right to managers of bodies to mark documents as business or tax secret without providing a deadline stating the reasons for restricting access to information, are consequently cumulatively strengthening a rather low degree of transparency of work of local self-governments. The Strategy of Public Administration Reform in Montenegro 2016-2020 recognizes a reduced level of transparency in processes such as conducting public procurement, budgeting and recruiting new staff. The same problems are also pointed out by the European Commission’s Report on Montenegro for 2018 and the Report on Implementation of Action Plan for implementation of Chapter 2 for period January-June 20183. Thus, the key planned activities are aimed at improving transparency in the planning process, the adoption of acts and their implementation with the respect of the principle of participation and establishment of a transparent public procurement procedure in accordance with the Law on Public Procurement. The SIGMA Monitoring Report on Montenegro also warns about the problem of nonavailability of data on employees and their earnings, which is part of a proactive publication of data. This paper provides a cross section of the observed parameters along with basic guidelines as to how to overcome some of the identified problems related to (non) transparency of local self-governments. The first part deals with the manner of resolving of local self-governments’ bodies and overview of the data obtained as per requests for free access to information sent to local self-governments, after which availability of data on websites of municipalities was processed in detail in comparison with the application of Article 12 of the Law on Free Access to Information. From this, conclusions and key recommendations for improvement of the existing system were made.

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University Walls - Analysis of transparency of work of higher education institutions in Montenegro

Author(s): Mira Popović,Daliborka Uljarević,Matej Babič / Language(s): English

In the landscape of Montenegrin higher education institutions, which do not stand out on any dimension of contemporary education, the lack of transparency is an additional cause for concern, especially taking into account more visible trend of “raising walls” around universities. So far, there were no researches of transparency of higher education institutions in Montenegro that could offer overview of these institutions’ attitude to transparency based on indicators, as well as of the availability of information on their websites, which are the main source of such information to the public. Hence, this study has twofold objective: to offer an overview of the current state of affairs with regard to availability of information on university websites and to provide the starting point for monitoring future progress. The overall purpose is to improve the quality of education, to which transparency is essential. Higher education institutions have the public responsibility to provide educational services, and there is no reason to keep any information about their functioning secret.

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Transparency index of Montenegrin municipalities

Author(s): Mira Popović,Maja Marinović,Ana Nenezić / Language(s): English

Fight against corruption requires a multidisciplinary, continuous and multifaceted approach, and one of the preconditions is a high degree of transparency in the work of public sector bodies. Local self-governments are the closest service to the citizens which is expected to respond directly to their needs. However, openness is still not an integral part of their work, which can to a large degree make it more difficult for citizens to access these services, and for the civil society to monitor public policies at this level. It also does not help to dispel the existing unethical and corrupt patterns and practices. Regular monitoring with annual scores for each Montenegrin municipality can also serve as an incentive to improve the transparency. The Transparency Index of Montenegrin municipalities, which systematically and methodologically frames earlier activities in this area, is a direct contribution in this direction. Several years of close monitoring of municipal websites, presumably the simplest method to inform the citizens about their work, shows that Montenegrin municipalities have made some progress. These websites are today visually better, more functional and richer in content than they were a few years ago. However, they still do not provide sufficient coverage of information and do not publish all of the documents, they are legally obliged to publish, nor many of those which they should be publishing proactively. The Transparency Index of Montenegrin municipalities provides an overview of the current situation, with detailed explanations that can be instructive to each municipality individually. In addition to this information, the Transparency Index of Montenegrin municipalities also presents the findings of public opinion polls that survey citizens’ perceptions of corruption in Montenegro. The Transparency Index of Montenegrin municipalities emerged as part of the project ‘Let’s Put Corruption into Museum’ implemented by the Centre for Civic Education (CCE) with the non-governmental organizations CeMI from Podgorica, Za Druga from Petrovac, Bonum from Pljevlja and UL-info from Ulcinj, in cooperation with the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and the Ministry of Public Administration, and with the support of the EU Delegation to Montenegro and co-financing by the Ministry of Public Administration. We hope that the future annual reviews will find Montenegrin municipalities scoring much better on transparency, and thus contributing to archiving corruption in our society.

