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№141: Aid Coordination in Moldova: Politics Killing Policy

№141: Aid Coordination in Moldova: Politics Killing Policy

Author(s): Victoria Bucătaru,Anita Sobják / Language(s): English

Leading up to the formation of Moldova’s third government since elections a year ago, Chisinau faces not only political and macro-financial instability, but also suffers from a severe trust deficit in relations with external partners, some of which have suspended aid flows this year. If Moldova was once the most advanced Eastern Partnership state in terms of aid coordination, government ownership of the process has significantly weakened as a result of the protracted political crisis. Although donors continue to cooperate among themselves via well-established channels, participation by state institutions is currently limited. Once the political setting is stabilised, the government will need to go to great lengths to regain the trust of its external partners and re-establish donor coordination. This is fundamental if Moldova is to make the best use of assistance in order to recover its finances quickly.

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Poroshenko stands alone. Ukraine politics in a pre-election year
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Poroshenko stands alone. Ukraine politics in a pre-election year

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwański / Language(s): English

The year 2019 will be an election year in Ukraine, with a presidential election in the spring and a parliamentary election in the autumn. The short timeframe and the order in which these two elections will be held increase the chances of the winner of the presidential election forming the largest faction in parliament. The first phase of election campaigning has already begun, with Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko as the main contenders, but opinion polls are inconclusive. The atmosphere surrounding the campaign is one of mistrust on the part of voters in the authorities and the political class. Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution created expectations politicians could not fulfil.

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On the way to creating the ‘Donbas people’. Identity policy in the self-proclaimed Republics in East Ukraine
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On the way to creating the ‘Donbas people’. Identity policy in the self-proclaimed Republics in East Ukraine

Author(s): Yulia Abibok / Language(s): English

Four years since the unrecognized ‘republics’ in the east of Ukraine were declared, their future remains unclear. On the one hand, Ukraine, its western partners and the leadership of the Russian Federation continue to insist that these territories be returned to Kyiv’s control on the terms of the Minsk Agreements. On the other side, the self-proclaimed leaders of these ‘republics’, while also declaring their commitment to the Minsk Agreements, have publicly rejected any possibility of reunification with the rest of Ukraine1. As a result, the east of Ukraine remains in a condition of smouldering war.Four years since the unrecognized ‘republics’ in the east of Ukraine were declared, their future remains unclear. On the one hand, Ukraine, its western partners and the leadership of the Russian Federation continue to insist that these territories be returned to Kyiv’s control on the terms of the Minsk Agreements. On the other side, the self-proclaimed leaders of these ‘republics’, while also declaring their commitment to the Minsk Agreements, have publicly rejected any possibility of reunification with the rest of Ukraine1. As a result, the east of Ukraine remains in a condition of smouldering war.In this situation of uncertainty, the Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics’ are continuing to make efforts to legitimize and strengthen their ‘statehood’, most notably by means of a new historical policy. Both para-states are trying to revise the assessments of historical events which have been established during the years of Ukraine’s independence. Serious efforts are being made in the area of the ‘patriotic education’ of children, both in school and during extra-curricular activities; there are new ‘state’ holidays, cults, and a large-scale campaign honouring and perpetuating the memories of the new ‘rebel’ heroes and of civilians who have died at the hands of the Kyiv ’murderers’ is being conducted.Moreover the events of the war of 1941–5 are being reinterpreted, compared to the current military actions ‘against the fascists’. The new ‘state’ cult is being built on just such a parallel, which not only imparts significance to the current events, but also helps to contrast the ‘republics’ to today’s Ukraine. The intended effect of the DPR and LPR’s historical policies is the creation of a new Donbas community which is hostile towards ‘nationalist’ Ukraine.

