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Too green, too fast, too dear. The AfD is gaining popularity in Germany

Author(s): Kamil Frymark / Language(s): English

The popularity of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) is growing, as confirmed by its second place in the latest opinion polls, putting it on a par with Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s SDP, and that is raising great concern in Germany. The factors which have contributed to the AfD’s success include the public dissatisfaction with the incumbent government and the overlapping consequences of the Ukraine war and the inflation, climate and migration crises. The SPD-Green-FDP government coalition has presented different, often inconsistent approaches to these challenges. This has been coupled with Scholz’s deliberate passiveness as he shuns disputes inside the coalition in an attempt to improve his popularity ratings. This strategy has been successful up to a certain point, but is currently failing, and as a result the Chancellor is being blamed for the situation in the coalition. The AfD is benefitting from this, while also capitalizing on the fears most Germans share about the pace of the changes being implemented as part of the government’s climate policy. The party is also an advocate for voters who oppose the excessive influx of migrants to Germany and further support for Ukraine. Residents of the eastern federal states are particularly sensitive to these issues, where the AfD leads the polls with over 30%, and is viewed as a ‘catch-all’ or mass party, and not merely a fringe movement. This is particularly important given the upcoming elections to the parliaments of Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia scheduled for autumn 2024, which will be the final electoral test before the Bundestag elections in 2025.

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Russia is weaponising food

Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): English

The Kremlin has made further attempts in recent months to use the food market to intensify pressure on the West, primarily in order to ease the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation. For example, Moscow is again threatening to pull out of the Black Sea Grain Initiative which enables Ukrainian food to be exported through Odesa’s ports. The escalation of the Kremlin’s demands is based on false accusations that the Western coalition is blocking Russian exports of agricultural products and mineral fertilizers. Over the past few months, Russian exports of these goods have grown dynamically and the export volume has returned to the pre-invasion level; in the case of grain it is now definitely higher. Last year, despite the decline in the volume of supplies, their value increased significantly and accounted for 10% of Russia’s export revenues. This not only ensured the inflow of currency to Russia but, given that selected members of the Putin elite are among the direct beneficiaries of these exports, it enabled them to further build their fortunes. The Kremlin’s threats should therefore be seen on the one hand as a test of the West’s unity and determination to continue its sanctions policy towards Russia, and on the other as an attempt to maximize public revenues from the export of agricultural products and mineral fertilizers.

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At all costs. Germany shifts to LNG

Author(s): Michał Kędzierski / Language(s): English

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the resulting collapse of the concept of an energy alliance between Berlin and Moscow, have become the catalysts for Germany to change its approach to building LNG import infrastructure. In order to become permanently independent of Russian supplies, Berlin has made an enormous financial effort to build its own terminals at record speed and on an unprecedented scale. The facilities planned will not only enable Germany to meet its economy’s demand for gas, but will also help it to maintain its role as the gas hub for Central Europe, which has been somewhat weakened recently. They will also allow it to continue to use gas as a transition fuel during the period of the country’s energy transition (Energiewende).

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Unfulfilled ambitions: Russia’s LNG sector in the grip of sanctions

Author(s): Filip Rudnik / Language(s): English

The technological sanctions which the West has imposed on Russia’s LNG sector have drastically reduced the opportunities for the industry’s expansion, and made it less likely that Russia can increase its share on the global LNG market. Moreover, the Russian Federation’s ambitious targets for LNG production capacity have not been formally revised, which means that it is now virtually impossible to achieve them. The slim chances of Russia’s LNG production capacity increasing over the coming years have a negative impact on the country’s overall gas exports. In view of Moscow’s political decision to slash pipeline supplies to Europe, liquefied gas could help Russia to mitigate the consequences of this reduction as long as there are no formal restrictions on its imports to the EU; it could also ensure that European consumers remain partly dependent on Russian gas. However, the tough restrictions on technology exports to Russia have significantly reduced the likelihood of this scenario becoming a reality.

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Games between allies. Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow

Author(s): Witold Rodkiewicz,Michał Bogusz / Language(s): English

The official visit by Xi Jinping, the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Moscow on 21–23 March was a demonstration of his country’s continued support for Russia in its conflict with the West. It also served as confirmation that Beijing and Moscow will continue to work for the revision of the international order, and therefore they regard each other as indispensable partners. The decisions on economic cooperation announced at the summit, and their intended results, point to a growing asymmetry in Sino-Russian economic relations. Economically, Russia is falling into a deep trade dependence on the PRC, its technology, and the use of the Chinese currency (RMB) for international settlements. Beijing is also showing growing ambitions to shape the security situation in the post-Soviet area, something previously reserved for Moscow.

