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Series:Helsinške Sveske

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №04: Universal and Collective Rights of Minorities
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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №04: Universal and Collective Rights of Minorities

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №04: Individualna i kolektivna prava manjina

Author(s): Rada Beronja,Dragan Dabić,Tatjana Ivelić,Nedim Sejdimović,Vladeta Stanković,Vlastimira Stanković / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia;rights and freedoms; minorities; round-table; multicultural; cohabitation; autonomy;

In view of the key importance of inter-ethnic relations and status of national minorities in Serbia for development of democracy, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Centre for Regionalism, the Vojvodina Club and Centre for Multiculturality have organised the round-table "National Minorities in Serbia" on 8 and 9 September 2000 in Novi Sad. Participants in this round-table were representatives of several dozen NGOs from Vojvodina and Serbia, representatives of political parties, prominent public personalities and experts for minority rights and ethnic relations. In a two-day debate participants in the round-table underscored that peace, tolerance and democratization of the society represent the basic prerequisite of the exercise of individual and collective rights and freedoms in the Republic of Serbia. Considering that a social community in the Republic of Serbia has a markedly heterogeneous cultural character and the fact that it is faced with pronounced ethnification of politics and intolerant nationalism, our discussion confirmed that the majority nation, that is, the ruling political establishment, were to be blamed for such a poor status of inter-ethnic relations. Hence the current political authorities cannot be relieved of responsibility from catastrophic consequences of internal conflicts and external and internal isolation. After analysing institutions and real social and political processes and actions of the most influential political protagonists, it was established that we all must insist on comprehensive implementation of ideas and legal-constitutional norms determining the Republic of Serbia as a state of equitable citizens, and the one guaranteeing corresponding standards in attainment and exercise of collective rights of national minorities in Serbia. Unfortunately during our discussion we identified through a host of examples a pronounced gulf between proclaimed norms and concrete reality in the sphere of protection of national minorities rights, notably in development and expression of their cultural identity. After the SFRY disintegration, the problem of "new minorities", notably Croats, Bosniaks, and Macedonians, emerged in Serbia. This problem entails official recognition of those minorities and concrete legal regulation of their status and rights. During preparations for the 2001 census scientific and cultural institutions and representative bodies should lay the groundwork for facilitating the free declaration of nationality by citizens. This particularly applies to Bosniaks, who have been deprived of that right to date. It is also expected that the democratic opposition of Serbia shall take a clear public stand on manner of resolution of minority problems, and incorporate pertinent proposals into their program of changes, offered as an alternative to the current regime. We brought into prominence the need to revive earlier initiatives for adoption of the Act on National Minorities in the Republic of Serbia, aimed at removing current shortcomings and imprecise points, and boosting harmonisation of domestic legal and political practice with the European standards on the Protection of Minorities. Our discussion indicated that the Republic Serbia in its relations with almost all neighbouring countries disregards the issue of minorities, and that this negligence is in turn reflected in the status of minorities and has a negative impact on relations between the majority and minorities. The role of ecological issues was discussed in the context of good-neighbourly relations, for they alike the minority issue clear the way for establishment of broad and efficient communications. Considering regional trends within the context of Europe those two issues can play an important role in the inclusion of Serbia in the project of European regions. Participants think that the Stability Pact is a conceptual framework for analysis of the most important problems and devising models of their resolution.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №13: The Past as a challenge to the law
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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №13: The Past as a challenge to the law

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №13: The Past as a challenge to the law

Author(s): Vladimir V. Vodinelić / Language(s): English

Keywords: legal responsibility; authoritarianism; past; rule of law; Serbia; regime; personal data; protection; exceptions; state security service; legal system;

Societies in whose present time the authoritarian past is still a socially relevant thing may be placed in two opposing manners in front of this morally, politically and legally compromising past: there is a distinct difference between the policy of coping with the past and the policy of non coping with the past. In German, the only language with a specific expression for the complex phenomenon of the former, for ‘cope with’ the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), one can also use the synonym Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung. However, ‘to cope with’ is a bet-ter expression. The expression, as well as ‘to prevail over’ the past and ‘to get control over’ the past – indicates more clearly that at issue is a process by which the past is dealt with: to im- pose over, to get control over the past that imposed over us, and it would impose over us again, if we do not impose over it. The extreme patterns of the reactions to the authoritarian past by which it cannot be prevailed are on one side retaliation and pure vendetta and on the other side the 'as-if-nothing-has-happened' pattern: closing your eyes before the authoritarian past. By neither method, it must be emphasized, can the past be prevailed over. Retaliation is an authoritarian fight with the authoritarian past, but not the prevailing over it. Fire cannot be fought with fire here. The authoritarian fight with the past, even if it was authoritarian, is just a repetition, but with the opposite roles.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №22: Serbia between Constitution and Constitutionality
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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №22: Serbia between Constitution and Constitutionality

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №22: Srbija između ustava i ustavnosti

Author(s): Marijana Pajvančić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; constitution; constitutionality; political society; politics; law; violation of constitution; legal act; constitutional Court; president of the Republic; human rights;