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(Un)realistic neutrality. Attempts to redefine Belarus’ foreign policy
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(Un)realistic neutrality. Attempts to redefine Belarus’ foreign policy

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): English

The continuing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, together with the increased tension in relations between Russia and the West, have led the Belarusian authorities to attempt to redefine their country’s foreign policy by stressing neutrality towards the two sides in the conflict. As a result, over the last year or so Belarus has clearly adopted a non-committal stance. Minsk is trying to play the part of a neutral mediator in the hope that this will safeguard it in the event of escalation of tensions between Russia and the West, which is seen as the greatest threat to the country’s security at the present time. Thus Minsk is returning to the notion, discussed in the early 1990s, of Belarus striving for neutrality. Officially, the goal of neutrality is still stated in the Belarusian Constitution. However there are serious limitations to the effectiveness of this new strategy, due to Minsk’s close military alliance with Moscow, and therefore Belarus will not be entirely credible on the international stage as a country that wishes to remain neutral.

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A Basin under Special Supervision. The Russian–Ukrainian tensions in the Sea of Azov

A Basin under Special Supervision. The Russian–Ukrainian tensions in the Sea of Azov

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): English

The construction and opening in May 2018 of the Crimean Bridge, which connects the territory of the Russian Federation with the Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula, has contributed to a worsening of Russian–Ukrainian relations in the Sea of Azov. Since April 2018, Russians have halted merchant ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch, which is greatly limiting the operation of Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. Russia’s actions are affecting Ukraine’s economy in that they make the export of goods that account for a major portion of Ukraine’s state budget revenue increasingly difficult. According to estimates by the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure, total financial losses due to shipping limitations stand at US$ 20–40 million annually.Russia’s activity in the Sea of Azov and in the Strait of Kerch seems to confirm Moscow’s ambitions to make this basin a fully Russian-controlled internal area. Increased concentration of the Russian armed forces near the Crimean Bridge proves that this piece of infrastructure is of strategic importance for the Russian Federation. Access to the Sea of Azov and control of the ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch enables Russia to exert economic blackmail on Ukraine. The measures Russia has launched are of a permanent nature and are also intended to exacerbate Ukraine’s difficult economic situation. In this way, the Russian leadership is trying to influence the public mood in the southern part of the Donbas (which is controlled by Kyiv) to persuade the local residents that any further confrontation with Russia would be senseless.

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Serbia-Kosovo negotiations – playing for time under pressure from the West
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Serbia-Kosovo negotiations – playing for time under pressure from the West

Author(s): Marta Szpala / Language(s): English

The negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement to normalise relations between the two states are to enter a new phase in September. Although the negotiations, which have been going on since 2011 under the oversight of the European Union, may have prompted the incorporation of the Serbian minority and the territories it inhabits into Kosovo’s institutional system, they have been at a standstill for three years. The authorities in Prishtina are unwilling to agree to further concessions to the Serbs until Belgrade recognises Kosovo’s independence, at least on a de facto basis. Any compromise will come at a high political cost for the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo, due to hostility on the part of the public and the opposition in both states. Meanwhile, the EU and the US are putting pressure on Belgrade and Prishtina to reach an agreement by no later than mid-2019. The Serbian and Kosovar elites cannot ignore this pressure as they largely owe their political positions to support from the West, and for this reason the authorities in both states wish to play for time and prolong the talks. They are doing this by periodically escalating tensions and putting forward solutions that are unacceptable to the other party or the international community. One example of this was the proposals made in July by the presidents of Serbia and Kosovo, Aleksandar Vučic and Hashim Thaçi, to exchange territory and change borders, which caused a great deal of controversy inside and outside the countries. Moreover, divisions between countries in the West, which do not have a united strategy regarding the negotiations, may hamper moves to reach a compromise. The United States is pushing for a quick resolution of the dispute, even if this means reviewing the borders. . However, Germany is opposed to that solution as it fears that this would strengthen separatist movements throughout the entire Balkans. Both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians will try to exploit these divisions, while the success of the process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations will in fact depend upon effective pressure from the West.

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China’s offer to the EU: tough negotiations or a coalition against Trump?

