Ослобођење Београда 1944.

Московские годы Иосипа Броза Тито: Предыстория Партизана

Московские годы Иосипа Броза Тито: Предыстория Партизана
(The Moscow Years of Josip Broz Tito: The Pre-History of the Partisans)

Author(s):Nikita Bondarev
Language:Russian
Subject(s):Military history, Political history, History of Education, History of Communism
Page Range:15-30
No. of Pages:16
Keywords:Josip Broz Tito; Comintern; Communism; Stalinism; Terrorism; Military School Comintern; Partisan Factions; Dmitry Manuilsky; Josif Pjatnicki;
Summary/Abstract:The Commintern was literally the general-staff of the world revolution. Not only strategy and tactics of armed uprisings were discussed there, but military and military-political courses were held at which Communists and Communist youths were trained as terrorist fighters. In the early 1930s some military courses and schools had been abolished, whereas the remaining ones were unified into the so-called „Partisan Academy“ run by the Polish Communist Carol Swerczewsky under the psudonim of „Walter“. This „Walter“ shouldn’t be confused with another „Walter“ – Josip Broz, as was donne in the latest book by Pera Simić. It is very likely that the two Walters (and eight persons in all used the pseudonym Walter in the Commintern) were meeting each other and communicating, since Josip Broz could be educated, and maybe even taught, at the above mentioned „Partisan Academy“. This cannot be ascertained with absolute accuracy since all documents concerning the activity of the Commintern military schools are still closed for the public.

Price: 4.50 €

Емигрантска влада Краљевине Југославије о југословенско-совјетским односима (погледи Милана Гавриловића)

Емигрантска влада Краљевине Југославије о југословенско-совјетским односима (погледи Милана Гавриловића)
(The Exile Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on the Yugoslav-Soviet Relation (Views of Milan Gavrilović))

Author(s):Mira Radojević
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Diplomatic history, History of ideas, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:31-51
No. of Pages:21
Keywords:Kingdom of Yugoslavia; Soviet Union; Great Britain; international relations; foreign policy; diplomacy; ideology; political parties; intelligence services; emigration;
Summary/Abstract:Milan Gavrilović, the leader of the Union of Agriculturists, of anti-German and pro-British persuasion, became the first ambassador of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to Moscow as diplomatic relations were taken up in June 1940. With a brief recess from early May to mid-July 1941, he remained on that post until the end of 1941. During that time, and after it too, he conceived the most unfavourable opinion about the possible and expected influence of the Soviet Union on the Balkans and in Yugoslavia. Apart from ideological disagreement, the belief that Balkan should be left over to the Balkan peoples contributed to his opinion that the independence of these peoples must be defended against the domination of any great power, as well as against their mutual confrontations. Being sure that this was the true interest of the Balkan states, he espoused the creation of a Balkan federation and he defended his views even at the cost of parting ways with political and personal friends. During the war he was considered a „Greater-Serb“ and „anti-Soviet“.

Price: 5.00 €

Србија под Немачком окупацијом у Другом светском рату

Србија под Немачком окупацијом у Другом светском рату
(Serbia Under German Occupation in WWII. Characteristics of the Occupation Administration)

Author(s):Dragan Aleksić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Governance, Military history, Political history, Military policy, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:52-72
No. of Pages:21
Keywords:Germany; occupation; The Second World War; Serbia; occupation administration;
Summary/Abstract:One of the main features of the German administration in Serbia in WWII was the fact that the occupation policy wasn’t directed from one center. Since the agencies of the military administration were not under unitary command in Serbia, nor did they have clearly delimitated spheres of action, their influence on occupation policy depended on the authority of their positions, i.e. on the place of the superimposed agencies in the complex pecking order of power in the Third Reich. Internal relations between individual occupation factors and the power of their influence were of importance for concrete implementation of the occupation policy and its consequences for the population. The spheres of activity of the occupation administration were divided among four agencies which fulfilled occupation tasks parallely without mutual coordination and often with conflicting interests. Each agency had its main office in Berlin and each had to fulfill its tasks directly, sidestepping the military administration in Serbia. Since security of the troops was endangered by a strong resistance movement and since due to the long protracted war the needs of German war economy steadily increased, the police and economic administration played the leading role in the hierarchy of German occupation agencies.

Price: 5.00 €

Однос немачког окупатора према домаћим сарадницима у Србији 1941–1944.

Однос немачког окупатора према домаћим сарадницима у Србији 1941–1944.
(The Attitude of German Occupiers toward Local Collaborators in Serbia 1941–1944)

Author(s):Ljubinka Škodrić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Civil Society, Governance, Political history, Government/Political systems, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:82-94
No. of Pages:13
Keywords:The Second World War; occupation; German authorities; collaboration; ideology;
Summary/Abstract:The defeat in the April War, the break-up of the Yugoslav state and the genocide against the Serbian people were the facts the occupied Serbian society had to face already in the first months of occupation. Realizing the difficulty of the situation, the collaborationists strove to improve it by aiding and supporting the occupiers, believing they would by and by recognize that cooperativeness and reward it by improving the situation of the Serbian people in the German system of the „New Order”. However, in the plans of the Third Reich, there was no place for such opinions. The occupied territory was interesting for them only inasmuch it needed as small forces as possible to keep peace and order in it, with the aim of exploiting it as thoroughly as possible. In that context, although local government was set up to help them run the administration, a complex occupying apparatus was also put in place which interfered drastically with the functioning of the local organs, exercising strict surveillance and control over them. Mistrust of local population, regardless of the degree of collaboration remained the lasting trait of the German occupying apparatus in Serbia.

Price: 4.50 €

Москва и антифашистское движение И. Броз Тито (январь – начало октября 1944 г.)

Москва и антифашистское движение И. Броз Тито (январь – начало октября 1944 г.)
(Moscow and the Anti-Fascist Movement J. Broz Tito (January - early October 1944))

Author(s):Andrej Borisovič Edemski
Language:Russian
Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Military history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:95-129
No. of Pages:35
Keywords:Yugoslavia; USSR; Great Britain; Liberation of Belgrade; The Second World War; anti-fascist movement;
Summary/Abstract:The author uses documents of Vjacheslav Molotov’s collections from Russian State Archive of Social-Political History (Rossiyskii gosudarstvenniy arhiv sotsialno-politicheskoy istorii / RGASPI. Fond 82) and Archive of Russian Foreign Policy (Arhiv vneshnei politiki Possiiskoy Federatsii /AVPRF: Fond 06), and several others more consistently than before. On the base of synthesis of these documents with already published Soviet and Yugoslav archival documents and the results of still valuable early research conducted by Nikola Popovic, Yuriy Girenko, Leonid Gibianskiy and Vladimir Volkov this article sheds more light on interrelations and coordination between Soviet leadership and J. Broz Tito from January 1944 to beginning of Belgrade operation October 1944. Several stages of these interrelations are discovered and reviewed this time in some cases more detailed than in previous research. The article discusses main events from January 1944 when decision on formation of Soviet military misson to Yugoslavia was made to end of February when it had beem landed to location of Tito’s headquarters assuming that key trends in this period were coordination of Tito’s activity in international field during end of January–early February. Despite the fact that each stage was important during 1944 it seems that April was extraordinary one because of coming of Yugoslav military mission to the USSR, inner Soviet discussions on the ways and means to improve the assistance to Yugoslav people army, and, the third one, Soviet decision to inform Tito by Stalin (that time codename „Friend”) and Molotov (codename „Alekseev”) that not Bulgaria but Yugoslavia is main Soviet ally on the Balkans during this war and after it. According to documents the end of May and early June when two meetings of Stalin with Yugoslav mission was the point when the final shift in understanding of British activity was made. The stage of July–August when the main stress of Yugoslav liberation forces has been shifted on Serbia the Soviets gave Tito free hand in his contacts with Britain and at the same time gave him full support in Yugoslavia by concentrating all assistance in his hands since only after Tito’s approval this assistance might be get by regional detacheemnts. Despite the fact that author could not obtain Soviet documents on secret Tito’ visit to Moscow in September 1944 he continues the reconstruction of context of these events by involving available indirect data around Tito’s meetings with Soviet leaders that time. The article ends with analysis of already published Soviet military documents on preparations of the Red Army early October 1944 before entering Yugoslavia as friendly country on which despite of they were already have been published were not paid attention by researchers until nowdays.

Price: 6.00 €

Четници и Црвена армија у Србији 1944. године

Четници и Црвена армија у Србији 1944. године
(The Chetniks and the Red Army in Serbia in 1944)

Author(s):Žarko Jovanović
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Military history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Fascism, Nazism and WW II
Page Range:133-146
No. of Pages:14
Keywords:Yugoslavia; Soviet Union; Serbia; Red Army; NOVJ; Chetniks; Draža Mihajlović;
Summary/Abstract:WWII was aproaching its end in fall 1944. Italy, member of the Axis had already capitualted. German armed forces suffered grave defeats both on Western and Eastern fronts. They were also forced to start withdrawing from Greece through the vallies of the Vardar and the Morava. The Chetnik movement of Dragoljub Draža Mihalović was also in bad shape at that time. After a number of admonitions to start military actions against the occupying forces, the Western Allies withdrew their military missions from the Staff of Supreme Command as well as from other Chetnik staffs. Furthermore, they withheld military and every other kind of aid. Under the pressure of the British government, the King and the Yugoslav exile government have given them up too. The increasingly difficult military and political situation of the movement of Dragoljub Draža Mihalović spurred the gathering of the Central Nationa Committee whose permanent session started in the village of Milićevci near Čačak on September 8, 1944. Apart from making combinations about the make-up of the „Chetnik government“, the possibility of the Russian crossing of the Danube into Serbia and Yugoslavia was discussed at the meeting. Having crossed the Yugoslav-Romanian border at Turnu Severin on September 6, 1944, the units of 3rd Ukrainian Front of the Red Army, together with the units of the People’s Liberation Army dispersed the German, Chetnik, Nedić and Ljotić forces and prepared to take starting positions for the begining of the Belgrade operation. On hearing that the Red Army units were crossing into Serbia and in order to butter up to the command of the Soviet troops, the commander of the Rasina-Toplica corps group colonel Dragutin Keserović immediately undertook sabotage actions, obstructing German transports and he started attacking German forces. He ordered that German lines of communication be severed between Vrnjačka Banja and Kraljevo. Part of the Toplica Corps was saddled with the task to do the same between the village of Stopanje and Trstenik. The third part of his forces had the task to cut off the communication between Kruševac and Stalać. Chetnik forces of over 10.000 soldiers were used for these actions. At the intervention of the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, the attempt at cooperation between the Chetniks of Draža Mihalović and the Red Army units turned out to be a total failure since it was known that some Chetnik commanders continued colaborating with Germans. For the leadership of the Red Army the Chetniks became the enemy force in Serbia which was to be destroyed together with occupying and other Quisling forces. Part of the members of Chetnik units was disarmed and set free, whereas many joined the units of the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and took part in the fight against occupiers and their collaborators. The Chetnik forces which managed to avoid being disarmed, withdrew together with their commanders and the Supreme Command simultaneously with the occupying forces in the previously determined direction of Bosnia and further to the West where they met with tragic fate. Smaller Chetnik groups which remained in some parts of Serbia organized terrorist activities for some time after the end of WWII until they were completely destroyed.

