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This modern translation of all the surviving literary compositions ascribed to Liudprand, the bishop of Cremona from 962 to 972, offers unrivaled insight into society and culture in western Europe during the "iron century". Since Liudprand enjoyed the favor of the Saxon Roman emperor Otto the Great, and traveled to Constantinople more than once on official business, his narratives also reveal European attitudes toward the Byzantine Empire and the culture of its refined capital city. No other tenth-century writer had such privileged access to the high spheres of power, or such acerbic wit and willingness to articulate critiques of the doings of powerful people. Liudprand's historical texts (the Antapodosis on European events in the first half of the 900s, and his Historia Ottonison the rise to power of Otto the Great) provide a unique view of the recent past against a genuinely European backdrop, unusual in a time of localized cultural horizons. Liudprand's famous satirical description of his misadventures as Ottonian legate at the Byzantine court in 968 is a vital source of information on Byzantine ritual and diplomatic process, as well as a classic of medieval intercultural encounter. Readers interested in medieval European culture, the history of diplomacy, Italian and German medieval history, and the history of Byzantium will find this collection of translated texts rewarding. A full introduction and extensive notes help readers to place Liudprand's writings in context.
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O tome kako je Srbija reagovala na izazov na početku Trećeg milenijuma napisano je već mnogo knjiga. Pred čitaocem je knjiga koja se u tom mnoštvu izdvaja po tome ko, kada i šta u njoj govori. Na talasima Radija Deutsche Welle, 149 intelektualaca, pretežno srpske nacionalnosti, ali i stranaca koji se Srbijom profesionalno bave, u 169 intervjua govore o stanju u Srbiji uglavnom posle 5. oktobra 2000. godine. Po definiciji kritičko, individualno mišljenje ekonomista, istoričara, lekara, diplomata, umetnika zaokružilo je zabrinjavajuću sliku celine. Govoreći nezavisno jedan od drugoga, sagovornici Radija Deutsche Welle otkrivaju realnost Srbije koja se bitno razlikuje od službene realnosti. Označavan kao mirna revolucija, kao novi početak za Srbiju, kao njena istorijska šansa da, uz nepodeljenu podršku Evropske unije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, prestane da gubi vreme, 5. oktobar 2000. godine, kada je uklonjen konsenzualni autokrata Slobodan Milošević, bio je višeznačan događaj. Probuđene su velike nade; stvorena nerealna, ali objašnjiva očekivanja; postignuto prividno jedinstvo intencija glavnih aktera. Ali, sam po sebi, 5. oktobar 2000. godine nije predstavljao bilans onoga što se u prethodnih 15 godina događalo, a još manje jasnu projekciju Srbije u budućnosti. Pokušaj koji je u tom pravcu učinio premijer Zoran Đinđić brutalno je zaustavljen njegovim ubistvom. Legalizam je bio novo ime za velikodržavni projekat devedesetih godina koji je Srbiju doveo do katastrofe, a srpsko nacionalno i državno pitanje u ćorsokak. Demontaža režima Slobodana Miloševića mogla je nastupiti samo kao posledica diskontinuiteta sa tom politikom. Diskontinuitet nije, međutim, moguć tako što će se reći ’’sada je prekretnica, ovim danom prestaje ono i počinje ovo, već tako što će se, prethodno, objasniti šta se to desilo u prethodnim godinama, i sa čim se to ne uspostavlja kontinuitet već se gradi novo društvo’’ (O. Milosavljević). Sagovornici Radija Deutsche Welle nepodeljeni su u uverenju da je glavno merilo kontinuiteta/diskontinuiteta odnos prema zločinima koji su počinjeni u Hrvatskoj, Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu. Taj odnos su i sve demokratske zemlje u svetu postavile kao uslov da Srbija povrati izgubljeni državni kredibilitet. Posle isporučivanja Slobodana Miloševića Međunarodnom krivičnom sudu u Hagu, odnosno posle ubistva premijera Zorana Đinđića, došlo je do identifikovanja Srbije sa zločinom. To je produbilo sukob sa svetom i, samim tim, blokiralo unutrašnje promene: ’’Poricanje zločina jeste najveći problem i zbog toga što konzervira srbijansko društvo, a srbijansko društvo, zahvaljujući tom poricanju zločina, ostaje da živi u atmosferi u kojoj je sasvim normalno i, čak, poželjno ubiti nekoga zato što pripada drugoj etničkoj grupi.’’ Tako se ’’ne prekida sam ciklus nasilja’’ (M. Toma). Upravo u ovom postratnom razdoblju došlo je do grube netolerancije prema svim manjinama, do buđenja antisemitizma i klerofašizma. U glavama, rat još uvek traje: ’’Zvijer je tu ... zato što u ovoj savani ima još toliko hrane za nju’’(V. Krmpotić). Čime se ona hrani? Upravo zaokupljenošću istrošenim velikodržavnim projektom, državom kao mitskom a ne ljudskom tvorevinom, ksenofobijom, političkom kulturom koja se održava na proizvodnji neprijatelja. A za to vreme, Srbija nazaduje: sve je dalje od vladavine prava i ekonomskih sloboda. Srbija se okreće u sve užem krugu i sa sve manje mogućnosti izbora. Vladajuće strukture ’’mogu da se obogate samo dok su na vlasti ... kroz korupciju’’, i promene im nisu u interesu. U takvu zemlju teško dolaze investicije, i ona je osuđena na stagnaciju (M. Prokopijević). Produbljuje se jaz između Srbije i sveta (S. Popović). U svim istočnoevropskim zemljama postoje otpori promenama, ali u Srbiji ’’Vlada pokušava da vrati zemlju u samoizolaciju’’. Ne radi se samo o inerciji već o ideološkim opredeljenjima ’’koja su antizapadna i antievropska’’. Analitičari razmišljaju o tome šta može da se uradi da se ta ideologija promeni, ali se ne ustežu da postave pitanje: ’’Da li to uopšte može da se menja?’’ (J. Lyon) Formiran je mentalitet čije su karakteristike ’’veličanje negativnog’’, ’’emocionalno mrtvilo’’, odsustvo ’’dissenta (neslaganja), nema opozicije, pobune’’ (M. Ilić). Zemlju sve više karakteriše zatvaranje. Posledice su dvojake. Na unutrašnjem planu: etnička i politička homogenizacija, svaki politički protivnik je neprijatelj. Na spoljnom planu, Srbija postaje ekonomski i društveno inkompatibilna sa okruženjem koje se menja. (’’Srbija, još uvek, ima najvišu državnu potrošnju u Evropi - 55 procenata.’’ (M. Prokopijević)). Njene institucije se urušavaju: u Vojsci ginu regruti, i to ostaje bez objašnjenja. Crkva ne unosi u narod veru već politiku. I u njenom je dugoročnom interesu da podupre težnje ka pravdi, jer bez pravde nema oproštaja i pomirenja, nema mira. Država gubi kredibilitet jer odbija da ispuni svoje međunarodne obaveze. Šta u toj situaciji može pojedinac? Da dijagnosticira stanje u oblasti za koju je kompetentan. Bez toga nije moguć bilans neposredne prošlosti. U tom smislu, pojedinačni iskazi 149 intelektualaca na Radiju Deutsche Welle predstavljaju izraz nepristajanja na nazadovanje. Sabrani u ovoj knjizi, oni predstavljaju važno svedočanstvo koje obavezuje vladajuće strukture u Srbiji. Ne može se ignorisati stvarnost ako postoji politička volja da se ona menja i da se nazadovanje Srbije zaustavi.
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(ANOTHER SERBIA) Every Saturday for a period of two months, from the beginning of April till the end of June 1992, sessions organized by the Belgrade Circle were held at the Student Cultural Centre in Belgrade. At these sessions, ten in all, intellectuals, members of the Belgrade Circle and their quest – distinguished writers, scientists, artists, journalists, film and theatre directors, architects, actors, interpreters – expressed their own views of another, radically different Serbia. In times of anguish and affliction, the meetings, attended by a large assembly of listeners experiencing a kind of moral purification, were nonetheless imbued with a frail hope that there still might be a chance for a turn in events. With a desire to present ideas, opinions and sensations shared by the participants of the Belgrade Circle sessions to a much larger audience, the reading public, and to preserve them, because of their merit, in a more lasting form, discussions of over eighty intellectuals were compiled to form this book. In the meantime, the overwhelming disaster has reached its climax: »The Bosnian War«, still raging with no feasible way out as yet, exploded and blazed up like fire. The Belgrade Circle participants, distressed and abashed at the display of all those real or imagined evil deeds, so eagerly reported by the portentous heralds of death voiced hitherto often deeply hidden and silent feelings and thoughts about their burdensome disgust at the plague gripping and afflicting us all. Each participant contributed in his or her own way – rigorous scientific analysis, artistic susceptibility, eyewitness accounts, or simply. A public-minded desperate wail – to the shaping of one new, public opinion, the one that stirred in that sad Spring of ’92 and rebelled against the general fear, animosity, devastation, extermination, ethnic cleansing, forcible population exchanges... All those responsible and public-minded citizens, holding different political opinions, some members of various political parties, with incomparable personal experiences, varied professional interest and often of »objectionable« national origin, showed, however the will to insert tolerance among the basic principles of a humanized way of fife. But, in spite of the pronounced differences, their common aim, discernable in each and every speech imported to the audience, was to finally establish a community based on simple but as yet still unattainable ideals such as peace, freedom, tolerance and justice in place of degrading political, national and religious exclusiveness. Participants focussed their attention on various aspects of the problem: some analysed the roots of hatred and evil; some indicated the disastrous consequences of irresponsible national myth revivals; others warned of menaces yet to come unless we see reason in time. Some were stern, others witty and others still perhaps too prone to pathos, but they were all deeply concerned, and, as it unfortunately turned out, correct in predicting subsequent events. Therefore, individuals who take no notice of current, official policy and who have for a long time now tenaciously refused to render their talent and knowledge to the needs of the authorities, gathered round a project titled »Another Serbia«. Instigating a state of war and providing alleged erudite justification for the necessity of mutual extermination in the name of some noble goals, vague even to the very massacre executors, must not and cannot be the vocation of anyone who considers him or herself an »intellectual«, or earns a living acting as one. Hence, all session participants had but one desire: to mark out a path that may lead into a more promising future, to another, different, better and happier Serbia. »Another Serbia« soon became the synonym of resistance to fabricated lies, nationalistic madness, criminal war, a fascist holocaust, senseless destruction of villages and cities. Thanks are also due to the daily newspaper »Borba« which regularly reported on the Belgrade Circle Saturday sessions, and published a number of contributions presented there... We hope that the Another Serbia we all aspire to be easily discernable in the collection of essays presented in this book. The reader who hopes to find traces of at least some political program will be gravely disappointed. At present, when politics have poisoned the very soul of so many men of letters and knowledge, and when, among the most violent oppressors, in the ranks of all mortal enemy groups, one finds so