China’s offer to the EU: tough negotiations or a coalition against Trump?

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Konrad Popławski / Language(s): English

Donald Trump’s aggressive policy towards Beijing and the spectre of a trade war have served as a catalyst for the resumption of dialogue between China and the EU. Within a period of less than two weeks, the Chinese prime minister held three meetings with EU leaders: within the 16+1 framework, a German-Chinese intergovernmental consultation, and a China-EU summit. Beijing’s diplomatic offensive was intended to show openness to the EU’s demands to liberalise access to the Chinese market, and to neutralise allegations that China has been exploiting divisions between EU member states. Beijing hopes that improving the climate of the talks, together with making some small concessions to Brussels, and especially to Berlin, will allow it to bring the EU onto its side in its conflict with the United States at relatively little cost. This puts the EU in a dilemma. On the one hand, supporting the pressure Washington is currently putting on Beijing could lead to a real opening-up of the Chinese market, and also reduce the growing imbalance in international trade whose roots lie in China. However, this risks a collapse of economic growth in China, which would mean losses for many European companies. On the other hand, if the EU cooperated with Beijing on this matter, it could strengthen the multilateral trading system based on the WTO, and also help to defend the Iran agreement and the Paris agreement on climate change. However, if Brussels openly joins the Chinese coalition against Washington, that could cause serious divisions within the EU and in trans-Atlantic relations, and also limit Beijing’s determination to undertake domestic reforms.

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Crisis in Turkmenistan. A test for China’s policy in the region

Crisis in Turkmenistan. A test for China’s policy in the region

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Mariusz Marszewski / Language(s): English

The currency crisis, caused by the collapse in gas prices, has turned into the most serious social and political crisis in the history of Turkmenistan. The government in Ashgabat has passed the burden of the economic problems onto the population, suspending the convertibility of the manat and dismantling the extensive social security system. The drastic reduction in the standard of living of Turkmenistan’s population has undermined the stability of the regime. The depletion of Turkmenistan’s foreign exchange reserves could bring an end to the monumental state investment programme which – together with the social security system – is the main source of the regime’s legitimacy. The current dynamics of the crisis are fully dependent on China, the sole recipient of Turkmenistan’s gas (receiving more than 90% of total gas exports) and Ashgabat’s main creditor. The terms of the Chinese-Turkmen contracts (apparently linking gas prices with oil prices) is leading to a drain of Turkmen resources and reducing the inflow of foreign currency. China may be faced with the need to stabilise the economy of Turkmenistan. In the absence of any rescue actions, there is a considerable risk of the collapse of the Turkmen state. However, any greater involvement by China could mean a violation of the Chinese-Russian modus vivendi in the region. Moscow could take advantage of the crisis to rebuild its influence in Ashgabat, and include Turkmenistan within its own political integration projects within the region, resuming gas cooperation and offering military assistance to stabilise the regime.

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The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia – circuses instead of bread?

The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia – circuses instead of bread?

Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska,Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English

The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia has become the most expensive World Cup in history, with its cost standing at more than US$ 13 billion. Russia gained new sports, transport and tourist infrastructure, and nearly 3 million foreign tourists came to the country to attend the matches. However, the investments and revenues connected with the tournament will have a minor impact on Russia’s GDP growth rate; at best they may contribute to an acceleration in the development of those regions (particularly the less affluent ones) that hosted the World Cup events. Predictably, the main beneficiary from the tournament’s organisation was President Putin’s business environment : companies controlled by Putin’s cronies won the main tenders for the construction of sports and transportation facilities.

