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Vážené čtenářky, vážení čtenáři, v rukou právě držíte jednu z prvních publikací o informačních a komunikačních technologiích (ICT) a ženách v České republice, kterou pro Vás společně připravily Gender Studies, o.p.s. a Síť mateřských center. Najdete v ní informace o tom, co vlastně ICT jsou a proč jsou v současnosti skloňovány ve všech pádech. Představíme Vám také jejich využívání v praxi neziskových organizací i fi rem. ICT totiž velkou měrou přispívají ke slaďování osobního a pracovního života – právě ony umožňují pracovat z domova a přitom zůstat v úzkém kontaktu s kolegy a kolegyněmi v práci a předávat všechny potřebné informace a dokončené úkoly včas. Počítač a internet také otevřely nový prostor pro rozvoj podnikání. Určitě jste si již někdy vybrali a objednali zboží v internetovém obchodě. Je to levnější a pohodlné. Pohodlné může být i vaše podnikání po internetu – pracujete z domova a volíte si pracovní dobu podle vlastních potřeb. I na toto téma se zaměřuje jedna z kapitol publikace: navíc Vám přináší základní informace o evropských strukturálních fondech, odkud můžete získat fi nanční zdroje pro podnikání. Věřím, že Vás publikace zaujme a naleznete v ní nové pohledy na trh práce a podnikání v České republice.
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This issue of Robotrolling examines users suspended by Twitter. Contrary to expectation, most of the accounts were human-controlled accounts rather than bots. Since 2017, the speed at which Twitter suspended misbehaving users has by two measures almost doubled. However, removals of Russian-language accounts have been considerably slower than for English. The speed of removal can be critical, for instance in the context of an election. The Latvian elections, conducted on 6 October 2018, passed with remarkably little Russian language activity about the NATO presence in the country. Our analyses show a movement in the past year away from automated manipulation to humans operating fake or disposable identities online. The figures published in this issue reflect the good work done to tackle bots, but show much work remains to tackle manipulation through fake human-controlled accounts. Bots created 46% of Russian-language messaging about the NATO presence in the Baltics and Poland. More than 50% of Russian-language messaging about Estonia this quarter came from automated accounts. Anonymous human-operated accounts posted 46% of all English-language messages about Poland, compared to 29% for the Baltic States. This discrepancy is both anomalous and persistent. Some of the messaging is probably artificial. We continue to publish measures of fake social activity in the hope that quantifying the problem will focus minds on solving it.
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On the popular Russian-language social network VK, material about the NATO presence in the Baltics and Poland was viewed no less than 11 million times this quarter (February – April 2019). 93% of these views were for material from community spaces. On VK, community spaces are increasingly important, both as a sources of content and as places for discussion. The move to groups has implications beyond the Russian-language space. Facebook has recently launched a push to promote community spaces. These spaces, normally closed to researchers, offer huge potential for misuse and manipulation. Our investigation of VK community spaces reveals that the vast majority of groups in which NATO is discussed are communities with radical pro-Kremlin or nationalist tendencies, or dedicated to the conflict in Ukraine. These communities generate more posts and attract more views even than communities created by Russian state media outlets. On Twitter, bots tweeting in Russian remain a bigger problem than bots tweeting in English. In Russian, they account for 43% of all messages—a significant increase in recent months. In English bots posted 17% of messages. English-language bots this quarter overwhelmingly amplified news content from RT (formerly Russia Today) and other pro-Kremlin news outlets. On all platforms, discussion regarding NATO troops in Poland attracted the largest number of posts this quarter. Finally, in this issue we publish our first case study of manipulation on Facebook. It looks at the degree to which bots and trolls targeted posts promoted by Latvian political parties contesting the European Elections in late May 2019.
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Hate speech on Internet has been more present in public discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the last years, as noted by ECRI and European Commission in their reports. The particular problem presents the fact that, despite ECRI recommendations from 2016, and obligations that BiH accepted by ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, criminal laws have not been amended in a way to conform to the requirements set forth in this document nor in Committee of Ministers' Recomendation 97(20). Also, there is no adequate protection in civil or administrative laws that would allow those affected by on-line hate speech to seek redress. It is argued in this Article that the competent authorities should develop a comprehensive strategy to tackle on-line hate speech. This strategy should include different measures such as: legislative amendments in criminal and civil laws, enactment of a separate law that would include a clear definition of hate speech, obligations of on-line media in relation to establishing mechanisms for more efficient monitoring and prevention of hate speech, as well as their civil liability for hate speech in their publications and for users generated content. However, all legislative measures should be carefully designed in order not to undermine or allow disproportional restrictions to the freedom of speech or to have “chilling effect” on media or to discourage public debate and criticism. Until then, the courts should adhere to their constitutional obligation to directly apply ECHR and should interpret inadequate laws in a way that will not undermine the Convention rights.