Price: 4.50 €

Први Титов сусрет са Стаљином

Први Титов сусрет са Стаљином
(Tito’s First Meeting With Stalin)

Author(s):Nikola B. Popović
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Military history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:147-158
No. of Pages:12
Keywords:NOP of Yugoslavia; Soviet Union; allies; help; weapons; combat operations;
Summary/Abstract:Tito met Stalin for the first time in Moscow between September 21 and 27 1944. Tito himself said about it: „That was the first time in my life that I met Stalin and talked to him. Until then I only saw him from distance, such as at the 7th Congress of the Commintern. This time I had several meetings with him, a couple of them in his office in the Kremlin. He also invited me twice to his private house to dinner.” Judging by this statement, Tito was shown great courtesy. Tito’s idea was to meet Stalin in private. It is possible he talked about that with general Kornjejev, chief of the Soviet military mission with the Supreme Staff of the People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Units of Yugoslavia. Tito informed Stalin about the aim of this conversation in his letter of July 5, 1944. Thus, in the beginning he states that the British were doing their best to strengthen the position of the King and the Chetniks and to weaken the People’s Liberation Army, so that for that reason one couldn’t count on their (British) allied help. Right after that he wrote: „We’ll need your utmost help to solve the problem of Serbia which is very important for us, since the final success and the creation of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia depends on that.” The letter was ended with the following words: „There are many important matters I would like to discuss with you in person.” Stalin accepted the proposal as well as the topic of the talks. It was political, military and material aid of USSR to the People’s Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia. All Tito’s pleas for aid met with favourable response. Everything that happened between USSR, the People’s Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia and the Royal Yugoslav Government from September 28 onwards was the consequence of Tito’s conversation with Stalin. The direct consequence of talks between Tito and Stalin was the TASS statement of September 28 about the agreement of the „Soviet Command” and the People’s Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia. With this statement the Soviet government de facto recognized People’s Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia as the Yugoslav government. This act had great consequences for the development of the People’s Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia. At the same time, the advance of the Red Army into Serbia (Kruševac, Čačak, Belgrade) in October 1944 was the fruit of Tito’s agreement with Stalin. The material aid of USSR for the People’s Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia which followed and lasted until the end of the war had also been agreed upon in Moscow. If Tito asked for „large aid” from Stalin, he got it and sealed it during his talks with him between September 21 and 27, 1944.

Price: 4.50 €

Совјетски ратни заробљеници у Југославији (1943–1944)

Совјетски ратни заробљеници у Југославији (1943–1944)
(Soviet POWs in Yugoslavia (1943–1944))

Author(s):Milan Koljanin
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Military history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Peace and Conflict Studies
Page Range:73-81
No. of Pages:9
Keywords:Yugoslavia; prisoners of war; Russian white emigration; liberation of Belgrade;
Summary/Abstract:Soviet POWs are among the greatest victims of WWII. Their mass destruction by Nazi Germany was racially and ideologically (anti-Bolshevik) motivated. Soviet POWs came to the territory of Yugoslavia and Serbia in various ways. Some were sent to Serbia to complement the Russian Defense Corps, an auxiliary military unit of the German occupational forces. The largest group among the Soviet POWs were the Cossacks who volunteered for the First Cossack Division of the Wehrmacht. The combat career of this division, particularly in Syrmium and Slavonia, was marked by mass crimes. Nevertheless, there was also a wide-spread desertion from this unit. Part of the Soviet POWs found themselves in POW camps in Serbia and Yugoslavia. From among the escapees from these camps, as well as from among deserters from the Cossack Division who joined the partisans, a battalion of the 7th Vojvodina Brigade of the People’s Liberation Army was formed. Members of this battalion returned to the Red Army after its arrival in Serbia in October 1944. They too took part in the Belgrade operation which led to the liberation of the capital of Yugoslavia on October 20, 1944, as part of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

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Београд 20. октобра 1944. године

Београд 20. октобра 1944. године
(Belgrade 1944, October 20)

Author(s):Momčilo Mitrović
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Governance, Local History / Microhistory, Military history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:159-167
No. of Pages:9
Keywords:Belgrade; Serbia; occupation; liberation of Belgrade; 1944; recovering from war damage;
Summary/Abstract:The work represents a Historiographie description of Belgrade during the 1944 and 1945. In addition to portraying the city immediately after the liberation, the author describes the war damage on houses, and cultural and industrial monuments and buildings in the capital. The city's cultural features are presented along with its communal capacities and the organization of providing supplies for the inhabitants, in addition to information regarding health service, education, traffic, etc. Local sources are combined with the reports of Fitzroy Maclean, Chief of the British Military Mission, who entered Belgrade a few days after the liberation.

Price: 4.50 €

Црвена aрмија на Дунаву, ослобођење Београда и тежње Срба из Румуније ка присаједињењу Југославији 1944–1945.

Црвена aрмија на Дунаву, ослобођење Београда и тежње Срба из Румуније ка присаједињењу Југославији 1944–1945.
(The Red Army on the Danube, the Liberation of Belgrade and the Desire of the Serbs from Romania to be United With Yugoslavia)

Author(s):Vladimir Lj. Cvetković
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Civil Society, Military history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Migration Studies, Ethnic Minorities Studies
Page Range:168-184
No. of Pages:17
Keywords:Yugoslavia; Romania; Red Army; Soviet Union; Serbian ethnic minorities in Romania; Banat; Banat cliff; The Second World War;
Summary/Abstract:At the end of WWI as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Romania were founded, some 40.000 Serbs became the Serbian national minority in Romania. They were compactly settled in the border regions, partly in the Banat and partly in the Banatska Klisura, alongside the left bank of the Danube. During the inter-war period the situation of the Serbian minority wasn’t particularly good and it deteriorated during WWII and the Fascist regime of marshal Antonescu when Serbs deserted en masse from the Romanian army, not wishing to fight against „Russia”, even though it might be Communist. Almost 1.000 people, partly deserters from the Romanian army, crossed over to Yugoslavia in the last phase of the war, and joined Tito’s partisans with whom they took part in battles against Germans. After they had returned to their villages they became advocates of the idea of unification with Yugoslavia. The appearance of the Red Army on the Romanian bank of the Danube where Serbs lived in compact communities additionally strengthened that idea among the local Serbs. The participation of some Soviet officers and soldiers in the revengeful actions of Serbs and their detraction of the authority of the Romanian government, although probably isolated cases, helped the conviction to spring up among part of the minority population that they would enjoy Soviet support for such a step, the Soviets being the masters of the situation in Romania. The liberation of Belgrade and the organization of the new Yugoslav government were the signal for the beginning of the propaganda action in which some Red Army soldiers also took part and which would eventually provoke the armed counter-action of the Romanian authorities. However, the attempt to organize the Antifascist Front of Slavs (SAF) in early May 1945 showed that the attitude of the Yugoslav and Soviet authorities had changed in the meantime – most probably during the visit of Josip Broz Tito to Moscow between April 5 and 17, and in connection with the founding of the government of Dr Petru Grozda in Romania to which USSR guaranteed territorial integrity. Although the congress didn’t take place and although it foresaw no action in connection with unification of the Romanian part of the Banat with Yugoslavia, the bill for toying with this idea was footed by Serbs in Romania at the time of conflict with the Informbuerau. They were subjected to mass deportations to the deserts of Baragan, as a kind of revenge by the Romanian authorities.

Price: 4.50 €

Војвођански Немци у октобру 1944.

Војвођански Немци у октобру 1944.
(The Vojvodina Germans in October 1944)

Author(s):Zoran Janjetović
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Military history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Inter-Ethnic Relations, Ethnic Minorities Studies
Page Range:185-204
No. of Pages:20
Keywords:Volksdeutchers; Vojvodina; Evacuation; Red Army; mass murders; concentration camps;
Summary/Abstract:Due to indoctrination, unsatisfying minority position in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, national enthusiasm because of Hitler’s victories and the whole historical situation which was caused by these and other factors, the Vojvodina Swabians sided with Germany and its allies. Because of that, they enjoyed more or less privileged status in the territory of the Vojvodina after April 1941. However, it was coupled with duty to support the war effort of the Axis powers. In August 1944 the situation started to change dramatically for the worse for them due to the capitulation of Romania. Evacuation started to be contemplated. Detailed plans for evacuating German population from the Banat and from Syrmium were made during September, whereas no such plans (except for Novi Sad) were made for the Backa, so as not to undermine the morale of the allied Hungary. Although the Red Army units were already standing on the border of the Yugoslav Banat in late September, the Volksdeutsche were not given permission to start evacuating. Until this day it is not known who was responsible: Hitler, Himmler or the Senior Chief of the SS-Police in Belgrade, Behrends. The reason was certainly the unwillingness to burden the Reich with refugees and to show, in an indirect way, that the German war machinery was grinding to a halt. When the permission to start evacuating the Banat was finally granted on September 28/29, it was already too late for part of the Volksdeutsche; another part, crushed by weeks long anxiety didn’t want to be evacuated any more. In the Bacska flight and evacuation of the Volksdeutsche started simultaneously with the withdrawal of the Hungarian authorities. The main advocates of the evacuation were people active in Volksdeutsche organizations and relatives of the Waffen-SS members. Those who thought they had done no harm to anyone refused to be evacuated. For that reason, only one half of the Germans left the Bacska. On the contrary, in Syrmium the evacuation was executed according to the plan between mid-October and early November. Some 90% of the Germans left, and large quantities of goods were also evacuated. The remaining Volksdeutsche in the Banat and the Bacska were subject to mass shootings, rape, pillaging, arrests and manhandling by members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Red Army. Their freedom of movement was restricted and they were taken to forced labor. Internment of the Swabian population into concentration camps began. On October 17, 1944 Military Administration was imposed in the Banat and the Bacska. It was supposed to fortify the power of the PLA and to use all resources of the province for further war effort. It had a distinct anti-minority taint, and the Hungarians suffered together with the Germans during the first weeks of the new regime – albeit to a smaller extent. The treatment of the Hungarians was relaxed in late November, whereas it became even more rigid for the Germans. In that way October 1944 brought freedom to the Serbian population and the beginning of Calvary for the Volksdeutsche.