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Samotność Poroszenki. Ukraińska polityka w roku przedwyborczym

Samotność Poroszenki. Ukraińska polityka w roku przedwyborczym

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwański / Language(s): Polish

W 2019 roku na Ukrainie wiosną odbędą się wybory prezydenckie, a jesienią – parlamentarne. Bliskość w czasie i sekwencja obu elekcji zwiększy szanse zwycięzcy wyborów prezydenckich na stworzenie największej frakcji w parlamencie. Wstępna faza kampanii wyborczej już się rozpoczęła. Głównymi pretendentami są Petro Poroszenko i Julia Tymoszenko, wyniki sondaży przedwyborczych nie są jednak jednoznaczne. Kampania toczy się w atmosferze nieufności wyborców do władz i klasy politycznej, gdyż rewolucja godności rozbudziła oczekiwania, których politycy nie byli w stanie spełnić.

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„Niepodległe państwo potrzebuje niepodległego Kościoła”. Walka o samodzielność kanoniczną ukraińskiego prawosławia

„Niepodległe państwo potrzebuje niepodległego Kościoła”. Walka o samodzielność kanoniczną ukraińskiego prawosławia

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): Polish

19 kwietnia Rada Najwyższa Ukrainy na wniosek prezydenta Petra Poroszenki, a 22 kwietnia sam prezydent poparli prośbę Ukraińskiego Kościoła Prawosławnego Patriarchatu Kijowskiego (UPC-KP) i Ukraińskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego (UAPC) do patriarchy ekumenicznego (tj. patriarchy Konstantynopola, najwyższego zwierzchnika Kościołów prawosławnych) o przyznanie ukraińskiemu prawosławiu autokefalii. Wiele wskazuje na to, że decyzja o spełnieniu tej prośby już zapadła, a ogłoszenie odpowiedniego tomosu (dekretu patriarchy) nastąpi jeszcze w tym roku. Proklamowanie Ukraińskiego Autokefalicznego Partykularnego Kościoła Prawosławnego (Ukrajinśka Pomisna Awtokefalna Prawosławna Cerkwa, UPAPC) oznaczać będzie początek nowej fali konfliktów konfesyjnych na całej Ukrainie, w tym prawdopodobnie rozłam w Ukraińskim Kościele Prawosławnym uznającym zwierzchność patriarchy Moskwy (UPC). Nie ma bowiem wątpliwości, że pewna, trudna dziś do określenia część wiernych i kapłanów pozostanie lojalna wobec Moskwy, Patriarchat Moskiewski będzie wszelkimi sposobami wspierał ukraińskie struktury Rosyjskiego Kościoła Prawosławnego (RPC), władze Ukrainy będą zaś przeciwdziałać ich rozwojowi.

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Odwilż w Uzbekistanie. Reformy prezydenta Mirzijojewa
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Odwilż w Uzbekistanie. Reformy prezydenta Mirzijojewa

Author(s): Mariusz Marszewski / Language(s): Polish

It has been almost two years since the death of the long-serving leader of Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, and since Shavkat Mirziyoyev took up power (September 2016). The change has had spectacular results, including signs of liberalisation of the previous, extremely authoritarian system of rule, and economic reform, for instance with regard to stimulating growth of small-scale business, and in fact activation of Uzbekistan on the international stage and normalisation of relations with neighbours. Meanwhile, certainly the most important process under way in Uzbekistan is that of consolidation of power by the new president, and a key element of this is dismantling the might enjoyed to date by the National Security Service. The curbing of the position of the National Security Service, which has been successful so far, entails internal restructuring of the state apparatus. The limited liberalisation and opening up to the world are mainly a result of this process.Mirziyoyev has created a new dynamic both internally and in the region. The effects will only become clear in the long term. The outcome of this new situation is uncertain; consolidation of the new president’s power and the ensuing reforms are accompanied by constantly recurring crises which were frozen during Karimov’s rule. There are also external threats – a possibility of return to custodianship of Russia, a country which is fortifying its position, China’s increasing economic dominance, and growing strength of radicals among the Uzbek minority in northern Afghanistan. The emerging processes are therefore proceeding fast, and thus it is hard to determine whether the new Uzbekistan under President Mirziyoyev will prove to be a stable country in which the liberal reforms will continue.

