Problem językowy na Ukrainie. Próba nowego spojrzenia

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): Polish

Ukraina zaledwie od dwudziestu lat jest państwem niepodległym, a konsekwencją długotrwałego pozostawania ziem ukraińskich w państwie rosyjskim/sowieckim jest mieszany etnicznie charakter społeczeństwa. Na Ukrainie obok Ukraińców mieszkają bardzo liczni Rosjanie i członkowie innych narodowości b. ZSRR, a także wciąż duża grupa ludzi, identyfikujących się jako ludzie sowieccy. Znacząca część Ukraińców posługuje się w życiu codziennym (zwłaszcza zawodowym) językiem rosyjskim, znając ukraiński słabo lub nie znając go wcale. Kwestia językowa jest więc poważnym wyzwaniem dla państwa ukraińskiego i jednym z ważniejszych problemów ukraińskiej polityki wewnętrznej. // Celem tego opracowania jest zarysowanie problematyki językowej Ukrainy i jej kontekstu społecznego, ze zwróceniem uwagi na ważne, a zazwyczaj pomijane w tego rodzaju opracowaniach zagadnienia, jak aspekt handlowy (komercyjny) regulacji językowych w mediach oraz kluczowa rola „kwestii językowej” w ukraińskiej polityce tożsamości (polityce symbolicznej, historycznej etc.).

Rosyjski Kaukaz bez zmian. Lokalna wojna na przedpolach olimpiady

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): Polish

Od rozpadu ZSRR Kaukaz Północny pozostaje najbardziej niestabilną częścią Federacji Rosyjskiej, a skala przemocy wskazuje, że mamy do czynienia z lokalną wojną domową. Jej stronami są: odwołujące się do islamu salafickiego zbrojne podziemie oraz świeckie władze poszczególnych republik, wspierane przez struktury siłowe. Wyjątkowo silną pozycję osiągnął lider Czeczenii Ramzan Kadyrow, który w dużym stopniu uniezależnił się od Moskwy i chce podporządkować sobie sąsiednie terytoria. Kreml, dla którego priorytetem jest bezpieczeństwo igrzysk w Soczi, stoi przed strategiczną decyzją, czy próbować integrować Kaukaz Północny, czy też go izolować, godząc się na istnienie nieformalnej „wewnętrznej zagranicy”. Procesy, toczące się w regionie – islamizacja, demodernizacja czy derusyfikacja – mentalnie coraz bardziej oddalają go od reszty Rosji, wzmacniając poczucie wzajemnej obcości.

The anatomy of Russian information warfare. The Crimean operation, a case study

Author(s): Jolanta Darczewska / Language(s): English

Information warfare has a long tradition in Russia. Over the past few years it has been redefined, using geopolitical theory as its foundation. According to this theory, information warfare is a means used by the state to achieve its ends in international, regional and domestic politics and also to gain geopolitical advantage. Geopolitics has also provided Russia with ideological arguments in its strategy for rivalry with the West. As opposed to the ideology of liberalism, it promotes a “neoconservative post-liberal power struggling for a just multipolar world, defending tradition, conservative values and true liberty.” It provides an explanation for the internal crisis in Ukraine and grounds for the annexation of Crimea by Russia in the context of rivalry between ‘Eurasian civilisation’ and the ‘US-led Atlantic civilisation.’ // This text is an attempt to reconstruct an outline of the information warfare theory based on the writings of the leading representatives of Russian geopolitics, Igor Panarin and Aleksandr Dugin, and also its applied use during the operation in Crimea.

The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of Russia's military doctrine

Author(s): Jolanta Darczewska / Language(s): English

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). // An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.