many proud bearers of scientific degrees, who may actually be designated as men of unmerited and easily squandered reputation, it has become somewhat indecent to praise »intellectual pursuits«. The Belgrade Circle was, however, founded early in 1992 with the aim of retrieving dignity – another dangerous quality! – to public speech and conceived plans of action for the benefit of truth. We do not take an elitist position and stand indifferently above the crowd. On the contrary, being deeply involved and concerned, we place ourselves in its midst. The Association of Independent intellectuals insists upon its main goal, as declared in the program, namely, to bring together »critically oriented public figured who wish to unite their own civil and intellectual engagements with those of other, basically similarly oriented people«. That is why the Belgrade Circle will continue to »promote ideas, deeds and activities that affirm the values of a democratic, civil and plural society...« The Belgrade Circle will »encourage free and critical thought in all spheres of public life. It will support and help institutions and individuals who resist violence and animosity, and who plead for dialogue and for the survival of culture as the only humanly valid way of life«. Fine speeches? Maybe. Nevertheless, the Belgrade Circle has already, and despite many organizational and financial hardships, as well as ugly and unjust abuse from people who should have been, by the very nature of their vocation, in our ranks had they not knuckled under the burden of a more noble – national to be sure – mission, gained an undeniably high reputation. The words uttered with the aim of promoting »Another Serbia« and presented in this book to serve at testimony to the existence of a number of sensible people, shrewd and brave enough to resist suffocation by overwhelming absurdity, were not the only »weapon« used by Belgrade Circle members. They had also an active part in numerous civil and peace movements and events, thus contributing to the establishment of critical public opinion in Belgrade and Serbia: let us recall, for instance, the sad candles and our wake in the park, with souls colder than the Belgrade frost, while one of the past infernal wars – God, which one was it? – was raging out there somewhere; let us recall the »Black Band«, »Yellow Band«, »Student Protest ‘92«, and our endeavours to bring the people of Hrtkovci (»Srbislavci«) to reason; let us recall our guests from Pljevlja, Montenegro, Bosnia... All the time we were just launching our unhappy and, we believe, noble, though perhaps futile venture the very first participant said: let the Belgrade Circle begin it’s work! We hope that by offering this book to the public we have already come a long way. (INTELLECTUALS AND WAR) This volume, Intellectuals and War, follows on the heels of last year’s publication of Another Serbia. Like the latter, it is the result of the work of the Belgrade Circle. As the reader will recall, Another Serbia is a collection of over eighty talks given by members of this association of independent intellectuals and their guests, during ten of the sessions of the Belgrade Circle held every Saturday from the beginning of April to the end of June 1992. Intellectuals and War brings together some fifty texts, which were presented as part of the series »Intellectuals and War« organized every other week, for ten sessions from the beginning of October 1992 until the end of February 1993. At a time when every call for peace, national tolerance, and liberal democracy was being confronted with scorn, disdain, and open ridicule; at a time, that is, when even the most cautious doubts about the utility of the war, which might deflate the state mythology were being denounced as acts of treason committed by slanderers of the National Idea, the Belgrade Circle organized the thematic series, »Another Serbia« and introduced itself to the domestic public as one of the truly rare associations (not to mention political parties, the few exceptions not withstanding) whose members refused on principle to contribute to the destruction of other nations and the demise of their own. With this series and, particularly, with the publication of our book by the same name, the expression »Another Serbia« became a motto for all those who sooner or later came to see the dangers of the nationalist policies of the past five or more years. Unfortunately, many of the dark forebodings expressed in that first series proved to be true. With tragedies mounting at an alarming rate, many words that then sounded very strong, sometimes even, strident, have become but mild reproaches today. Words that once, only a year ago, were just short of blasphemy, have long since become commonplace in the mildest critical discourse in which almost everyone engages. Yet, in looking through the pages of Another Serbia today, one issue emerges from a number of the contributed works that still has not permeated public consciousness deeply enough and has only with great difficulty found its way into the conscience of those individuals to whom it directly refers. This is, of course, the matter of the responsibility of intellectuals for spreading national intolerance, inflaming hatred, advocating war, and – eventually – for instigating crimes and barbaric destruction and causing the isolation, poverty, denigration and scorn which has since come our way. With this in mind, the Belgrade Circle, as an association of – to repeat – independent intellectuals, decided to organize its second thematic series of discussions around this sensitive and uncomfortable question, which is often protected by taboo. The Belgrade Circle did not act impetuously in calling for an open examination of the role of public-opinion makers in the Yugoslav