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Negocjacje Serbii z Kosowem – gra na czas pod presją Zachodu
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Negocjacje Serbii z Kosowem – gra na czas pod presją Zachodu

Author(s): Marta Szpala / Language(s): Polish

The negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement to normalise relations between the two states are to enter a new phase in September. Although the negotiations, which have been going on since 2011 under the oversight of the European Union, may have prompted the incorporation of the Serbian minority and the territories it inhabits into Kosovo’s institutional system, they have been at a standstill for three years. The authorities in Prishtina are unwilling to agree to further concessions to the Serbs until Belgrade recognises Kosovo’s independence, at least on a de facto basis. Any compromise will come at a high political cost for the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo, due to hostility on the part of the public and the opposition in both states. Meanwhile, the EU and the US are putting pressure on Belgrade and Prishtina to reach an agreement by no later than mid-2019. The Serbian and Kosovar elites cannot ignore this pressure as they largely owe their political positions to support from the West, and for this reason the authorities in both states wish to play for time and prolong the talks. They are doing this by periodically escalating tensions and putting forward solutions that are unacceptable to the other party or the international community. One example of this was the proposals made in July by the presidents of Serbia and Kosovo, Aleksandar Vučic and Hashim Thaçi, to exchange territory and change borders, which caused a great deal of controversy inside and outside the countries. Moreover, divisions between countries in the West, which do not have a united strategy regarding the negotiations, may hamper moves to reach a compromise. The United States is pushing for a quick resolution of the dispute, even if this means reviewing the borders. However, Germany is opposed to that solution as it fears that this would strengthen separatist movements throughout the entire Balkans. Both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians will try to exploit these divisions, while the success of the process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations will in fact depend upon effective pressure from the West.

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Akwen pod specjalnym nadzorem. Rosyjsko-ukraińskie napięcia na Morzu Azowskim
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Akwen pod specjalnym nadzorem. Rosyjsko-ukraińskie napięcia na Morzu Azowskim

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): Polish

Budowa i oddanie do użytku w maju br. mostu krymskiego, łączącego terytorium Federacji Rosyjskiej z zaanektowanym Półwyspem Krymskim, stały się przyczyną zaostrzenia rosyjsko- -ukraińskich relacji na Morzu Azowskim. Od kwietnia Rosjanie zatrzymują przepływające przez Cieśninę Kerczeńską jednostki handlowe, co wpływa na znaczące ograniczenie pracy ukraińskich portów nad Morzem Azowskim. Działania rosyjskie uderzają w gospodarkę Ukrainy, utrudniając eksport towarów stanowiących istotny udział w dochodach do budżetu. Ukraińskie Ministerstwo Infrastruktury szacuje całościowe straty finansowe z tytułu ograniczenia żeglugi na poziomie 20–40 mln dolarów rocznie. Rosyjska aktywność na Morzu Azowskim i w Cieśninie Kerczeńskiej potwierdza dążenie Moskwy do uczynienia z akwenu w pełni kontrolowanego, wewnętrznego obszaru. Zwiększona koncentracja rosyjskich sił zbrojnych w pobliżu mostu krymskiego dowodzi strategicznego znaczenia tej infrastruktury dla Federacji Rosyjskiej. Dostęp do Morza Azowskiego i kontrola przepływających przez Cieśninę Kerczeńską jednostek daje możliwość szantażu ekonomicznego wobec strony ukraińskiej. Przedsięwzięte przez Rosję środki mają trwały charakter, a ich celem jest również pogłębianie trudnej sytuacji gospodarczej Ukrainy. Władze rosyjskie starają się w ten sposób wpłynąć na nastroje społeczne w południowej części Donbasu (kontrolowanej przez Kijów), wzbudzając wśród tamtejszych mieszkańców przekonanie o bezsensowności dalszej konfrontacji z Federacją Rosyjską.

