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Izbor - Kosmet, 2008 / 09 / 26

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Serbian

NEZAVISNOST KOSOVA DOBILA JE PRVI OZBILJAN UDARAC UPRAVO OD DRŽAVA KOJE SU GA PRIZNALE I BEZREZEVNO PODRŽAVALE (Radio “Kosova e lirë” - Priština) VLADA KOSOVA - RAJ ZA MEDIOKRITETE I KORUPCIJU (Kosova sot - Priština) PROVINCIJALNI IDENTITET (Express - Priština) KONTRAST I NESIGURNOST (Shqip - Tirana) SRPSKI ZAHTEV U OUN - IZVOR NAPETOSTI (Gazeta shqiptare - Tirana) KOSOVO ISPAŠTA JER GA NE PRIZNAJE EU, A NE ZBOG OUN (Koha ditore - Priština) STAV EU KOJI BI ŠOKIRAO” SRBIJU (Zëri - Priština) RAZGOVORI PRIŠTINA-BEOGRAD, DA ILI NE? (Standard - Tirana) OPASNOST OD SRPSKE INICIJATIVEU GENERALNOJ SKUPŠTINI OUN (Zëri - Priština) LEGLA KORUPCIJE I EULEX (Kosova sot - Priština) MIRENJE SA REALNOŠĆU (Zëri - Priština) ŠTA OČEKUJEMO OD MISIJE EULEX?! (Telegrafi - Priština) POLITIČKI, ZAKONSKI I VOJNI ARGUMENTI ZA NEZAVISNOST KOSOVA (Zëri - Priština) GDE PRONAĆI KRIVCE ZBOG ZASTOJA PROCESA PRIZNAVANJA KOSOVA?! (55 - Tirana) TRI FAZE UNMIK-a ZA STAPANJE SEVERA (Koha ditore - Priština) BORBA SRBIJE PROTIV KOSOVA DIPLOMATSKIM SREDSTVIMA (Zëri - Priština) SRPSKA POLITIKA I MORAL (Infopress - Priština) IZMEĐU EU I SRBIJE JE – KOSOVO (Zëri - Priština) OUN I NJENO POLITIČKO ISKUŠENJE (Kosova sot - Priština) FAKTURA EU ZA SRBIJU (Zëri - Priština) KFOR PALI ZELENO SVETLO (Kosova sot - Priština) DA LI MOŽE DA SE POSTIGNE PREĆUTNA SAGLASNSOT BEOGRADA ZA USPOSTAVLJANJE EULEX-a NA KOSOVU? (Zëri - Priština)

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DPC BOSNIA DAILY: Constitutional And Governance Reforms In Bosnia and Herzegovina (II)

Author(s): Raluca Raduta / Language(s): English

Bosnia Daily: January 9, 2015 – Constitutional And Governance Reforms In Bosnia and Herzegovina (II)

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Държавното управление: Нагласи на общественото мнение и политическия елит

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Bulgarian

Since the end of 1999 Vitosha Research with the Center for the Study of Democracy and Freedom House foundation, has been working on an international project entitled Accountable Government: Self and Public Perception. Activities under this initiative included the conducting of sociological surveys in Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Fieldwork was conducted in the period March 23 - April 15, 2000. The present paper outlines the findings of the surveys conducted in Bulgaria among the general population and MPs from the 38th National Assembly.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №02: Potential For Changes

Author(s): Slobodan Inić,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

(English edition) This report contains the analysis of data collected during the month of October 1999. One should have in mind this time frame-when considering the findings, drawing different generalizations or setting guidelines for possible actions. Sets of values of members of the observed generation, their social awareness, perception of the past and present, their stance on the West, and above all their potential to bring about changes are essentially determined by some long-standing and less intensive structural factors. To put it simply a generation of people who today have between 25 and 35 years, and who represent the future of the country, was to a large extent formed under the influence of structural features of the society eroded by constant wars and war threats, protracted economic crisis, internal conflicts and strife and total confusion in the sphere of social awareness and public moral. The generation which in the last decade came of age in such a society per force had to reflect its essential characteristics, despite a relative autonomy which each age groups had as its inherent characteristic. Young people and even relatively young people, to which the respondents of this survey belong, have a determined biological and psychological potential which can help them partially overcome the given moment of time and which usually indicates some of their future contents and values in the present day. In that sense one could expect that the mind-set of the observed generation substantially differs from so-called social conscience. But in conditions of an ever-deepening social crisis, in which the process of coming-of-age unfolded under pressure of retrograde, rather than progressive social factors, the aforementioned advantages of such a generation are less manifest, since their potential crumbles under pressure of a regressive society. One must bear in mind the aforementioned and thus avoid to treat unjustly the observed age group: they are expected to be the creators of the Serbian society at the beginning of the Twenty-first century, but it is pretty obvious that their social actions will be affected by a sorry legacy of the social and moral collapse. In fact they were not less predestined than the earlier generations to be unequipped for the contemporary world. They simply developed under much less favorable conditions. But this should not minimize their responsibility for the future development of society in Serbia. On the other hand such adverse development factors should be borne in mind if one truly wishes to understand the traits of this generation, instead of bluntly condemning them. My intention is not to prejudge results evidenced by this survey, but it bears mentioning that it is easier to reject the middle generation in Serbia, like Serbia proper, than to try to understand and render assistance to both.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №02: Potencijal za promene