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In the period May—July 2019 bots accounted for 55% of all Russian-language messages on Twitter. This big increase in automated activity was largely driven by news-bots contributing to information effects around stories published by the Kremlin’s propaganda outlet, Sputnik. On VK, the bot presence also increased, and currently accounts for one quarter of all users. 17% of English language messaging was done by bots. Three military exercises were of particular interest for Russian-language bots on Twitter and VK: Spring Storm, Baltic Operations (BALTOPS), and Dragon-19. The level of Twitter activity during the month of July was less than half that observed for the period May–June. Having studied robotic activity for almost three years, we see a clear pattern: whenever a military exercise takes place, coverage by hostile pro-Kremlin media is systematically amplified by inauthentic accounts. In this issue of Robotrolling we take a closer look at how manipulation has changed during the period 2017–2019 in response to measures implemented by Twitter. Since 2017 bot activity has changed. Spam bots have given way to news bots—accounts promoting fringe or fake news outlets—and mention-trolls, which systematically direct messaging in support of pro-Kremlin voices and in opposition to its critics. We present an innovative case study measuring the impact political social media manipulation has on online conversations. Analysis of Russian Internet Research Agency posts to the platform Reddit shows that manipulation caused a short-term increase in the number of identity attacks by other users, as well as a longer-term increase in the toxicity of conversations.
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The malicious use of social media is a widespread phenomenon, targeting individuals, public opinion, and in some cases even the functioning of the state. In recent years, social media platforms have been abused by foreign governments, private companies, and individuals to influence the outcomes of democratic elections and to undermine public trust in the societies in which we live. Today, social media platforms are manipulated by malign actors in order to pursue their political and military goals. In other words, social media platforms have developed into an effective tool for waging information warfare. Although information warfare is nothing new, social media platforms offer a cheaper, more efficient, and less demanding stage for influencing larger numbers of people than ever before. While the social media platforms are conduits facilitating the free passage of information, the companies that own them are active participants wielding significant influence over what takes place in the social media space and, increasingly, over how we communicate, interact, and socialise in the 21st century.
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The author provides a detailed case study and reflective account of the aBerNo project. The course, making full use of videoconferencing, covered all four language learning skills through the teaching of key academic skills. The article covers key stages in the course’s development and highlights the work expected and outcomes achieved. Many technology-related issues are discussed, as are assessment procedures. The author provides a personal insight into the workings of a carefully developed project designed to enhance both the linguistic and academic skills of high-level students.
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Władze Chin traktują Internet jako przestrzeń rywalizacji międzynarodowej. Uważają, że wspierany przez UE i USA swobodny dostęp do informacji w globalnej sieci zagraża stabilności ich systemu politycznego. Zacieśniają więc kontrolę Internetu w swoim państwie, dążąc do ograniczenia przepływu informacji. Za element wzmacniania pozycji ChRL w cyberprzestrzeni uważają także ekspansję gospodarczą chińskich firm z sektora IT za granicą. Inicjują również – konkurencyjny wobec UE i USA – projekt międzynarodowego kodeksu bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego. Działania Chin stoją w sprzeczności z promowaną przez UE otwartością globalnej sieci oraz wolnością gospodarczą.
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Przebieg wyborów prezydenckich w Stanach Zjednoczonych pokazał, że walka o głosy wyborców prowadzona za pomocą mediów społecznościowych umożliwia szybsze rozprzestrzenianie fałszywych informacji, propagandy i dezinformacji. W zbliżającej się kampanii wyborczej w Niemczech może wystąpić podobny scenariusz. By temu zapobiec, rząd niemiecki zamierza podjąć działania prewencyjne, jednak wobec nowych form internetowego zagrożenia mogą się one okazać niewystarczające.