tragedy. Nor did it do so only after having seen the tragic results of conspicuous blunders by writers, scholars, and religious figures in irresponsible national mythmaking or – worse – in open incitement to war. Such a decision was part of the original motivation guiding the future founders of the Circle. Long before the disintegration of the country and before borders were redrawn, territory occupied and people expelled from their homes, they witnessed a number of their colleagues working as free agents or, more often, as institutional propagandists, dutifully reviving national myths, recounting the victims of pats years as if infatuated with death, reworking the ideology of land and blood and skilfully explaining the need for the South Slavic peoples to »separate« from one another once and for all. Seeing this, it became clear to the future members of the Belgrade Circle that it would not be long before these words were turned into deeds. The common denominator for the some twenty philosophers, sociologists, scientists, artists, and journalists who joined together in the Belgrade Circle was, in fact, the decisive refusal to participate in such undignified activities, which could only end in the horrors of war. In its founding Act, and later in number of public statements and individual appearances by its members, the Circle pointed to the responsibility of the »national intelligentsia« and »national institutions« for war and condemned their abuse of public speech. Although against political trials as a matter of principle, the Belgrade Circle argued in its first public statement that not only should politicians, military leaders, and those directly involved in executing their policies be held accountable for their deeds, but also intellectuals responsible for inciting war and causing crimes against humanity, the destruction of cultural and historical treasures, massive displacement of populations and the exile of numerous distinguished creative figures, and the involuntary flight of educated young people. The fact that it was precisely those individuals who given the nature of their work, should have been among our ranks, but chose instead to put their talents, knowledge, and reputation in the service of legitimising a new collectivism, who were the first to poke fun at the Circle and attack it with angry, even threatening messages made it convincingly clear that this important initiative was directed to the right address. At the crucial moment when the class-based identity of society began to collapse from within, these intellectuals, rather then putting their strength and authority into the democratic enlightenment of an apathetic citizenry actively helped to enthrone another new unifying principle, a new unio mistica which would, this time, be based on an artificially awakened and stimulated national identity. Thanks largely to these efforts, the opportunity to become a society of free individuals who act as autonomous citizens in the political sphere and not as anonymous members of the one and only Class, on Nation was again – and, again for a long time – gambled away. Put simply and crudely: once again, »ideologues«, »clerics«, and »guard dogs« have sold us a bill of goods. Few or the participants in the series »Intellectuals and War« were prepared to say that all »national intellectuals« were guided by evil intentions, hatred toward other peoples, vicious greed, futile craving for fame and honour, or the desire to gain the favour of the new/old rulers. It was clear to our authors that there were honest and intelligent people among these »national intellectuals« who sincerely believed that after the fall of the »old regime« it was more important to resolve the national question than to work for the establishment of parliamentary democracy. Reality – as is most often the case – provided them with a real basis for dissatisfaction. However, just as the framers of the idea of the social revolution before them, they turned to the implementation of the national revolution, without paying attention to the means those contracted do to the job – nurtured as they were in our rich tradition – would more than likely use. Thus, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the war began in words. Any rational observer of the now distant events could reasonably have expected the abbreviated series of exchanges between abstract ideas and concrete acts to turn easily and rapidly into bullets. After all, doesn’t the saying go: the pen is mightier than the sword!? A majority of the authors contributing to this volume, share the belief that if intellectuals – who have since become peace advocates – are now amazed and horrified by the sea of spilled blood, the ruined cities and villages, the rivers of displaced and uprooted people, and the previously unimaginable faschisation, impoverishment, and criminalisation of society, they must – if nothing else – face up to their own professional and moral responsibility for this. But this is a question of individual conscience which no one may or should pas a judgment. Some of the text, however, express the belief that another kind of responsibility – one that presumes more tangible consequences than merely having to confront oneself – must surely fall on the shoulders of that »portrait gallery« of our intellectual guard who have consciously advocated war and misted the people, captivating them with otherworldly messages, promising them the heavenly city, submerging them into the past, offering them dignity through force, and turning them away from the most natural desire to live a better and happier life with Others rather than in isolation from the outside world, imprisoned by self-love. One moment openly, the next moment covertly, they supported the consolidation of an authoritarian and