Author(s): Slobodan Inić,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

This report contains the analysis of data collected during the month of October 1999. One should have in mind this time frame-when considering the findings, drawing different generalizations or setting guidelines for possible actions. Sets of values of members of the observed generation, their social awareness, perception of the past and present, their stance on the West, and above all their potential to bring about changes are essentially determined by some long-standing and less intensive structural factors. To put it simply a generation of people who today have between 25 and 35 years, and who represent the future of the country, was to a large extent formed under the influence of structural features of the society eroded by constant wars and war threats, protracted economic crisis, internal conflicts and strife and total confusion in the sphere of social awareness and public moral. The generation which in the last decade came of age in such a society per force had to reflect its essential characteristics, despite a relative autonomy which each age groups had as its inherent characteristic. Young people and even relatively young people, to which the respondents of this survey belong, have a determined biological and psychological potential which can help them partially overcome the given moment of time and which usually indicates some of their future contents and values in the present day. In that sense one could expect that the mind-set of the observed generation substantially differs from so-called social conscience. But in conditions of an ever-deepening social crisis, in which the process of coming-of-age unfolded under pressure of retrograde, rather than progressive social factors, the aforementioned advantages of such a generation are less manifest, since their potential crumbles under pressure of a regressive society. One must bear in mind the aforementioned and thus avoid to treat unjustly the observed age group: they are expected to be the creators of the Serbian society at the beginning of the Twenty-first century, but it is pretty obvious that their social actions will be affected by a sorry legacy of the social and moral collapse. In fact they were not less predestined than the earlier generations to be unequipped for the contemporary world. They simply developed under much less favorable conditions. But this should not minimize their responsibility for the future development of society in Serbia. On the other hand such adverse development factors should be borne in mind if one truly wishes to understand the traits of this generation, instead of bluntly condemning them. My intention is not to prejudge results evidenced by this survey, but it bears mentioning that it is easier to reject the middle generation in Serbia, like Serbia proper, than to try to understand and render assistance to both.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №03: Russia, Serbia, Montenegro

Author(s): Jelica Kurjak,Olga Popović-Obradović,Mijat Šuković / Language(s): English

(English edition) Russia’s long presence in the Balkans - from the eleventh century onwards - can be analysed in terms of its two salient features: continuity and, as far as the role of the Russian state in Balkan (especially Serbian) affairs is concerned, inconstancy. Russia has been trying to push out its frontiers as far as the warm seas ever since Muscovy Russ and the principality of Kiev began to expand. Its imperialistic policy has carried its influence as far south-west as the Adriatic Sea across and with the help of Balkan states. Various Balkan states have found in Russia both friend and foe; this depended on their attitude towards Russia’s rivals among the great powers and towards other Balkan countries at the time. At one time the latter found Russia’s support invaluable, at another they regarded it counter-productive. Russia was particularly adept in capitalising on Balkan crises and wars, in which it took an active part, to strengthen its position in the Balkans; its consequent peace-making efforts were almost always hailed by local populations with great relief. This policy has given rise to a number of myths in some Balkan countries (especially among the Serbs) about there being a selfless "mother Russia" always ready to rush to one’s rescue. However, historical evidence shows Russia to have been far less amiable and benevolent than some local political elites concerned primarily with furthering their day-to-day political objectives made out at the time. In the pursuance of its "Balkan strategy" Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, sought to realise its political interests; the fact that at some periods these interests coincided with the interests of some Balkan nations cannot be used to defend the thesis that Russia has been an a priori friend of Balkan states, especially of Serbia and/or Montenegro. Once the need for an outlet to the warm seas ceased being a strategic priority, Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, found another justification for its presence in the Balkans: having emerged from the Second World War as a major world power, it took part in the partition of Europe into two political systems and controlled one-half of the Balkan peninsula for over fifty years ostensibly to protective those parts from the other, imperialistic side. Throughout that period Russia’s political vocabulary and rhetoric abounded with stock ideological phrases to justify this presence in some Balkan country or other. Finally, the closing years of the twentieth century, witnessing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY, proved once again that Russia is an unavoidable protagonist in Balkan tragedies. As a great power, Russia strove permanently to add territory and then to protect its gains by all available means. Whenever it found it impossible to expand territorially, Russia sought to widen the zones of its political, economic and military influence. Russia either waged war or played nations against each other to realise its strategic objectives in the role of victor or peacemaker as the case may be; whether on the winning or the losing side, Russia always made the most of a situation. To be sure, besides paying rich dividends this policy occasionally backfired: in times of war, for instance, Russia usually paid a heavy price in human lives as well as found it necessary to deal with increasingly strong separatist movements on its soil (especially in 1991-93). But even in such times of adversity Russia found the strength to make the most of the setback. On the other hand, whenever it emerged victorious it tried to keep all the spoils. This dual line became especially prominent after the cold war and the end of the bipolar division of the world, when Russia failed to learn to play the part of one of the major forces in Europe; it is still finding it difficult to accept its new role of a respectable factor. The contradictory nature of Russia’s imperialistic policy vis-à-vis the Balkans was shown up in particular during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY. The analyses that follow show that even when Russia seemed to be losing ground it managed to realise its interests at least partially if not in whole.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №03: Rusija, Srbija, Crna Gora

Author(s): Jelica Kurjak,Olga Popović-Obradović,Mijat Šuković / Language(s): Serbian

