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Analysis of Japanese political analytic articles: Making face salient to explain actions in political interactions

Author(s): Yasuhisa Watanabe / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

In Japanese newspapers and web journal articles analysing political and international relations, the Japanese counterparts of the term “face”, for example kao, mentsu, taimen (Yabuuchi, 2004) as well as tachiba, considered as the key to describe interpersonal relationships (Haugh, 2005), are frequently used. The emic notion of Japanese face and its construals (Spencer-Oatey, 2007) are used to explain actions or the lack of actions by a politician and a government as a result of saving or claiming face. The face that each participant, be it a person or an organisation, claims is an image of itself, formed through ongoing relationships among participants and observers in the political arena. Facework among the participants unfolds in forms of decisionmaking, political power game and war. Goffman’s (1967) formulation of face and facework is still applicable in describing the face of a politician and a government in these articles.The aim of this chapter is to analyse the Japanese emic face on its own through the analysis of Japanese political analytic articles, which make direct references to emic notion of face as cultural insiders (Haugh, 2013). I will firstly demonstrate how Japanese emic face is applied to describe intra-national and international political relations in Japanese political analytic articles. I will then reaffirm the ongoing nature of face, both between participants and in public, and the role that non-participants play in maintaining one’s face.

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Медиите между гражданското общество и държавата

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Bulgarian

The present sociological analysis is based on empirical data from a survey of public opinion conducted by Vitosha Research in May 1998. It aims to determine the extent of the mass media impact on Bulgarian society. The focus is on the way in which relations between the Fourth Power and the State are being built and regulated.

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Доклад върху резултатите от социологическо проучване сред журналисти на тема: "Корпоративно управление и медии"

Author(s): Plamen Chipev / Language(s): Bulgarian

The survey was conducted among a wide range of journalists (77), electronic, print and internet editions, including a wide range of media from the capital and about 20% of provincial publications. More than 70% of respondents are from specialized economic publications with a very high level of education, predominantly humanitarian, but not a small part - more than 1/3 are economically educated, with an even larger proportion (43%) attending economic courses and specializations.

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NETWORK OF TERROR: HOW DAESH USES ADAPTIVE SOCIAL NETWORKS TO SPREAD ITS MESSAGE

