CANTOR’S CONTINUUM PROBLEM

Author(s): Cristina Criste / Language(s): English Issue: 13/2015

One of the Georg Cantor’s main intellectual preoccupations was the problem of the continuum. In 1878, this old philosophical problem, closely related to the concept of infinity, received a purely mathematical formulation, later known as the Continuum Hypothesis. In his attempt to demonstrate this conjecture, Cantor largely laid the foundations of set theory. I will firstly articulate the configuration of this mathematical expression and then I will present some of its philosophical aspects. The text will focus only on Cantor’s work and not on set theory’s later developments determined by the Zermelo-Fraenkel’s axiomatization

Nagovijest situacijskoga tumačenja kvantne mehanike

Author(s): Tihomir Vukelja / Language(s): Croatian Issue: 02/2003

This paper discusses the possibility of interpreting Hamiltonian function as a formal representation of particle's dynamical situation, where the dynamical situation is conceived as totality of circumstances that influence its mechanical state. Moreover, it is indicated that such considerations open the possibility of »situational interpretation of quantum mechanics. Within that interpretation all self-adjoint quantum-mechanical operators - usually understood as states or observables - are consistently interpreted as the formal representations of different situations in which atomic objects can be found.

Newtonovo i Bergsonovo vrijeme

Author(s): Norbert Wiener / Language(s): Croatian Issue: 1-2/2016

Svako dijete u Njemačkoj zna ovaj mali napjev odnosno pjesmicu: ≫Weisst du, wie viel Sternlein stehen An dem blauen Himmel szelt? Weisst du, wieviel Wolken gehen Weithin uber aile Welt? Gott, der Herr, hat sie gezahlet Dass ihm auch nicht eines fehlet An der ganzen, grossen Zahl.≪ W. Hey U prijevodu glasi ovako: ≫Znaš li koliko je zvijezda na plavom svodu neba? Znaš li koliko oblaka plovi visoko nad cijelim svijetom? Izbrojioih je Gospod Bog, pa nijedna ne fali u velikom čitavom broju.≪

Ljudi i strojevi

Author(s): Thomas Lamarre / Language(s): Croatian Issue: 1-2/2016

Čini se da je val fascinacije kiborzima, u popularnoj kulturi i kulturalnoj analizi, dosegnuo vrhunac te se povlači, međutim i dalje imamo neugodno pitanje o vezi između ljudi i strojeva. Ustvari, čini se da je fascinacija kiborzima ušla u slijepu ulicu, da blokira umjes to da otvara nova istraživanja. O tome piše Ian Hacking u tek stu ≫Canguilhem među kiborzima≪ (Hacking, 1998), pa kaže da je Descartes na određeni način blizak Donni Haraway po shvaćanju veze između ljudi i strojeva.

Strukturalni Realizam – Potraga za Nosiocem Realnosti

Author(s): Milutin Stojanović / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 3/2016

In the last two decades the old debate concerning reality of science shifted from questions regarding scientific entities to questions regarding scientific structures. I will present and assess advantages and drawback of this new realists’ focus on structures, and at the same time analyze the wider picture of development of the scientific realism. The structural realism will be tackled in the form encountered in works of John Worrall and James Ladyman. Special attention will be devoted to the relationship of their solutions to the argument based on the scientific revolutions – the pessimistic meta-induction. I will argue that these realist’s strategies are not sufficiently convincing to steer us to make a leap in ontology and presume the existence of meta-physical structure (regardless of the question is it scientifically relevant) – in the first place because neither one of them manages to satisfactorily identify a structure, however general, which accumulates in the scientific-theory change.

Normal Science and Normal Kuhn. Review of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions – 50 Years On

Author(s): Adam T. Tuboly / Language(s): English Issue: 2-3/2015

1962 marked an important point in intellectual history not only for historians, philosophers, sociologists and scientists but also for educated laymen. After a long and productive decade Thomas Kuhn published his “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” as Volume 2 Issue 2 of the “International Encyclopedia of Unified Science”, edited (after the death of Otto Neurath) by Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris. 2012 marked another important date—it was the 50th anniversary of Structure’s first edition. The many conferences, workshops and presentations were documented in special issues and collections; one of them is Kuhn’s “Structure of Scientific Revolutions – 50 Years On”, edited by William J. Devlin and Alisa Bokulich. The review aims to shed light on the collections relevance for current interdisciplinary studies.