U knjizi SRBIJA IZME ĐU USTAVA I USTAVNOSTI iznela sam svoj pogled na ustavno pitanje u Srbiji. Srbija je jedina među zemljama koje su pošle putem evropske integracije, koja nije izmenila temeljni akt koji definiše osnovne vrednosti na kojima počiva politička zajednica, nije izmenila Ustav koji simbolizuje režim autoritarne vladavine. Šta je tome razlog i zašto Srbija toliko dugo traga za svojim ustavnim identitetom? Koje prepreke stoje na putu uspostavljanja ustavne države u Srbiji? Odgovor na ova pitanja već dugo vremena s pravom očekuju građani i građanke Srbije. Kao građanka Srbije i sama sam želela da saznam odgovor na ta pitanja. Profesija kojom se bavim i uža oblast mog naučnog interesovanja obavezivali su me da i sama pokušam da na neka od pitanja odgovorim. Ova knjiga ilustruje moja traganja za odgovorima. Da li sam u tome uspela i u kojoj meri, ostavljam čitaocima ove knjige da prosude sami. Kontinuirano sam pratila ustavni proces u Srbiji, posebno ustavne kontroverze koje prate ovaj proces. Sudelovala sam aktivno u tom procesu, prvenstveno na profesionalnom planu, na stručnim raspravama, ali i u široj javnosti.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №27: Multi-Ethnic Identity of Vojvodina: Challenges in 2007-08
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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №27: Multi-Ethnic Identity of Vojvodina: Challenges in 2007-08

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №27: Multietnički identitet Vojvodine: izazovi u 2007-08

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Vojvodina; identity; ethnic group; minority; human rights; multi-ethnicity; politics; protection of minorities; multi-culture;

(Serbian edition) Isticanje etničkog pluralizma Vojvodine predstavlja opšte mesto u retorici pokrajinskih političara, medija i predstavnika civilnog društva. Činjenica da na području Vojvodine žive pripadnici velikog broja nacionalnih manjina u toj se retorici uzdiže kao prednost i vojvođanska vrednost. Ovo naglašavanje višeetničnosti nije slučajno. Tokom raspada bivše Jugoslavije, multietnički karakter vojvođanskog društva često je bio na udaru. U sudaru sa heterogenom prirodom društva, novi politički ideal - nacionalna država - vrlo brzo je oslobodio svoje destruktivne potencijale. Nacionalistička histerija, nasilje, reduciranje prava i omalovažavanje vodile su marginalizaciji i izolaciji manjina, njihovom zatvaranju u uske granice vlastite etničke grupe, povlačenju iz sfere javnosti, iseljavanju u matične, odnosno treće države. Nakon 5. oktobra 2000. godine učinjeni su stanoviti pomaci u saniranju posledica Miloševićevog režima. Ti su pomaci, međutim, bili i ostali polovični. Donet je, recimo, zakon o Zaštiti prava i sloboda nacionalnih manjina, ali ne i zakon o načinu izbora i nadležnostima nacionalnih saveta. Na nivou republike i pokrajine formirani su, nakon zaoštravanja međuetničkih odnosa u Vojvodini, saveti za nacionalne manjine, ali oni, lišeni bilo kakvog realnog uticaja, vegetiraju pretvoreni u fasadne institucije. Spremnost države da se obračuna sa govorom mržnje i etnički motivisanim napadima je, najčešće, izostajala, što je kod manjina stvorilo utisak o selektivnoj primeni krivičnih paragrafa. Kampanja koju je, u cilju protežiranja tolerancije, svojevremeno vodilo Ministarstvo za ljudska i manjinska prava završila je neuspehom. Ni sadašnji projekat koji sprovodi Pokrajinski sekretarijat za upravu, propise i nacionalne manjine, neće uspeti ako njegovi napori na afirmisanju tolerancije i multikulturalizma ne budu snažno podržani od strane važnih društvenih podsistema.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №29: Sandžak and the European perspective
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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №29: Sandžak and the European perspective

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №29: Sandžak i evropska perspektiva

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Sandžak; European perspective; politics; marginalization; ethnic minority; Islam; Muslims; identity; integration; society; discrimination;

Sandžak, deo Srbije na tromeđi sa Bosnom i Crnom Gorom, gde živi najveći deo bošnjačke manjine u Srbiji, više od dve decenije je na udaru državne represivne politike u cilju marginalizacije te manjine. Odnos prema islamu i Muslimanima u Jugoslaviji počeo je da se zaoštrava i dobija neprijateljski prizvuk još osamdesetih godina prošlog veka, kada srpska elita pokreće kampanju protiv Muslimana i iznosi tezu o „islamskom fundamentalizmu koji preti da uništi Jugoslaviju“. To je bila priprema za genocid u Bosni, čije su posledice osetili i Bošnjaci u Sandžaku. Odnos prema muslimanima nije se suštinski promenio, ali se pod pritiskom evropskih organizacija kao što su Savet Evrope, OEBS i EU, država uzdržava od otvorene represije. Međutim, sada primenjuje druge metode poput kriminalizacije pojedinaca ili grupa (vehabije), ali pre svega, konstantnim podrivanjem Islamske zajednice (IZ) kao jedine institucije koju Bošnjaci imaju i koja je inače, od ključnog značaja za njihov identitet. Značaj Islamske zajednice za Bošnjake je izraz potrebe za religijom koja doprinosi jačanju vlastitiog identiteta i doprinosi integraciji društva. Potreba za jačanjem identiteta je i razumljiv odgovor na dugogodišnju diskriminaciju i „nevidljivost“, kao i policijski teror, otmice i likvidacije tokom rata u Bosni. Islamska zajednica je takođe, ključna identitetska matrica za bošnjačku zajednicu u odsustvu drugih institucija. Zbog toga je i bila na udaru Beograda i beogradskih „službi“, sa ciljem da se temeljno destabilizuje. To je dovelo do cepanja Islamske zajednice i podizanje tenzije unutar bošnjačke zajednice što može, ako bude potrebno, da se brzo pretvori u kriznu tačku.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №30: Prisons in Serbia 2010 - Monitoring the Reform of Prison System
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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №30: Prisons in Serbia 2010 - Monitoring the Reform of Prison System

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №30: Zatvori u Srbiji 2010 - Praćenje reforme zatvorskog sistema