indifferent regime, which would carry out the dirty work for them and for the greater glory of the Nation. They graciously allowed the forces of evil to strike, always ready to put the intellectuals’ most daring plans into action. Sometimes participating directly in the government, but more frequently, acting in the shadows as advisors to the absolute ruler and his priests and in collusion with our Volksgeist, these intellectuals were not prepared to take a stand at those moments when the people appeared to have come to their senses. They introduced even greater discord into the already confused political scene as they entered into the ranks of political parties that had the appearance of becoming democratic. Through both their silence and action, they allowed the uneducated electoral body to surrender itself to the one and only real leader. With these texts in front of us, it is tempting to outline a series of »generic-types«, that is, to construct a certain number of »ideal types« from among our national intellectuals. It is easy to understand those readers who would be happy with a string of unique caricature-like portraits. We have merely to think about all those crazed painters, poets of hearth and home, ominous prophets, patented demystifyers of planetary conspiracies and experts in deconstructing the »new world order«, ethno geneticists and amateur historians who trace their nation’s roots to ancient, even prehistoric times, former Marxists who find solace for their collapsed ideology in the »sweet joy of belonging« to the Nation, indefatigable drafters of geopolitical maps, and journalists and columnists who have persistently presented our unsophisticated readers and television audiences with an up side down picture of history and the world. But for now, let’s just keep these in mind: as, in this brief introduction we cannot even hope to sketch out such a typology, much less, to take on a detailed study of some prominent cases. What we can do is hope that a future systematic examination of the role of intellectuals in the wars we are going through will enable us to arrive at an answer to the question posed by the authors of this volume. They themselves have not been motivated by the ambition to offer an answer now and this motivation could hardly be sad to be common denominator among the various texts, which differ both in genre and in the opinions they present. As in Another Serbia, the contributors to Intellectuals and War have their own views and are alone responsible for their words.
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Based on the reference literature, the author observes the perception of the Srebrenica genocide in the domestic and foreign public, concluding that the Srebrenica genocide is a “blood stain on the conscience of humanity”. The author paid special attention to the views of those who deny genocide and glorify war crimes and promote the ideology of hatred. In Serbia, RS and in the international community there are political actors at all levels of state and government as well as in the academia, journalism and all other institutions who are turned in sharing revisionistic narratives about genocide in Srebrenica. Despite the campaign of denial of genocide in Srebrenica which appears in different forms with an aim to revise history and to remove the indisputable facts those efforts mostly stayed without success. Evidences, expert reports, primary sources of varying provenance support the verdicts of the International tribunal for former Yugoslavia and International residual mechanism for criminal courts in Den Hague. Based on these evidences which were thoroughly verified ICTY, Mechanism and International Court of Justice in the Hague confirmed undoubtedly that genocide was committed in Srebrenica in July 1995. The 25th anniversary of genocide in Srebrenica is still performed in the shadow of political games and on the diplomatic stage of international community.
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It is not a novus in scientific and public discourse to insist on forgetting the “burdening” past. Just as Friedrich Nietzsche did not find anything valuable in the memory of evil, believing that turning back turns us against life, so also lately, at the time of the strongest wave of genocide denial against Bosniaks, there are tendencies in public discourse that victims should forget evil committed against them. The oblivion is presented as a precondition for the way forward, the way to a common and better future, the way to development of the state and society of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is forgotten that evil is “repetitive” as Hannah Arendt says regardless of the punishment. Once a specific crime occurs, its recurrence is much more likely than the possibility of its occurrence. The continuity of the centuries-long recurrence of crimes against Bosniaks, which is in fact a matter of the identity of the state and society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also of Bosniaks as victims, is an adequate example and proof of this attitude. The continuity of the centuries-long recurrence of crimes against Bosniaks, which in fact represents a matter of the identity of the Bosnian state and society, but also of Bosniaks as victims, is an adequate example and proof of this attitude. Consequently, in this paper we will look at (un)conscious ways and methods of denying genocide against Bosniaks, identify new methods of denial, certain deviance dealing in the aftermath genocide, but also to give recommendations in which direction the study of genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina should go in order to adequately remember it, and finally stop the evil of genocide against Bosniaks that has lasted for several centuries.