Russia’s long presence in the Balkans - from the eleventh century onwards - can be analysed in terms of its two salient features: continuity and, as far as the role of the Russian state in Balkan (especially Serbian) affairs is concerned, inconstancy. Russia has been trying to push out its frontiers as far as the warm seas ever since Muscovy Russ and the principality of Kiev began to expand. Its imperialistic policy has carried its influence as far south-west as the Adriatic Sea across and with the help of Balkan states. Various Balkan states have found in Russia both friend and foe; this depended on their attitude towards Russia’s rivals among the great powers and towards other Balkan countries at the time. At one time the latter found Russia’s support invaluable, at another they regarded it counter-productive. Russia was particularly adept in capitalising on Balkan crises and wars, in which it took an active part, to strengthen its position in the Balkans; its consequent peace-making efforts were almost always hailed by local populations with great relief. This policy has given rise to a number of myths in some Balkan countries (especially among the Serbs) about there being a selfless "mother Russia" always ready to rush to one’s rescue. However, historical evidence shows Russia to have been far less amiable and benevolent than some local political elites concerned primarily with furthering their day-to-day political objectives made out at the time. In the pursuance of its "Balkan strategy" Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, sought to realise its political interests; the fact that at some periods these interests coincided with the interests of some Balkan nations cannot be used to defend the thesis that Russia has been an a priori friend of Balkan states, especially of Serbia and/or Montenegro. Once the need for an outlet to the warm seas ceased being a strategic priority, Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, found another justification for its presence in the Balkans: having emerged from the Second World War as a major world power, it took part in the partition of Europe into two political systems and controlled one-half of the Balkan peninsula for over fifty years ostensibly to protective those parts from the other, imperialistic side. Throughout that period Russia’s political vocabulary and rhetoric abounded with stock ideological phrases to justify this presence in some Balkan country or other. Finally, the closing years of the twentieth century, witnessing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY, proved once again that Russia is an unavoidable protagonist in Balkan tragedies. As a great power, Russia strove permanently to add territory and then to protect its gains by all available means. Whenever it found it impossible to expand territorially, Russia sought to widen the zones of its political, economic and military influence. Russia either waged war or played nations against each other to realise its strategic objectives in the role of victor or peacemaker as the case may be; whether on the winning or the losing side, Russia always made the most of a situation. To be sure, besides paying rich dividends this policy occasionally backfired: in times of war, for instance, Russia usually paid a heavy price in human lives as well as found it necessary to deal with increasingly strong separatist movements on its soil (especially in 1991-93). But even in such times of adversity Russia found the strength to make the most of the setback. On the other hand, whenever it emerged victorious it tried to keep all the spoils. This dual line became especially prominent after the cold war and the end of the bipolar division of the world, when Russia failed to learn to play the part of one of the major forces in Europe; it is still finding it difficult to accept its new role of a respectable factor. The contradictory nature of Russia’s imperialistic policy vis-à-vis the Balkans was shown up in particular during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY. The analyses that follow show that even when Russia seemed to be losing ground it managed to realise its interests at least partially if not in whole.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №09: In the Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units

Author(s): Stipe Sikavica,Budimir Babović,Miloš Vasić,Filip Švarm / Language(s): English

Even if one were to maintain that some psychological, political and professional features of Yugoslav Army resembled those of the armies of some European states undergoing transition, then one must also admit that the Yugoslav Army does not have its counterpart anywhere in the world when it comes to the YA origins, background, war experience and the current political engagement. One could say without any exaggeration that it is a phenomenon among the armies of the world, as much as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a phenomenon among other countries in the world. At least this assertion applies to the state and its army during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. It was created not through transformation, as the versions of the domestic (both active and retired) military professionals imply (see, for example, Veljko Kadijević, My perception of the war, Beograd 1993 page 113) but by simple downsizing and (mere renaming) of the former Yugoslav People's Army to the Serbian-Montenegrin combat and high officers cadres. That process evolved in a frightening wanton war destruction and wandering “of the armed force of all our peoples and nationalities” from Karavanka mountains in Slovenia to Danube and Drina. The Army of Yugoslavia after ten years of its existence is still searching for its own identity.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №09: U trouglu državne sile - vojska, policija, paravojska

Author(s): Stipe Sikavica,Budimir Babović,Miloš Vasić,Filip Švarm / Language(s): Serbian

Even if one were to maintain that some psychological, political and professional features of Yugoslav Army resembled those of the armies of some European states undergoing transition, then one must also admit that the Yugoslav Army does not have its counterpart anywhere in the world when it comes to the YA origins, background, war experience and the current political engagement. One could say without any exaggeration that it is a phenomenon among the armies of the world, as much as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a phenomenon among other countries in the world. At least this assertion applies to the state and its army during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. It was created not through transformation, as the versions of the domestic (both active and retired) military professionals imply (see, for example, Veljko Kadijević, My perception of the war, Beograd 1993 page 113) but by simple downsizing and (mere renaming) of the former Yugoslav People's Army to the Serbian-Montenegrin combat and high officers cadres. That process evolved in a frightening wanton war destruction and wandering “of the armed force of all our peoples and nationalities” from Karavanka mountains in Slovenia to Danube and Drina. The Army of Yugoslavia after ten years of its existence is still searching for its own identity.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №11: The Balkans Rachomon

Author(s): Todor Kuljić,Olivera Milosavljević,Olga Manojlović-Pintar / Language(s): English

The author presents the main and general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe in the 1990s, drawing attention to the various features of revisionism in former socialist countries (Russia, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) and their attitude to Socialism. The necessary scientific re-examination of the past is separated from its ideological reinterpretation inspired by revived nationalism. The attention focuses on Serb and Croat revisionism, that is, on its moderate versions (‘medium compass’ revisionism), as found in the works of the Yugoslavia historians Branko Petranović and Dušan Bilandžić. Digest: Contemporary historiographic revisionism exhibits a number of components: a critical attitude to historiography on the part of the winner (the communists); a clearer understanding of the essence of past events owing to greater distance from them and to the availability of new sources; a pragmatic reinterpretation of the past inspired by narrow or broad party or national motives. Revisionists in former socialist countries find their principal source in revived nationalism which seeks to play down one’s own fascist past by uncritically attacking anti-Communism and anti-totalitarianism. Instead of being confronted, the dark shadows from one’s own past are being shown in a new light. This paper draws attention to state-sponsored and academic revisionism, and lays bare its chief motives and rhetoric in several European countries. The object of this comparative study is to show up the triviality of domestic revisionism. The revisionism in the works of B. Petranović and D. Bilandžić written in the 1990s is discussed at some length to show up the contradictions characterizing their writings before and after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the pattern of their revision fired by awakened concern for their respective ‘endangered’ nations. Selective memory and orchestrated forgetfulness were major catalysts of the civil war in Yugoslavia, with revisionist historiography enlisted to justify the new national objectives. The author believes that one can master one’s past only by confronting its dark aspects and hopes that a critical appraisal by domestic scholars of own nationalism will not be overly delayed by customary tardiness. Is contemporary historiography in former Yugoslav republics under the prevalent influence of any of the following components: a) an inevitably maturer scientific outlook on the past brought about by sounder theory and improved methods, and made possible by the discovery of hitherto unknown archival material of prime importance; b) a rather understandable shift of accent in interpreting key historical events, that is, a fuller and broader understanding of their historical function resulting from changes in the epochal consciousness and from the disappearance of the authoritarian patterns of the one-party socialist regime, or; c) a pragmatic revision of the past prompted by broader or narrower ideological, party or personal interests or motives? Which of the above components are discernible in the leading historians and can they be differentiated in more detail? In trying to answer these questions we shall take a look at: a) some general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe and in former socialist regimes at the end of the twentieth century as an important aspect of reinterpreting the recent past; b) narrower regional characteristics, that is, the chief nationalistic motives of revisionism in the contemporary historiography of former Yugoslav republics, and; c) concrete revisionist components in the works of the Yugoslavia historians D. Bilandžić and B. Petranović.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №11: Balkanski rašomon