Author(s): Joseph Shaheen / Language(s): English

We conducted research aimed at understanding the process by which DAESH disseminates propaganda online. Our focus was not the content that is distributed but the method by which it is distributed. We did so using a number of qualitative, statistical, and numerical analysis techniques in hopes of gaining a deeper insight into their operations and making recommendations for NATO and NATO member states on how to combat them effectively. We discovered a number of important findings the most salient of which is on how individual level decisions made by many of their members have contributed to the survival of their propaganda capabilities, and in some instances an advanced ability to thwart efforts to eliminate their message and their outreach to both locals as well as westerners. We can summarize our findings as follows: • Popular social media platforms such as, and especially, Twitter forms the core of DAESH’s propaganda and information dissemination efforts. They use these mediums as the core of a web of content that is spread in many parts of the ungoverned internet. • DAESH (perhaps unknowingly) uses and an adaptive network structure on Twitter to combat outside influences and to react to external operations seeking to curb their operations. This network adapts at high speed and with limited central organization. • DAESH makes innovative use of platform vulnerabilities that allows them to evade detection, suspension and deletion by state and non-state actors through both automated and manual methods of detection. • DAESH has amassed a strong following supported by an internal dedicated human infrastructure allowing them to affect a substantial impact on the information environment. • Through the use of a core-periphery network structure and a high number of networkcentral actors DAESH created a redundancy factor that can withstand repeated efforts to disrupt their information supply chain. • Through the use of account inflation, signaling, and closure methods, DAESH has been able to successfully create friend/ follow networks that feed into their ability to build sustainable adaptive networks, evade detection, and maintain their level of online activity. • DAESH has built a network structure that utilizes the flexibility of small communal networks and allows for the large scale interactions commonly associated with large diverse-use networks. This adds to the challenge of combating them in the traditional information warfare environment. • We create an explanatory process to simplify the reader’s understanding of the group’s usage of social media. We call it the DEER process. The DEER process begins with dissemination and ends with replenishment. We recommend this model as a way to build more effective strategies in combating the group. Our findings lead us to a more detailed understanding of the DAESH propaganda machine which has gained them notoriety throughout the world and especially on traditional media platforms; and though our conclusions are technical in nature, they have far reaching policy implications. To begin, these conclusions illustrate the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of a distributed response to DAESH propaganda. DAESH uses limited centralization from a network perspective in order to evade detection while maintaining some control over method and content of their messages—a hybrid model—where flexibility and potency are both achievable. This means that substantial resources must be dedicated in order to combat their ideology effectively. These resources (human and otherwise) are, at the moment, non-aligned, ineffective, and unsustainable over the long term. This is not because the resources and methods used are by nature ineffective, but because the adversary is using strategies and tactics which have never been encountered on this scale ever before. For example, in this report we show that the targeting of highly visible active accounts on Twitter for deletion or suspension, though can eliminate short terms gains by the group, also provides them with the time and knowledge to build more adaptive, responsive networks. While, if account targeting is based on a community/clustering method, we can increase the transaction costs of our adversary’s recovery substantially—gaining invaluable time pinned on lower levels of propaganda diffusion— and simultaneously building more strategic operational tactics. We propose and recommend that in addition to the adjustments of technical methods used in the targeting of DAESH network infrastructure, that more emphasis should be placed on disrupting the supply chain of propaganda, rather on providing contrasting messages. This implies that permanent investments not only in new technology, but in human resources should be made, and coordinated labor division among NATO members as well as allies in the region should be instituted. Our discoveries rely on a number of assumptions to produce our recommendations—the most important of which—is that this information battle is based on concepts of adaptive networks and complex systems. This is a direct result of DAESH’s approach of relating loose policies to its members and allowing them to make individual level behavioral decisions on how best to conduct an information war. In turn, this means that traditional methods as have been adopted by various agencies, state, and non-state actors alike simply will and do not suffice, as has been evident from the group’s continual ability to conduct a propaganda war while facing insurmountable opposition, both physical and electronic. We also recommend that more effort must be made to remove the value proposition which DAESH uses to attract recruits to begin with. Though, our research did not engage the socioeconomic and geo-political environment under which potential recruits are subjected, we hypothesize that innovative efforts in this space can produce substantial declines in DAESH’s ability to disseminate propaganda and ultimately to recruit westerners to their cause. Finally, we make recommendations for future and ongoing research, some of which is much needed to understand and produce effective strategies to combat the group.

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ROBOTROLLING 2018/1

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Generational change in malicious activity on social media seems to be at hand. Primitive bots indiscriminately promoting links to news sites are on the decline. They are being replaced by coordinated accounts that target conversations centred upon individual media outlets or members of different elites. In recent months on Twitter, the volume of automated content about NATO activity in the Baltics and Poland has declined at an increasingly rapid pace. The number of bottweets dropped by 15 percentage points for Russian and 20 percentage points for English. We infer that this reduction is best explained by changes introduced by the platform. Our findings are verified by drawing on thirty times more data than for previous Robotrolling issues. For the first time we include messages from VKontakte as a control. We see a marked rise in organised trolling activity conducted by humans using fake accounts compared to early 2017. As of January 2018, 50% of all Russian-language messages are directed at other Twitter users. As social media companies intervene to clean up automation, they should take care that changes they introduce may enable new forms of manipulation. Russian language bot activity is in decline in absolute terms, but Twitter in Russian remains more polluted than Twitter in English.

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INTERNET TROLLING AS A HYBRID WARFARE TOOL: THE CASE OF LATVIA

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The executive summary outlines the main conclusions of the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: Case of Latvia, commissioned by the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University and the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Institute of Mathematics and Informatics (University of Latvia)1 and was aimed at analysing organised pro-Russian trolling in internet media and measuring its influence on public opinion, using Latvia as a case study. The research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and offers recommendations on how to mitigate its effects when used as a tool in hybrid warfare. A multidisciplinary approach – including communication science, social anthropology, political science and information technology expertise – was applied in order to understand the trolling phenomenon, develop a method for its identification and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE - EXAMINING NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE FROM A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVES

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №27: Multietnički identitet Vojvodine: izazovi u 2007-08