Price: 5.00 €

Участие СССР в депортации Немцев с территории Югославии после Второй Мировой Войны (1944–1946 г.)

Участие СССР в депортации Немцев с территории Югославии после Второй Мировой Войны (1944–1946 г.)
(USSR Participation in the Deportation of Germans from the Territory of Yugoslavia after the Second World War (1944–1946))

Author(s):Jelena Jurjevna Guskova
Language:Russian
Subject(s):Military history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Ethnic Minorities Studies
Page Range:205-209
No. of Pages:5
Keywords:The Second World War; deportation of Germans; the role of USSR; territory of Yugoslavia;
Summary/Abstract:The fact about deportation of Germans from territory of Yugoslavia the come to power communists is known. However in the Russian archives documents on participation in it of Moscow contain. Recently published documents allow to restore this process in detail enough. On December, 16th, 1944 the State Committee of Defense of the USSR has accepted the decision about mobilization and internment for use on works in the USSR „all able-bodied Germans in the age of - men from 17 till 45 years, women from 18 till 30 years which are being on released Red Army of territory of Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia“. The management of operation has been assigned to comrade Beriju. Directly for Yugoslavia and Bulgaria answered Tolbukhin and Biruzov. Till 19 January, 1945 from the Balkan countries 67930 Germans have been sent to the USSR, including from Yugoslavia – 10935 persons. The Interned Germans worked in the USSR till the spring 1946.

Price: 4.50 €

Искуство сучељавања: Црвеноармејци и становништво Србије

Искуство сучељавања: Црвеноармејци и становништво Србије
(The Experience of Confrontation: Red Army Soldiers and the Population of Serbia)

Author(s):Aleksej J. Timofejev
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Civil Society, Military history, Social history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:210-236
No. of Pages:27
Keywords:Red Army; imaginology; Serbian-Russian relations; social history; history of everyday life;
Summary/Abstract:The mutual perception of the Red Army soldiers and Serbian population in fall 1944 had far-reaching consequences. The people who came to the Balkans in the ranks of the Red Army in fall 1944 differed from the „pre-revolutionary Russians”. The slump in living standards of peasants and workers supplied in fact the Soviet state with the necessary means for developing the heavy industry and armaments production. During 1930s Russia was transformed from a semiagricultural country into a industrial giant able to produce more quality armament than the leading industrial powers of Europe. For many Red Army soldiers coming to the Balkans was the first opportunity to compare the life in capitalism with the achievements of the Communist system. Soldiers and officers represented relatively young population. Youth coupled with large wartime experience increased the self-assuredness and even self-assertiveness of the soldiers, and particularly of officers. Apart from their comparative youth, officers and soldiers of the Red Army shared common problems: fatigue, poor nourishment, problems with regular clothes and shoes. Trophies helped with solving these problems. It was not all about belts, sausages and typewriters. In the corps of general Zhdanov 65% of the means of non-combat transport were commandeered enemy cars. There were individual problems with immoral behaviour and pilfering, although their number was minimal compared to the general mass of the soldiers. Alcohol was the general problem. The Red Army soldiers knew next to nothing about Yugoslavia before coming to the Balkans. The sole exception was the propaganda message about the partisan movement and Tito transmitted in a few articles before crossing the Serbian border on the Danube. After a while a informal closeness developed between the Red Army soldiers and the partisans, which sometimes turned into collective drinking bouts. All Soviet participants in the combats in Yugoslavia remembered the forthcoming attitude on the part of the population. Perception of the Red Army soldiers by Yugoslav (Serbian) civilians and soldiers had another predispositions and was considerably different. From the materials at our disposal, a general conclusion can be drawn that Yugoslavs, and Serbs in the first place, felt a bit disappointed in USSSR and even in Russians after the Red Army had passed through their territory. Criminal or antisocial behaviour of some Red Army soldiers had to leave a bitter taste, even amidst great joy because of liberation from the German occupation. Partisan repression also contributed to that. However, it would be wrong to claim that the final Yugoslav, and above all Serbian, perception of the Soviet soldiers was just negative. The longawaited liberation and the meeting with the „Russians” couldn’t be completely marred by excesses of individuals and haughty and cautious behaviour of the Soviet officers. The material aid and military assistance lent by the Soviet state to the People’s Liberation Army in the last phase of the war also contributed to the creation of a more positive image of USSR, although occasional confusions and misunderstandings occurred here too. Joy to „see the back” of the Germans, mixed with positive feelings for the Russians and lack of knowledge about the character of the Communist regime, led to touching scenes.

Price: 5.00 €

Совјетска помоћ међународном признању Народноослободилачког покрета на крају Другог светског рата

Совјетска помоћ међународном признању Народноослободилачког покрета на крају Другог светског рата
(Soviet Aid toward International Recognition of the People’s Liberation Movement at the End of WWII)

Author(s):Milan Terzić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Civil Society, Political history, Social history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), History of Communism
Page Range:239-246
No. of Pages:8
Keywords:War; international recognition; USSR; Yugoslav Royal Government; NKOJ; Tito; Draža Mihajlović; help; aid;
Summary/Abstract:There is no doubt about the help USSR lent to the People’s Liberation Movement in the struggle for international recognition of changes which came about in Yugoslavia during WWII. USSR and its leader Stalin were not willing to side unreservedly with the Communist movement in Yugoslavia since they didn’t want to spoil their relations with the Western Allies. They were directing the Yugoslav Communists to reach a compromise with the royal Yugoslav government. As shown by the partisan military diplomacy, it was through a compromise that the common government (the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia and the royal Yugoslav government) was built at the end of the war. However, one shouldn’t forget the independence of the Yugoslav movement and its leader J.B. Tito. The autochthonous Yugoslav military power which developed during the war in Yugoslavia, deserves special mention. The Yugoslav leader J.B. Tito learned exactly at that time what the interests of the world politics were. He would prove his self–assuredness later on by clashing with Stalin and USSR and by putting into question the unity of the Communist East.

Price: 4.50 €

Отношение Вашингтона к участию Красной армии в освобождении Югославии

Отношение Вашингтона к участию Красной армии в освобождении Югославии
(Washington's View of the Red Army's Participation in the Liberation of Yugoslavia)

Author(s):Aleksej A. Kostin
Language:Russian
Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Military history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:247-271
No. of Pages:25
Keywords:Yugoslavia; Soviet-Yugoslavian relations; USA foreign policy; Red Army; The Second World War; anti-Hitler coalition;
Summary/Abstract:The participation of the Red Army in the liberation of Yugoslavia is one of the topics from WWII which have a political flip-side. The news about Red Army's advance into the Yugoslav territory came as no surprise to the White House. The Americans were informed by the British and by their own intelligence service about the trip of the leader of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito to Moscow. In the State Department there were no doubts about the consequences of Tito's visit to Moscow, and already on September 20, 1944 the possibility of scaling down the len-lease aid for Yugoslavia was discussed. The Americans considered the possibility of the Soviet participation in the liberation of the Balkans already in late 1943. President's position voiced at the conferences in Kairo and Teheran prove that Roosevelt, believing in complete success of the Red Army in Romania, deemed its advance in Yugoslavia very likely. The Western Allies could prevent the Red Army's advance only at the cost of the break-up of the Anti-Hitler coalition. Taking into account the complexity of the military actions in the Balkans, a delay of the Allied armies in the case of operations in Istria and Dalmatia, could lead to the Red Army's turning toward Holland, Belgium and France after the fall of Berlin. The information of the US intelligence service say Yugoslavia was liberated largely thanks to the Red Army. American agents claimed the Yugoslav partisans had no heavy armament necessary for larger military actions, which directly caused low military efficiency of the People's Liberation Army. The information of the American intelligence service directed the Washington analysts to better understand the mutual interest of Moscow and the Yugoslav partisans in each other. Relying on the Soviet military and political support Tito conquered power, and the Soviet leadership strove to spread Communist influence through the victory of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. After all, the State Department considered the presence of the Soviet military forces in Yugoslavia as an „important factor” which had to be taken into account in the process of making US policy toward Yugoslavia.

Price: 5.00 €

Совјетски савез и формирање југословенских снага безбедности (1944–1945)

Совјетски савез и формирање југословенских снага безбедности (1944–1945)
(USSR and the Creation of the Security Apparatus in Yugoslavia 1944–1945)

Author(s):Dmitar Tasić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Governance, Military history, Political history, Security and defense, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:272-281
No. of Pages:10
Keywords:Yugoslavia; USSR; security agencies; HOVJ; OZNA; KNOJ; military and intelligence agencies; counter-intelligence protection;
Summary/Abstract:Parallel with the „wartime“ formation of the „New“ or Tito’s Yugoslavia and its armed forces, the process of founding of the security apparatus was also going on. The fact that the war against the occupiers was at the same time a civil war and a thoroughgoing socialist revolution, additionally stressed the importance of well organized and well trained security and intelligence agencies. No doubt, ties established with USSR during the war as well as the known experiences of the October Revolution, civil wars in USSR and in Spain, had a strong impact on the way the Yugoslav security apparatus was formed and used. The split with USSR which came about in 1948 and which influenced this sphere too, would entail stressing autochthonous development or unconscious neglect or total omission of the foreign (speak: Soviet) influence in subsequent research.