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Indeksi i transparencës së komunave Malazeze

Author(s): Mira Popović,Maja Marinović,Ana Nenezić / Language(s): Albanian

Eliminimi i korrupsionit kërkon qasje multidisiplinare, të vazhdueshme dhe shtresore, e një nga parakushtet është edhe shkalla e lartë e transparencës në punën e organeve të sektorit publik. Vetëqeverisjet vendore janë shërbimi më i afërt i qytetarëve dhe qytetareve prej të cilit pritet që t’i përgjigjet nevojave të tyre në mënyrë të drejtpërdrejtë. Mirëpo, transparenca vazhdon të mos jetë pjesë përbërëse e punës së tyre që kjo mungesë ia vështirëson, konsiderueshëm, procedurat e ndryshme qytetarëve dhe qytetareve, por edhe mbikëqyrjen e politikave publike nga ana e shoqërisë civile. Po ashtu, në këtë mënyrë nuk kontribuohet as në eliminimin e formave dhe praktikave joetike dhe korruptive. Transparenca e komunave malazeze mund të nxitet edhe me monitorimin i cili si rezultat ka gjendjen vjetore. Indeksi i Transparencës së Komunave Malazeze jep kontributin e drejtpërdrejtë në këtë drejtim duke sistematizuar dhe kornizuar, në aspektin metodologjik, aktivitetet e mëhershme në këtë lëmi. Monitorimi shumëvjeçar i faqeve të internetit të komunave, të cilët duhen të jenë mënyra më e thjeshtë e informimit mbi punën e tyre, tregon se komunat malazeze kanë bërë një hap përpara. Domethënë, sot këto faqe janë më të mira nga ana vizuale, më funksionale dhe më me përmbajtje sesa në periudhën para disa vitesh. Por, ato vazhdojnë të mos ofrojnë sasinë e mjaftueshme të informatave dhe dokumenteve, si të atyre që janë obligim ligjor i komunave, ashtu edhe të atyre që duhet të publikohen në mënyrë proaktive. Indeksi i Transparencës së Komunave Malazeze jep një pasqyrim të gjendjes momentale me shpjegimet e hollësishme të cilët mund të konsiderohen si udhëzime për çdo komunë. Po ashtu, Indeksi i Transparencës së Komunave Malazeze prezanton edhe rezultatet e hulumtimit të opinionit publik i cili ka të bëjë me perceptimin e qytetarëve dhe qytetareve për korrupsionin në Mal të Zi. Indeksi i Transparencës së Komunave Malazeze u krijua në kuadër të projektit “Ta vendosim korrupsionin në muze”, të cilin e realizon Qendra për Arsimim Qytetarë (QAQ) me organizatat joqeveritare QMH nga Podgorica, “Za Druga” nga Petrovaci, Bonum nga Plevla dhe UL-info nga Ulqini, në bashkëpunim me Agjencinë për Parandalimin e Korrupsionit dhe Ministrinë e Administratës Publike. Shpresojmë se në matjet e ardhshme vjetore komunat malazeze do të arrijnë rezultate shumë më të mira sa i përket transparencës, e si rrjedhojë të kontribuojnë kështu edhe në arkivimin e korrupsionit në shoqërinë tonë.

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Balkanization instead of europeanization - Fight against corruption in Montenegro

Author(s): Vladimir Vučković / Language(s): English

Montenegro was granted candidate status in December 2001, and in June 2012, the European Union (EU) opened accession negotiations with Montenegro. After eight years, the European Commission (EC) country report notes limited progress in 25 chapters, good progress in seven chapters, while for one chapter it noted that no progress has been made. Accession negotiations with Montenegro started with the so-called new approach of the European Union, which referred to Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security), as starting and ending points. Thus, the advance in these chapters has become crucial for the overall dynamics and quality of Montenegrin EU accession negotiations. This study, the first one in a series of three, aims to scrutinize one of three political membership indicators that the EU closely monitors during the accession process - the fight against corruption. Judicial reform, strengthening regional cooperation and the improvement of good neighborly relations will be additionally addressed. These EU membership conditions are included in the most important strategic documents on the enlargement policy, starting with the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), i.e. the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), as well as the new negotiating framework adopted in 2012, according to which Montenegro started negotiations. At the same time, they represent the basis for further progress on Montenegro’s path towards the EU. Finally, these are three dependent variables that must be kept in mind for the systematic analytical framework. Over the past eight years, Montenegro has not achieved the expected measurable results in combating corruption. However, the EU has also demonstrated political inconsistency regarding the continuous and necessary external pressure to Montenegro. Hence, Montenegro, despite of all, has been making progress in the accession process for a long time, with an evident deficit of political will to effectively approach the prevention and suppression of corruption. Consequently, corruption remains widespread and a matter of serious concern. There was also a visible change in the recent approach of EU conditional policy through a strategy of conditionality in strengthening anti-corruption policy, i.e. allowing the candidate country to progress in the EU integration process, although it does not achieve satisfactory results in the fight against corruption. Therefore, given the limited progress in the fight against corruption, Montenegro has paradoxically made for long time progress in the EU accession process. However, the fact that only eight years after opening the accession negotiation all 33 negotiation chapters have been opened and only three provisionally closed, as well as the fact that a new methodology is in force, points to the need for a significant change in the approach of the Montenegrin authorities to dynamize this process and use it effectively for the process of internal democratization and Europeanization.

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