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Denial of genocide and mass crimes committed by Serb forces has been in progress since the 1992–95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To gain sympathy from the western forces and have them intervene, after the first massacres in occupied Sarajevo, Serb propaganda machinery accused the government of RBiH of shelling and sniper fire over its citizens. Notorious massacres in the streets Vase Miskina, Markale I, and Markale II, as well as the square known as ‘Gate’ in Tuzla, were subjected to ridicule by the Serb media. News about the concentration camp in Krajina during the summer of 1992 and the news about mass rape were dismissed as propaganda. Genocide in Srebrenica has since been denied and was subjected to conspiracy theories. A quarter of a century after the genocide, despite numerous judicial processes and vast forensic evidence, the denial of genocide and other crimes grows ever stronger. Notable western writers have also denied the genocide and other crimes including Jessica Stern, Noam Chomsky, Diana Johnstone, and Peter Handke. During the last decade, genocide denial has become the official strategy of the Republic of Serbia and Republika Srpska. In this paper, I will focus on key actors and their arguments in genocide denial and mini- mization of genocide and other crimes committed. I will demonstrate the sophistication of genocide denial developed over the years.
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After a quarter of a century, the past 25 years since the genocide of Srebrenica Bosniaks will be analyzed in this text through three aspects of observing Bosnian society, the state and its citizens, and especially like-minded people - who should continuously consider how to permanently heal the open wounds of postgenocidal the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first aspect concerns the evident division in the international community - the so-called of the civilized world to those who condemn genocide and the so-called an insidious world that denies it even after the final judgments of the International Court of Justice in The Hague; the second aspect is the division within Bosniaks into those who, as survivors of genocide, suffer the terror of the usurpation of basic human rights and those non-Bosniaks for whom every remembrance of war suffering is a terror of remembrance. Finally, the third division arises on the ideas and practices of how to proceed in the entity of Republic of Srpska and Srebrenica and Bosnia and those who ruthlessly flee from any such thought. All three circles, all three envelopes are especially important how to place them in the educational system, in home education, in personal understanding and socialization. There is no doubt that all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and intellectuals in particular, are responsible and that some jobs are well done. But the year 2020 just showed how irresponsible and lost it is in this group of people.
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Živimo u vremenu sve većeg kršenja ljudskih sloboda i prava, s težnjom da se ona urede i normiraju brojnim i raznovrsnim zakonima, a evidentno je i sve prisutnije njihovo kršenje na najbrutalniji način kroz počinjene brojne oblike zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava. Iz ovoga je više nego jasno da su izvori i subjekti, kako ugrožavanja tako i ugroženih, sve brojniji i raznovrsniji, što se vezuje za ostvarivanje osnovnih ljudskih, civilizacijskih i kulturnih potreba, kao što su potrebe za identifikacijom, pripadanjem i zaštitom od ugrožavanja. To se manifestira kao univerzalni ljudski i društveni problem, koji je i društveno i naučno značajan. [...]
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Every May 8, European, North American, and many other countries around the world celebrate Victory in Europe Day (known as VE Day). For millions of people living in the West, VE Day has a special meaning, symbolising the historic victory over Nazi Germany and an end to nearly six years of a brutal war. On this day, various celebratory events are held to mark the occasion, including parades, memorial services, and street celebrations.
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The historical decisions made at the assembly of AVNOJ and ZAVNOBIH, regardless of the socio-political context of their interpretation, represent permanent values of anti-fascist voices from Bosnia and Herzegovina at the midst of World War II. These were the steps that preserved the inner being of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the connection of its all centuries old symbols. The dynamics of memories and public perception of significant dates have been altered due to changes in the value of the political framework in the socialist and post-socialist period. In the case of AVNOJ and ZAVNOBIH, different treatment of events can be seen related to state holidays. The Yugoslav culture of memory included all segments of society, in order to shape the formative forces of the desired articulation of remembrance. The historical places are shaped in places of memory, in which deep symbolic connections. Such is an example can be followed Bihać, Mrkonjić-Grad and Jajce, as well as the events which have been organized for the purpouse of among anniversaries in these cities. State holidays and commemorative dates were in the crisis during the time dissolution of Yugoslavia and in clash of overall legacy of communism. In the period of democratic changes, the coarse selection, partial or complete rejection and denial has occurred. AVNOJ’s current socio-political context has become completely useless, while ZAVNOBIH has been perceived in three ways in the 1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ethnic divisions after the Dayton Peace Agreement have resulted in the relativization and denial of anti-fascist legacy and the identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The public monuments and spaces related to this were abused in order to deepen the national divisions and disrupt the idea of equality of citizens and nations, which was achieved 75 years ago. In this case, it is not just about transforming memories, but about undermining universal civilizational values in order to strengthen nationalisms. Such a relationship to the AVNOJ and ZAVNOBIH and their significance for Bosnia and Herzegovina points to a serious crisis of democratic values.