Price: 4.50 €

Југославија, велике силе и питање статуса Јулијске крајине 1943–1945.

Југославија, велике силе и питање статуса Јулијске крајине 1943–1945.
(Yugoslavia, Great Powers and the Question of Venezia Giulia 1943–1945)

Author(s):Miljan Milkić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):International Law, Governance, Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:282-296
No. of Pages:15
Keywords:Yugoslavia; Venezia Giulia; foreign policy; allies; USSR;
Summary/Abstract:Although ideologically opposed and seeing the future social system in Yugoslavia differently, both the Royal Yugoslav Government and the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia shared the interest in enlarging the Yugoslav state, putting overtly forward territorial claims against neighboring countries. The wartime coalition of USSA and Western Powers showed its nonviability in the matter of the future state appurtenance of Venezia Giulia. The territorial dispute wasn’t definitively solved by the Belgrade and Devin agreements and the territorial status of Venezia Giulia remained a bone of contention in the relations between great powers. After WWI through the activity of the League of nations an attempt was made to repudiate the concept of power equilibrium and to implement the concept of collective security. This concept proved its nonviability at the outbreak of WWII. With the beginning of the Trieste crisis at the end of WWII the power equilibrium became the dominant concept in the relations between great powers once again.

Price: 4.50 €

Совјетски савез и Југославија на крају Другог светског рата 1944–1945.

Совјетски савез и Југославија на крају Другог светског рата 1944–1945.
(The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the End of WWII 1944–1945)

Author(s):Kosta Nikolić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), History of Communism
Page Range:297-314
No. of Pages:18
Keywords:Yugoslavia; communism; allies; The Second World War; international relations; USSR;
Summary/Abstract:The fate of Yugoslavia was decided within the triangle of the „Great Allies”, and the global agreement between USA and the Soviet Union was of major importance. It is needles to ask if the Yugoslav Communists understood the nature of this agreement – they were just consequently following the instructions from Moscow. Revolutionary logic proved very effective in contact with American officers too: they reported that the partisans were fighting. The estimate as to against whom, in what degree and with which goal depended on experience and sagacity of individual officers, but the partisans always fulfilled the first requirement of the Allied coalition: they fought or they made an impression they were fighting. The American government created on purpose an illusion that Yugoslavia wasn’t handed over to the Soviets, but to an autonomous resistance movement of unclear political orientation. Later reports which testified to the Communist character of the People’s Liberation Movement, about the clear intention of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to gain power by all means, about outright inimical attitude toward USA, about the reign of terror, about existence of aggressive mix of nationalism and Communism, about proofs that the new Yugoslav regime was a carbon copy of the Soviet system and that Tito was Moscow’s best pupil, didn’t cause any reaction on the part of the American administration. Yugoslavia was in the Soviet sphere of influence. Comparative analysis of British and American influence on the denouement of the civil war and the post-war social system of Yugoslavia shows that apparent disinterest is more nefarious and more important than excessive engagement. The American military establishment decided that the second front in Europe wouldn’t be opened in the Balkans, and Roosevelt drew political conclusions from this decision and left Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union. Churchill’s endeavors to exercise his own influence on Tito and to retain a modicum of political influence, must be seen in this context. USA had both military and political means of influencing the fate of Yugoslavia, whereas Britain hadn’t. USA cared exclusively about its interests and not about the proclaimed principles of foreign policy. Only the facade of democracy was to be preserved.

Price: 4.50 €

Српско грађанство између Истока и Запада (1944–1945)

Српско грађанство између Истока и Запада (1944–1945)
(Serbian Bourgeoisie Between East and West (1944–1945))

Author(s):Nataša Milićević
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Civil Society, Political history, Social history, Government/Political systems, Social development, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), History of Communism, Sociology of Politics
Page Range:315-326
No. of Pages:12
Keywords:Serbian bourgeoisie; Serbia; Yugoslavia; democracy; communism; East; West;
Summary/Abstract:The Serbian bourgeoisie found itself in a particular social and political situation in 1944–1945. Apart from the victory of the People’s Liberation Movement in the liberation and civil war and the take-over by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, it was determined by the division into two worlds, East and West, socialism and capitalism. The Serbian bourgeoisie, like that in other East European countries, found itself between those two worlds. On the one hand, according to the basic ideological values it espoused, it was turned westwards, whereas, on the other hand, geographically and politically it found itself in the area in which the new political and social forces headed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia strove to establish the values which canceled the very basis of the existence of the bourgeoisie. Particular attention was devoted to democracy, as one of the great ideas of the Serbian bourgeoisie. In meeting and clashing with the revolutionary forces it was defeated and virtually “disappeared”, together with the bourgeoisie as political and social class. After difficult crucible with it met during the previous decades – for instance crucible connected with the fulfillment of the national ideal, i.e. the creation of a democratic state in which all Serbs would live, or temptations occurring within the multiethnic state, or those, particularly hard, created by wars, particularly WWII - the Serbian bourgeoisie was weak, divided, without the aid of a strong monarchy, army and support of the Western democratic powers in that historical moment to defend and save the achievement in which it invested political, economic and intellectual capacity and innumerable human losses. The older generation of the Serbian bourgeoisie which had experienced democratic political life was biologically, politically and in every way tired and spent. It couldn’t understand the new times which demanded changing one’s ideological and political views and opinions, as well as moral values and their adaptation to the new times. Neither did the younger generation of bourgeoisie which was supposed to take over and lead the struggle for democracy have enough strength, unity or capability. It ripened in the years leading to WWII and had no opportunity to realize what the real democratic and parliamentary life looked like. The new times draw them partly into the ranks of the Communist Party in whose ideals they saw beacons for better life and arrangement of social relations.

Price: 4.50 €

Совјетски поглед на Балкан и југословенску доминацију у Албанији (1943–1947)

Совјетски поглед на Балкан и југословенску доминацију у Албанији (1943–1947)
(The Soviet View of the Balkans and the Yugoslav Domination in Albania (1943–1947))

Author(s):Aleksandar Životić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Geopolitics
Page Range:327-346
No. of Pages:20
Keywords:Balkans; Yugoslavia; Albania; Soviet Union; Josip Broz Tito; Enver Hoxha; a cold war; a socialist world; political domination;
Summary/Abstract:The Soviet Union kept a watchful eye on the Yugoslav presence in Albania immediately after the end of WWII. Yugoslavia was helping Albania in every way during WWII and it continued its aid after the war. In the beginning the Soviet Union wasn’t present in that country to any significant degree. The Soviet influence was confined to symbolic military and diplomatic presence. However, over time the Soviet presence in Albania began to be more perceptible and clearer. The Soviet presence didn’t push back the Yugoslav influence and it didn’t limit the level of the Yugoslav-Albanian relations, but it strictly determined the reach of the mutual cooperation. The Soviets left to the Yugoslavs the organizatorial activities in the Albanian Communist Party, economy and culture. One gets the impression the Yugoslav presence in Albania was a downsized copy of the Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was a powerful mediator between Albania and the Soviet Union, a country the Soviet top-brass entrusted with the tutelage over Albania, seeing it as the guarantor of Albanian independence and security.

Price: 5.00 €

Совјетски савез и југословенско-аустријски територијални спор после Другог светског рата

Совјетски савез и југословенско-аустријски територијални спор после Другог светског рата
(The Soviet Union and the Yugoslav-Austrian Territorial Dispute After WWII)

Author(s):Petar Dragišić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Geopolitics
Page Range:349-356
No. of Pages:8
Keywords:Yugoslavia; Austria; Koruška; Soviet Union; territorial dispute;
Summary/Abstract:One of the key elements of the Yugoslav foreign policy during the first years after WWII was the attempt of the new Yugoslav authorities to strengthen their position in the region and to expand their territory at the expense of the neighboring countries. Already in the last phase of the war Yugoslavia raised territorial claims against Austria. Yugoslavia was particularly interested in annexing parts of Carinthia, justifying territorial demands by the fact that a larger number of members of the Slovenian national minority had lived there. The Yugoslav attempt to put the Allies before a fait accompli by invading Carinthia in the last phase of the war, failed. While the Soviet side was willing to accept the participation of Yugoslav troops in the occupation of Austria, the Western Allies insisted on withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from the occupied territories in Austria. In its diplomatic campaign to annex the border parts of Austria the Yugoslav regime enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union. Unlike the diplomatic representatives of the Western powers, the Soviet representatives lent their support to the Yugoslav territorial demands against Austria at the conferences on the peace treaty with Austria in 1947 and 1948. The Soviet attitude changed after the Resolution of the Informbuerau. Already in mid-1949 the Soviet diplomacy withheld its further support to Yugoslav claims against Austria, which led to the breakdown of the Austrian policy of the Yugoslav regime and eventually opened the way to the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty.

Price: 4.50 €

Научна сарадња Југославије и Совјетског савеза 1944–1947.