Author(s): Todor Kuljić,Olivera Milosavljević,Olga Manojlović-Pintar / Language(s): Serbian

The author presents the main and general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe in the 1990s, drawing attention to the various features of revisionism in former socialist countries (Russia, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) and their attitude to Socialism. The necessary scientific re-examination of the past is separated from its ideological reinterpretation inspired by revived nationalism. The attention focuses on Serb and Croat revisionism, that is, on its moderate versions (‘medium compass’ revisionism), as found in the works of the Yugoslavia historians Branko Petranović and Dušan Bilandžić. Digest: Contemporary historiographic revisionism exhibits a number of components: a critical attitude to historiography on the part of the winner (the communists); a clearer understanding of the essence of past events owing to greater distance from them and to the availability of new sources; a pragmatic reinterpretation of the past inspired by narrow or broad party or national motives. Revisionists in former socialist countries find their principal source in revived nationalism which seeks to play down one’s own fascist past by uncritically attacking anti-Communism and anti-totalitarianism. Instead of being confronted, the dark shadows from one’s own past are being shown in a new light. This paper draws attention to state-sponsored and academic revisionism, and lays bare its chief motives and rhetoric in several European countries. The object of this comparative study is to show up the triviality of domestic revisionism. The revisionism in the works of B. Petranović and D. Bilandžić written in the 1990s is discussed at some length to show up the contradictions characterizing their writings before and after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the pattern of their revision fired by awakened concern for their respective ‘endangered’ nations. Selective memory and orchestrated forgetfulness were major catalysts of the civil war in Yugoslavia, with revisionist historiography enlisted to justify the new national objectives. The author believes that one can master one’s past only by confronting its dark aspects and hopes that a critical appraisal by domestic scholars of own nationalism will not be overly delayed by customary tardiness. Is contemporary historiography in former Yugoslav republics under the prevalent influence of any of the following components: a) an inevitably maturer scientific outlook on the past brought about by sounder theory and improved methods, and made possible by the discovery of hitherto unknown archival material of prime importance; b) a rather understandable shift of accent in interpreting key historical events, that is, a fuller and broader understanding of their historical function resulting from changes in the epochal consciousness and from the disappearance of the authoritarian patterns of the one-party socialist regime, or; c) a pragmatic revision of the past prompted by broader or narrower ideological, party or personal interests or motives? Which of the above components are discernible in the leading historians and can they be differentiated in more detail? In trying to answer these questions we shall take a look at: a) some general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe and in former socialist regimes at the end of the twentieth century as an important aspect of reinterpreting the recent past; b) narrower regional characteristics, that is, the chief nationalistic motives of revisionism in the contemporary historiography of former Yugoslav republics, and; c) concrete revisionist components in the works of the Yugoslavia historians D. Bilandžić and B. Petranović.

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Izborni modaliteti Predsjedništva BiH (poticaj odluke Sejdić/Finci)