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Serbian

(Serbian edition) Isticanje etničkog pluralizma Vojvodine predstavlja opšte mesto u retorici pokrajinskih političara, medija i predstavnika civilnog društva. Činjenica da na području Vojvodine žive pripadnici velikog broja nacionalnih manjina u toj se retorici uzdiže kao prednost i vojvođanska vrednost. Ovo naglašavanje višeetničnosti nije slučajno. Tokom raspada bivše Jugoslavije, multietnički karakter vojvođanskog društva često je bio na udaru. U sudaru sa heterogenom prirodom društva, novi politički ideal - nacionalna država - vrlo brzo je oslobodio svoje destruktivne potencijale. Nacionalistička histerija, nasilje, reduciranje prava i omalovažavanje vodile su marginalizaciji i izolaciji manjina, njihovom zatvaranju u uske granice vlastite etničke grupe, povlačenju iz sfere javnosti, iseljavanju u matične, odnosno treće države. Nakon 5. oktobra 2000. godine učinjeni su stanoviti pomaci u saniranju posledica Miloševićevog režima. Ti su pomaci, međutim, bili i ostali polovični. Donet je, recimo, zakon o Zaštiti prava i sloboda nacionalnih manjina, ali ne i zakon o načinu izbora i nadležnostima nacionalnih saveta. Na nivou republike i pokrajine formirani su, nakon zaoštravanja međuetničkih odnosa u Vojvodini, saveti za nacionalne manjine, ali oni, lišeni bilo kakvog realnog uticaja, vegetiraju pretvoreni u fasadne institucije. Spremnost države da se obračuna sa govorom mržnje i etnički motivisanim napadima je, najčešće, izostajala, što je kod manjina stvorilo utisak o selektivnoj primeni krivičnih paragrafa. Kampanja koju je, u cilju protežiranja tolerancije, svojevremeno vodilo Ministarstvo za ljudska i manjinska prava završila je neuspehom. Ni sadašnji projekat koji sprovodi Pokrajinski sekretarijat za upravu, propise i nacionalne manjine, neće uspeti ako njegovi napori na afirmisanju tolerancije i multikulturalizma ne budu snažno podržani od strane važnih društvenih podsistema.

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Political Participation of Women in BiH: The 2018 General Election

Author(s): Medina Mujić / Language(s): English

Participation of politically engaged women in political processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a subject of discussion in the public sphere of Bosnia and Herzegovina for many years. This issue is most frequently addressed by civil society representatives, both men and women, relevant institutions and individual female defenders of women’s human rights. The current situation regarding representation of women in politics is not satisfactory. Yet, it is quite rarely in focus of discussions among representatives of political parties who are held responsible, informally and formally, for the lack of women’s participation in government.

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Maghiarii din Transilvania în spaţiul politic maghiar şi românesc

Author(s): Tamás Kiss,Gergő Barna / Language(s): Romanian

Between 18 May and 8 June, 2013 the authors have collected data from a representative sample of 1,232 Hungarians from Transylvania with the purpose to examine the political behavior of the aforementioned community within the political spaces of both Hungary and Romania. While closely related to a research project (entitled 'Ethnic parties, voting behavior') carried out within the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, the present research has extended its focus to Transylvanian Hungarians'voting behavior outside Romania. This change of perspective has been necessary because on 26 May 2010 the Hungarian Parliament adopted the amendment to the 1993 Law on Hungarian citizenship by introducing the simplified naturalization procedure, thus enabling Hungarians from the neighboring countries of Hungary to obtain Hungarian citizenship without residency. Moreover, the new Hungarian election law adopted in November 2011 allows Hungarian citizens without residency in Hungary to vote in the Hungarian Parliamentary elections (on candidates from national party lists). As a consequence, the political, or voting behavior of Hungarians from Transylvania needs to be analyzed by taking into account this perspective as well.

