Andrei Marmor: Social Conventions
Review of: Andrei Marmor: Social Conventions Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009, xii + 186 pp.
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Review of: Andrei Marmor: Social Conventions Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009, xii + 186 pp.
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Causal overdetermination – i.e. instances in which x, y, and z all occur and intuitively the occurrence of x alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z and the occurrence of y alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z – has long been considered a problem for counterfactual analyses of causation. Intuitively, we want to say both x and y caused z, but standard Lewisian counterfactual analysis yields the result that neither x nor y caused z. David Lewis, himself, suggested that overdetermination ought to be left as “spoils to the victor”. I show how, if we modify Lewis’ account of events slightly, we can bring counterfactual analysis in line with our intuitions about overdetermination.
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The article deals with some questions that are closely connected with clarifying the meaning of causal claims and understanding of their distinctive features. It presents a perspectival view of causation that regards both the asymmetry of causation and its temporal orientation as products of our own perspective we all share. The author argues against one of the basic thesis of causal perspectivalism according to which the notion of causation arises from our experience of success as agents, and she asserts that the distinction between causes and effects can also be relevant to practical or epistemic behaviour of creatures who are mere observers.
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Chcel by som odpovedať na niektore kriticke pripomienky a otazky Silvie Galikovej z članku „Kam zmizli futbalisti?“, v ktorom reagovala na moju stať „Idealizmus a materializmus vo filozofii mysle“.
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The article considers the nature of descriptive statements and the ontological status of descriptive constructs in linguistics, taking the example of a phoneme of English. It is argued that descriptive statements should be seen as expressions of the content of descriptive models or as hypotheses. Furthermore, it is argued that descriptive models and constructs in linguistics have a purely explanatory function in relation to speech events and without ontological commitment to corresponding entities in the real world.
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V tomto textu reaguji na některe teze članku Martina Schmidta (Schmidt 2010; na mista jeho textu niže referuji jen čisly stranek). Ten byl nedavno otištěn v tomto časopise, přičemž Pavel Cmorej na něj reagoval textem postihujicim leccos z toho, co bych chtěl řici ja (takže na text Cmorej 2010 čtenaře odkazuji nejprve).
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Rad pokračuji v naši diskuzi se Stanislavem Sousedikem o problematice existence, v niž ja hajim Fregeho stanovisko. Sousedik chce ukazat, že existence individui neni trivialni vlastnosti. Na obranu sveho stanoviska tvrdi, že existuje několik typů existence individui, existence realna a existence bajna, kterou existuji individua instanciujici pojem jednorožce v bajich. Na to odpovidam takto: existence individui je pouze jednoho typu, je to naprosto trivialni vlastnost individui, ktere realně jsou. Pokud něco existuje bajně, znamena to jen tolik, že to vlastně – v pravem smyslu – neexistuje vůbec.
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The terms denotation and reference are commonly used as synonyms. A more fine-grained analysis of natural language as offered by TIL1 shows that we can distinguish these terms in the case of empirical expressions. The latter are shown to denote non-trivial intensions while their reference (if any) is the value of these intensions in the actual world.
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In his last book about Locke’s philosophy, E. J. Lowe claims that Frege’s arguments against the Lockean conception of number are not compelling, while at the same time he painstakingly defines the Lockean conception Lowe himself espouses. The aim of this paper is to show that the textual evidence considered by Lowe may be interpreted in another direction. This alternative reading of Frege’s arguments throws light on Frege’s and Lowe’s different agendas. Moreover, in this paper, the problem of singular sentences of number is presented, and Frege’s and Lowe’s views are confronted with it.
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The general slogan in the title of this paper (which is taken from Strawson 1952, 57) gives a general, but nevertheless accurate, expression of Strawson’s view concerning the nature of formal logic per se in relation to natural language. What is at stake here is the extent to which the formal methods and the formal semantics of contemporary symbolic logic can render the meanings of natural language expressions. Strawson sets up an agenda for logical theory which, although rather dated for a logic text, is what one naturally expects from an introduction to elementary formal logic and a systematic analysis of certain crucial metalogical concepts, most notably entailment. However, my own reading is that Strawson’s approach to logic makes a lasting contribution to understanding the inner workings of natural language through his critical discussion of the limits of the formal renderings of the semantics of natural language expressions via canonical first-order notations. One can recognize in this critical attitude towards the limits of formal methods a consistent generalization of Strawson’s own strategy from his critical response to Russell’s theory of descriptions. In my paper I shall focus on certain examples which illustrate the general slogan that characterizes Strawson’s views on the nature of logic in connection with ordinary language and talk.
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The author defends a combination of Strawson’s account of definite descriptions as devices of singular reference par excellence with the Russellian truth-evaluation of utterances of sentences with descriptions. The complex Russellian proposition is, according to the author’s view, introduced by such utterances into communication as a by-product of the instrumental side of an attempt to make a singular statement. This, precisely like the instrumental aspects of similar attempts exploiting names or demonstratives has to be reflected by analysis but should not be confused with the communicative function of utterances. The success of all these attempts depends on the fulfilment of empirical conditions of various types, given by semantics of descriptions, names or demonstratives (unless the relevance of these conditions is neutralized by another identificatory factor dominating in given context). But their communicative function does not consist in claiming that these conditions are fulfilled. The author agrees with Strawson that the first two conjuncts of the complex Russellian proposition are introduced into communication as presuppositions: but argues in favour of defining presupposition (in pragmatic sense) in normative, rather the intentional terms.