Author(s): Marija Jelić,Gordana Lukić-Samardžija,Ljiljana Palibrk,Ivan Kuzminović / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; prison; Valjevo; Leskovac; Sremska Mitrovica; Požarevac; Novi Sad; quality of life; security; re-socialization; minor; woman; hospital;

Unapređivanje krivičnopravnog sistema, kao preduslov za izgradnju boljeg i bezbednijeg društva, jedan je od najvažnijih aspekata reforme pravosuđa koja se u Srbiji sprovodi poslednjih godina. Osim nesumnjivog značaja za zajednicu, posmatran u kontekstu ljudske bezbednosti ovaj segment reforme dodatno dobija na važnosti, jer je neminovno vezan za globalne procese i međunarodni pravni poredak. U isto vreme, i postupanje sa prestupnicima i zatvorenicima koji se nalaze na izdržavanju kazne, podleže brojnim zakonima i pravilima, konvencijama i drugim dokumentima koji se baziraju, kako na specifi čnoj unutrašnjoj i međunarodnoj legislativi, tako i na konceptu ljudskih prava. Imajući to u vidu, Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava je već 2002. godine počeo sa monitoringom zatvora u Srbiji, najpre kroz jednogodišnji projekat kojim je obuhvaćeno 13 zatvora, a potom kroz trogodišnji (2003-2006) regionalni projekat „Prevencija torture-podrška rehabilitaciji žrtava torture“, tokom koga je vršen kontinuirani monitoring svih zatvora u zemlji.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №32: Monitoring Prison System Reform in Serbia 2012-2013 and Prison System in Serbia in 2011
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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №32: Monitoring Prison System Reform in Serbia 2012-2013 and Prison System in Serbia in 2011

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №32: Praćenje reforme zatvorskog sistema u Srbiji 2012-2013 i Stanje ljudskih prava u zatvorima u 2011

Author(s): Jelena Mirkov Subić,Mara Živkov,Ljiljana Palibrk,Ivan Kuzminović / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; prison; reform system; human rights; quality of life; security; re-socialization; legality of treatment; personnel; Kruševac; Valjevo; Požarevac; minor; woman;

Tokom godina Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava obilazio je zatvorske ustanove u Srbiji i izveštavao o stanju ljudskih prava osuđenih i pritvorenih lica – drugim rečima, od 2001. godine Odbor je posetio svih 28 ustanova za izvršenje krivičnih sankcija, mnoge od njih više puta. U velikom broju izveštaja1 Odbor je posebno analizirao raskorake između domaćeg zakonodavstva i međunarodnih standarda s jedne i prakse u sistemu izvršenja sankcija s druge strane, sugerišući moguća rešenja. Pred čitaocem su izveštaji iz zatvora koje je Helsinški odbor posetio u periodu 2011–2013. godina. Ove posete realizovane su u okviru dva kompatibilna projekta – “Reforma zatvorskog sistema u Srbiji” i “Jačanje Nacionalnog preventivnog mehanizma i zagovaranje prava institucionalizovanih osoba”, koje su finansijski podržali Civil Rights Defenders i Ambasade Kraljevine Holandije u Srbiji.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №34: Extremism – Recognizing a Social Evil
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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №34: Extremism – Recognizing a Social Evil

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №34: Ekstremizam: Kako prepoznati društveno zlo

Author(s): Srđan Milošević,Pavel Domonji,Jelena Višnjić,Ivana Stjelja,Staša Zajović,Umberto Eco / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: extremism; social evil; anti-fascism; Serbia; woman; politics; crime; hatred; law; minority; radicalization; hooliganism; social norms;

Pojava ekstremne desnice i desničarske ideologije u Srbiji posledica su strukturalnih promena nakon razgradnje socijalističke države. Ratovi devedestih vođenih sa idejom o prekomponovanju Balkana, odnosno s idejom o Velikoj Srbiji (Memorandumu Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, 1986), samo su jedan od ideoloških osnova na kojima još uvek opstaje desna misao. Njene osnovne karakteristike jesu: etnička homogenizacija, težnja za stapanjem državnih i etničkih granica, antikomunizam i negiranje antifašizma, jačanje tradicionalizma i autoritarnosti, pravoslavlje tretirano kao superiorna religija u odnosu na ostale etničke i religijske grupe (posebno Hrvate, Muslimane i Albance), otpor idejama multikulturalizma i kosmopolitizma i netrpeljivost prema “novim” (LGBT popuacija) i tradicionalnim manjinama (Romi). Zajedničko svim desničarskim pokretima koji se pozivaju na ekstremni srpski nacionalizam i fundamentalističke interpretacije pravoslavlja, odnosno svetosavlja, jeste i izrazita islamofobija i neprijateljski stav prema svemu što je islamsko.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №33: Mental Healthcare Befitting Human Dignity
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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №33: Mental Healthcare Befitting Human Dignity

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №33: Briga o mentalnom zdravlju - Po meri ljudskog dostojanstva

Author(s): Dejan Lj. Milenković,Miloš V. Janković,Nikola Grujić,Vlаdimir Jović,Paolo Serra,Darko Sekulić,Jelena Marković,Milan Marković ,Ljiljana Palibrk / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: mental health; human dignity; human rights; Serbia; psychiatry; mental illness; law; de-institutionalization; disability; NGO;

This collection of papers broaches some of the biggest stumbling blocs in the way of mental health reform and effective deinstitutionalization in the Republic of Serbia Analyses, opinions and recommendations presented in it refl ect the years-long advocacy by several non-governmental organizations and independent experts for mental health reform and transformation from institutional to community-based care. This is about a long-term campaign of committed individuals, organizations and associations for gradual shutdown of residential institutions catering for psychiatric patients, and children and adults with mental disabilities, and, moreover, for dignifi ed lives of and equal opportunities for these most vulnerable groups of population.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №31: Attitudes and Value Orientations of High School Students in Serbia
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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №31: Attitudes and Value Orientations of High School Students in Serbia

