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On the popular Russian-language social network VK, material about the NATO presence in the Baltics and Poland was viewed no less than 11 million times this quarter (February – April 2019). 93% of these views were for material from community spaces. On VK, community spaces are increasingly important, both as a sources of content and as places for discussion. The move to groups has implications beyond the Russian-language space. Facebook has recently launched a push to promote community spaces. These spaces, normally closed to researchers, offer huge potential for misuse and manipulation. Our investigation of VK community spaces reveals that the vast majority of groups in which NATO is discussed are communities with radical pro-Kremlin or nationalist tendencies, or dedicated to the conflict in Ukraine. These communities generate more posts and attract more views even than communities created by Russian state media outlets. On Twitter, bots tweeting in Russian remain a bigger problem than bots tweeting in English. In Russian, they account for 43% of all messages—a significant increase in recent months. In English bots posted 17% of messages. English-language bots this quarter overwhelmingly amplified news content from RT (formerly Russia Today) and other pro-Kremlin news outlets. On all platforms, discussion regarding NATO troops in Poland attracted the largest number of posts this quarter. Finally, in this issue we publish our first case study of manipulation on Facebook. It looks at the degree to which bots and trolls targeted posts promoted by Latvian political parties contesting the European Elections in late May 2019.
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Anonymous users stole the show this quarter. Never before have we observed such high levels of activity from anonymous accounts. At the same time, bot activity in Russian-language conversations about NATO activity in the Baltics and Poland has emerged from its winter slumber. In the wake of the Skripal poisonings in the UK in March, Russian-language bot and anonymous activity about NATO more than doubled. Mentions of NATO on VK, in contrast, have been stable and declining during the whole period. Social media companies are working to end platform misuse. But malicious activity is evolving. Today, anonymous accounts are dominating the conversation. These accounts are either operated manually, or they have become advanced enough to fool human observers. The responses from open and free societies to the problem of online malicious activity have neither been strong enough, nor consistent enough. Figures presented in this issue reveal a disparity between the conversation quality in English and Russian-language spaces. Currently, the Russian-language conversation about NATO in the Baltics and Poland has six times the proportion of content from bot and anonymous accounts. As Twitter has taken steps to remove bots, the disparity has only widened. We assess that 93% of Russian-language accounts in our dataset are operated anonymously or automatically. In no way does this conversation mirror opinions of citizens. Journalists, policy makers, and advertisers take note!
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This report presents top-level findings from the first research project to systematically track and measure the scale of inauthentic activity on the Russian social network VK. On VK, a vocal core consisting of loyal news media, pro-Kremlin groups, and bots and trolls dominates the conversation about NATO. The volume of material from this core group is such, that overall genuine users account for only of 14% of the total number of messages about NATO in the Baltic States and Poland. The spread of demonstrably fake content can offer a starting point for measuring how social media manipulation impacts genuine conversations. In the case of one story about a fictitious Finnish blogger, our algorithm estimates that at least 80% of users who shared the fake story were authentic. This quarter, messages appeared in more than 2 000 different group pages on VK. Setting aside messages from group pages, 37% of VK posts came from ‘bot’ accounts—software that mimics human behavior online. This level of activity is comparable to what we have seen on Russian-language Twitter. Unlike on Twitter, where the vast majority of human-controlled accounts are operated anonymously, on VK most accounts are likely to be authentic. Western social media companies have belatedly taken an active role in reducing the reach of the Kremlin’s social media manipulation efforts. However, it remains hard for researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of these measures on platforms such as Facebook and Instagram. In this context, VK offers a cautionary view of a network with minimal privacy, regulation, and moderation.