Sojusz ołtarza z tronem. Rosyjski Kościół Prawosławny a władza w Rosji

Author(s): Katarzyna Chawryło (Jarzyńska) / Language(s): Polish

Rosyjski Kościół Prawosławny Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego (RKP), największa wspólnota wyznaniowa w Rosji, odgrywa istotną rolę w procesie samoidentyfikacji kulturowej i państwowej narodu rosyjskiego. Jako instytucja społeczno-polityczna z wielowiekową historią dysponuje dużym kapitałem symbolicznym i cieszy się autorytetem społecznym, co jest wykorzystywane dla celów politycznych. // Po powrocie Władimira Putina na urząd prezydenta w 2012 roku Kreml dla wzmocnienia reżimu politycznego zaczął szeroko odwoływać się do ideologii konserwatywnej oraz promować tradycyjne wartości moralno-obyczajowe, za których strażniczkę uważa się Cerkiew. Pociągnęło to za sobą zacieśnienie stosunków pomiędzy władzą państwową i RKP oraz skutkowało większym zaangażowaniem hierarchów i struktur cerkiewnych w kwestie dotyczące polityki wewnętrznej oraz zagranicznej. Taka sytuacja naraża RKP na krytykę z powodu zbytniego upolitycznienia oraz w dłuższej perspektywie na ryzyka związane z potencjalną destabilizacją systemu władzy w Rosji.

Pierestrojka Nazarbajewa. Kryzys i reformy w Kazachstanie

Author(s): Aleksandra Jarosiewicz / Language(s): Polish

Kazachstan to państwo wyjątkowe na obszarze postsowieckim. Jest krajem autorytarnym i uchodzi za bliskiego sojusznika Rosji, mimo to dąży do modernizacji i poszukuje nowych, nieobciążonych sowieckością modeli rozwoju, co w praktyce coraz bardziej go od Moskwy oddala. Obecnie Kazachstan znajduje się na drodze do wielopłaszczyznowego kryzysu o charakterze społecznym, politycznym i gospodarczym. Próbą wyhamowania tej tendencji jest inicjowana przez prezydenta Nazarbajewa przebudowa państwa, przypominająca pierestrojkę lat osiemdziesiątych. Celem Nazarbajewa jest przekształcenie i usprawnienie systemu tak, aby zwiększyć zdolność państwa do przetrwania i zachowania dotychczasowego dorobku. W tym celu próbuje on wybiórczo kopiować zachodnie rozwiązania bez zasadniczego naruszania autorytarnego charakteru reżimu. Realizację reform utrudnia współtworzony przez niego samego porządek polityczno-społeczny w Kazachstanie, a także opór biurokracji, grup polityczno-biznesowych i podziały przecinające społeczeństwo. W obecnych realiach Kazachstanu wprowadzanie reform jest tak samo niebezpieczne, jak ich zaniechanie. Pierestrojka to zatem ryzykowna próba ucieczki przed kryzysem i osuwaniem się w cywilizacyjny cień Rosji.

Silk globalisation. China’s vision of international order

Author(s): Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): English

The New Silk Road is China’s main foreign policy project, devised under Xi Jinping. Beijng is striving to build up durable influence in the states in its neighbourhood. At the same time, China’s view of the international order is characterised by a non-confrontational understanding of influence. China does not intend to build its own closed regional bloc, but is rather trying to push through its own vision of globalisation for Asia, Europe and Africa. China is trying to merge its traditional way of thinking about the external world (Sinocentrism, and a preference for bilateral relations with weaker states) with Western formats for multilateral cooperation such as development banks and international organisations. While trying to purse China’s ambitions resulting from its rise as a global power, the Chinese elites nevertheless fear taking over leadership in the region and assuming responsibility for the same.

The unfinished state. 25 years of independent Moldova

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): English

The Republic of Moldova is an exceptional state. It was the only Soviet republic to proclaim independence, on 27 August 1991, in order to become part of another state, i.e. Romania, rather than building its own independent political future. After the civil war, the break-up of the common state and the de facto collapse of the unification project, the newly established Moldova found itself in an ideological vacuum. With no experience of statehood, no coherent historical narrative or responsible political elites, and with a nation that was unsure of its identity, it set off on a long march in search of an idea that could define the shape of its statehood and the direction of its future development. // Twenty-five years on, the social and political project called the Republic of Moldova is experiencing a grave crisis. The Moldovan statehood remains fragile and seemingly impermanent. The country’s successive governments have not been able to build effective state institutions or create adequate conditions for economic development. After years of structural and economic weakness, today’s Moldova as led by Vlad Plahotniuc, the country’s most powerful politician and businessman, is a typical post-Soviet oligarchy ruled by a narrow clique interested mainly in protecting its own political and business interests.