Author(s): Mirza Korajlić / Language(s): Bosnian

Član 5 Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine regulira instituciju Predsjedništva BiH. Predsjedništvo Bosne i Hercegovine se sastoji od tri člana: jednog Bošnjaka i jednog Hrvata, koji se svaki biraju neposredno sa teritorije Federacije, i jednog Srbina, koji se bira neposredno sa teritorije Republike Srpske. Članovi Predsjedništva biraju se neposredno u svakom entitetu, tako da svaki glasač glasa za popunjavanje jednog mjesta u Predsjedništvu Bosne i Hercegovine. Najupadljivija karakteristika Predsjedništva BiH je da je to institucija sastavljena od tri člana, a ne jedinstvena izvršna funkcija. Tročlano Predsjedništvo, kao i druge državne institucije u BiH, kreirane su tako da se dijeli moć između tri konstitutivna naroda, da ni u jednom državnom organu predstavnik bilo kojeg konstitutivnog naroda nema prevlast. Ovaj dio Ustava izražava etničku dimenziju unutrašnjeg uređenja države Bosne i Hercegovine i gotovo isključivo se bavi postojanjem i djelovanjem tri „konstitutivna naroda“, ili tri etničkovjerske skupine, Bošnjaka, Hrvata i Srba. U tom dijelu „Ostali“ narodi, kao i „građani“, mada se spominju u Preambuli Ustava BiH, praktično su ostali izvan domašaja ustavne regulacije. Dakle, dva su glavna problema današnjih izbora članova Predsjedništva BiH: 1. U Predsjedništvo mogu biti izabrani samo pripadnici konstitutivnih naroda i na taj način se isključuju (diskriminiraju) „Ostali“. Znači, „Ostali“ nemaju pasivno biračko pravo, kao jedno od osnovnih političkih prava građana u savremenim demokracijama. Dok je aktivno biračko pravo opšte, pasivno biračko pravo je ograničeno. 2. Kombinacija teritorijalnih i etničkih propisa isključuje (diskriminira) Bošnjake i Hrvate iz Republike Srpske i Srbe u Federaciji BiH da budu izabrani u Predsjedništvo BiH, ali i da glasaju za člana Predsjedništva svoje etničke grupe, tako da se aktivno i pasivno biračko pravo uskraćuje za oko 45% građana BiH. Takvim pravilom se samo pripadnici određene etničke grupe mogu smatrati potpuno lojalnim građanima entiteta, koji mogu braniti njegove interese. Prema tome, postoji diskriminacija u oba entiteta sva tri konstitutivna naroda: Bošnjaka, Srba i Hrvata, kao i nacionalnih manjina, a posebno se diskriminiraju građani Bosne i Hercegovine, jer nemaju ista politička prava u izbornom procesu na cijeloj teritoriji BiH. Slijedi da je ugrožen princip jednakosti građana u pogledu pristupa najvažnijim državnim funkcijama. Na osnovu toga se može zaključiti da izbori za Predsjedništvo BiH nisu u potpunosti slobodni izbori i da ograničavaju aktivno i pasivno biračko pravo, kao i neke od osnovnih principa demokratskih izbora, jednake mogućnosti i puno učešće građana u političkim procesima. Presudom Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u predmetu Sejdić i Finci protiv Bosne i Hercegovine, sistem izbora članova Predsjedništva BiH i Doma naroda Parlamentarne skupštine BiH proglašen je diskriminirajućim u odnosu na „Ostale“. Problem diskriminacije Srba u Federaciji i Bošnjaka i Hrvata u Republici Srpskoj nije odlučen u pomenutoj presudi. Iako u Katalogu ljudskih prava koja sadrži Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine nije izričito nominirana lista političkih prava, s obzirom na međunarodne standarde koji su sadržani u Ustavu, može se zaključiti da su garancijama političkih prava obuhvaćena prvenstveno: prava koja uključuju slobodu mišljenja, savjesti i vjere; slobodu izražavanja i štampe; aktivno i pasivno biračko pravo, kao i pravo na demokratske izbore; zabrana diskriminacije u skladu sa članom 2 (4) Ustava BiH. To znači da građani pod uvjetima opće jednakosti i bez diskriminacije po bilo kojem osnovu, imaju pravo da biraju i da budu birani, te da bez ikakve diskriminacije upravljaju javnim poslovima i da im bude, pod jednakim uslovima, dostupno vršenje javne službe. Iako bi se iz ovoga moglo zaključiti da izborno pravo, kao i druga politička prava, pripadaju građanima u Bosni i Hercegovini na cijelom njenom teritoriju i bez bilo kakve diskriminacije, ipak postoji nesklad i kolizija ovih ustavnih odredbi u odnosu na ustavne norme koje uređuju pitanja izbora, između ostalog, i Predsjedništva BiH.

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Značaj analitičkog pristupa u formulisanju Javnih Politika i Propisa u sektoru pravde u Bosni i Hercegovini