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Evolution of EU Travel Rules During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author(s): Jolanta Szymańska / Language(s): English

The new variants of SARS-CoV-2 and the development of the vaccination process in the EU are changing the rules of travel within the territory of the Community. New guidelines on this matter adopted by the Council of the EU in January focus not so much on the country of departure of the traveller as on his/her personal health situation. This more individualised approach is to make it possible to dispense with additional ad hoc travel restrictions imposed by Member States. At the same time, it promotes vaccination, recognising it as essential in fighting the pandemic.

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Hungary and the Russian Threat of Further Aggression Against Ukraine

Author(s): Veronika Jóźwiak / Language(s): English

Hungary considers the dispute between the West and Russia over renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine is of no concern to it. The government defines its stance from a neutral third party position. It neither condemns Russia’s actions nor supports Ukraine. Past actions indicate Hungary will not veto EU and allied actions against Russia if it would be the only country to break from common positions, however, it will continue to act to the benefit of Russia by trying to weaken Euro-Atlantic structures and impede cooperation with Ukraine.

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The EU increases its agri-food imports from Ukraine: causes and reactions from Central European states

Author(s): Team OSW / Language(s): English

31 March 2023 saw the publication of a joint letter by the prime ministers of Poland, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, and the president of Bulgaria, to the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen on the measures they intended to take to counteract the negative effects of the increased imports of agricultural products from Ukraine to the EU. The document highlights the unprecedented increases in imports of grain, oil seeds, fruit, dairy and honey. It also proposes measures to improve the situation of local agricultural producers, including increasing the financial support offered to them. The authors of the letter emphasise that if the market disruptions cannot be eliminated by other means, tariffs and tariff rate quotas will need to be re-introduced on imports from Ukraine (they were suspended in June 2022). On 7 April 2023, Warsaw and Kyiv reached an agreement on suspending the export of wheat, corn, sunflower seeds and rapeseed to Poland until the beginning of the new season (summer), while the transit of Ukrainian produce via Polish territory will be maintained.

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Ukraine: a decisive blow to the Moscow Patriarchate?

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża,Katarzyna Chawryło (Jarzyńska) / Language(s): English

29 March 2023 marked the deadline for representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) to leave the Pechersk Lavra monastery complex in Kyiv, which they had been leasing. On 10 March the Ministry of Culture, which formally supervises the shrine, announced the termination of the agreement following a government audit which uncovered numerous irregularities there. Some of the clergy complied with the order, while another group headed by the lavra’s abbot, Metropolitan Pavlo (Lebid), refused. On 1 April, on the basis of a court ruling, the metropolitan was placed under house arrest for 60 days on charges of justifying the Russian attack on Ukraine. However, some monks still remain at the facility.

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A dangerous resemblance. Moves to revise Germany’s China policy

Author(s): Lidia Gibadło / Language(s): English

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revived the ongoing discussion in Germany regarding the need to revise its policy towards China. Until recently, the course Berlin adopted towards Beijing and Moscow was not only convergent in many aspects, but also enjoyed a consensus among the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, who co-formed three government coalitions from 2005–2021. This resulted in the emergence of a dependence that was unfavourable for Germany. With Russia this involved the import of fuels and with China it involved supplies of components and also major investments carried out by German companies in China. Both states were viewed as priority partners, frequently at the cost of relations with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, respectively. Berlin’s approach to Beijing and Moscow sparked disputes with its closest allies as well as dilemmas regarding Germany’s economic and security interests. In addition, cooperation with authoritarian regimes that violate human rights was a blot on Germany’s image in the context of its foreign policy.

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China after the 20th CCP Congress: a new stage in Xi Jinping’s revolution

Author(s): Michał Bogusz / Language(s): English

The 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ended with the complete triumph of Xi Jinping and marks the culmination of a process of radical overhaul of the political system created in the 1980s and 1990s. It marks not only the end of collective leadership in the party, but also a redefinition of the relationship between the party and the state and the relationship between the CCP and society. The transformation of the CCP carried out by Xi Jinping over the past decade provides him with the tools to overcome institutional inertia and the resistance of middle and lower-level party-state cadres – factors that are among the elements holding back the changes in the socio-economic development model of the People’s Republic of China(PRC) that were first announced 15 years ago. Therefore, radical and rapid decisions in this sphere are to be expected in the coming years. They will bring further the Marxist-nationalist ideologisation of the PRC, the introduction of a mechanism of mass redistribution and an increase in the role of the party and the state in all aspects of the social and private life of the population. This, in turn, heralds an increase in totalitarian tendencies.