Środki aktywne. Rosyjski towar eksportowy

Author(s): Jolanta Darczewska,Piotr Żochowski / Language(s): Polish

Przedstawione w niniejszym opracowaniu uwagi pokazują złożoność i wielowymiarowość działań, określanych jako „środki aktywne”. Obserwowany współcześnie renesans tej problematyki uwarunkowała ich kryzysotwórcza rola. Temat zasługuje na odrębne potraktowanie także z tego względu, że współczesne formy środków aktywnych są w ogromnej mierze oparte na schematach znanych i opisanych w przeszłości. Historyczna perspektywa może przyczynić się do ich zdiagnozowania oraz zidentyfikowania ich niejawnych mechanizmów. Obecne problemy z agresywnymi działaniami rosyjskich służb specjalnych są zarazem wzmocnioną wersją starych, do czego przyczyniły się nowe technologie informacyjno-komunikacyjne. // W tekście podjęto próbę doprecyzowania tego historycznego pojęcia, pokazano instytucjonalne ramy działań informacyjno-dywersyjnych, innowacje koncepcyjne i organizacyjne po zimnej wojnie, a także zasygnalizowano współczesne wyzwania oraz sposoby ich identyfikacji.

Region specjalnej troski. Rosyjski Daleki Wschód w polityce Moskwy

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): Polish

O ile w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku rosyjski Daleki Wschód nie stanowił ważnego regionu w polityce wewnętrznej władz centralnych Rosji, o tyle po dojściu do władzy Władimira Putina został na poziomie deklaratywnym uznany za strategiczny. Moskwa nie potrafiła jednak dotąd wygenerować rzeczywistych impulsów rozwojowych w regionie. Z jednej strony wynika to z problemów systemowych występujących w całej Rosji – brak spójnej koncepcji rozwoju gospodarczego, nieefektywne zarządzanie; z drugiej strony z barier stricte lokalnych – problemy kadrowe, zdecentralizowany system energetyczny, ograniczone zaangażowanie inwestorów zagranicznych. Nie istnieje obecnie ryzyko marginalizacji regionu na podobieństwo lat dziewięćdziesiątych. Wydaje się jednak, że polityczna reintegracja regionu z federalnym centrum (ściślejsza instytucjonalna kontrola ze strony Moskwy) oraz status stabilnego zaplecza surowcowego państw azjatyckich to obecnie maksimum możliwości rozwojowych rosyjskiego Dalekiego Wschodu.

Russia's Afghan Problem. The Russian Federation and the Afghanistan problem since 2001

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak / Language(s): English

Russia is facing a difficult choice regarding its further policy towards the Afghan problem. It seems that Moscow has no coherent or consistent strategy. It is likely that the Russian ruling elite, like expert circles, is divided on this issue. In practice, the Russian authorities now seem to be simultaneously implementing elements of various strategies, thus trying to leave themselves the widest possible room for manoeuvre.

The ‘Tribal Areas’ of the Caucasus. The North Caucasus – an enclave of ‘alien civilisation’ within the Russian Federation

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English

Militant Islam is currently the greatest threat to security and stability in the Russian part of the Caucasus. However, even though the armed Islamic underground is capable of organising terrorist attacks and carrying out actions of sabotage, it seems too weak to bring about any change in the Caucasus’s political status quo. Besides, militant Islam is merely a symptom (albeit the most radical and spectacular) of a much wider process, namely the widening civilisational gap between Russia and the North Caucasus, initiated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The key elements of this process are as follows: the spontaneous re-Islamisation of social life and the dynamic growth of Islam's political influence; the de-Russification of the region; and the ongoing marginalisation of secular intellectuals. As a result, the North Caucasus, and principally Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, are turning into an enclave separated from the rest of the Russian Federation by a growing civilisational gap, and becoming increasingly different from the rest of Russia. This situation may recall the tribal areas of Pakistan inhabited by Pashtuns (FATA) along the Afghan border.

Russia’s revisionist policy towards the West

Author(s): Marcin Kaczmarski / Language(s): English

Russia’s actions so far have led to a kind of deadlock. Moscow has managed to stop NATO enlargement into the CIS area, persuade the USA not to deploy the missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, and avoid major consequences after the war with Georgia; nevertheless, the full implementation of its objectives remains unlikely.