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The Future of Public Service Broadcasting in Croatia

Author(s): Davor Marko / Language(s): English

The transformation of the former state-controlled Radio-television Zagreb into a broadcaster serving the public interest in Croatia, and its subsequent reform to comply with the European standards and principles is the main focus of this paper. Croatian-Radio Television (Hrvatska radiotelevizija, or HRT) - as the reformed broadcaster was named after the first multi-party elections in 1990 - underwent several developing stages. The analysis provided within the study reflects on the process of its evolution against the backdrop of specific political, social and economic factors, also taking into account challenges of a substantial and technological nature. In recent years, as Croatia moved towards full membership of the EU, the status and operation of the PSB, as well as its broadcasting regulatory mechanisms and media policies, were reviewed to bring them in line with the new EU regulations. Croatia’s case seems somewhat unique compared to other countries that were once part of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, but it also shares some similar contextual characteristics. First and foremost, the funding model is what sets apart the Croatia’s PSB from other Western Balkan post-socialist states. Considered one of the most successful models, HRTs license fee collection system has been continuously and systematically improved since the 1960s when it was first introduced. Albeit the level of editorial independence and financial sustainability has seen frequent oscillations at different points in time, HRT maintains its financial sustainability, and manages to drive its internal development. Like the other countries, Croatian PSB is under permanent political pressures, while its program has been commercialized, becoming less distinctive from content provided by commercial competitions. In order to assess the transformation of HRT into a public service, considering the challenges to its current operation and further development, the paper intends to answer the following questions. The first is related to the development of regulation and media policies in regard to PSB, including the various actors involved, the political setting, and internally or externally driven reforms. The second question targets the current regulation, status and role of the PSB in Croatia, with special attention to the PSB remit, funding model, formal and de-facto independence, market share, and the progress regarding technological innovations and digitalization. Finally, the paper deals with the challenges to the PSB operation in Croatia, taking into account ongoing debates on the global level, and country-specific discussions. This research draws upon the ongoing debates on the status and operation of PSB in a changing media environment. Technology developments, commercialization processes and the growing role of the market in defining media roles and audience tastes, information abundance, and audience fragmentation significantly define what we know today as ‘media ecology’. In such a context, the status and role, funding model and social role of PSB, and its relation with the audience, are contested. To evolve into a genuine public media, Croatian Radio-Television has to face these challenges both internally and externally. This study follows recent and ongoing debates on the future of PSM, and builds its analytical framework on concepts and ideas developed by contemporary PSM scholars such as Donders, Lowe, Moe and Van den Bulck, also taking into account theoretical accounts of media and PSB developments in the post-socialist area, including Jakubowicz, Sukosd, Splichal, and others. This research paper is divided in four main sections. The following section outlines the main theoretical concepts and the key debates in regard to the future of PSB. The third section reflects on the country background including political and economic factors, the development of the media system in Croatia and its PSB. The final section summarizes the main findings and discusses them in relation to the socio-political context and contemporary trends related to regulation, funding and the technological developments related to PSB in general. A discussion of the main trends and dilemmas on the European and regional level is presented within the final section.

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Think Locally - Act Locally! - Results of local self-governments in application of mechanisms for prevention and fight against corruption at the local level in Montenegro - Annual Report -

Author(s): Ana Nenezić,Milka Tadić-Mijović,Željka Ćetković,Marko Šošić / Language(s): English

Corruption is directly impeding rule of law, demolishing moral of society and shattering stability and economic progress of state. Not only it is in contrast with positive legal regulations, it represents also a deviation of fundamental social principles. Therefore, fight against corruption represents a precondition for development of democratic society. Corruption is also one of key challenges that Montenegro is facing, and consequently adequately addressing corruption must be a key task of state administration, including also units of local self-government. According to researches, of both international and national organizations, fight against corruption in Montenegro remains at unsatisfactory level and additional efforts are needed in order to achieve sustainable results in this area. Unlike at national, corruption at the local level has not been recognised for a long time as an issue that must be paid attention to. Precisely lack of efficiency and responsibility at the local level has resulted also in enormous debt of Montenegrin local self-governments, which has at the end of 2016 amounted to 143,091 million EUR, whereby system of responsibility does not exist in practice, and there are rare examples of effective processing of corruption cases at the local level by authorised organs.

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Антиратне и мировне иницијативе у Србији током pатова деведесетих на простору бивше Југославије

Author(s): Aleksandar Todosijević / Language(s): Serbian

Један од основних предуслова за миран и просперитетан живот у савременом друштву је мир. Мир обезбеђује услове за економски и привредни развој и општи друштвени напредак. Доприноси том циљу могу бити различити, а један од њих је могућ кроз образовање за мир. Учење о миру обухвата знања о мировним покретима, антиратним иницијативама, алтернативним начинима превазилажења и решавања сукоба, чињенице о разоружању, животној средини и одрживом развоју, људским правима, другим културама и религијама, различитостима и др.