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The northern tandem. The Swedish-Finnish defence cooperation
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The northern tandem. The Swedish-Finnish defence cooperation

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): English

In response to the change in the security environment after 2014, militarily non-aligned Sweden and Finland are developing their defence cooperation with NATO and the USA and strengthening their bilateral defence relationship. Although a bilateral alliance is unlikely, the two states are suggesting that, were a situation of a conflict in the Nordic-Baltic region to occur, the hypothetical aggressor will need to take into account their cooperation and joint actions with NATO. The Northern Wind 2019 exercises carried out in March 2019, whose scenario includes the defence of northern Sweden, are a display of the interoperability of the Swedish and Finnish armed forces. However, the military synergy between Sweden and Finland is limited by the differences in their respective models of armed forces, years-long insufficient defence expenditure, and military personnel cuts.

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Północny tandem. Współpraca obronna Szwecji i Finlandii
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Północny tandem. Współpraca obronna Szwecji i Finlandii

Author(s): Piotr Szymański / Language(s): Polish

W odpowiedzi na zmianę środowiska bezpieczeństwa po 2014 roku bezaliansowe Szwecja i Finlandia rozwijają stosunki wojskowe z NATO i USA oraz zacieśniają dwustronną współpracę obronną. Choć bilateralny sojusz jest mało prawdopodobny, oba państwa sygnalizują, że w razie konfliktu w regionie nordycko-bałtyckim agresor musi się liczyć z ich współdziałaniem i współpracą z Sojuszem Północnoatlantyckim. Demonstracją interoperacyjności szwedzkich i fińskich sił zbrojnych są odbywające się w marcu br. ćwiczenia Northern Wind 2019, których scenariusz zakłada obronę północnej Szwecji. Efekt militarnej synergii Szwecji i Finlandii jest jednak ograniczony przez różnice w modelach sił zbrojnych, ich wieloletnie niedofinansowanie i redukcje personelu.

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US-German clash over international order and security. The consequences for NATO’s Eastern flank
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US-German clash over international order and security. The consequences for NATO’s Eastern flank

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

This year’s Munich Security Conference has laid bare the differences in the US and German visions of international order and security in speeches given by Chancellor Angela Merkel and US Vice President Mike Pence. Germany fundamentally disagrees with the Trump administration both on the paradigm of inter-state strategic competition with China and Russia (and Iran) and on the redefinition of the political, economic and military terms of the alliance with Europe. Berlin, aware of the growing challenges to European and global order and security, rejects the American ‘peace through strength’ policy, but at the same time has failed to present any real alternative. Merkel’s defence of the multilateral approach and of the liberal international order (understood as shaping the policy with partners and allies, above all the USA, but also in dialogue with China and Russia) is not a viable alternative any more. Nor is developing comprehensive European strategic autonomy in the French spirit, independent of the United States. Berlin is still aware that the alliance with the USA form the foundations of German and European security and prosperity even if Washington is becoming an increasingly difficult partner and ally. Given the long-term domestic limitations that shape German foreign and security policy, it is difficult to expect any major change in Germany’s in-between course in the coming years. The continued disagreements between the two biggest allies over key security issues will present an increasing challenge to NATO’s Eastern flank countries.

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Niemiecko-amerykańskie spory o bezpieczeństwo. Konsekwencje dla wschodniej flanki
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Niemiecko-amerykańskie spory o bezpieczeństwo. Konsekwencje dla wschodniej flanki