Russia's policy in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski / Language(s): English,Polish

1. The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia are priority areas for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Russia mainly sees its influence in both regions as an important factor determining its international stature, and as a precondition for reinforcing its position as a world power. The Caucasus and Central Asia are also important for Russia from the points of view of economy, especially because of those area's natural resource wealth, and security, as both regions generate serious potential threats to the Russian Federation, including Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, the drugs trade and illegal migration. // 2. The policy which Russia has been implementing in the Southern Caucasus is ineffective. Even though its position in the region is still strong, Moscow has suffered painful defeats there and is systematically losing influence. These failings should largely be blamed on Russia's colonial 'divide and rule' attitude which involves inciting conflicts between the various Caucasian nations in order to keep them within the Russian sphere of influence. However, this approach is only effective in the short term. It is based on domination rather than co-operation, and reflects the Kremlin's ambition to keep the Caucasian states dependent on Moscow. For this reason they treat Russia as a 'necessary evil' rather than a constructive partner, and are trying to make themselves independent of their former overlords to as great an extent as they possibly can. This situation is not conducive to the development of lasting influence with sound regional foundations. // 3. The situation is different in Central Asia, where Russia has been scoring tactic victories and shoring up its position, mostly in the economic and military spheres. This is because the Kremlin has made skilful moves and is competently using the changing geopolitical situation in the region to pursue its own interests. Moscow has successfully implemented a 'carrot and stick' tactic in relation to the Central Asian states. Russia's position in the region is also strengthened by the fact that most Central Asian states are weak, and the West has shown relatively little interest in the region (apart from the energy sector). // 4. The weakness of the Kremlin's Central Asian policy is that it has failed to solve the mushrooming political, social and economic problems which the region is struggling with. This particular concerns the support that Moscow has been providing to the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, whose rule is exacerbating those countries' internal problems and leading to the development of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. As a consequence of the Kremlin's approach, the threats that Central Asia poses to Russia and its interests in the region are mounting rather than diminishing. // 5. The Kremlin's policy for the Caucasus and Central Asia has some distinctive features. It is characterised by a post-imperial and post-colonial perception of both regions in the eyes of the Russian power elite. In addition, Russia has no positive development model to offer to the states and societies in Central Asia, such as would buttress economic reforms or encompass projects to solve the mounting internal problems or frozen ethnic conflicts. In both regions, the Russians have failed to promote any values that could appeal to the politically and socially active strata of societies in the two regions, and could compete with Western values in the Caucasus or with Islamic values in Central Asia.

Russia vs. the European Union: a "strategic partnership" crisis

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak / Language(s): English,Polish

1. Contrary to both parties' declarations on the development of their "strategic partnership", relations between Russia and the European Union have over recent years been in a state which could be called one of crisis. However, this does not mean that there have been no achievements in EU-Russian relations. The key problem is that Russia and the European Union have essentially different perceptions, aspirations and interests, which causes mistrust and disillusionment. This crisis is manifested in mutual criticism by the two sides, regularly recurring tensions and cooling of relations ("minicrises"), and especially by the "virtualisation of co-operation", i.e. concealing a lack of substantive content in many key areas under increasingly rich layers of dialogue and co-operation. // 2. The causes of the crisis differ, and some of them are profound. Most of them originate from Russia and its policy. These fundamental reasons include a lack of any clear definition of Russia's civilisational identity (whether it is a European or a Eurasian state), a lack of any defined and established vision of Russia's place in the modern world, and of a policy based thereon (the "great power" option vs. the pro-integration option), a crisis in Russia's "European project" (supporters of Russia's actual integration with the European area are in a minority among the Russian ruling elite), a lack of understanding and a negative perception of the EU and its policy by a great part of that Russian ruling elite, and the failure to develop a vision of an ultimate model of relations with the EU by the Russian government. The internal crisis in the EU (its unclear prospects for institutional reform, enlargement and neighbourhood policy) is adversely affecting its policy towards Russia. // 3. Additionally, the crisis is worsened by other factors, which on one hand are linked to the peculiarity of the Russian Federation's policy, and on the other result from the conflict of interests between Russia and the European Union. In the first case, the current Russian authorities are sticking to a model of government (authoritarianism) which is essentially different from European standards, and they resort to negative political tactics in their relations with the EU (including by exploiting differences of opinions within the EU for their own benefit). In the second case, discrepancies between the two sides' respective policies towards a "common neighbourhood" (especially towards the western countries of the CIS situated between Russia and the EU) take prominence. Russia has been attempting to support a specific political and economic model in this area, different from that suggested by the EU, as it perceives the EU's activity as a challenge to its interests. // 4. The future of Russian-EU relations depends on many factors. An analysis of the current key trends leads to the following conclusions: - It should not be expected in the short term that the situation will clearly improve, nor that the crisis will be overcome, mainly due to the fundamental causes thereof and a lack of signs of any essential change in either Russia's domestic policy or its international environment. // - some positive changes (from the European perspective) in Russia's European policy can be expected in the long term; there is a chance for a revival of Russia's "European project", which can be deduced from long-term trends (including the advantage of long-term tendencies to devolution over integration in the CIS area, the growing power of China, the expected growth of the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism and extremism on Russian territory, the asymmetric partnership with the USA which lacks durable foundations, and in particular the strong cultural, political and economic ties which exist between Russia and the rest of Europe).