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №31: Stavovi i vrednosne orijentacije srednjoškolaca u Srbiji

Author(s): Marija Radoman / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; high school students; value orientations; tradition; conservatism; homophobia; violence in school; human rights;

Analiza stavova i vrednosnih orijentacija srednjoškolaca je rezultat istraživanja na osnovu podataka prikupljenih u periodu april-jun 2011, u šest gradova u Srbiji. Da bismo se uopšte bavili vrednostima ove mlađe generacije u našem društvu, moramo se osvrnuti na neke strukturalne promene koje obeležavaju vreme njihovog odrastanja. Period u kome želimo da proučavamo stavove i vrednosne orijentacije srednjoškolaca u Srbiji, jeste period nakon decenije «demokratskih» promena u zemlji, period (još uvek) zakasnele transformacije. Došlo je do proglašenja nezavisnosti Crne Gore i Republike Kosovo a nestabilnost država regiona (Bosne i Hercegovine i još uvek nerešene granice sa Kosovom) su uzrok osećaja nesigurnosti u socijalnom ali i nacionalnom smislu, kod većine stanovništva Srbije. Govorimo i o periodu u kome se odvija revizija istorije i relativizacija, pa i promocija desnih ideologija (ravnogorski pokret i omladinske profašističke organizacije) i u kome su religija i crkva i dalje veoma važne za veliki deo naroda. Ne smemo da zanemarimo i povećan prodor globalizacijiskih faktora koji su relativno uticali na izgradnju demokratije u zemlji. Najupadljiviji faktor je zvanična odluka da se pristupi ulasku u EU. Kao rezultat postoji donekle približavanje državne politike interesima Evropske unije. Međutim, u zemlji problemi postoje: oligarhijski sistem, uticaj političkih stranaka i visoka korupcija – kako u privredi tako i u politici – kao i problemi zaštite prava marginalizovanih grupa koji sprečavaju izgradnju građanskog društva.

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HELSINKI FILES №37: The Youth in a Post-Truth Era – European Identity and Education
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HELSINKI FILES №37: The Youth in a Post-Truth Era – European Identity and Education

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №37: The Youth in a Post-Truth Era – European Identity and Education

Author(s): Vladimir Gligorov,Izabela Kisić,Sonja Biserko,Srđan Barišić,Aleksandra Đurić-Bosnić,Jelena Vasiljević,Miloš Ćirić,Aleksandar V. Miletić,Dragan T. Stanojević,Ivan Đurić,Srđan Milošević,Biljana Đorđević,Srđan Atanasovski,Časlav Ninković,Duško Radosavljević,Pavel Domonji,Miroslav Keveždi,Branislava Opranović,Ana Pataki,Andrea Ratković,Iskra Vuksanović / Language(s): English

Keywords: European identity; education; youth; EU accession; democracy; pluralism; extremism; pluralism; framed reality; interculturalism; ethnic nationalism; liberal ideology;