Научна сарадња Југославије и Совјетског савеза 1944–1947.
(Scientific Cooperation between Yugoslavia and USSR 1944–1947)

Author(s):Dragomir Bondžić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, History of Education, State/Government and Education, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:357-381
No. of Pages:25
Keywords:Yugoslavia; Soviet Union; science; cooperation; exchange; help; propaganda; literature; scientists; institutions;
Summary/Abstract:Apart from military and political, economic, cultural and educational cooperation, academic ties of the new Yugoslav authorities with state and scholarly institutions of the Soviet union developed already by the end of 1944. Above all, it was the matter of great expectations and certain aid from the Soviet Union in cadres, material and in organizing of scientific work and of basing of Party and state scientific policy completely on the Soviet scholarly and research model and the achievements of Soviet science. Ideological and political propinquity and the need to develop the backward science and to apply it to the needs of the country and the people, made it necessary to rely on the experiences, achievements and aid of the first country of socialism. This trend found its underpinning in the Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Aid and Afterwar Cooperation between Yugoslavia and USSR from April 1945. Ties between scholarly institutions and scientists were realized through the highest educational organs of the state, and above all through the Society for Cultural Cooperation of Yugoslavia and USSR, founded in 1945. Already from the first afterwar school year Soviet curricula, plans and Russian language were introduced on all levels of education, and it was tried to base the instruction on dialectical materialism. Soviet schoolbooks were translated and Russian-language literature recommended, methodology and results of certain scholarly disciplines were taken over from Soviet science (psychology, pedagogy, history, literary theory, biology etc.) Through exchange and grants primarily Russian-language books and scholarly journals came into libraries of faculties and scientific institutions. Apart from its practical application, Soviet science was strongly advertised and praised as the „most progressive” in the press and in public statements of scientific and public workers, as opposed to the „bourgeois reactionary science” of Western countries. Aid in application and advertising of achievements of Soviet science were lent also by scientists from the Soviet Union, who, apart from lectures at universities and in public, often had the task of organizing scientific research work and of helping with the set-up, organization and work of scholarly institutions. Furthermore, a large number of students and specializing experts, as well as scientists was sent to the Soviet Union. During their stay there they came to know the organization and achievements of Soviet science and they propagated it in public and applied it in their institutions. All forms of scientific cooperation were limited by material resources and possibilities and imbedded in the general cultural and propaganda atmosphere based on ideological and political situation and the relations between Yugoslavia and USSR. After the Resolution of the Informbuerau in 1948 and the conflict between Yugoslavia and USSR scientific ties between the two countries were abruptly severed and the propaganda image of Soviet science was gradually revised.

Price: 5.00 €

„Конструктивно васпитање“ најмлађих припадника југословенске заједнице. Совјетски модел на трагу „познавања наше сопствене проблематике“

„Конструктивно васпитање“ најмлађих припадника југословенске заједнице. Совјетски модел на трагу „познавања наше сопствене проблематике“
(„Constructive Education“ of the Youngest Members of the Yugoslav Community The Application of the Soviet Model for „Solving our Own Problems“)

Author(s):Sanja Petrović Todosijević
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Civil Society, Political history, History of Education, State/Government and Education, Social development, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), History of Communism
Page Range:382-392
No. of Pages:11
Keywords:education; politics; Soviet model; Yugoslav society; Communist Party of Yugoslavia; Union of the Pioneers of Yugoslavia;
Summary/Abstract:The policy of education and upbringing in the Yugoslav state after WWII wasn't clearly defined until the end of 1949. The paper wants to point out at the, in many respects true but nevertheless problematic claim, that Soviet policy of education and upbringing was unconditionally accepted in Yugoslavia untill the split with the Soviet Union in 1948. Suggesting such supeficial claims is the consequence of insufficiently researched political and social processes which took place in the Yugoslav society between the second half of 1944 and summer 1948. Superficial estimates are often the fruit of the unjustified need to stress discontinuity, even though many analysis of complex social processes showed that clear continuity can be observed ever since the founding of modern, i.e. national states in these parts, and even further back. Although the year 1948 is often considered a boundary for marking certain phenomena in the Yugoslav society, it should be emphasised that it would be much more accurate to say that certain phenomena took their clearest form after summer 1948 or later, but that the first manifestations of the proces of emancipation from Moscow's tutelage, and thus also the first signs of the search for Yugoslavia's own way to socialism, could be observed long before 1948.

Price: 4.50 €

Југославија, СССР и источноевропске земље 1944–1948.

Југославија, СССР и источноевропске земље 1944–1948.
(Yugoslavia, USSR and East European Countries 1944-1948)

Author(s):Slobodan Selinić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Governance, Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), History of Communism
Page Range:393-418
No. of Pages:26
Keywords:Yugoslavia; USSR; Poland; Czechoslovakia; Bulgaria; Albania; Hungary; Romania; Eastern Europe; Josip Broz Tito; politics; economy; culture;
Summary/Abstract:Between the end of WWII and the conflict of Yugoslavia with the Informbuerau power was grabbed by the Communists in all East European countries. During that period of time, Yugoslavia established good relations with all these countries, concluding treaties on friendship with them. However, the place of all these countries in the Yugoslav foreign policy was by no means the same. The relations were best with USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland, Slavonic countries and wartime allies. Great efforts were made to establish as close ties as possible with Albania, i.e. to exercise as great Yugoslav influence in that country as possible, as well as to convert Bulgaria’s status of a defeated foe into that of an ally and a friend. Good relations were most difficult to establish with Hungary where „reactionary” forces were strong and with Romania with which many opened questions existed and where Communists were weak. In keeping with the place these countries had in Yugoslav foreign policy, treaties of friendship were signed with them: the one with USSR on April 11, 1945, with Poland on March 18, 1946, with Czechoslovakia on May 9, 1946, with Albania on July 9, 1946, with Bulgaria on November 27, 1947, with Hungary on December 8, 1947, and with Romania on December 19, 1947. Cooperation with these countries meant national affirmation for Yugoslavia, strengthening of its position, security in case of renewed German aggression, an expression of Slavic solidarity, a form of siding with USSR in Cold War divisions etc. Everyday propaganda of Soviet models in Yugoslav public also served foreign policy goals, as well as the endeavor to develop as rich cultural exchange as possible with these countries, particularly Slavic ones. For this reason Yugoslav cooperation with East European countries was marked by mutual visits of writers, scientists and sportsmen, exchange of films, mutual artistic propaganda, but political one as well, in the form of exhibitions etc. In that context, particularly important were societies for cooperation between Yugoslavia and East European countries, founded in Yugoslavia and in those countries. The societies had as their goal to contribute to all-encompassing mutual knowledge and cooperation of these peoples. In Yugoslavia they were completely serving the foreign policy goals of the government and the Communist Party.

Price: 5.00 €

У трагању за „новим човеком“: Врхунац културне сарадње Југославије и Совјетског савеза 1944–1948.

У трагању за „новим човеком“: Врхунац културне сарадње Југославије и Совјетског савеза 1944–1948.
(In the Search for the „New Man“: The Pinnacle of Cultural Cooperation Between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1944–1948)

Author(s):Goran Miloradović
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Fine Arts / Performing Arts, Cultural history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Sociology of Politics, Sociology of Art
Page Range:419-436
No. of Pages:18
Keywords:Soviet Union; Yugoslavia; Stalinism; socrealism; new man; cultural cooperation; artistic production;
Summary/Abstract:The relations of Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union had in the field of culture, as well as in other fields, their most intensive phase in the first post-war years. Cultural contacts were realized through import of products of Soviet culture, and even on a larger scale through taking over and application of the Soviet model by Yugoslav Communists and artists close to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The practice of socialist realism in Yugoslavia was reflected in uncritical aping of artistic form of Soviet authors and in consistent adoption of tenets of official Stalin-type of art. Cultural cooperation was the corollary of the military and political support of the Soviet Party and the state for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the war and the first post-war years. Soviet cultural production was presented and promoted in Yugoslavia through art exhibitions, visits by artists, film production, publishing of translated literature and popularizing of Soviet music. In those years every cultural event of greater importance took the form of inter-state and interparty cooperation. Due to unequal cultural power, cultural cooperation between Yugoslavia and USSR in the first post-war years marked in fact the pinnacle of the influence which was reaching Yugoslavia from USSR. Although a modicum of cooperation existed during the inter-war period, just as that cooperation existed during the second half of 20th century, it was never so intensive and multifaceted, nor was it ever so strongly and assiduously supported by the two states as was the case during the first five years after WWII.

Price: 4.50 €

Совјетска обавештајна служба у Југославији 1944–1948. године

Совјетска обавештајна служба у Југославији 1944–1948. године
(The Soviet Intelligence Service in Yugoslavia 1944–1948)

Author(s):Bojan B. Dimitrijević
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Education, Military history, Political history, International relations/trade, Security and defense, Military policy, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:437-455
No. of Pages:19
Keywords:Yugoslavia; Soviet Union; NKVD; KOS; military missions; military instructors; education; Informbiro;
Summary/Abstract:The paper gives a survey of the activities of the Soviet Intelligence Service based on the data reached by the Yugoslav Counter-Espionage in its researches after the conflict between Yugoslavia and USSSR in 1948. It is pointed out that these activities were channeled through several forms of cooperation: through military missions sent to the Yugoslav partisans in 1944, through special NKVD and SMERS groups which came to Belgrade after the arrival of the Soviet and partisan forces on October 1944, through units set up among the Yugoslavs which were sent to Yugoslavia, as well as through a number of advisors sent to the Yugoslav Army after the end of the war and finally through broad plans of education courses in USSR attended by members of the Yugoslav Army between 1944 and 1948. What can be gleaned from these analyses is that a precise number of Soviet advisors and other representatives between 1944 and 1948 couldn’t be established, as well as that of the members of the Yugoslav Army (YA) who were educated in USSR. The main question within the YA after the Resolution of the Informbuerau was boiled down to ideological and political declaration concerning the views expressed in the Resolution. These views of the YA members were basically the most important thing to the political and counter-espionage agencies. Thus, the analysis of the activities of the Soviet intelligence service in Yugoslavia 1944–1948 and the depth of its penetration into the Yugoslav establishment was neglected for a long time.

Price: 4.50 €

Британски погледи на односе између југославије и СССР-а 1945–1947.