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Bosnian

Usljed uočenih nedostataka, nedosljednosti i relativno niskog sveukupnog kvaliteta usvojenih propisa na svim nivoima vlasti u BiH, Parlamentarna skupština BiH, kao najviši zakonodavni organ vlasti BiH, usvojila je u martu 2004. godine Zaključak o potrebi unapređenja stanja u oblasti izrade propisa u institucijama BiH, unificiranjem i modernizacijom metoda i tehnika njihove izrade, s ciljem što efikasnijeg ispunjavanja uslova i obaveza vezanih za pristupanje BiH Evropskoj uniji, kao i obaveza koje su preuzete drugim međunarodnim dokumentima. Također, temeljem spomenutog Zaključka, Parlamentarna skupština BiH je u januaru 2005. godine usvojila “Jedinstvena pravila za izradu propisa u institucijama Bosne i Hercegovine” (“Službeni glasnik BiH”, broj 11/05) koja, po uzoru na slična rješenja u zemljama Evropske unije i regiona, uvodi u proces izrade propisa niz inovativnih, lex artis, metoda i tehnika, do sada relativno malo poznatih u normativnoj praksi i tradiciji u BiH, poput obaveze izrade teza (dokumenta o javnoj politici, prije pristupanja izradi teksta propisa), procjeni troškova i koristi (tzv. ex ante analiza mogućih učinaka). Po modelu “Jedinstvenih pravila za izradu propisa u BiH”, Vlade RS-a i Brčko Distrikta BiH su usvojile gotovo identična pravila, dok je Vlada FBiH usvojila Uredbu o načinu pripreme, procjeni utjecaja i odabiru politike u postupku izrade akata, koje predlažu i donose Vlada FBiH i federalna ministarstva (“Službene novine FBiH”, broj 35/11). Ipak, kako to pokazuju izvještaji relevantnih međunarodnih organizacija poput SIGMA-e, ali i sami izvještaji Ureda koordinatora za reformu javne uprave u BiH o stepenu realizacije Akcionog plana Strategije reforme javne uprave u BiH, a što potvrđuje i ova analiza, u praksi je i dalje uočljiv izuzetno nizak kvalitet primjene odredbi Jedinstvenih pravila, koja se odnose na pitanja izrade javnih politika i ex ante procjene utjecaja. Institucije sektora pravde u BiH dijele gotovo identičnu sudbinu ostalih institucija u BiH po pitanju krajnje ograničenih kapaciteta i vještina za razvoj javnih politika, uključujući procjenu utjecaja javnih politika i propisa, koja se neminovno odrazila na efikasnost i učinkovitost pri realizaciji Akcionog plana Strategije reforme sektora pravde u BiH (AP SRSP), i čija izgradnja tek predstoji. Iz tog razloga, fokus institucija sektora pravde u BiH u narednom periodu, pored intenziviranja aktivnosti izgradnje kapaciteta i vještina za strateško planiranje, treba usmjeriti i na izgradnju kapaciteta i vještina za razvoj javnih politika i procjenu utjecaja. Smisao postojanja ljudskog kapaciteta sa specifičnim znanjima i sposobnostima za analitički pristup u kreiranju javnih politika, bio bi prelazak sa zastarjelog koncepta kreiranja zakona (kreiranje zakona na način prepisivanja i pozivanja na već postojeće zakone i propise, bez urađene detaljne analize problema) na znatno moderniji koncept, utemeljen na inovativnosti službenika i novim idejama za prevazilaženje određenog problema. Te ideje se mogu zasnivati na dobrim praksama iz zemalja u okruženju, članicama Evropske unije, ali mogu biti i sasvim nove ideje, koje nisu nigdje do sada primjenjene, ali bi bile u kontekstu rješavanja tog problema detaljno testirane na situaciju u Bosni i Hercegovini, od uzroka problema, do predviđanja svih posljedica tj. pozitivnih i negativnih efekata. S tim u vezi, a sukladno zahtjevima Strategije reforme javne uprave u BiH, potrebno je da Ministarstvo pravde BiH, Federalno ministarstvo pravde, Ministarstvo pravde RS-a, kantonalna ministarstva pravde I Pravosudna komisija Brčko Distrikta BiH, izvrše analizu postojećih organizacionih i kadrovskih kapaciteta za vršenje poslova razvoja javnih politika, te na osnovu takve analize, osiguraju uspostavu najprikladnije organizacione strukture za kvalitetno vršenje ove funkcije (ovisno od obima posla i raspoloživih kadrova za obavljanje navedenih funkcija). Također, na osnovu izvršene analize, potrebno je da svako od pomenutih ministarstava izmjeni/dopuni svoj pravilnik o unutrašnjoj organizaciji i sistematizaciji poslova kako bi uspostavili odgovarajuću unutrašnju organizacijsku strukturu ili pojedinačna radna mjesta za vršenje ove funkcije, uz utvrđivanje odgovarajućih opisa poslova. Imajući u vidu sve veća budžetska ograničenja u smislu nemogućnosti upošljavanja novih državnih službenika, i s ciljem izbjegavanja mogućeg dodatnog “gomilanja” administracije, preporučuje se da se popunjavanje ovih pozicija, prije svega, pokuša izvršiti internim premještajima i/ili izmjenama i dopunama opisa poslova postojećih državnih službenika, koji već djelimično obavljaju ove poslove u sklopu (uporedo) sa svojim redovnim radnim zadacima. U slučajevima kada provedene analize argumentovano ukažu na nemogućnost primjene ovog rješenja, ministarstva bi trebala pokrenuti inicijativu za upošljavanjem novih službenika. Paralelno s ovim aktivnostima trebala bi se pripremiti i metodologija razvoja javnih politika i procjene utjecaja politika i propisa. U cilju koherentnosti rješenja na nivou sektora pravde, optimalno rješenje bi predstavljala jedinstvena metodologija, koja bi se zatim internim aktom (npr. pravilnikom) mogla transponirati u okviru svake institucije sektora pravde, dok bi kao model pri izradi ove metodologije mogla poslužiti Uredba Vlade Federacije o načinu pripreme, procjeni utjecaja i odabiru politike u postupku izrade akata koje predlažu i donose Vlada FBiH i federalna ministarstva (“Službene novine FBiH”, broj 35/11). Također, s obzirom na složenost procesa razvoja javnih politika i procjene utjecaja, preporučljivo je da uz metodologiju bude izrađen i odgovarajući priručnik, kao i da se imenovanim službenicima ministarstava pravde osigura dodatna specijalistička obuka i mentorska potpora, s ciljem izgradnje i produbljivanja njihovih tehničkih znanja i vještina neophodnih za vršenje ovih poslova. Iz svega navedenog, evidentno je da institucije sektora pravde u BiH neće biti u mogućnosti same provesti sve predložene aktivnosti, pa se čini opravdanim da im se, u tom smislu, osigura odgovarajuća tehnička potpora od strane bilateralnih ili multilateralnih donatora aktivnih u sektoru pravde u BiH. Kako djelovanje u području javnih politika podrazumijeva širi aspekt djelovanja od samog kreiranja javne politike, mora se imati na umu da je neophodno da se pored kreatora javnih politika u procesu osigura i sudjelovanje drugih segmenata društva, kao što su predstavnici akademske zajednice, praktičari i predstavnici civilnog društva u BiH. Imajući u vidu da se sve javne politike moraju zasnivati na relevantnim činjenicama i analizama, budući kreatori politika moraju imaju razumijevanja o vrijednostima podataka i resursa, koji su im na raspolaganju, te je neophodno da se kroz uspostavu odnosa suradnje između svih spomenutih aktera, osigura razmjena podataka i naučnih istraživanja. Na kraju,posebno naglašavamo potrebu da se na razini sektora treba napraviti opis poslova i profila ljudi, koji treba da rade na poslovima razvoja javnih politika i ex ante i ex post procjene utjecaja.

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DODATAK 3. ALTERNATIVNOM IZVJEŠTAJU O IMPLEMENTACIJI CEDAW KONVENCIJE I ŽENSKIM LJUDSKIM PRAVIMA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

Author(s): Aleksandra Petrić,Fedra Idžaković,Gordana Vidović,Sabiha Husić,Mara Radovanović,Selma Hadžihalilović,Sadžida Tulić / Language(s): Bosnian,Serbian

Dodatak trećem alternativnom izvještaju je nastao kao rezultat zajedničkih napora grupe aktivistkinja i aktivista iz nevladinih organizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini sa dugogodišnjim iskustvom u direktnom radu sa ženama čija su prava ugrožena ili direktno povrijeđena, kao i aktivnostima zalaganja za usvajanje rodno osjetljivih i odgovornih zakona i javnih politika u oblasti zaštite ženskih ljudskih prava i ravnopravnosti polova.