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Eastern Asia — which we will define as including East and Southeast Asia — is a region of increasing geopolitical competition with many racial, cultural and societal fractures. With the rapid expansion of inexpensive internet access, these fractures and tensions mean that many states in the region are both vulnerable to, and a source of, hostile information activities that are being used to achieve strategic goals both inside and outside the region. This report documents examples of hostile information activities that have originated in Eastern Asia and have been targeted in the following countries: • Taiwan; • The Hong Kong-based protest movement; • West Papua; • The Philippines.
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Bot activity this quarter fixated on the global COVID-19 pandemic, with conversations about the virus captured by our dataset peaking in March. Pro-Kremlin social media accounts amplified a false story, originally shared by a Russian politician, that Poland closed its airspace to Russian planes delivering humanitarian aid to Italy. Though we found that bots commanded the Russian-language conversations about COVID-19, their content was no more viral than examples from recent Robotrolling reports. Throughout this quarter, we observed a considerable reduction in both the number of unique users and volume of messages. Inauthentic English- and Russian-language activity experienced a similar decline. Since late March, Russian-language activity on Twitter and on VK has been abnormally low. On VK, the conversation about NATO in the Baltics and Poland is currently being conducted in groups with regional or nationalist profiles. Notably, the large Russian state-run media outlets we frequently observe on the platform have engaged far less with the subject in recent months. Additionally, we observed a halving of posts from bot accounts this quarter. Finally, in this edition of Robotrolling, we delve into the role of pro-Kremlin bots in spreading disinformation about COVID-19 throughout March. In our analysis, we identify striking differences between how bots engaged with COVID-19 in the Russian- and English-language information spaces.
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This quarter, the disputed presidential election result and nationwide protests in Belarus were the main targets of inauthentic Russian-language accounts, resulting in a cluster of spikes in fake activity in August. Pro-Lukashenka users concocted an external threat from NATO by pushing false claims of NATO buildup along the Belarusian border and shared rumours of impending intervention. Automated users asserted that NATO posed an internal threat in Belarus as well, alleging that the demonstrations are “puppeteered” by the West. The situation in Belarus coincided with the most pronounced uptick in attention from identifiably human Russian-language accounts. Compared to the previous report, the portion of messages attributed to identifiable humans increased from 14% to 18% on Twitter and from 26% to nearly 30% on VK. This increase in legitimate engagement in NATO-related discussions of Belarus drove down the percentage of bot users to the lowest figure we have observed, 15% on Russian Twitter and 19% on VK. English-language activity focused on Polish affairs, both independently and in relation to the ongoing protests in Belarus. Inauthentic English-language discussions peaked with announcements of US troop relocation from Germany to Poland. In September, former US vice president Joe Biden made critical comments about Hungary and Poland, triggering the highest volume of automated retweets from English-language bots this quarter. Finally, in this instalment of Robotrolling we take a look at the supply side of fake social media accounts. The second iteration of the COE’s social media manipulation experiment tracks variation between the responses of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and TikTok to inauthentic engagement. Strikingly, the report found that Instagram is 10x cheaper to manipulate than Facebook, TikTok has virtually no self-regulatory defences, and it remains easy to manipulate US senators’ accounts, even during an election period.
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This quarter, we observed a significant drop in both authentic and inauthentic engagement with the topic of NATO in Poland and the Baltics. The number of bots and the volume of messages they disseminated decreased among both English- and Russian-language communities on Twitter and VK. Spikes in bot activity this winter coincided with NATO military exercises. Inauthentic accounts placed particular emphasis on unfounded claims of disorderly conduct among NATO soldiers and the alleged effects that military exercises have on local civilian populations. Throughout this period, inauthentic accounts also amplified claims of turmoil within the alliance and fears of military buildup along the border of Kaliningrad. While Russian-language bot activity was focused primarily on military affairs, English-language bot activity was centered on US affairs in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, particularly debates over how the Biden administration will impact US-Polish relations and transatlantic security more generally. In this issue of Robotrolling, we also discuss the steps Twitter has taken to protect its platforms from attempts to incite violence, organise attacks, and share misinformation following the riot at the US Capitol on 6 January 2021. This regulatory enforcement resulted in the removal of tens of thousands of accounts connected to QAnon conspiracy theorists. Our analysis is accompanied by a visualisation of the English-language accounts mentioning the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics, demonstrating the impact these account removals will have on the information space.