(English edition) Ongoing public debates frequently focus on European identity. What sparked off such debates were tremendous global changes after the Cold War, disappearance of two opposing blocs, ethnic conflicts, migrations, sociopolitical crises of liberal societies as well as the mass renouncement of value-based orientations Europe and the whole world had been built on after World War II and defeat of Nazism. People all over the world are now growingly concerned with the issues of statehood, ethnicity and the notion of “being a citizen.” Political manipulation of collective identities badly affects people’s lives and policies on which societies are being built. Many theoreticians are questioning – and with good reason – the very notion of collective identity, ethnic in the first place, as extremely exclusive. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia has launched a series of round tables under the title “Youth in a Post-Truth Era: European Identity and Education.” Participants were intellectuals of younger generations mostly, NGO activists and civil sector representatives, but secondary school and university students too. What we wanted achieve with these open debates – never devoid of controversial arguments – was to give shape to authentic views with impact on practical politics and (in)formal education of the youth. Our researches and experience in communication with young people show that they do care about collective identities, and that their ethnicities and religions are crucial in identity-building. Although they recognize the potential of Euro-integration for, say, better schooling or economic progress, a snail’s pace of the accession process and domestic propaganda make them turn to other international players. Young Serbs are turning to Russia and Putin, Bosniaks to Turkey and Erdogan, while young Hungarians to Serbia’s neighbor in the north and Orban. Revisionism also strongly influences the youth regardless of their ethnicities. They practically always oppose strongly any questioning of patriarchal values and react fiercely to it. Value-based orientations as such are mostly the effects of the spread of fake news and narratives predominant in the media, schools environments and families; the narratives that forced their way into the public sphere in the 1980s, bloomed in the 1990s and are thriving now against the global backdrop. Is the narrative about European identity and education a key to changes and inclusive enough? When I say European identity I am not advocating for Euro-centrism, especially not now when it implies social and economic exclusion of people heading for Europe from various continents and countries, or those outside the European Union. In Balkan countries aspiring to EU membership European identity is used as a political instrument supportive to integration processes. At the same time, it supports the transfer from a one-dimensional, nationalistic and wartime identity to a multi-dimensional, civic one. As it has turned out so far, the issues of class consciousness, socioeconomic justice and the right to education for all will be predominant in the debates to come. We do not intend to impose alternative narratives on the youth but to capacitate them for critical thought; to help them recognize and stand up against social repression and collective identities that have been imposed on them and exclude any “otherness.” Ever since the early 1990s the European Commission has also been focused on the researches of European identity (or identities). The European bureaucracy was interested in it for very practical reasons: the European Commission’s concern with the manner in which different processes of identification with the European Union shape integrative processes and strengthen the sense of solidarity among Europeans. On the eve of the Gothenburg Summit in November 2017 the European Commission issued guidelines for strengthening of the common European identity through education and culture, under the motto “unity in diversity.” The document was meant for the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the European Socioeconomic Committee and the Committee of Regions. It was motivated by the rise of populism “at home” and beyond the EU, the spread of fake news and manipulation of information networks. Given that the EU administration interferes not into educational systems and culture of its member-states but leaves them to national, regional and local authorities, its role is limited to strengthening of cooperation and support to national projects in these spheres. It realized that education and culture make Europe attractive for learning and working, attractive as a space of freedom and shared values reflected in fundamental rights and an open society. And education as such builds foundations for active citizenship and helps to prevent populism, xenophobia and violent radicalism. Education, along with culture, plays a key role in cross-border meetings and learning about the true meaning of “being a European.” According to an analysis commissioned by the European Commission, joint, cross-border actions such as engagement in social movements or in organizations with shared goals (such as ecologic organizations) can promote the sense for European identity since collective actions are always taking into consideration the “other’s” points of view. How to involve candidates for the membership of the EU in the debate on Europe’s future and identity (identities) is among major issues. Isolated periphery and people’s frustration with accession that is being constantly postponed incite Euroskepticism and passivity of the youth who actually stand for European integration. The publication “European Identity and Education” resulted from a series of discussions and debates organized by the Helsinki Committee. Its introductory section presents one of the essays and political analyses of the international and local context in which Serbia’s youth are being raised: “Democracy, Pluralism and Extremism” by Vladimir Gligorov. The following section presents readers with draft practical politics for those dealing with institutional and informal education of the young. These draft policies, actually suggestions, are about teaching methods that may efficiently develop critical thinking among the youth and their awareness about alternatives. Inter alia, the suggested approaches are meant to motivate young people to get actively involved in building of a democratic society based on pluralism, inter-culturalism, solidarity and socioeconomic rights. Recommendations can be summed up as follows: 1. Strengthening of the idea of active citizenship; 2. Media literacy and development of critical thinking of the youth; and 3. Development and modernization of educational programs and present approaches to education of school children. Drafts of public policies were on the agenda of debates held in Belgrade and Novi Sad with participation of scholars and activists from younger generations mostly, concerned with the issues of identity and education. This publication also presents excerpts from those debates. How possibly could cosmopolitanism, inter-culturalism, anti-fascism and open society be promoted in today’s Serbia but also in Europe where extremism, fear of “otherness,” concerns for the safeguard of one’s own national identity that is allegedly threatened, be on the up and up? This is one of major dilemmas facing us today. Few students have access to informal education that rests on the principles guiding a democratic society. Speaking from experience many participants in debates pointed to the lack in professional staffs involved in educational process. Civic education is being marginalized in elementary and secondary schools. The participants also presented well-thought-out arguments against religious teaching in school curricula. The majority of participants take that strengthening of informal education that would lead towards incorporation of similar contents and methods into the educational system could be a solution to the above-mentioned dilemma. That would be a chance for attracting young people whose interests and ambitions are well beyond the rigid educational system, they argue. Positive experiences of Yugoslavia’s interculturalism and socialism, and the common history and culture can be used as resources for strengthening interculturalism throughout the region. Small steps forward within institutions that depend, above all, on individual activism and courage are another possible approach to resolution. This publication is meant as a contribution to local but also more extensive debate on European identity and new European policies that would cope with today’s challenges by far more efficiently.

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HELSINKI FILES №37: The Youth in a Post-Truth Era – European Identity and Education
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HELSINKI FILES №37: The Youth in a Post-Truth Era – European Identity and Education

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №37: Mladi u eri postistine – Evropski identitet i obrazovanje

Author(s): Vladimir Gligorov,Aleksandra Đurić-Bosnić,Boris Varga,Tamara Tomašević,Srđan Barišić,Izabela Kisić,Sonja Biserko,Miloš Ćirić,Jelena Vasiljević,Dragan T. Stanojević,Aleksandar V. Miletić,Srđan Milošević,Ivan Đurić,Srđan Atanasovski,Biljana Đorđević,Časlav Ninković,Duško Radosavljević,Pavel Domonji,Miroslav Keveždi,Branislava Opranović,Ana Pataki,Andrea Ratković,Iskra Vuksanović / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: European identity; education; youth; EU accession; democracy; pluralism; extremism; pluralism; framed reality; interculturalism; ethnic nationalism; liberal ideology; geopolitics;