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Macedonia and the Western Balkans Awaiting the 2008 EU Progress Reports: Back to Basics

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Facing 5 November 2008, when the Commission is to publish the progress reports, Macedonia and the wider Balkan region are considering the options for speeding up the process of accession to the EU. However, the difficulties faced with regards to political reforms, such as lack of political dialogue between the government and opposition decreases the likeliness that Macedonia will start accession talks in the years to come unless there is consolidated reform process that would be tested in the upcoming elections of March 2009.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №26: Ka izgradnji održivog kosovskog društva

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Serbian

The edition “Moving towards a Sustainable Society in Kosovo” provides insight into the activities the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia realized under the project of the same name. Serbia’s policymakers have managed to prolong the resolution of the Kosovo status for more than a year and thus fuel the regional vulnerability. Encouraged by Russia’s support and its embargo on the UN Security Council resolution that could have laid the foundations for Kosovo’s future status, the official Belgrade has been toughening nationalistic rhetoric and focusing on Kosovo as the top priority of the agenda of national interest. Such an attitude has turned the relations between Albanian and Serb communities in Kosovo even more delicate. For, the drawn-out status debate has overshadowed key issues of the Kosovo society, economy and interethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs and other minority communities. Two panel discussions, “Human Security in Kosovo” and “Framed Trials of Kosovo Albanians,” the Helsinki Committee organized with the assistance of partner organizations from Pristine probably best testify the need for interethnic dialogue. This edition carries integral proceedings of those gatherings. The workshops – described in this edition – one in the Serb enclave of Plemetina and another in Pristine bringing together Serb and Albanian women are also illustrative of Belgrade’s attempt to choke any rapprochement between Serbs and Albanians and of such policy’s detrimental effects on Kosovo Serbs. The rhetoric of confrontation and the emotion-fueled delusion that Kosovo would remain a part of Serbia have dominated Serbia’s political and social scene for the past twelve months. This is why this edition also brings to the public eye relevant discussions in the Serbian parliament, the text of the “Resolution on the Need for Just Solution of the Question of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo Based on International Law” that was unanimously adopted in late July 2007, as well as major Kosovo-related addresses by highest state officials. However, Serbia does have a political alternative to such mainstream: the Liberal Democratic Party /LDP/, which entered the parliament following the January 2007 elections. The LDP alternative document on Kosovo, submitted for the parliamentary consideration, is also presented in this edition. Last but not least, some illustrative commentaries, run in the Committee’s magazine The Helsinki Charter – scrutinizing Kosovo developments along with other key issues of Serbia’s modernization and Europeanization – are here available to readers as condensed reading matter.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №37: The Youth in a Post-Truth Era – European Identity and Education

Author(s): Vladimir Gligorov,Izabela Kisić,Sonja Biserko,Srđan Barišić,Aleksandra Đurić-Bosnić,Jelena Vasiljević,Miloš Ćirić,Aleksandar V. Miletić,Dragan T. Stanojević,Ivan Đurić,Srđan Milošević,Biljana Đorđević,Srđan Atanasovski,Časlav Ninković,Duško Radosavljević,Pavel Domonji,Miroslav Keveždi,Branislava Opranović,Ana Pataki,Andrea Ratković,Iskra Vuksanović / Language(s): English