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): Polish

Tegoroczna Monachijska Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa, na której kluczowe przemówienia wygłosili kanclerz Niemiec Angela Merkel i wiceprezydent USA Mike Pence, obnażyła różnice w amerykańskiej i niemieckiej wizji europejskiego i globalnego ładu i bezpieczeństwa. Niemcy fundamentalnie nie zgadzają się zarówno z paradygmatem strategicznej rywalizacji z Chinami i Rosją (oraz z Iranem), jak i z redefiniowaniem przez administrację Donalda Trumpa politycznych, gospodarczych i wojskowych warunków sojuszu z Europą. Berlin, dostrzegając rosnące wyzwania dla europejskiego bezpieczeństwa, odrzuca amerykańską politykę „pokój przez siłę”, ale jednocześnie nie proponuje realnej alternatywy dla zagwarantowania europejskiego bezpieczeństwa. Nie jest nią „powrót do przeszłości”, czyli wezwanie do obrony bazującego na multilateralizmie „liberalnego porządku międzynarodowego”, rozumianego jako kształtowanie polityki wraz z partnerami i sojusznikami na czele z USA, ale także w dialogu z Chinami i Rosją. Nie jest nią również rozwijanie niezależnej od Stanów Zjednoczonych całościowej autonomii strategicznej UE w duchu francuskim. Waszyngton staje się dla Europy coraz trudniejszym partnerem i sojusznikiem, ale Berlin nadal zdaje sobie sprawę, że podstawą niemieckiego i europejskiego bezpieczeństwa stanowi NATO i współpraca z USA. W związku z długofalowymi niemieckimi ograniczeniami wewnątrzpolitycznymi trudno liczyć na zasadniczą zmianę polityki Niemiec w najbliższych latach. Oznacza to kontynuację tarć pomiędzy największymi sojusznikami w najważniejszych kwestiach bezpieczeństwa – reakcji Zachodu na wyzwania ze strony Chin i Rosji.

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Defying America. Russia’s policy towards Iran
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Defying America. Russia’s policy towards Iran

Author(s): Witold Rodkiewicz / Language(s): English

Russia’s relations with Iran are almost entirely based on geopolitical considerations. The Russian elite perceives Iran as an essential, albeit difficult partner, with whom it shares a number of interests; a partner who understands the language of power politics, and has demonstrated a willingness to seek pragmatic compromises where the interests of Moscow and Tehran diverge. The foundation of the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership is both countries’ common interest in reducing American power and influence, both in the Middle East and globally. The partnership with Iran is also important for Russia because it helps to stabilise the geopolitical situation in the south of the post-Soviet area (the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia) and minimise the influence of Western countries in the region. Since the Russian Federation began its military intervention in Syria (September 2015), Iran has become its de facto ally in its war against the armed anti-Assad opposition. Since the United States withdrew from the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) in 2018, Russia has become a major advocate of maintaining it, and has undertaken active diplomatic efforts to persuade its Western European signatories to resume economic relations with Iran – in defiance of the American sanctions. In response to the escalation in the conflict between Iran and the United States and its Arab allies in summer 2019, Russia has provided diplomatic and propaganda support for Iran. It has also undertaken initiatives aimed at easing tensions in the region and creating a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf, based on the logic of a concert of powers and limiting the importance of bilateral relations in the security sphere between the US and the region’s Arab monarchies.

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European strategic autonomy or European pillar in NATO? Germany’s stance on French initiatives
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European strategic autonomy or European pillar in NATO? Germany’s stance on French initiatives

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

In February this year, at the École de Guerre in Paris and at the Munich Security Conference, France’s President Emmanuel Macron again reiterated the need to strengthen European autonomy in foreign and security policy and presented yet another proposal in this area. This time he offered to launch a strategic dialogue on the role of the French nuclear deterrence in Europe’s collective security. Although the proposal is addressed to all of France’s European partners, the most important response will come from Germany. Official reactions in Berlin have so far been consistent with the German approach to French defence initiatives – Germany declared it is ready for such a dialogue but remains cautious about ist goals. Berlin does see the need to boost Europe’s role in foreign and security policy and recognises Paris as its most important partner in this field. However, Germany’s approach differs considerably from that of France. Berlin prefers to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy and the European pillar in NATO, rather than build European strategic autonomy under French leadership. At the same time it does not necessarily have the required political will and military means to back up its own rhetoric. || With regard to nuclear deterrence Germany’s stance on the French proposal might not be the most important challenge Berlin is currently facing. The upcoming decision on the replacement of the aged German Tornado combat aircraft, able to carry nuclear weapons under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, might be much more significant for the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe.

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