(Serbian edition) Ongoing public debates frequently focus on European identity. What sparked off such debates were tremendous global changes after the Cold War, disappearance of two opposing blocs, ethnic conflicts, migrations, sociopolitical crises of liberal societies as well as the mass renouncement of value-based orientations Europe and the whole world had been built on after World War II and defeat of Nazism. People all over the world are now growingly concerned with the issues of statehood, ethnicity and the notion of “being a citizen.” Political manipulation of collective identities badly affects people’s lives and policies on which societies are being built. Many theoreticians are questioning – and with good reason – the very notion of collective identity, ethnic in the first place, as extremely exclusive. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia has launched a series of round tables under the title “Youth in a Post-Truth Era: European Identity and Education.” Participants were intellectuals of younger generations mostly, NGO activists and civil sector representatives, but secondary school and university students too. What we wanted achieve with these open debates – never devoid of controversial arguments – was to give shape to authentic views with impact on practical politics and (in)formal education of the youth. Our researches and experience in communication with young people show that they do care about collective identities, and that their ethnicities and religions are crucial in identity-building. Although they recognize the potential of Euro-integration for, say, better schooling or economic progress, a snail’s pace of the accession process and domestic propaganda make them turn to other international players. Young Serbs are turning to Russia and Putin, Bosniaks to Turkey and Erdogan, while young Hungarians to Serbia’s neighbor in the north and Orban. Revisionism also strongly influences the youth regardless of their ethnicities. They practically always oppose strongly any questioning of patriarchal values and react fiercely to it. Value-based orientations as such are mostly the effects of the spread of fake news and narratives predominant in the media, schools environments and families; the narratives that forced their way into the public sphere in the 1980s, bloomed in the 1990s and are thriving now against the global backdrop. Is the narrative about European identity and education a key to changes and inclusive enough? When I say European identity I am not advocating for Euro-centrism, especially not now when it implies social and economic exclusion of people heading for Europe from various continents and countries, or those outside the European Union. In Balkan countries aspiring to EU membership European identity is used as a political instrument supportive to integration processes. At the same time, it supports the transfer from a one-dimensional, nationalistic and wartime identity to a multi-dimensional, civic one. As it has turned out so far, the issues of class consciousness, socioeconomic justice and the right to education for all will be predominant in the debates to come. We do not intend to impose alternative narratives on the youth but to capacitate them for critical thought; to help them recognize and stand up against social repression and collective identities that have been imposed on them and exclude any “otherness.” Ever since the early 1990s the European Commission has also been focused on the researches of European identity (or identities). The European bureaucracy was interested in it for very practical reasons: the European Commission’s concern with the manner in which different processes of identification with the European Union shape integrative processes and strengthen the sense of solidarity among Europeans. On the eve of the Gothenburg Summit in November 2017 the European Commission issued guidelines for strengthening of the common European identity through education and culture, under the motto “unity in diversity.” The document was meant for the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the European Socioeconomic Committee and the Committee of Regions. It was motivated by the rise of populism “at home” and beyond the EU, the spread of fake news and manipulation of information networks. Given that the EU administration interferes not into educational systems and culture of its member-states but leaves them to national, regional and local authorities, its role is limited to strengthening of cooperation and support to national projects in these spheres. It realized that education and culture make Europe attractive for learning and working, attractive as a space of freedom and shared values reflected in fundamental rights and an open society. And education as such builds foundations for active citizenship and helps to prevent populism, xenophobia and violent radicalism. Education, along with culture, plays a key role in cross-border meetings and learning about the true meaning of “being a European.” According to an analysis commissioned by the European Commission, joint, cross-border actions such as engagement in social movements or in organizations with shared goals (such as ecologic organizations) can promote the sense for European identity since collective actions are always taking into consideration the “other’s” points of view. How to involve candidates for the membership of the EU in the debate on Europe’s future and identity (identities) is among major issues. Isolated periphery and people’s frustration with accession that is being constantly postponed incite Euroskepticism and passivity of the youth who actually stand for European integration. The publication “European Identity and Education” resulted from a series of discussions and debates organized by the Helsinki Committee. Its introductory section presents one of the essays and political analyses of the international and local context in which Serbia’s youth are being raised: “Democracy, Pluralism and Extremism” by Vladimir Gligorov. The following section presents readers with draft practical politics for those dealing with institutional and informal education of the young. These draft policies, actually suggestions, are about teaching methods that may efficiently develop critical thinking among the youth and their awareness about alternatives. Inter alia, the suggested approaches are meant to motivate young people to get actively involved in building of a democratic society based on pluralism, inter-culturalism, solidarity and socioeconomic rights. Recommendations can be summed up as follows: 1. Strengthening of the idea of active citizenship; 2. Media literacy and development of critical thinking of the youth; and 3. Development and modernization of educational programs and present approaches to education of school children. Drafts of public policies were on the agenda of debates held in Belgrade and Novi Sad with participation of scholars and activists from younger generations mostly, concerned with the issues of identity and education. This publication also presents excerpts from those debates. How possibly could cosmopolitanism, inter-culturalism, anti-fascism and open society be promoted in today’s Serbia but also in Europe where extremism, fear of “otherness,” concerns for the safeguard of one’s own national identity that is allegedly threatened, be on the up and up? This is one of major dilemmas facing us today. Few students have access to informal education that rests on the principles guiding a democratic society. Speaking from experience many participants in debates pointed to the lack in professional staffs involved in educational process. Civic education is being marginalized in elementary and secondary schools. The participants also presented well-thought-out arguments against religious teaching in school curricula. The majority of participants take that strengthening of informal education that would lead towards incorporation of similar contents and methods into the educational system could be a solution to the above-mentioned dilemma. That would be a chance for attracting young people whose interests and ambitions are well beyond the rigid educational system, they argue. Positive experiences of Yugoslavia’s interculturalism and socialism, and the common history and culture can be used as resources for strengthening interculturalism throughout the region. Small steps forward within institutions that depend, above all, on individual activism and courage are another possible approach to resolution. This publication is meant as a contribution to local but also more extensive debate on European identity and new European policies that would cope with today’s challenges by far more efficiently.