The Russian Economy under Putin. Growth Factors and Impediments to Economic Development

Author(s): Ewa Paszyc,Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): English,Polish

After a dramatic economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial breakdown of 1998, the Russian economy has begun to emerge from its deep crisis. The years 1999-2004 were a period of dynamic development in all sectors of Russian economy, and saw a rapid growth in GDP of over 7 per cent per year. // Russia owed the excellent macroeconomic results of that period to a combination of favourable factors. The key factors were: high hydrocarbon prices on the global markets; an increase in Russia's international competitiveness thanks to the "rouble devaluation effect" (following the 1998 financial crash); and the market reforms carried out within that period. // In 2004, despite very high oil and gas prices on world markets, a slowdown of the GDP growth took place. Even though the economy is still developing fairly rapidly, we are able to say that Russia is exhausting those traditional mechanisms (apart from oil and gas prices) which have hitherto stimulated GDP growth. Moreover, there are no new mechanisms which could replace the old ones. In the longer term, these unsolved structural problems may seriously impede Russia's economic growth.

Ukraine's Parliamentary System after the Elections

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English,Polish

The dominant force in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, elected in March 2002, are the deputies of "One Ukraine", a fraction of the pro-presidential centre. "One Ukraine" has refused to admit any of the opposition's representatives (either from the right or left wings) into the parliament's presidium, but has accepted opposition-appointed heads of many parliamentary commissions. Viktor Yuschenko's "Our Ukraine", which has been the largest parliamentary fraction since June, attempted to proclaim itself the centre of the parliamentary majority, but its policy was awkward and inconsistent, and the main success of this club was that it didn't break up. Viktor Yuschenko's moves have been particularly incoherent and they undermined the image of Yuschenko as Ukraine's future leader, created throughout the course of the electoral campaign.In autumn, the main oligarchic groups and their representative fractions ("One Ukraine", which proved to be a useless instrument, was dissolved in June), reached a compromise with the president. It was agreed that the new prime minister should be a Donetsk clan representative (Viktor Yanukovych), and that the Dnipropetrovsk clan should appoint the president of the National Bank of Ukraine (this position went to Serhij Tihipko). The Kyiv clan obtained the President's Administration (Viktor Medvedchuk was appointed in spring) and a considerable number of parliamentary commissions. The president's interests in the government are to be protected by Mykola Azarov, former Head of the State Tax Administration. This compromise "package" was designed to secure the shares of the main oligarchic clans in the power and the president's strong position as mediator.

Relations between Russia and NATO before and after the 11th of September /// Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's aspirations to integrate with NATO and the EU in the context of these countries' relations with Russia

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak,Miryna Kutysz,Joanna Hyndle-Hussein / Language(s): English,Polish

Ukraine and Russia: mutual relations and the conditions that determine them /// The Republic of Belarus or the Belarussian republic?

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański,Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga / Language(s): English,Polish

Putin: the first year /// The Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of EU enlargement

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak,Bartosz Cichocki,Andrzej Wilk,Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz / Language(s): English,Polish