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President Trump’s whirlwind tour of Europe in July provoked ferocious discussion about NATO on social media. Anonymous human-controlled English-language accounts, expressing positions in support of or in opposition to the US President, dominated online conversations. Compared to the levels observed in the Spring issue of Robotrolling, the volume of English-language messages has more than doubled. The increasing proportion of anonymous accounts active during key political moments indicate that anonymity is being abused to cloak manipulation on social networks. We call on social media companies to keep investing in countering platform misuse. The social media companies Reddit and Twitter have released lists of accounts identified as originating from the notorious St Petersburg ‘troll factory’—the Internet Research Agency (IRA). In this issue, we present the first quantitative analysis comparing English- and Russian-language posts from these accounts. The IRA bombarded citizens in Russia and its neighboring states with pro-Kremlin propaganda. For English, fake accounts posed as Trump supporters, and argued both sides of the Black Lives Matter controversy. Russian-language material closely echoed and amplified the narratives popularized by Russian state-media. Amongst the accounts identified by Twitter, 26 also posted about NATO in the Baltics and Poland. Our algorithm correctly identified 24 of these as bot accounts. The other two accounts were anonymous human-controlled (troll) accounts.
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The paper considers some criminal law aspects of “hate speech” on electronic media and internet. After the definition of meaning of the term “hate speech” provided for the needs of the paper, and a review of obligations of the member States concerning prohibition and criminalization of hate speech in certain international legal documents, the paper also gives a review of the manner and scope of criminalization of hate speech in the criminal codes in force in BiH. In addition to an analysis of the principal legal elements of the related criminal offenses, the paper pays a special attention to the preconditions which must be satisfied in order that a conviction for the criminal offense of hate speech is not in violation of the right to free expression as one of the fundamental human rights. The paper also refers to the responsibility of journalists and media for hate speech and its spreading, as well as the responsibility of mediators – service providers for hate speech of others.
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After analyzing the prohibition of hate speech in international law and practice, the author analyzes the normative and institutional framework for hate speech prohibition in Serbia. The analysis points to valid legal solutions to this prohibition, regulations of regulatory bodies that are responsible for combating hate speech in print and electronic media and the Internet, and then provides an overview of institutional mechanisms of protection against hate speech. After that, the author gives a critical overview of the functioning of the normative-institutional framework for the prohibition of hate speech and points to the key problems, first of all: the problem of media freedom, the high degree of non-recognition of the essence of discrimination and hate speech among representatives of the public authorities, the problem regarding the functioning and independence of regulatory bodies, but also the judicial system in general. Political discourse in Serbia is burdened with the spirit of intolerance and rhetoric that often contains hate speech. The fact that pro-government media often appear as actors of such rhetoric is worrying, as it points to the readiness of the public authorities to promote a critical dialogue that is the premise of a healthy democratic society.
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If the seriousness of a given “emerging security threat” is measured by the number of recent analyses devoted to it or the proliferation of experts studying it, then cyberthreats must now surpass the dangers of offline terrorism and energy security. While all issues “cyber” attract a high level of policymaker attention, another threat seems to have been forgotten and marginalised: cyberterrorism. To an extent, the evolution of cyberterrorism mirrors that of “regular” terrorism, which erupted as the “weapon of the weak,” and after a state-sponsored phase seems to be returning to its sub-state or even “lone wolf” roots. Cyberthreats, on the other hand, originally of a sub-state nature, are now mostly in the domain of state entities that have not yet made the decision to launch state-sponsored cyberterrorism.
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China’s authorities are expanding the promotion of Chinese politics abroad through social media such as Twitter and Facebook, popular in Europe and the U.S. but blocked in China. In recent months, many Chinese diplomatic missions and ambassadors have set up accounts on these platforms, and Twitter profiles had already been established by prominent state media employees. Through their interactions with users and positive presentations of Chinese policy, they seek to change attitudes to China in European and American societies and sway experts and political leaders in their countries. Although these actions are in the preliminary stage, the Chinese authorities will try to expand their influence on the decision-making processes in the EU and U.S.
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Władze ChRL poszerzają promocję chińskiej polityki za granicą przez media społecznościowe takie jak Twitter i Facebook, popularne w Europie czy USA, ale blokowane w ChRL. W ostatnich miesiącach wiele chińskich placówek dyplomatycznych i ambasadorów założyło na nich konta. Profile na Twitterze mieli już wcześniej prominentni pracownicy mediów państwowych. Wchodząc w interakcje z użytkownikami i przedstawiając politykę ChRL w pozytywnym świetle, dążą do zmiany nastawienia europejskich i amerykańskich społeczeństw – w tym aparatu władzy i ekspertów – do Chin. Choć działania te są na początkowym etapie, władze ChRL będą je rozwijać, próbując wpływać na proces decyzyjny w UE i USA.