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Bromance. Turkey’s activity in the Western Balkans

Author(s): Marta Szpala,Adam Michalski / Language(s): English

At the beginning of September 2022, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia and Croatia. The trip was the culmination of Turkish diplomatic activity towards the region in recent months. Earlier, in June 2022, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited Serbia, Croatia, BiH and Kosovo, in August 2022 he attempted to act as a mediator during the escalation of the Serbian-Kosovan conflict, and on 2 September2022 he attended the summit of the Serbian-led Open Balkan initiative held in Belgrade. These activities are consistent with Ankara’s policy that involves fostering its image as both an influential actor, and at the same time a neutral mediator in the Western Balkans – one that is able to contribute to a resolution of bilateral disputes and to the region’s stabilization. Turkey has pursued this policy for more than a decade. In addition, it has been consistently expanding economic influence in the Balkans, accompanied by the development of its retinue of soft power instruments based on shared religious and historical background. However, Turkey’s cooperation with the region’s states is also riddled with challenges. These include Ankara’s close collaboration with Moscow, which raises concern in some Balkan capitals; increasing tension in its relations with the EU and the US; as well as multi-faceted intra-regional disputes.

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A tactical pause in relations with the West: China plays on hopes for peace

Author(s): Michał Bogusz / Language(s): English

In November 2022, China’s leader Xi Jinping embarked on a wide-ranging diplomatic campaign to prevent an uncontrolled breakdown of relations with the West, which should be considered a short-term success, at least in terms of reopening channels of communication with Western countries. This move has succeeded owing to Beijing’s instrumental use of the West’s hopes that it can secure China’s opposition to Russia’s possible use of weapons of mass destruction, and belief that China might be willing to mediate peace in Ukraine. The PRC’s actions have also met the expectations of its Western partners as they look for ways to stabilise relations with Beijing in the face of a looming global economic crisis. At present, we can say that the escalation has been halted, although the negative trend in China’s relations with the West –in particular with the United States – has not been reversed. Faced with economic and social challenges at home, the PRC will make further efforts to avoid economic confrontation with the West in the immediate future, by using more or less veiled suggestions of possible mediation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

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The calm before the storm: the state and prospects of Russia’s oil sector

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): English

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have serious consequences for the health of the Russian oil sector, which is one of the most important branches of the country’s economy. Although its production and export performance, and consequently its budget revenues, remained high in2022, the situation began to worsen in December, and the negative trend is likely to continue in the coming months. The main reason for this state of affairs is the sanctions introduced by Western countries, in particular the European Union’s embargo on imports of Russian oil and petroleum products. Russia’s government and companies have taken adaptive measures, such as reconfiguring the directions of oil exports; however, economic, infrastructural and political constraints may make it much more difficult to follow through with the plan for sustainable market diversification. Thus, the EU embargo may lead to a significant reduction in oil production in Russia over the coming years, which will worsen the country’s financial and economic health. The ultimate effect of the restrictions will depend on the determination of Western countries and the pace at which they implement sanctions, as well as the attitudes of Moscow’s other trading partners.

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Germany: how the gas sector changed in the crisis year of 2022

Author(s): Michał Kędzierski / Language(s): English

Due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the mounting energy and gas crisis in Europe,2022 saw a spell of permanent crisis management in the German energy sector, in particular gas. The structure of Germany’s imports has changed significantly: shipments from Russia, its former principal supplier, have ceased; and Germany has had to launch extremely costly emergency measures to find alternative suppliers on the global market. The war has pushed Berlin to take numerous steps to diversify its supplies, in particular to develop its LNG import infrastructure at a rapid and unprecedented pace. A significant reduction in gas consumption, mild weather and LNG supplies have all enabled Germany to fill its gas storage facilities and avoid the risk of gas shortages this winter. Major changes have also occurred in the management and ownership structure of the German gas sector: Berlin has nationalised the SEFE (Gazprom Germania) and Uniper companies, which has enabled the German state to seize control of the country’s key gas infrastructure and its strategically important gas importers. All these factors have contributed to a major weakening of Germany’s energy ties with Russia.

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Russia: export restrictions and mobilisation – more blows to the economy

Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): English

In Q3 2022, the economy of the Russian Federation increasingly suffered negative consequences from the sanctions imposed on Russian exports. A ban on imports of a substantial part of Russian steel and iron into the EU came into force in mid-June, followed by a ban on imports such as cement and wood on 10 July, and a ban on coal imports on 10 August. The mood among business and the public soured further with the military mobilisation announced on 21 September, which also had a negative impact on the domestic outlook. As a result, the Russian budget is coming under increasing strain.