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Montenegro - Between reform leader and reform simulacrum

Author(s): Not Specified Author / Language(s): English

Six years since the start of accession negotiations, Montenegro is still a showcase of state capture. In the same manner it has been exhausting domestic democratic public for decades, Montenegrin Government masterfully applies the exhaustion strategy to the process of European integration, abusing the EU’s need for a new integration optimism.

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Ukrainian oligarchs in wartime

Author(s): Sławomir Matuszak / Language(s): English

Russia’s military invasion has contributed to a major decline in the role of oligarchs in Ukraine. This is largely due to the fact that domestic political rivalry both in the media and in parliament has ceased, which in turn has reduced the role played by those spheres of life in which their influence was most perceptible. Ukraine’s main political forces have backed President Volodymyr Zelensky in defending the country, as a result of which laws are presently passed almost unanimously. In addition, the most important oligarch-owned TV stations, which before the war formed their main tool of influence, have decided to air a joint news programme. Alongside this, the owners’ control of broadcasting content has been further weakened through specific legal regulations. Some oligarchs have lost portions of their assets as a result of military activity and occupation, and some have suffered significant financial losses due to the economic crisis and export restrictions in a situation when they still need to service their foreign debt. Most of the oligarchs have offered funds to help the country in its fight against the aggressor, but some of these activities are being kept low-profile. If the war’s outcome is positive for Ukraine, and if Kyiv receives substantial Western support for its recovery and investment effort, the position of the oligarchs will diminish, and the president, who enjoys an enormously high level of trust from society, will in practical terms be free to continue to reduce the oligarchs’ influence on Ukraine’s political life.

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A war not won, a war not lost. The military situation after 100 days of the Russian aggression against Ukraine

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

One hundred days of Russian aggression against Ukraine has still not answered the basic question: who will win? The first phase of the clash – a manoeuvre warfare until the end of March, in which the aggressor had broadly defined operational goals – ended in failure for Russia, and resulted in it withdrawing from one of the two main theatres of operations and reducing its aspirations in other directions. The trench warfare phase, which has lasted since the turn of April, has not led to a breakthrough, but the extended actions have exhausted the Ukrainian army to an extent that the enemy has been able to make slow but consistent progress in achieving its assumed minimum goal: taking control of the entire Donbas and the land bridge to Crimea. Moscow has largely achieved this aim; since 24 February it has taken control of80,000 km² of Ukraine’s territory. It is not enough simply to maintain the status quo regarding external support for Ukraine, without which it will no longer be able to fight off the aggressor. The comprehensive rearming of the Ukrainian army with Western weapons and military equipment offers a chance to stop the Russian aggression. Moreover, in order to defeat Russia militarily, the West must display an attitude of consistent solidarity.

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№123: Breaking Down Russian and Chinese Disinformation and Propaganda About the War in Ukraine

Author(s): Agnieszka Legucka,Justyna Szczudlik / Language(s): English

Russia and China use a convergent narrative about the reasons for the war in Ukraine. Both accuse the West, mainly the United States, of provoking Russia, and as a result, the indivisibility of European security has been undermined. Despite the similarities, the Chinese narrative is not entirely the same as Russia’s. China formats its messages about the war in such a way that it attempts to create the perception of it as a still-neutral partner, restraining Russia’s actions. The European Union should pay more attention to Chinese disinformation, which can more effectively reach people and groups not susceptible to Russian narratives.

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COVID-19 tracing app in Serbia: How to pave the road with trust, transparency and inclusion

Author(s): Milena Lazarević,Dragana Bajić / Language(s): English

Governments across the globe are increasingly using digital tools to accelerate the tracking of people infected with COVID-19 and their contacts as a key measure to prevent the pandemic’s spread. Among potential solutions, contact tracing mobile applications have emerged as the most used and discussed, and it is likely that many governments, including Serbia’s, will include them in national public health efforts. Nevertheless, issues of privacy and data protection, and low public trust and user acceptance can prevent these apps from being used, which is why Serbia’s government needs to ensure a good understanding and respect of citizens’ concerns before proceeding with the implementation of one. Given the comprehensive EU-level discussions towards finding the best possible common solution aligned with the Union’s robust personal data protection policies, little can go wrong if Serbia follows European approaches. This can also help rea rm the country’s pro-European orientation.