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The Russian authorities actively use the digital space to achieve foreign policy goals. On Russia’s initiative, the UN General Assembly adopted two new resolutions in the field of cybersecurity. The first concerns the rules of conduct of states on the internet and the second deals with cybercrime. They were adopted despite opposition from Western countries. Russia is trying to protect the Russian network against external influence. The aim of these activities is ensuring the stability of the internal political regime.
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Rosyjskie władze aktywnie wykorzystują przestrzeń cyfrową do realizacji celów polityki zagranicznej. Z inicjatywy Rosji Zgromadzenie Ogólne ONZ przyjęło dwie nowe rezolucje z zakresu cyberbezpieczeństwa. Pierwsza dotyczy zasad postępowania państw w internecie, druga – walki z cyberprzestępczością. Zostały one przegłosowane przy sprzeciwie państw zachodnich. Rosja stara się chronić rosyjską sieć internetową przed wpływami zewnętrznymi. Celem tych działań jest stabilność wewnętrznego reżimu politycznego.
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Estonia's commitment to strengthening cybersecurity is a result of its experience as a victim of hacking. At the same time, Estonian authorities are consistently raising the country's informatisation level and lobbying for an effective digital single market in the EU. For Estonia, expertise in increasing cybersecurity has become the country’s unique brand, and the application of comprehensive and effective solutions means that it can be a model partner for Poland in digitisation and combating cyberthreats.
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Zaangażowanie Estonii we wzmocnienie cyberbezpieczeństwa jest wynikiem ataków hakerskich, jakich doświadczyła. Jednocześnie estońskie władze konsekwentnie podnoszą poziom cyfryzacji kraju oraz lobbują na rzecz efektywnego jednolitego rynku cyfrowego w UE. Dążenie Estonii do zwiększania cyberbezpieczeństwa stało się wręcz jej znakiem rozpoznawczym. Stosowanie przez nią kompleksowych i efektywnych rozwiązań sprawia, że może ona być dla Polski wzorcowym partnerem w cyfryzacji i zwalczaniu zagrożeń cybernetycznych.
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The objective of this paper is to analyze the perception of university students towards fake news by assessing the relationship between the incidence of fake news shared by themselves within their social networks and the risk assumed by students when sharing news they do not fully trust. Quantitative study through the application of a survey using a Likert scale applied to 313 students from different careers of the Faculties of Administration and Pedagogy of the Universidad Veracruzana in Mexico. Processing was carried out with descriptive and inferential statistics. The results point out the correlation between the risk assumed and the cases of false news shared indicating the existence of cases in university students with little predisposition to inquire into the reliability of the information, and who in turn, risk sharing it anyway. The variables of sex, age, semester, and educational program do not influence the risk that students assume when sharing news. However, students who claim not to share news they distrust also share fake news they do believe in on their social networks.
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Following global trends, social media has become an instrumental part of daily life for most Albanians. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, it was a primary means for social communication and receiving information on current affairs. Moreover, since the outbreak of the pandemic, social media has cemented its position as an irreplaceable aspect of people’s personal and professional lives. While it is wonderful that the internet allows education, business, and daily life to continue, there are some challenges to such dependency on social media. For example, disinformation spreads six times faster through social media channels than actual news, and social media platforms create opportunities for unsupervised communication, which can lead to harassment, abuse, and blackmail.
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This report examines the concept of „digital narrative“, with a focus on clarifying the nature and application of digital narrative in election campaigns, with the aim of collecting and systematizing my currently available scientific information in the indicated direction. The concept of 125 „digital narrative“ is central to my dissertation research and the information referenced here will be used in it. In clarifying the essence of the digital narrative, the following methodological framework was used: who is the subject of the digital narrative, i.e. who is the digital storyteller, what is the digital story in terms of classical communication models, what are the possible applications of the digital story. This methodological framework predetermines the structure of the present exposition. The application of digital storytelling in campaign communications is explored in a one-day special.
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