More...
HELSINKI FILES №35: Opinion poll conducted among the Sandžak youth - How Susceptible are the Youth to Islamic Extremism
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HELSINKI FILES №35: Opinion poll conducted among the Sandžak youth - How Susceptible are the Youth to Islamic Extremism

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №35: Opinion poll conducted among the Sandžak youth - How Susceptible are the Youth to Islamic Extremism

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić,Srđan Barišić,Stefan Stefanović,Izabela Kisić,Jovana Saračević / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia; Montenegro; Sandžak; youth; Islamic extremism; Wahhabis; religious radicals; opinion poll;

The crucial question here is: Are the Muslim youth in Sandžak imbued with religious extremism or not? Hardly any interethnic and inter-religious incident has been registered in this part of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, fighters from Sandžak are being involved in the Iraqi and Syrian wars. Depending on the answer to the question above, the authorities could take appropriate actions aiming at young people in Sandžak. Both domestic and international stakeholders – and there are many of them, including the non-governmental sector – could develop plans and take a variety of concrete steps depending on the answer to this very question. Fahrudin Kladničanin wrote about the influence of Wahhabi Islamic extremism on the youth in Sandžak: “Wahhabis are usually focused on recruiting young people 19 – 27 years old with little education, who are poor and often come from dysfunctional families. The youth are being indoctrinated in private places of worship (masjids), which are either rented or owned by Wahhabis, and in certain religious objects (mosques) whose imams support Wahhabi teaching, and prayers in these mosques are always led by Wahhabis. (Kladničanin, 2013: 130) Marija Radoman analyzed the reasons driving young people in Serbia towards extremist ideologies. Two citations from an earlier research of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia will thus be mentioned: „Regarding the period after 2000, surveys show that the family remains the mainstay of its young members, that young people’s life patterns lack individualization, and that they normatively accept the traditional sequence of events in a person’s life (i.e. completion of education, getting a job, entry into marriage and only then having children). What intrigues me is the sphere of influence between the respondents to this survey and their families. I tried all the time to keep a picture in my head of the families in which they grew up. I wanted to find out whether the respondents’ attitudes would reflect that background, which is hardly bright and optimistic, or whether the differences would be more than conspicuous.” (Radoman, 2011: 12). Family is the primary mechanism by which extremism is interiorized. However, it is not a cause, given that the changes stemming from structural circumstances also occurred within the family. Radoman wrote that “Today’s efforts to establish a stable democratic society in Serbia are being sabotaged, conditionally speaking, by the second generation of the nationalist current (i.e. by the circles close to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the remaining appointees of political parties who served the Milošević regime and members of Russophile conservative options, notably the Democratic Party of Serbia and New Serbia, but also the Serbian Progressive Party), as well as by the extreme right-wing reactionary Russophiles, i.e. the Serbian Radical Party. The efforts to establish a democracy are also hindered by the economic crisis.” (Ibid: 10) The analysis is based on the survey the Helsinki Committee conducted with the youth in Sandžak in May 2016. The focus was on their attitude towards religious extremism, whereas the goal to contextualize the findings: to see how to recognize and understand Islamic extremism and what could be done – preventively and concretely – considering the factors that have influenced the Sandžak youth. No doubt, interviewees’ attitudes towards extremism – or their everyday experience – differ from theoretical considerations of the phenomenon. The very notion of extremism is indisputable. In 2013 I wrote that mainstream social forces of individual societies were arbitrarily determining the notion of extremism. Official codification of political extremism and radicalism make it possible for governments and other political factors to place all those opposing the values such as equality, freedom, democracy, rule of law, etc. under control or control those advocating these values in the manner that contradicts a government’s interests. On the other hand, radicalism (or extremism) gauged by “political correctness” is being determined, as a rule, by the manner or scope in which a certain value is considered either unquestionable or unacceptable. And in all this, decision makers and the majority of population need not see eye to eye. For instance, according to many opinion polls, the majority of Serbia’s population discriminates sexual minorities, national minorities, some religious minorities and, especially fenced off communities such as Roma. By the standards of political correctness decision-makers term such stands – notwithstanding its predominance – extremist and “expel” them from media space. Extremism is deep-rooted in social structures. “The emergence of extreme right-wing and rightist ideology in Serbia derive from structural changes following on the disintegration of the socialist state. The 1990s wars, inspired by the idea of recomposition of the Balkans – or the Greater Serbia idea – are only one of many ideological bases on which the right-wing thought still lives; and its basic characteristics are: ethnic homogenization, wish to have ethnic and state borders ‘merged,’ anticommunism and denial of antifascism, the growingly stronger traditionalism and authoritarianism, the Eastern Orthodoxy seen as superior to other religions and ethnic groups (especially Croats, Muslims and Albanians), resistance to multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, and intolerance of ‘new’ (LGBT population) and traditional minorities (Roma),” writes Sonja Biserko in 2014. To what extent is Islamic, religious extremism spread in Sandžak? In June 2015 in Novi Pazar Snežana Ilić quoted the ICG report “Serb Sandžak still Forgotten” saying that there were some 300 Wahhabis in Sandžak who were not exactly organized, that only some 50 of them were active, but the movement was spreading anyway. According to the said report, Wahhabism emerged in Sandžak in 1997, triggered off by an imam wanting his believers in a mosque to pray in a different way. The believers had opposed the imam and sent him away. However, over the past couple of years Wahhabis have better organized themselves in Sandžak, while getting more and more funds from abroad for their movement. Many of them were going to work in Vienna; apparently to be recruited in a way, since they dressed and behaved like true Wahhabis once back home. Snežana Ilić believes that the highest authorities of the Islamic Community in Serbia have been using Wahhabis in several ways. For instance, they have been presenting themselves internationally as someone capable of controlling Bosniaks’ religious radicalism by the principle of Islamic legitimacy. The message they have been putting across to Western diplomats and governments runs, “Give us a free hand, we must advocate Islamization of the society as that is the only way of keeping religious radicals under control.”