Британски погледи на односе између југославије и СССР-а 1945–1947.
(British Views on the Relations Between Yugoslavia and USSR 1945–1947)

Author(s):Đoko Tripković
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Governance, Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), History of Communism
Page Range:456-468
No. of Pages:13
Keywords:Great Britain; British views; Yugoslavia; USSR; international relations; estimations; influence;
Summary/Abstract:The leading British statesmen, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden tried in fall 1944 to maintain the policy of compromise toward Yugoslavia they had pursued throughout that year, whose basic idea was the formation of a common government comprizing representatives of the partisan movement headed by J.B. Tito and the Communist Party and the representatives of the Yugoslav government under Ivan Šubašić. They hoped that the realisation of that concept would enable them to keep in check the rising Soviet influence in Yugoslavia, at the time when the miltiary victory of Tito's movement seemed quite certain. In order to achieve the goals of that policy they turned to direct communicating with the Soviet leadership, judging it a more efficient way than negotioating with Tito in whom, after his elopement from Vis to Moscow, they had no trust any more. The results of their endeavours were the following: the agreement about common work in Yugoslavia (50:50) between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow (October 1944), the agreement between Tito and Šubašić about the founding of a unified government (November 1944), resolutions and suggestions of the three allied powers at the Yalta conference (February 1945) concerning Yugoslavia, creation of a temporary government of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (March 1945). Although the policy the British were favoring was formally implemented, they were aware that a fundametnal change took place in Yugoslavia, that Tito and the Communists took power and that in the post-war period Yugoslavia would go in a direction that was neither agreeable to their wishes and interests nor in keeping with agreement reached with the Soviet leadership about equilibrium of interests. This was confirmed by reports and estimates of their representatives in Belgrade about the situation in Yugoslavia in the first months after the Communist takeover – first by Fitzroy McLean and then by ambassador Ralf Stivenson. Shortly put, the main conclusion was that everything pointed in the direction that the new authorities were bent on establishing a system based on the Soviet model in domestic affairs, and on following closely policy and views of USSR in foreign affairs. Disapointed and unhappy with such development, Churchill proposed in March 1945 that Britain should gradually withdraw and disengage from Yugoslav affairs and that it should leave Tito „to be cooked in the Balcan stew”. However, Eden didn't think Britain should withdraw and „leave the whole business to Tito and Moscow”. In the period that followed the British policy toward Yugoslavia was a kind of mix of Churchill's and Eden's views and it wasn't substantially changed even after Churchill's fall from power in summer of that year. The important events in 1945 took place in accordance with that policy. Britain took a very sharp stand against Yugoslav territorial demands in Italy, managing to force Tito to withdraw his troops from Trieste, but it wasn't overly engaged in internal Yugoslav development: certain attempts to do something more at the Potsdam conference and during the elections for the Constituent Assembly bore no fruits due to the attitude of Moscow which stood firmly behind the proces of establishment and recognition of the new government in Belgrade. Throughout 1946 the British continued to intensly observe and analyze both the internal development and the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. They didn't look with favor at strong Yugoslav leaning toward USSR and other East European countries and they considered that the Yugoslav leadership was determined on completly relying on Moscow and that it was activly working on political and economic integration of these states under the leadership of USSR. Nevertheless, they didn't give up hope, thinking there was hope Yugoslav policy would change down the road and that things could turn to their favor. Lacking arguments to substantiate these hopes in everyday political practice, they counted on the effect of the geographic factors: „Belgrade is much farther from Moscow than is Warsaw.” From the information and analysis they had gathered, they concluded that Tito's regime and the Communist system in Yugoslavia were the reality one had to put up with, as well as with the fact that Tito's government was strongly tied to Moscow and that under such circumstances one had to be patient and to keep the door to the West opened for Yugoslavia, to develop relations with it in the limits of the possible, primarily economic ones, and to preserve in that way the remaining influence and lay the foundations for its increase in the future. In the British public, as well as among observers and analysts the image of Yugoslavia wasn't changed in 1947. It was still depicted as the closest and the best beloved ally of Moscow, as the main exponent of the Soviet policy in the region of South-Eastern Europe etc. Not even in the Foreign Office did one expect siginficant changes in the relations with Yugoslavia, nor in the relations between Belgrade and Moscow. The refusal of the Yugoslav government to join the Marshal Plan – which was in keeping with attitude of the Soviet leadership – and active participation at the founding of the Cominform later on, were seen as solid proofs that Tito's government firmly stood on the position of a close ally and follower of the policy of USSR. However, there were opinions that not everything was so rosy in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations as it seamed. F. Roberts, minister-advisor in the British Embassy in Moscow (ambassador in Belgrade later on) suggested in early 1947 that there was a colision between the Yugoslav national interests pursued by Tito's government and the principles of proletarian internationalism advocated by the Soviet leadership, which could lead to a conflict between the Yugoslav and the Soviet governments. However, Ch. Pick, the ambassador in Belgrade, and the officials in the Foreign Office didn't countnance his opinion. They thought that, although Roberts' s observations were founded on realistic arguments, „Belgrade would never dare to refuse any demand Moscow would seriously wanted to impose.”

Price: 4.50 €

Албания в политике Югославии и СССР в первые послевоенные годы по советским дипломатическим документам

Албания в политике Югославии и СССР в первые послевоенные годы по советским дипломатическим документам
(Albania in the Policy of Yugoslavia and USSR During the First Post-War Years, According to Soviet Diplomatic Documents)

Author(s):Anatoly Semenovich Anikeev
Language:Russian
Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Geopolitics, Peace and Conflict Studies
Page Range:469-489
No. of Pages:21
Keywords:Yugoslav-Albanian relations; N. Spiru; Yugoslav aid to Albania; Soviet mission in Tirana; Chuvahin; Soviet-Yugoslav conflict; Stalin; Tito;
Summary/Abstract:The liberation from the Fascist occupation of a number of East European countries by the Soviet army was the first step in the process of transformation of political systems and the formation of the Soviet block. The dominant position in the Balkans was taken by the Communist Yugoslavia which strove to expand its influence in the region. In the first phase such a role of Yugoslavia tallied nicely with the interests of USSR which was willing to delegate part of its power to Yugoslavia. Albania, whose independence and territorial integrity were guaranteed by the agreement between USSR, USA and Great Britain, was in informal alliance with Yugoslavia and in the sphere of its military and political interests which, was one of the main reasons for Moscow to hand that country over to Belgrade in summer 1946 for »vicarious« administration. Having entrusted the Yugoslavs with this task, USSR took over the responsibility to supply aid to Albania, retaining at the same time the control over the execution of decision concerning foreign policy of that country. During 1946 and 1947 Yugoslavia concluded with Albania a number of treaties concerning economy and finance. It reorganized Albanian army according to the Yugoslav standards, which, to all intents, should lead to Albania becoming one of the Yugoslav republics. The Soviet leadership considered such policy realization of the agreements which had been reached, but only until the moment when, the Yugoslavs broke them – in the opinion of the Cremlin. Parallel aid from these two countries caused a clash of interests among the Albanian leaders and led to the formation of two groups, one of which started to consider the alliance with Yugoslavia a burden and to turn increasingly toward Moscow. In November 1947, under pressure from the Yugoslavs, the leader of that group, N. Spiru ended his life in suicide. This enraged Stalin who summoned Djilas to talks in Moscow. By the end of the year it became known in Cremlin that Tito intended to send an infantry division to Albania near the Greek border, which was a severe »transgression« that would endanger Soviet interests in the region. Stalin talked about that to Yugoslav leaders in February 1948 who were summoned to Moscow together with the Bulgarians to be »filled in«. The totality of these circumstances was one of the reasons for the conflict with Yugoslavia which would begin soon. In that experiment of the Cremlin Albania was held hostage by ambitions of the two Communist leaders, one of whom, having entrusted that country to Yugoslav patronage wasn't able to foresee all consequences of such a step, so he made an ultimatum to Yugoslavia at the crucial juncture. Disregarding the scale of its involvment in the events in Albania, Yugoslavia fulfilled the demands of the Cremlin, but it was forced to withdraw from Albania during the increasing conflict with USSR. Stalin's estimate that one could continue to run Yugoslavia from the Cremlin by relying on ideological instruments and economic pressure wasn't justified. For its part, Albania proved a faithful ally of Moscow until the end of the Stalin's era, together with other faithful and enraged (for reasons of their own) enemies of »Titoism«. On the whole, the episode of Yugoslav-Albanian relations which developed under Cremlin's careful auspicies during the first postwar years showed, coupled with other factors, the deeply flawed character of the policy on which Stalin tried to build his East-European empire.

Price: 5.00 €

Култура сећања на савезништво у Другом светском рату кроз називе улица, тргова и спомен-обележја

Култура сећања на савезништво у Другом светском рату кроз називе улица, тргова и спомен-обележја
(The Culture of Remembrance of the Alliance of WWII as Reflected in Names of Streets, Squares and Monuments)

Author(s):Mile Bjelajac
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Cultural history, Political history, Rural and urban sociology, Sociology of Culture, Fascism, Nazism and WW II, Politics of History/Memory
Page Range:493-504
No. of Pages:12
Keywords:Belgrade; streets and squares; Marshal Birjuzov; Marshal Tolbukhin; General Zhdanov;
Summary/Abstract:The renewed emergence in public of the question of respecting the tradition of the Anti-Fascist struggle and recognition of the allied (Soviet) contribution to the liberation of Belgrade in 1944 spurred the interest in reconsidering the practice of naming and renaming of streets which testify about that part of our common history. Although marking of monuments and maintenance of wartime graveyards, and even naming of streets after prominent personages are only part of the promotion of history of remembrance – since in our days it can be much more and stronger reflected in the media presence or in the form of schoolbook interpretations and attractive films or TV serials – we addressed this matter in capacity of a historian and an eyewitness. From a comparative survey of how marking of something which should represent lasting values was approached in various periods of history of Yugoslavia and now of Serbia, we glean that in our territory there was more ideology and „political correctness” than desire to measure with equal measure that which should always be esteemed – shedding of blood for the liberty of the country and the people, as well as the extended friendly hand in the hour of the direst necessity. Following the need of the moment, the town authorities in the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia named a street after the King’s general Petar Živković, in the very year the King imposed his dictatorship. It was renamed by his former oponent Milan Nedić in 1943. Overshadowed by Živković remained many fallen heroes or those whom he condamned or with whom he did away at the trial of Thessaloniki. Thus, the city did injustice to its defender colonel Tufegdžić and took away his name from a street in 1940. During the war, under occupation, streets were deprived of the names of former Serbian wartime and political allies. After the war ideological purges of „incorrect” or „uninteresting” local and allied names followed. In only few cases names deleted by the occupying and collaborationist administration were given back. Streetnames after Russian or Soviet wartime allies were no exception, only perhaps a more dramatic illustration of the change of „remembrance” in keeping with the changed political circumstances. After 1948 the names of streets and boulevards given after Russian great men, the Red Army and toponyms made famous during WWII started to disappear. After less than ten years, they started to return, as a sign of goodwill within the framework of improvement of bilateral relations. After the tragic incident in which a Soviet marshal and several generals, liberators of Belgrade were killed at Avala, the city renamed streets which had once born their names, after them again, and even added some new ones. During the transition of 1990, there was rush to repair all former „iniquities”. However, not even the newly proclaimed criteria were observed. Generals and marshals and the Red Army were once again the target of the reform. In accordance with our own insight and engagement we showed the history behind the scene, how the personality of marshal Biryuzov and the street bearing his name was saved from oblivion in 2004.