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V moderním světě plyne čas vpřed, linearita nahradila tradiční cykličnost. My, lidé moderního světa, vnímáme uplynulé události jako děje jednou provždy minulé. To, co se již stalo, nelze změnit ani zopakovat. Na události, které pominuly, můžeme už jen vzpomínat a tyto vzpomínky konzervovat, glorifikovat nebo tabuizovat. Vzpomínka ale není nic samo o sobě existujícího, musí nejprve vzniknout v procesu vzpomínání, který potřebuje kromě vypravěče postavu posluchače a alespoň základní shodu na hodnotě vzpomínání pro všechny přítomné. Každá privátní vzpomínka má také potenciál stát se pamětí jako pochopitelnou a významnou kulturní formou. Pro pochopení toho, jakým způsobem a za jakých okolností se z před paměťové podoby vzpomínek paměť vytváří, nebo také nevytvoří, je dobrou ilustrací výrok manželky jednoho ze zde představených pamětníků. Když se náhodou ocitla v situaci vypravěčky, protože její muž se opozdil v pří chodu domů, odvětila: „Můj příběh není zajímavý.“ Jiní lidé naopak automaticky v určitém momentu svého života začnou s vědomím toho, že jejich příběh zajímavý je, sepisovat paměti. Některé „osobnosti“ jsou dokonce přímo osloveny spisovateli a nakladateli, kteří se začnou předhánět, kdo první vydá jejich pravé, autorizované paměti. Neustále tak probíhá konstrukce významných osobností a protěžovaných společenských hodnot skrze paměťovou práci, nebo naopak marginalizace paměti (Sidiropulu Janků 2013).
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Duboke etničke podjele i negativni historijski narativi – dodatno osnaženi institucionalnim okvirima politika – i dalje koče proces pomirenja u Bosni i Hercegovini (BiH). Lične i kolektivne traume obično se transformiraju u prepričavanje historijskih narativa i koriste za intenziviranje osjećaja neprijateljstva prema “drugima” i želje za osvetom, ometajući tako procese zacjeljivanja i društvene obnove. Snažna kultura poricanja i neprihvatanja narativa onih drugih svakodnevna je pojava, a prate je etničke i vjerske podjele, potpirivanje nesigurnosti i sve veće prijetnje budućim sukobima. Prisutna je i na individualnom i na kolektivnom nivou, jačajući tako redovnu politiku usmjerenu protiv onih “drugih.” U obrazovnim planovima i programima se izostavljaju perspektive različitih etničkih i vjerskih grupa, a historija iz devedesetih godina još uvijek nije pronašla put do školskih udžbenika (vidi dio autorice Jeftić u ovom zborniku). Uz sve ovo su prisutni siromaštvo i slab ekonomski razvoj što doprinosi stvaranju okruženja koje njeguje kulturu nasilja, umjesto nenasilja i prosperiteta. Takva atmosfera prožima društveni život, ali istovremeno otkriva višestruke oblasti za intervenciju, njene brojne izvršitelje i različite vrste u dinamičnom procesu društvene promjene (npr. Kreisberg 1991; Senehi 2002). Uprkos brojnim strukturnim i infrastrukturnim projektima kojima su ponovo izgrađene državne institucije i domovi te poboljšani uslovi za povratnike/ce, proces društvene obnove u BiH je propao što ukazuje na potrebu za različitim intervencijama u cilju pružanja novih mogućnosti za pozitivnu transformaciju. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), u partnerstvu sa organizacijom Caritas Bosne i Hercegovine, je prepoznao potrebu za interveniranjem i osmislio projekat Choosing Peace Together (Izaberimo mir zajedno – CPT) koji je finansirala Američka agencija za međunarodni razvoj (USAID) od 2009. do 2013. godine.
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In the period 1992‒1995, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was subjected to a classic armed aggression by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Croatia. This was the aggression of colossal extent, which was followed by the commission of a numerous mass and individual crimes, primarily against Bosniacs. To scientifically study the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is extremely complex and demanding scientific and methodological task. The mere aggression is an empiric fact, which requires a scientific approach to the aggression, both in terms of theoretical and the empiric position. The aggression against the Republic. Of Bosnia and Herzegovina was systematically prepared, and to the smallest detail, as well as planned and organized, which included the political and military leadership of the neighboring country, as well as their supporters in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (political and military leadership of the self proclaimed Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Also, the role of the academic, cultural, and other circles cannot be disregarded, as they had the task to prepare ideological foundation and basis for the execution of the aggression. Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) can be particularly singled out in this regard with their Memorandum from 1986. All these listed actors became the basis for the advocacy and execution of the great-Serbian ideology and policy which in practical terms meant creation of ethnically cleansed Serbian territories, that is the creation of the so-called great Serbia. This fascistic and genocidal ideology could not have been implemented without the commission crimes, including the crime of genocide. Due to the complexity of circumstances, context, and the extent of the mere aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the general approach to this problem requires primarily a scientific approach based on knowledge and findings of the contemporary methodology of the social studies, through the implementation of the contemporary methods and techniques of the scientific study.
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The destruction of the Thracian Bulgarians in 1913 was genocide and ethnic cleansing of the Bulgarian population in the southern part of the region of Thrace during and soon after the Inter-Allied War. It was carried out by the regular army of the Ottoman army and the bashibozuka. The affected areas in which genocide is being committed against the Thracian Bulgarians include Eastern (Odrina) Thrace and Western (White Sea) Thrace.