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I argue that indefinite descriptions are referring terms. This is not the ambiguity thesis: that sometimes they are referring terms and sometimes something else, such as quantifiers (as argued by Chastain and recently Devitt). No. On my view they are always referring terms; and never quantifiers. I defend this thesis by modifying the standard conception of what a referring term is: a modification that needs to be made anyway, irrespective of the treatment of indefinites. I derive this approach from my speech-act theoretic semantics (2004). The basic thought is that referring terms have as their meanings speech-acts of a certain kind called proto-referring acts. These are acts in which speakers advertise or present intentions to denote, where denotation is a word-world relation, and advertising an intention is acting as if one has intentions, where it is open whether one has them or not, or whether the referring term used denotes or not. I show how this works for proper names. The meaning of a proper name is the speech-act proto-referring act type defined by a certain referential tree. This gives us the basis for an account of proper name meaning irrespective of denotation: a uniform treatment of full and empty names. Applied to indefinites, we can capture cases where speakers perform proto-acts—in which they advertise an intention to denote something—where they intend to denote, but others where they do not, but they still perform the proto-act: advertising an intention to denote. Two cases are ‘Fred saw a hippo’ and ‘Jane did not see a hippo’. In both cases U performs the same proto-act, represent it as R(a hippo)pro, but possesses the advertised intention in the first case, but not in the second. In the first case, R(a hippo)pro gains referential content—its descriptive content is expanded to include seen by Fred, whereas in its second token use it has no content augmentation or sentential determination of reference. In the second case ‘a hippo’ is an empty referring term, just as ‘Pegasus’ is empty in ‘Fred did not see Pegasus; he does not exist’. But in both sentences ‘a hippo’ functions in the same basic way: in both cases the basic proto-referring act R(a hippo)pro is performed. Using this approach, I show how definite descriptions can be construed as indefinites with added meaning.
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The aim of the paper is to argue that the ontological setting of objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is a version of structural realism. According to our plan, one of the opening statements of the Tractatus – The world is the totality of facts, not of things – introduces structuralist perspective: structures are superior to their constituents. However, structuralists use the notion ‘superior’ in various senses, but this paper argues that the Tractatus places its objects within the framework of ontic structural realism in its moderate form. That form puts structures and individuals on the same ontological footing. Such thesis contradicts traditional object-ontology that dominates Tractarian literature.
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The aim of the paper is to analyse and explicate the meanings the word „identification“ has in common language, philosophy of language and in P. Tichý’s theory of constructions. The author distinguishes acts of identification performed by a man from identification carried out by some expressions. He tries to argue that in case of expressions identifying is the same as referring and in case of Tichý’s constructions identifying means constructing (as it is defined in Tichý‘s theory of constructions).
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This rejoinder to Raclavský (2008) should be read in conjunction with the criticisms in Taliga (2008) and Miller (2008) of Raclavský’s (2007) defence of Tichý’s theory of verisimilitude. 1 The theory of partial ordering can be axiomatized with strict inequality < as a primitive term and asymmetry and transitivity as special axioms. It can be axiomatized also with weak inequality as a primitive term and reflexivity, antisymmetry, and transitivity as special axioms. It is common knowledge that these two axiomatizations are interchangeable, and that nothing of the least importance hangs on which of the relational predicates < and is taken as primitive.
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V predchádzajúcom pokračovaní sme sa zaoberali predovšetkým referenčným chápaním zložených demonstratív, pričom sme si všimli aj niektoré argumenty, ktoré poukazujú na neadekvátnosť takéhoto prístupu. Problémom je totiž to, ako posúdiť vplyv deskriptívnej zložky zloženého demonstratíva na celkový sémantický obsah, resp. pravdivostné podmienky výrokov, v ktorých sa takéto výrazy vyskytujú. V tomto záverečnom pokračovaní rozoberieme tri prominentné teórie, podľa ktorých sú zložené demonstratíva plnohodnotné kvantifikátorové výrazy. Najprv však zhrnieme a doplníme hlavné dôvody, prečo by sme zložené demonstratíva mali chápať práve takto.
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Review of: Scott Soames: Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol.1 The Dawn of Analysis Princeton University Press, New York 2005, 411 s.
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There were published just two replies to my recent paper (Raclavský 2007; CDV for short), namely that of Miller (Miller 2008; NMH) and Taliga (Taliga 2008; WVS). The two critical papers contain many points I consider faulty or being simply a gross misunderstanding of CDV. This admissibly long (thus rather short) version of my reaction concentrates only on the most important matters.
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V predchádzajúcich dvoch pokračovaniach Michal Mráz opísal klasickú Kaplanovu teóriu indexických výrazov a niektoré jej modifikácie, resp. rozpracovania či doplnenia. Spomínané koncepcie sa zaoberali predovšetkým syntakticky jednoduchými indexikálmi, t. j. indexikálmi, ktoré spravidla pozostávajú z jedného výrazu.2 Indexikály tohto druhu sa štandardne považujú za referujúce výrazy; presnejšie povedané, jednotlivé použitia takýchto indexikálov za považujú za referujúce výrazy vzhľadom na príslušný kontext ich použitia. V tomto pokračovaní prejdeme k zloženým indexikálom a postupne si ukážeme (najmä v nasledujúcom pokračovaní), prečo je vhodnejšie chápať ich skôr ako kvantifikátorové výrazy než ako referenčné termíny.
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Review of: Ludmila Dostálová – Tomáš Marvan (eds.): Quine: Nejen Gavagai Západočeská universita v Plzni, 2008, 126 s.
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