Price: 4.50 €

20. октобар: Од ослобођења до окупације Београда (радикална трансформација једног политичког симбола)

20. октобар: Од ослобођења до окупације Београда (радикална трансформација једног политичког симбола)
(October 20: From Liberation to Occupation of Belgrade (Radical Transformation of a Political Symbol))

Author(s):Miroslav Jovanović
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Military history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:505-523
No. of Pages:19
Keywords:Second World War; Belgrade operation; Red Army; Soviet-Yugoslav relations; historiography;
Summary/Abstract:When October 20, 1944 is in question, it is necessary to keep in mind the »overlapping« of two histories – the history of the event and the history of the interpretation of the event. The Belgrade operation was an important, but not the decisive operation in the South-Western advance of the Red Army on the vast front stratching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. On the other hand, the events in October 1944 introduced a fundamental change in the processes in Yugoslavia itself. It follows from the comparision of the forces of the German army group »Serbia« and those of the partizans that the liberation of Belgrade couldn't have been possible without the units of the Red Army. Over the past 65 years three historiographical discourses clearly featured in the interpretation of the events from October 1944: „common past”, „our past” and „occupation“. The history of WWII in Yugoslavia is interwowen and intersected by different contexts and levels of understanding and interpretation. The general context of the war is the world clash between the Anti-Hitlerite coalition and the Tripartite Pact. The occupation of Europe by the Third Reich and operating of occupation systems in these countries is on the second level. Mutual relations of allies within the Anti-Hitlerite coalition is on the third level. The context of the civil war in Yugoslavia comes only on the fourth level, having several different dimensions. Each of them represented a different historical context: religious war in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, struggle between the two resistence movements, war between the Quisling forces and the resistence movements... The visit of the Russian preisdent on the 65th anniversary of liberation of Belgrade (proposed by the president of Serbia) re-historicized the whole event and relativized the paradigm of October 20, as the „day of the new occupation“.

Price: 4.50 €

Проблема признания новой Югославии на завершающем этапе войны в освещении российской историографии

Проблема признания новой Югославии на завершающем этапе войны в освещении российской историографии
(The Problem of Recognizing the New Yugoslavia at the End of the Second World War in the Russian Historiography)

Author(s):Aleksandar Kulagin
Language:Russian
Subject(s):Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Philosophy of History, Politics of History/Memory
Page Range:524-533
No. of Pages:10
Keywords:Soviet-Yugoslav relations; recognition of the new Yugoslavia; AVNOJ in international relations; Russian historiography of the history of Yugoslavia;
Summary/Abstract:Recently, reduced interest in the diplomatic struggle for the recognizing of the new Yugoslav state in the Russian historiography. The reason is that in Soviet times the topic of relations AVNOJ and the USSR in this period has been given sufficient attention. And despite some discussion, the topic is fairly investigated. However, the problem of international recognizing of the new Yugoslavia is beyond the scope of relations between the USSR and the partisan commanders. It includes a set of international issues related to the struggle between the great powers for the organization of the postwar European order. In the Soviet historiography begins researching of this topic in a short time after the Second World War end. But the majority of researcher studied the soviet struggle for new Yugoslavia recognizing only. Moreover owing to peculiarity of the soviet archive system were almost all of the soviet sources without attention. Besides were not well-known the British sources. Consequently there are some questions, which are some discussion and now there about. The Soviet-Partisans relations in November–December 1943 connected with the summit in Jajce The Change of the British-American strategy towards Yugoslavia and their Michailovich give up The Tito summits with Churchill and Shubashich in the summer of 1944 The Tito secret visit to Moscow in September 1944 and the contents of his speaking to Stalin The British-Soviet negotiations in autumn of 1944 and the „procent agreement”. Consequently is this topic of present interest. But its researching isn’t possible without renovating of source base, especially without using the sources of the soviet foreign policy on the end of the Second World war. Moreover is also necessary to change the methodology and examine this problem in the context of relations between the great powers.

Price: 4.50 €

Радови о учешћу совјетских трупа у ослобођењу Југославије у часопису Војноисторијски гласник

Радови о учешћу совјетских трупа у ослобођењу Југославије у часопису Војноисторијски гласник
(Papers on the Participation of Soviet Troops in the Liberation of Yugoslavia in the Journal Vojnoistorijski Glasnik)

Author(s):Dalibor Denda
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Military history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
Page Range:534-544
No. of Pages:11
Keywords:Red Army; Yugoslavia; The Second World War; liberation; military; Vojnoistorijski glasnik; journal;
Summary/Abstract:Since the journal of the Institute for Military History, Vojnoistorijski glasnik had been started in 1950, 23 articles touching directly or indirectly on the participation of Soviet troops in the battles for liberation of Serbia in the late phase of WWII were published in it. Papers with such topics usually appeared at the time of anniversaries of the liberation of Belgrade or of the victory over Fascism. First articles with that topic were published in 1955. In most cases their authors were high-ranking military and state officials or scholars and researchers of the Institute for Military History of Yugoslav People’s Army. They were usually written with no footnotes and they represented the official views of the Yugoslav authorities on events from the common past of the Yugoslav and the Soviet peoples, which (views) changed according to ups and downs of Yugoslav-Soviet relations, rather than evaluating judgment of historians who had reached them in keeping with the standards of historical science. Their main feature is stressing of the authenticity of the Yugoslav revolution and the decisive role of the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (PLAY) in the operations for final liberation of the country, however without denying the help of the Soviet forces. In that context, PLAY was depicted as a regular military power capable of fighting on equal footing alongside with the Soviet forces against the common foe. The main evidence of the Yugoslav side are the „famous“ TASS report of September 28, 1944, comparison between the number of the Red Army soldiers fallen in Yugoslavia and in other East-European socialist countries, as well as pointing out to the casualties suffered by the Yugoslav peoples during the war. A gradual scholarly and expert „liberation“ of historians writing about this topic started after 1980 as ideological straight-jacket was loosened, so that historical sources could be more fully appreciated. The scholarly approach culminated in Branko Petranović’s „Policy of Compromise and Serbia 1944“ in the issue 2/1988. The last article with this topic was published in 1995. After that the polemic which side played the decisive role in the liberation of Serbia found no place on the pages of Vojnoistorijski glasnik.

Price: 4.50 €

(Не)видљива места сећања

(Не)видљива места сећања
((In)visible Places of Remembrance)

Author(s):Olga Manojlović-Pintar
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Social history, International relations/trade, Fascism, Nazism and WW II, Politics of History/Memory
Page Range:545-552
No. of Pages:8
Keywords:places of memories; monuments; National Liberation Army; Red Army; World War II;
Summary/Abstract:The paper analyses how personalization of tragedy of the participants of WWII was used to strengthen Yugoslav-Soviet ties in the first days after the liberation of Yugoslavia. The text also analyzes the processes of rapprochement and of establishing closer ties between the two countries during 1960s when new forms of political and cultural cooperation were based on renewed remembrance of the courage of the participants in the war. Special attention was devoted to interpretations of WWII in contemporary historiography which unearthed new data and opened new perspectives. Turning to experiences of individuals was suggested as a possibility of drawing conclusions without ideological revisions of the whole history of 20th century.

Price: 4.50 €

Употреба квислинга у данашњој Србији

Употреба квислинга у данашњој Србији
(The Using Quislings in Modern Serbia)

Author(s):Todor Kuljić
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Fascism, Nazism and WW II, Post-Communist Transformation, Philosophy of History, Politics of History/Memory
Page Range:553-562
No. of Pages:10
Keywords:use of the past; conservatives; rehabilitation of quislings; anti-antifascism;
Summary/Abstract:In the postsocialist regimes the rehabilitation of the quislings is a part of the useful new past. The article deals with the Serbian conservative attempts to rehabilitate serbian quislings in WW 2. The paper presents some forms of actually anti-antifascism. The former prescribed communist antifascism is replaced by anticommunist anti-antifascism. It was supposed the connection between economic privatization and a strong shift to the right awareness of the past. Quislings should be rehabilitated not only for normalizing nationalism but also because of the suppression of the Left, which should deprive her important moralpolitical capital – antifascism.

Price: 4.50 €

Подаци о ауторима

Подаци о ауторима
(About the Authors)

Author(s):Author Not Specified
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Essay|Book Review |Scientific Life
Page Range:563-570
No. of Pages:8

Price: 4.50 €

Именски и географски индекс

Именски и географски индекс
(Nominal and Geographical Index)

Author(s):Author Not Specified
Language:Serbian
Subject(s):Essay|Book Review |Scientific Life
Page Range:571-600
No. of Pages:30

Price: 4.50 €

Ослобођење Београда 1944. Liberation of Belgrade in 1944

Московские годы Иосипа Броза Тито: Предыстория Партизана

Московские годы Иосипа Броза Тито: Предыстория Партизана (The Moscow Years of Josip Broz Tito: The Pre-History of the Partisans)

Емигрантска влада Краљевине Југославије о југословенско-совјетским односима (погледи Милана Гавриловића)

Србија под Немачком окупацијом у Другом светском рату

Србија под Немачком окупацијом у Другом светском рату (Serbia Under German Occupation in WWII. Characteristics of the Occupation Administration)

Однос немачког окупатора према домаћим сарадницима у Србији 1941–1944.

Однос немачког окупатора према домаћим сарадницима у Србији 1941–1944. (The Attitude of German Occupiers toward Local Collaborators in Serbia 1941–1944)

Москва и антифашистское движение И. Броз Тито (январь – начало октября 1944 г.)