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Orbán’s fifth government: full power overshadowed by crises

Author(s): Andrzej Sadecki / Language(s): English

Upon attaining a fourth consecutive election victory, Viktor Orbán’s new government is sticking to its usual methods of operation: the concentration of power, control of the narrative, and ‘unorthodox’ economic policies, such as additional taxation on large profits. The cabinet functions in comfortable intra-political conditions, holding full power and facing a defeated and divided opposition. However, it faces its biggest challenges in years with the deteriorating economic situation and the unstable international environment. The government has no clear reform aspirations and is rather promising to manage the crisis permanently, while looking after its business base and further tightening its grip on media coverage. In view of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it will be increasingly difficult for Budapest to benefit from balancing between East and West. In this area, it is likely to attempt a rapprochement with the Western states that are more accommodating towards Moscow, while at the same time looking for ways to maintain the relations with the US and its partners in Central Europe, albeit these are the frostiest they have been in decades. Orbán is trying to postpone a reorientation in foreign policy until the result of the Russian-Ukrainian war is known. Should the West return to dialogue with Russia, he is counting on the benefits of a developed cooperation with the Kremlin, especially in the energy sector and, should Russia enter into a situation of protracted isolation, Orbán will seek to ensure that any reduction in this cooperation will see Hungary amply compensated by its Western partners.

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Turkish dilemmas in the shadow of the war in Ukraine

Author(s): Krzysztof Strachota / Language(s): English

The war in Ukraine forcefully evoked the question of Turkey’s international position and political strategy in its neighbourhood, but also in its relations with the West and Russia. In the first months of the aggression, Turkey reaffirmed its alignment with the West and its fear of Russian power and ambitions. The war also provided an opportunity for another attempt, not only to strengthen but also to redefine Turkish-Western relations – the lifting of sanctions imposed on Ankara and a stronger consideration of its security interests. Both the relative weakness of Russia, as revealed in the first period of the war, and the absence of the desired breakthrough in relations with the West have reinforced traditional and contentious tendencies in Turkish politics. The first is the desire to exploit Moscow’s weakness to deepen cooperation with it on better terms, which is reflected in the development of trade, including cooperation on the grain supply problems caused by the war. The second is aggressively manifesting Turkey’s interests in NATO. Included in this attitude is Ankara’s demand that some Alliance countries drop sanctions on the import of selected armaments by Turkey and adopt its counter-terrorism perspective, including on Kurdish groups affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and radical opposition organisations (including the Gülen Movement/FETO) that enjoy protection or support in the West. A demonstration of this policy was and still remains – despite the formal launch of the accession process by Sweden and Finland at the Madrid summit –Turkey’s continuing threat to block the enlargement of the Alliance by its national parliament.

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Separatism and gas: Russian attempts to destabilise Moldova

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): English

As the price crisis in Moldova has worsened in recent months, Moscow has taken steps destabilize the country. These are particularly evident in the autonomous Gagauzia, which has traditionally orientated itself towards Russia and where anti-government and pro-Russian economic protests regularly occur. The sense of insecurity is reinforced by frequent false bomb warnings (more than 50 in July alone), triggered mainly in Chisinau by individuals from Russia and Belarus territories. The uneasy situation persists in Moscow-controlled breakaway Transnistria, which has accused Moldova and Ukraine of complicity in carrying out a series of “attacks” on civilian and military facilities. There is no doubt that by fuelling Moldova’s economic crisis with high energy prices and supporting pro-Russian forces, the Kremlin is counting on the outbreak of mass protests as early as autumn and winter and also that the opposition Electoral Bloc of Communists and Socialists (BECS) will seize power in the country. The public’s deteriorating financial condition and continuing unrest are negatively affecting the popularity of the ruling pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). According to a June 2022 poll, it can count on only 22.6% of the vote, despite winning more than 52% in the snap parliamentary election just one year ago.

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Total defence. Six months of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

After six months of war, Ukraine can celebrate success – due to the mobilisation of its entire population to fight, and to unceasing reconnaissance and logistics support from the West, it continues to successfully defend itself. Russia, in turn, has failed to attain its initial objectives, including the “denazification” and “demilitarisation” of Ukraine and the intention to seize control of the country. The armed confrontation has already lasted far longer than the Kremlin had anticipated, which suggests that the first six months of war can be viewed from Russia’s perspective as a failure. Since the end of March 2022, when Russia decided to withdraw its troops from northern Ukraine and from portions of Mykolaiv Oblast, and when a frontline was formed in the south and in the east, Russian aggression has shifted from a phase of manoeuvre warfare to that of trench warfare. Since then, the strategic situation has not changed significantly and remains largely static. However, Russia continues to possess the initiative and any changes happening at the front are the consequences of its actions. The aggressor’s troops have maintained a relatively stable land bridge with Crimea and are slowly pushing the Ukrainian army back from its positions in the Donbas, which continues to be the main area of fighting. For the time being, the counter-offensive announced by Kyiv continues to form part of an information strategy aimed at boosting the defenders’ morale. Ukraine continues to lack sufficient manpower and adequate means, i.e. mainly heavy weaponry of an offensive nature, to attempt to recapture the occupied territories.

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