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TODAY AND TOMORROW: SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLICE SERVICES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Author(s): Marko Živković / Language(s): English

Police services in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) are not substantially active on social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube) and are not sufficiently exploiting the advantages of online communication such as: flexibility (accessible 24/7), relevance (provides a place for real-life policing examples and the exchange of experiences), and community building (the police can develop a supportive, stimulating community that is held by participants in high regard). There is a significant possibility for police services to use social media in the WB for strong community engagement and partnership with the aim of providing a crime-free and safe environment for citizens. Internet penetration in the region is 68.1% and there are 12.5 million internet users1 as well as more than 8.5 million Facebook2 account holders. The average Facebook consumer has more than 200 ‘friends’3 , which indicates a high potential for the community engagement and sharing of information. The research analysed the level of police presence in the social media platforms during the period from 1 January to 31 July 2017. It shows that five out of seven police services in the WB that are subject to this analysis use at least one social medium as a communication tool. Four out of seven are present on Facebook and YouTube, while three have Twitter and Instagram accounts. Only the Albanian police are present on all four social networks. The Kosovo Police makes use of three networks, while the rest use two out of four. Montenegrin police and the MoI of the Federation of BiH, however, are not present on any social networks. Police services in the region predominantly use social media to share basic information, and for promotion. Efforts to engage citizens are lacking. The nature of these social networks, as two-way communication tools, is not recognised by police forces of the region. The police in Albania are mostly active on Facebook, with more than 30,000 page-likes. Twitter and YouTube are used considerably less, Instagram not at all. Facebook is used primarily as a communication tool for sharing service information of the Albanian police, mostly through video posts. There is no interaction with the citizens. The language is formal and bureaucratic. The MoI of the Federation of BiH is not actively using social media, while the MoI of the Republic of Srpska has a YouTube account and an official Facebook page with 18,123 page-likes. It is not however present on Twitter. Facebook is primarily a communication tool used for sharing service information, mostly by way of posting photographs. Citizens’ engagement is low, but still better when compared to the practice in Albania and Kosovo. The Kosovo police have Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts, but no Instagram. Facebook is their main online communication tool, with 34,345 page-likes. However, the Kosovo police are not regularly active on Facebook and mostly share links that lead to service information. Interaction with citizens is very low. Original Twitter content is not produced and a low level of activity on YouTube has been noted. The MoI of Macedonia is active predominantly on YouTube, with more than 5,000 subscribers and almost 9.5 million views, which is the best result in the region. Its activity on Instagram is modest. The Facebook page was created in August 2017. There is no Twitter account. The Minister of Interior is not very active on Twitter, and tweets are not strictly related to policing. The MoI of Montenegro is not present on any of the social networks. The police in Serbia are active mainly on Instagram and YouTube.4 Tweeting ceased in February 2010. Instagram is used in accordance with the rules of this social network, with the primary goal to promote the activities of the police and the Minister. The YouTube account of the Serbian MoI had more than 9 million views and boasts 6,483 subscribers, which is the record in the region. Communication in the 21st century has been tremendously changed by new technologies. Social media now provide a completely new communication approach, with different potential and substance. Regardless of whether or not the police want to be present on social media, police issues are being discussed online. Due to this fact, if the police do not use social media many related information can be subjected to spinning and misuse, with no possibility of reacting through the same communication channel. Even though the facts regarding internet and social media users in the WB indicate that conditions for police use of social media do exist, law enforcement agencies of the region are not sufficiently active on social networks. There is significant room for improvement of social media usage by police in the WB to increase effectiveness by engaging citizens, and to build trust in the police by presenting the human side through community policing. Social networks are not just another traditional media channel; they allow greater connectivity and interaction between the web users and encourage contributions and feedback from anyone who is a member of any virtual community

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Elections in Serbia 2022 and conflict in Ukraine

Author(s): Not Specified Author / Language(s): English

Attitudes of electoral participants in online portals and on Facebook

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