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HELSINKI FILES №35: Opinion poll conducted among the Sandžak youth - How Susceptible are the Youth to Islamic Extremism
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HELSINKI FILES №35: Opinion poll conducted among the Sandžak youth - How Susceptible are the Youth to Islamic Extremism

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №35: Stavovi mladih u Sandžaku - Koliko su mladi otvoreni prema islamskom ekstremizmu

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić,Izabela Kisić,Jovana Saračević,Stefan Stefanović,Srđan Barišić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; Montenegro; Sandžak; youth; Islamic extremism; Wahhabis; religious radicals; opinion poll;

(Serbian edition) The crucial question here is: Are the Muslim youth in Sandžak imbued with religious extremism or not? Hardly any interethnic and inter-religious incident has been registered in this part of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, fighters from Sandžak are being involved in the Iraqi and Syrian wars. Depending on the answer to the question above, the authorities could take appropriate actions aiming at young people in Sandžak. Both domestic and international stakeholders – and there are many of them, including the non-governmental sector – could develop plans and take a variety of concrete steps depending on the answer to this very question. Fahrudin Kladničanin wrote about the influence of Wahhabi Islamic extremism on the youth in Sandžak: “Wahhabis are usually focused on recruiting young people 19 – 27 years old with little education, who are poor and often come from dysfunctional families. The youth are being indoctrinated in private places of worship (masjids), which are either rented or owned by Wahhabis, and in certain religious objects (mosques) whose imams support Wahhabi teaching, and prayers in these mosques are always led by Wahhabis. (Kladničanin, 2013: 130) Marija Radoman analyzed the reasons driving young people in Serbia towards extremist ideologies. Two citations from an earlier research of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia will thus be mentioned: „Regarding the period after 2000, surveys show that the family remains the mainstay of its young members, that young people’s life patterns lack individualization, and that they normatively accept the traditional sequence of events in a person’s life (i.e. completion of education, getting a job, entry into marriage and only then having children). What intrigues me is the sphere of influence between the respondents to this survey and their families. I tried all the time to keep a picture in my head of the families in which they grew up. I wanted to find out whether the respondents’ attitudes would reflect that background, which is hardly bright and optimistic, or whether the differences would be more than conspicuous.” (Radoman, 2011: 12). Family is the primary mechanism by which extremism is interiorized. However, it is not a cause, given that the changes stemming from structural circumstances also occurred within the family. Radoman wrote that “Today’s efforts to establish a stable democratic society in Serbia are being sabotaged, conditionally speaking, by the second generation of the nationalist current (i.e. by the circles close to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the remaining appointees of political parties who served the Milošević regime and members of Russophile conservative options, notably the Democratic Party of Serbia and New Serbia, but also the Serbian Progressive Party), as well as by the extreme right-wing reactionary Russophiles, i.e. the Serbian Radical Party. The efforts to establish a democracy are also hindered by the economic crisis.” (Ibid: 10) The analysis is based on the survey the Helsinki Committee conducted with the youth in Sandžak in May 2016. The focus was on their attitude towards religious extremism, whereas the goal to contextualize the findings: to see how to recognize and understand Islamic extremism and what could be done – preventively and concretely – considering the factors that have influenced the Sandžak youth. No doubt, interviewees’ attitudes towards extremism – or their everyday experience – differ from theoretical considerations of the phenomenon. The very notion of extremism is indisputable. In 2013 I wrote that mainstream social forces of individual societies were arbitrarily determining the notion of extremism. Official codification of political extremism and radicalism make it possible for governments and other political factors to place all those opposing the values such as equality, freedom, democracy, rule of law, etc. under control or control those advocating these values in the manner that contradicts a government’s interests. On the other hand, radicalism (or extremism) gauged by “political correctness” is being determined, as a rule, by the manner or scope in which a certain value is considered either unquestionable or unacceptable. And in all this, decision makers and the majority of population need not see eye to eye. For instance, according to many opinion polls, the majority of Serbia’s population discriminates sexual minorities, national minorities, some religious minorities and, especially fenced off communities such as Roma. By the standards of political correctness decision-makers term such stands – notwithstanding its predominance – extremist and “expel” them from media space. Extremism is deep-rooted in social structures. “The emergence of extreme right-wing and rightist ideology in Serbia derive from structural changes following on the disintegration of the socialist state. The 1990s wars, inspired by the idea of recomposition of the Balkans – or the Greater Serbia idea – are only one of many ideological bases on which the right-wing thought still lives; and its basic characteristics are: ethnic homogenization, wish to have ethnic and state borders ‘merged,’ anticommunism and denial of antifascism, the growingly stronger traditionalism and authoritarianism, the Eastern Orthodoxy seen as superior to other religions and ethnic groups (especially Croats, Muslims and Albanians), resistance to multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, and intolerance of ‘new’ (LGBT population) and traditional minorities (Roma),” writes Sonja Biserko in 2014. To what extent is Islamic, religious extremism spread in Sandžak? In June 2015 in Novi Pazar Snežana Ilić quoted the ICG report “Serb Sandžak still Forgotten” saying that there were some 300 Wahhabis in Sandžak who were not exactly organized, that only some 50 of them were active, but the movement was spreading anyway. According to the said report, Wahhabism emerged in Sandžak in 1997, triggered off by an imam wanting his believers in a mosque to pray in a different way. The believers had opposed the imam and sent him away. However, over the past couple of years Wahhabis have better organized themselves in Sandžak, while getting more and more funds from abroad for their movement. Many of them were going to work in Vienna; apparently to be recruited in a way, since they dressed and behaved like true Wahhabis once back home. Snežana Ilić believes that the highest authorities of the Islamic Community in Serbia have been using Wahhabis in several ways. For instance, they have been presenting themselves internationally as someone capable of controlling Bosniaks’ religious radicalism by the principle of Islamic legitimacy. The message they have been putting across to Western diplomats and governments runs, “Give us a free hand, we must advocate Islamization of the society as that is the only way of keeping religious radicals under control.”

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