(English edition) Ongoing public debates frequently focus on European identity. What sparked off such debates were tremendous global changes after the Cold War, disappearance of two opposing blocs, ethnic conflicts, migrations, sociopolitical crises of liberal societies as well as the mass renouncement of value-based orientations Europe and the whole world had been built on after World War II and defeat of Nazism. People all over the world are now growingly concerned with the issues of statehood, ethnicity and the notion of “being a citizen.” Political manipulation of collective identities badly affects people’s lives and policies on which societies are being built. Many theoreticians are questioning – and with good reason – the very notion of collective identity, ethnic in the first place, as extremely exclusive. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia has launched a series of round tables under the title “Youth in a Post-Truth Era: European Identity and Education.” Participants were intellectuals of younger generations mostly, NGO activists and civil sector representatives, but secondary school and university students too. What we wanted achieve with these open debates – never devoid of controversial arguments – was to give shape to authentic views with impact on practical politics and (in)formal education of the youth. Our researches and experience in communication with young people show that they do care about collective identities, and that their ethnicities and religions are crucial in identity-building. Although they recognize the potential of Euro-integration for, say, better schooling or economic progress, a snail’s pace of the accession process and domestic propaganda make them turn to other international players. Young Serbs are turning to Russia and Putin, Bosniaks to Turkey and Erdogan, while young Hungarians to Serbia’s neighbor in the north and Orban. Revisionism also strongly influences the youth regardless of their ethnicities. They practically always oppose strongly any questioning of patriarchal values and react fiercely to it. Value-based orientations as such are mostly the effects of the spread of fake news and narratives predominant in the media, schools environments and families; the narratives that forced their way into the public sphere in the 1980s, bloomed in the 1990s and are thriving now against the global backdrop. Is the narrative about European identity and education a key to changes and inclusive enough? When I say European identity I am not advocating for Euro-centrism, especially not now when it implies social and economic exclusion of people heading for Europe from various continents and countries, or those outside the European Union. In Balkan countries aspiring to EU membership European identity is used as a political instrument supportive to integration processes. At the same time, it supports the transfer from a one-dimensional, nationalistic and wartime identity to a multi-dimensional, civic one. As it has turned out so far, the issues of class consciousness, socioeconomic justice and the right to education for all will be predominant in the debates to come. We do not intend to impose alternative narratives on the youth but to capacitate them for critical thought; to help them recognize and stand up against social repression and collective identities that have been imposed on them and exclude any “otherness.” Ever since the early 1990s the European Commission has also been focused on the researches of European identity (or identities). The European bureaucracy was interested in it for very practical reasons: the European Commission’s concern with the manner in which different processes of identification with the European Union shape integrative processes and strengthen the sense of solidarity among Europeans. On the eve of the Gothenburg Summit in November 2017 the European Commission issued guidelines for strengthening of the common European identity through education and culture, under the motto “unity in diversity.” The document was meant for the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the European Socioeconomic Committee and the Committee of Regions. It was motivated by the rise of populism “at home” and beyond the EU, the spread of fake news and manipulation of information networks. Given that the EU administration interferes not into educational systems and culture of its member-states but leaves them to national, regional and local authorities, its role is limited to strengthening of cooperation and support to national projects in these spheres. It realized that education and culture make Europe attractive for learning and working, attractive as a space of freedom and shared values reflected in fundamental rights and an open society. And education as such builds foundations for active citizenship and helps to prevent populism, xenophobia and violent radicalism. Education, along with culture, plays a key role in cross-border meetings and learning about the true meaning of “being a European.” According to an analysis commissioned by the European Commission, joint, cross-border actions such as engagement in social movements or in organizations with shared goals (such as ecologic organizations) can promote the sense for European identity since collective actions are always taking into consideration the “other’s” points of view. How to involve candidates for the membership of the EU in the debate on Europe’s future and identity (identities) is among major issues. Isolated periphery and people’s frustration with accession that is being constantly postponed incite Euroskepticism and passivity of the youth who actually stand for European integration. The publication “European Identity and Education” resulted from a series of discussions and debates organized by the Helsinki Committee. Its introductory section presents one of the essays and political analyses of the international and local context in which Serbia’s youth are being raised: “Democracy, Pluralism and Extremism” by Vladimir Gligorov. The following section presents readers with draft practical politics for those dealing with institutional and informal education of the young. These draft policies, actually suggestions, are about teaching methods that may efficiently develop critical thinking among the youth and their awareness about alternatives. Inter alia, the suggested approaches are meant to motivate young people to get actively involved in building of a democratic society based on pluralism, inter-culturalism, solidarity and socioeconomic rights. Recommendations can be summed up as follows: 1. Strengthening of the idea of active citizenship; 2. Media literacy and development of critical thinking of the youth; and 3. Development and modernization of educational programs and present approaches to education of school children. Drafts of public policies were on the agenda of debates held in Belgrade and Novi Sad with participation of scholars and activists from younger generations mostly, concerned with the issues of identity and education. This publication also presents excerpts from those debates. How possibly could cosmopolitanism, inter-culturalism, anti-fascism and open society be promoted in today’s Serbia but also in Europe where extremism, fear of “otherness,” concerns for the safeguard of one’s own national identity that is allegedly threatened, be on the up and up? This is one of major dilemmas facing us today. Few students have access to informal education that rests on the principles guiding a democratic society. Speaking from experience many participants in debates pointed to the lack in professional staffs involved in educational process. Civic education is being marginalized in elementary and secondary schools. The participants also presented well-thought-out arguments against religious teaching in school curricula. The majority of participants take that strengthening of informal education that would lead towards incorporation of similar contents and methods into the educational system could be a solution to the above-mentioned dilemma. That would be a chance for attracting young people whose interests and ambitions are well beyond the rigid educational system, they argue. Positive experiences of Yugoslavia’s interculturalism and socialism, and the common history and culture can be used as resources for strengthening interculturalism throughout the region. Small steps forward within institutions that depend, above all, on individual activism and courage are another possible approach to resolution. This publication is meant as a contribution to local but also more extensive debate on European identity and new European policies that would cope with today’s challenges by far more efficiently.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. HAMAS’ USE OF HUMAN SHIELDS IN GAZA

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Hamas, an Islamist militant group and the de facto governing authority of the Gaza Strip, has been using human shields in conflicts with Israel since 2007. According to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the war crime of using human shields encompasses “utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas, or military forces immune from military operations.” Hamas has launched rockets, positioned military-related infrastructure-hubs and routes, and engaged the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from, or in proximity to, residential and commercial areas. The strategic logic of human shields has two components. It is based on an awareness of Israel’s desire to minimise collateral damage, and of Western public opinion’s sensitivity towards civilian casualties. If the IDF uses lethal force and causes an increase in civilian casualties, Hamas can utilise that as a lawfare tool: it can accuse Israel of committing war crimes, which could result in the imposition of a wide array of sanctions. Alternatively, if the IDF limits its use of military force in Gaza to avoid collateral damage, Hamas will be less susceptible to Israeli attacks, and thereby able to protect its assets while continuing to fight. Moreover, despite the Israeli public’s high level of support for the Israeli political and military leadership during operations, civilian casualties are one of the friction points between Israeli left-wing and right-wing supporters, with the former questioning the outcomes of the operation.

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The EU’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policy in Central Asia: Past Crises and Emergencies to Come

Author(s): Bruno De Cordier / Language(s): English

The 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia stresses security and stability through regional cooperation and integration, poverty reduction and good governance. But the strategy hardly mentions humanitarian aid, a security-related activity that not only plays a crucial role in strengthening European soft power in crisis-affected areas, but also predates many of the European Union’s programmes in the Central Asian region. Between 2007 and 2012, the region’s governments requested foreign aid for a dozen humanitarian emergencies. The majority were floods, earthquakes and so-called compound crises caused by exceptionally cold winters, a breakdown in energy supply and the reduction of winter crop yields and livestock. The same period also saw a political emergency with serious communal violence, displacement and habitat destruction. In one way or another, these crises affected around 4.5 million people out of a total population of some 58 million. These emergencies clearly reflect the hazard risks continually faced by the Central Asian region due to its physical and human geography as well as its sociopolitical legacies and dynamics.

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Political Participation of Women in BiH: The 2018 General Election

Author(s): Medina Mujić / Language(s): English

Participation of politically engaged women in political processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a subject of discussion in the public sphere of Bosnia and Herzegovina for many years. This issue is most frequently addressed by civil society representatives, both men and women, relevant institutions and individual female defenders of women’s human rights. The current situation regarding representation of women in politics is not satisfactory. Yet, it is quite rarely in focus of discussions among representatives of political parties who are held responsible, informally and formally, for the lack of women’s participation in government.

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