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Fabricating a „Pomak ethnicity“ is crucial for keeping the state borders set by the Lausanne Peace Treaty and certain Balkan states have been making efforts to assimilate the Bulgarian Muslims within their territories by grouping them into a „Pomak ethnic group“, thus preventing any possibilities for them identifying as Bulgarians.
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Croatian history and the changes of Croatia’s political position in the tides of European history, in particular in the 19th and 20th centuries, were in the focus of Franjo Tuđman’s historical research, wherein he paid special attention to political ideas and programs in the period that had shaped the identity of the modern Croatian nation and the program of its political independence, the period in which different variants of pan-Slavism and the ideas about Southern Slavic/ Illyric/ Yugoslav unity had played an important role in the formation of political programs and their implementation both in Croatia’s political forces and the political forces in Croatia’s immediate environment. He noted the continuity of Croatia’s struggles for a higher level of independence in multinational states, first in the Habsburg Monarchy, and later in Yugoslavia, and felt that the different variants of pan-Slavism and idea about Southern Slavic unity in Croatian politics had emerged from the political position of the Croatian territories in individual periods or from political situations (political dividedness and exposure to denationalization attempts in the Habsburg Monarchy, danger of the Croatian territory being divided at the time of World War I, and so on). On the other hand, Tuđman observed how these ideas were used for imperial purposes, for instance, how pan-Slavism was used in the service of Russian imperial politics, and how the idea about the unity of Southern Slavs was used to implement the program of Great-Serbian hegemony. He tracked the continuity of the existence and the political implementation of different forms of pan-Slavism and South-Slavic ideas to the time when he wrote his research papers, mostly the 1960s, a period in which Croatia was a part of the Social Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia, and the world was in the middle of the Cold War between two social, political, and military blocks. Tuđman felt that both the Universalist idea about world integration on the foundations of modern technological accomplishments, advocated by «Western democracies», and the Soviet insistence on socialist internationalism and limited sovereignty of the socialist countries were manifestations of imperial goals at the expense of small and dependent nations. He contrasted these two ideas with the activities of the Nonaligned Movement and the idea about coexistence in a world divided into blocks, the activities of the United Nations, the process of colonial territories establishing their national independence, and the headway of the idea about a united Europe, which he felt to be Europe’s way of distancing itself from both the United States and the USSR.
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Franjo Tuđman, the first president of the Croatian independent state, was the central figure of Croatian politics in the 1990s. His personal views on politics and his intellectual preoccupations, characterized by strong influences of historicism (as defined by K. Popper), had the decisive influence on all important aspects of Croatian politics and social life in the period of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the constitution of the Croatian state. In this historical context, the process of Croatia’s positioning in the international community was closely tied with the problem of articulating the legitimacy and legality of Croatian demands for national independence. The problem of self-determination of peoples surfaced in the argumentation of Croatia’s position and the position of other successors of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As it had been the case at the time of Yugoslavia’s establishment, the self-determination of peoples became the subject of political, legal, historical, and other debates in which different understandings and interpretations of this principle surfaced. This article considers and analyzes individual aspects of Tuđman’s views and of his political articulation of the idea about the self-determination of peoples in this context. The article is a part of a broader study that discusses the self-determination of peoples in the context of the establishment and disintegration of the Yugoslav state.
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Based on his speeches and other statements, the article analyzes Croatian president’s Franjo Tuđman’s views about the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito. We many conclude that Tuđman’s opinions about Tito had been for the most part positive, occasionally encroaching on noncritical apologia of the communist Yugoslavia’s former leader. We may also conclude that Tuđman’s partialness to Tito was, among other reasons, motivated by the fact that Tuđman had been a part of Tito’s Partisan movement in his young days, and that he had later been a member of the Yugoslavian communist nomenclature. To give a better illustration of Tuđman’s interpretation of Tito, the article also describes Tuđman’s insistence on the politics of national reconciliation of the Croatian people, with which he planned to overcome the ideological differences between Croats stemming from the events of World War II.
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The author discusses Franjo Tuđman’s contribution to the analysis and understanding of historical and political processes and events that took place in the Croatian national territory in the 19th and 20th centuries. He describes the particularity of the Croatian national question and the Croatian national integration process, the understanding of the antifascist and national liberation movement, and the fundamental human and national values and the right of the Croatian nation to self-determination and independence, nationwide and in the Istrian region alike. As a historian, Franjo Tuđman had not studied Istrian history directly, but he addressed it within his studies of the recent Croatian, Southern Slavic, and European history. The article also discusses Franjo Tuđman’s conduct towards Istria and its residents in the capacity of the President of the Republic of Croatia and the President of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) based on an analysis of the reports published in the local daily Glas Istre and four speeches Tuđman had delivered in Istria at the beginning of the 1990s, as well as looks into the political views of the Istrian Democratic Assembly’s (IDS) elite on Franjo Tuđman and the politics of the Croatian Democratic Union, at whose helm he had been.
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