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The developments following the 2020 U.S. presidential election, which took place during the writing of this chapter, have once more highlighted the problem of societal polarisation, information manipulation, and the influence of new information technologies on societies’ political decision-making and real-time behaviour. The 2021 storming of the U.S. Capitol, ‘the most recognized symbol of democratic governance in the world’, brought to fore questions around the collective responsibility of citizens, politicians, and tech giants to better understand, protect, and exercise freedom of speech in a time of disinformation. For example: What constitutes ‘harmful’ online content? Where does the border lie between online content that is protected by the right to freedom of expression and online content that should, or needs to, be regulated? Should tech giants be liable for the information they host? Do they have different obligations to society than other private companies do?
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Romania stands out as having one of the EU’s least developed systems of online public services, which contrasts with its extensive telecommunications infrastructure offering very fast and cheap access to the network. This is due both to the policy of the governments, which until 2019 did not show much interest in the digitisation process of the country or failed to propose a comprehensive programme for its implementation, and to the resistance of the public, who were distrustful of the e-government solutions offered. However, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a breakthrough: on one hand, it spurred the authorities to introduce legal changes and deploy new technological solutions that had hitherto been postponed, and on the other, it forced Romanian society to use public digital services.
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Ensuring practical cyber intelligence for a Security Operation Center (SOC) involves collecting, analyzing, and utilizing information about cyber threats to enhance the organization's security posture. This encompasses the gathering and analysis of data on potential and active cyber threats, including Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)" which refer to signs that a security breach may have occurred, while "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)" refer to the methods and behaviours used by an attacker to carry out a cyber attack and utilized by threat actors. Additionally, it entails the use of advanced tools to monitor networks, systems, and applications for suspicious activities, such as the utilization of Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS). Furthermore, it involves developing and implementing plans to respond to security incidents, including identifying, containing, eradicating, and recovering from cyber-attacks. Regularly scanning systems for vulnerabilities and applying patches or mitigations to reduce the attack surface are also crucial components of cyber intelligence in the SOC. Lastly, monitoring and analyzing user and entity behaviour to detect anomalies that could indicate insider threats or compromised accounts is another significant aspect of effectively integrating cyber intelligence into SOC operations.
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The aim of this work is twofold. Firstly, we search to clarify the notion of Big Data (BD) and demonstrate that the taxonomy constitutes one of the fundamental tools to portray the BD characteristics. Secondly, we have shown that the traditional analysis instruments are now relatively obsolete to integrate such outstanding amount of data; consequently, new advanced analysis tools are recommended. Based on a neural network approach, we have found that this methodology improves the forecasting results of high volatility assets compare to a basic GARCH model.
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The significance of empathy for professionals in helping professions, as well as for those on the path to becoming such professionals, has long been recognized as a crucial and integral component in the helping process. As the foundation of successful social interventions, empathy enables practitioners to establish authentic relationships with clients and gain a deeper understanding of their needs, sufferings, and challenges. Although empathy is a fundamental competence in social work, its prevalence has been neglected, even somewhat forgotten, and the effects of its application in practice remain underexplored. This paper focuses on the theoretical understanding of the concept itself, an analysis of contemporary approaches to understanding and developing empathy, an assessment of professionals’ capacities, and its practical effects. In a time of rapid social changes and increasing digitalization, empathy has become one of the most essential, yet most threatened, competencies in helping professions. Recent research on the impact of digitalization on human relationships points to the challenges that technology poses in the development of empathy. Analyzing the effects of digital communication on interpersonal skills and social interaction can provide valuable insights into how modern societies shape individuals’ ability to cultivate empathy. While many contemporary authors warn about environmental risks as threats to empathy development, others highlight the benefits that modern technology can offer. A special focus is placed on educating social workers and those on the path to becoming such, in developing this important skill. Empathy is not a static trait; it develops through education, personal and professional experience, and particularly through practice. Of course, it is important to bear in mind that excessive emotional involvement without clear boundaries can lead to burnout, while a lack of empathy reduces the professional’s ability to effectively assist clients. Therefore, this is an important opportunity to confront these challenges and redefine empathy as a dynamic and necessary skill, not only for social workers but for society as a whole. At a time when solidarity and humanity are more needed than ever, empathy remains a fundamental strength that can guide us through the most difficult societal challenges.
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