Москва и антифашистское движение И. Броз Тито (январь – начало октября 1944 г.) (Moscow and the Anti-Fascist Movement J. Broz Tito (January - early October 1944))

Четници и Црвена армија у Србији 1944. године

Четници и Црвена армија у Србији 1944. године (The Chetniks and the Red Army in Serbia in 1944)

Први Титов сусрет са Стаљином

Први Титов сусрет са Стаљином (Tito’s First Meeting With Stalin)

Совјетски ратни заробљеници у Југославији (1943–1944)

Совјетски ратни заробљеници у Југославији (1943–1944) (Soviet POWs in Yugoslavia (1943–1944))

Београд 20. октобра 1944. године

Београд 20. октобра 1944. године (Belgrade 1944, October 20)

Црвена aрмија на Дунаву, ослобођење Београда и тежње Срба из Румуније ка присаједињењу Југославији 1944–1945.

Војвођански Немци у октобру 1944.

Војвођански Немци у октобру 1944. (The Vojvodina Germans in October 1944)

Участие СССР в депортации Немцев с территории Югославии после Второй Мировой Войны (1944–1946 г.)

Участие СССР в депортации Немцев с территории Югославии после Второй Мировой Войны (1944–1946 г.) (USSR Participation in the Deportation of Germans from the Territory of Yugoslavia after the Second World War (1944–1946))

Искуство сучељавања: Црвеноармејци и становништво Србије

Искуство сучељавања: Црвеноармејци и становништво Србије (The Experience of Confrontation: Red Army Soldiers and the Population of Serbia)

Совјетска помоћ међународном признању Народноослободилачког покрета на крају Другог светског рата

Совјетска помоћ међународном признању Народноослободилачког покрета на крају Другог светског рата (Soviet Aid toward International Recognition of the People’s Liberation Movement at the End of WWII)

Отношение Вашингтона к участию Красной армии в освобождении Югославии

Отношение Вашингтона к участию Красной армии в освобождении Югославии (Washington's View of the Red Army's Participation in the Liberation of Yugoslavia)

Совјетски савез и формирање југословенских снага безбедности (1944–1945)

Совјетски савез и формирање југословенских снага безбедности (1944–1945) (USSR and the Creation of the Security Apparatus in Yugoslavia 1944–1945)

Југославија, велике силе и питање статуса Јулијске крајине 1943–1945.

Југославија, велике силе и питање статуса Јулијске крајине 1943–1945. (Yugoslavia, Great Powers and the Question of Venezia Giulia 1943–1945)

Совјетски савез и Југославија на крају Другог светског рата 1944–1945.

Совјетски савез и Југославија на крају Другог светског рата 1944–1945. (The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the End of WWII 1944–1945)

Српско грађанство између Истока и Запада (1944–1945)

Српско грађанство између Истока и Запада (1944–1945) (Serbian Bourgeoisie Between East and West (1944–1945))

Совјетски поглед на Балкан и југословенску доминацију у Албанији (1943–1947)

Совјетски поглед на Балкан и југословенску доминацију у Албанији (1943–1947) (The Soviet View of the Balkans and the Yugoslav Domination in Albania (1943–1947))

Совјетски савез и југословенско-аустријски територијални спор после Другог светског рата

Совјетски савез и југословенско-аустријски територијални спор после Другог светског рата (The Soviet Union and the Yugoslav-Austrian Territorial Dispute After WWII)

Научна сарадња Југославије и Совјетског савеза 1944–1947.

Научна сарадња Југославије и Совјетског савеза 1944–1947. (Scientific Cooperation between Yugoslavia and USSR 1944–1947)

„Конструктивно васпитање“ најмлађих припадника југословенске заједнице. Совјетски модел на трагу „познавања наше сопствене проблематике“

Југославија, СССР и источноевропске земље 1944–1948.

Југославија, СССР и источноевропске земље 1944–1948. (Yugoslavia, USSR and East European Countries 1944-1948)

У трагању за „новим човеком“: Врхунац културне сарадње Југославије и Совјетског савеза 1944–1948.

Совјетска обавештајна служба у Југославији 1944–1948. године

Совјетска обавештајна служба у Југославији 1944–1948. године (The Soviet Intelligence Service in Yugoslavia 1944–1948)

Британски погледи на односе између југославије и СССР-а 1945–1947.

Британски погледи на односе између југославије и СССР-а 1945–1947. (British Views on the Relations Between Yugoslavia and USSR 1945–1947)

Албания в политике Югославии и СССР в первые послевоенные годы по советским дипломатическим документам

Култура сећања на савезништво у Другом светском рату кроз називе улица, тргова и спомен-обележја

Култура сећања на савезништво у Другом светском рату кроз називе улица, тргова и спомен-обележја (The Culture of Remembrance of the Alliance of WWII as Reflected in Names of Streets, Squares and Monuments)

20. октобар: Од ослобођења до окупације Београда (радикална трансформација једног политичког симбола)

20. октобар: Од ослобођења до окупације Београда (радикална трансформација једног политичког симбола) (October 20: From Liberation to Occupation of Belgrade (Radical Transformation of a Political Symbol))

Проблема признания новой Югославии на завершающем этапе войны в освещении российской историографии

Проблема признания новой Югославии на завершающем этапе войны в освещении российской историографии (The Problem of Recognizing the New Yugoslavia at the End of the Second World War in the Russian Historiography)

Радови о учешћу совјетских трупа у ослобођењу Југославије у часопису Војноисторијски гласник

Радови о учешћу совјетских трупа у ослобођењу Југославије у часопису Војноисторијски гласник (Papers on the Participation of Soviet Troops in the Liberation of Yugoslavia in the Journal Vojnoistorijski Glasnik)

(Не)видљива места сећања

(Не)видљива места сећања ((In)visible Places of Remembrance)

Употреба квислинга у данашњој Србији

Употреба квислинга у данашњој Србији (The Using Quislings in Modern Serbia)

Подаци о ауторима

Подаци о ауторима (About the Authors)

Именски и географски индекс

Именски и географски индекс (Nominal and Geographical Index)

Ослобођење Београда 1944.
Liberation of Belgrade in 1944

Московские годы Иосипа Броза Тито: Предыстория Партизана
(The Moscow Years of Josip Broz Tito: The Pre-History of the Partisans)

Србија под Немачком окупацијом у Другом светском рату
(Serbia Under German Occupation in WWII. Characteristics of the Occupation Administration)

Однос немачког окупатора према домаћим сарадницима у Србији 1941–1944.
(The Attitude of German Occupiers toward Local Collaborators in Serbia 1941–1944)

Москва и антифашистское движение И. Броз Тито (январь – начало октября 1944 г.)
(Moscow and the Anti-Fascist Movement J. Broz Tito (January - early October 1944))

Четници и Црвена армија у Србији 1944. године
(The Chetniks and the Red Army in Serbia in 1944)

Први Титов сусрет са Стаљином
(Tito’s First Meeting With Stalin)

Совјетски ратни заробљеници у Југославији (1943–1944)
(Soviet POWs in Yugoslavia (1943–1944))

Београд 20. октобра 1944. године
(Belgrade 1944, October 20)

Војвођански Немци у октобру 1944.
(The Vojvodina Germans in October 1944)

Участие СССР в депортации Немцев с территории Югославии после Второй Мировой Войны (1944–1946 г.)
(USSR Participation in the Deportation of Germans from the Territory of Yugoslavia after the Second World War (1944–1946))

Искуство сучељавања: Црвеноармејци и становништво Србије
(The Experience of Confrontation: Red Army Soldiers and the Population of Serbia)

Совјетска помоћ међународном признању Народноослободилачког покрета на крају Другог светског рата
(Soviet Aid toward International Recognition of the People’s Liberation Movement at the End of WWII)

Отношение Вашингтона к участию Красной армии в освобождении Югославии
(Washington's View of the Red Army's Participation in the Liberation of Yugoslavia)

Совјетски савез и формирање југословенских снага безбедности (1944–1945)
(USSR and the Creation of the Security Apparatus in Yugoslavia 1944–1945)

Југославија, велике силе и питање статуса Јулијске крајине 1943–1945.
(Yugoslavia, Great Powers and the Question of Venezia Giulia 1943–1945)

Совјетски савез и Југославија на крају Другог светског рата 1944–1945.
(The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the End of WWII 1944–1945)

Српско грађанство између Истока и Запада (1944–1945)
(Serbian Bourgeoisie Between East and West (1944–1945))

Совјетски поглед на Балкан и југословенску доминацију у Албанији (1943–1947)
(The Soviet View of the Balkans and the Yugoslav Domination in Albania (1943–1947))

Совјетски савез и југословенско-аустријски територијални спор после Другог светског рата
(The Soviet Union and the Yugoslav-Austrian Territorial Dispute After WWII)

Научна сарадња Југославије и Совјетског савеза 1944–1947.
(Scientific Cooperation between Yugoslavia and USSR 1944–1947)

Југославија, СССР и источноевропске земље 1944–1948.
(Yugoslavia, USSR and East European Countries 1944-1948)

Совјетска обавештајна служба у Југославији 1944–1948. године
(The Soviet Intelligence Service in Yugoslavia 1944–1948)

Британски погледи на односе између југославије и СССР-а 1945–1947.
(British Views on the Relations Between Yugoslavia and USSR 1945–1947)

Култура сећања на савезништво у Другом светском рату кроз називе улица, тргова и спомен-обележја
(The Culture of Remembrance of the Alliance of WWII as Reflected in Names of Streets, Squares and Monuments)

20. октобар: Од ослобођења до окупације Београда (радикална трансформација једног политичког симбола)
(October 20: From Liberation to Occupation of Belgrade (Radical Transformation of a Political Symbol))

Проблема признания новой Югославии на завершающем этапе войны в освещении российской историографии
(The Problem of Recognizing the New Yugoslavia at the End of the Second World War in the Russian Historiography)

Радови о учешћу совјетских трупа у ослобођењу Југославије у часопису Војноисторијски гласник
(Papers on the Participation of Soviet Troops in the Liberation of Yugoslavia in the Journal Vojnoistorijski Glasnik)

(Не)видљива места сећања
((In)visible Places of Remembrance)

Употреба квислинга у данашњој Србији
(The Using Quislings in Modern Serbia)

Подаци о ауторима
(About the Authors)

Именски и географски индекс
(Nominal and Geographical Index)