Toksyczny związek: przemocowa nauka i filozofia nieasertywna. Recenzja książki „Filozofia i nauka: trudne związki. Metallmann – Witkiewicz – Gawecki”

Author(s): Błażej Brzostek / Language(s): Polish Issue: 2-3/2015

Autor omawia książkę Macieja Dombrowskiego w kontekście refleksji przynależnej do nauki oraz filozofii, charakteryzującej koncepcje Joachima Metallmanna, Stanisława Ignacego Witkiewicza i Bolesława Józefa Gaweckiego.

Stephena C. Meyera koncepcja „podpisu w komórce” a filozoficzne podstawy nauki

Author(s): Małgorzata Gazda / Language(s): Polish Issue: 13/2016

This article presents Stephen C. Meyer’s concept of “signature in the cell”, which he develops as an advocate of the intelligent design theory. He argues that invoking an intelligent cause is the only adequate explanation for the origin of genetic information. In so doing, he violates methodological naturalism, which is currently considered to be a fundamental rule of science; this rule affirms that permissible scientific explanations invoke only natural processes and mechanisms. Instead, for Meyer the fundamental methodological rule of science is to meet the criterion of causal adequacy. In that manner he wants to make his concept a permissible scientific explanation. However, this would require a significant change in the philosophical foundations of science.

Naturalizm metodologiczny w nauce — dylemat teisty

Author(s): Andrzej Zabołotny / Language(s): Polish Issue: 13/2016

Science is considered by many to be a specific human project, the purpose of which is to gain knowledge about the universe without any reference to supernatural realities. This approach may cause a dilemma for Christian scientists: how should one integrate theistic convictions with the prevailing naturalism of scientific practice? The usual way to solve this problem is to claim that naturalism is only a purely methodological principle of science. In this article a few different ways of understanding naturalism are considered, together with their philosophical consequences. It is suggested that the supposedly merely methodological principle has significant ontological components, which do not allow any direct actions of God in physical reality. In the last section, two different weaker versions of naturalism are suggested, which allow theists to affirm science’s aim to investigate the natural world, without contradicting the basic tenets of Christian theology.

Naturalizm i jego rola w nauce

Author(s): Leonard Brand / Language(s): Polish Issue: 13/2016

The philosophy of Naturalism dominates scientific thinking, for reasons that can be understood from review of the history of scientific thought. This article evaluates the nature and implications of Naturalism when several components are examined separately. Philosophical Naturalism rejects the possibility that God exists. It is clearly a philosophy, cannot be tested by science, and will not be discussed further in this paper. Methodological Naturalism (MN) is simply a method for doing science that does not accept any supernatural explanations. It seems, on the surface, to be harmless and a necessary part of the scientific method. However, since modern scientists working in areas of experimental, observational science do not seem to puzzle over whether they should invoke the supernatural in their explanations, it seems difficult to claim that MN is necessary in this part of science. However, in the study of history (geological or biological history, e.g.) it is important to decide what to do with MN. This article claims that when we can examine evidence for certain historical events, they are legitimate subjects for science, even if science cannot examine all the possible causes for those events. An example would be evidence for very rapid and extensive geological processes that may suggest a (divinely initiated) global flood as the cause.

Projekt jako kryterium demarkacji

Author(s): Mario A. López / Language(s): Polish Issue: 13/2016

Methodological naturalism, though inexplicit in the denial of purpose, operates exclusively under the tenets of ontological naturalism and, therefore, proceeds only by way of the empirical and naturalistic. A more neutral epistemology is less presumptive and would allow science to flourish without the strictures of such a philosophical commitment. The task of divorcing science from methodological naturalism requires the abandonment of the idea that the structure of knowledge, or justified belief, requires no epistemic foundation and that inferential justification possess a uniquely superior epistemic status in the sciences than that which is non-inferentially known. As I see it, the persistent problem of science, and thus the criterion of demarcation that undergirds it, is two-fold. First, it is assumed that only inferential knowledge is genuinely justified, and second, that theories must be, at the very least, theoretically falsifiable.In this paper, I intend to provide a criterion of demarcating science that is practical and heuristically useful to spur scientific progress. My proposition does not presuppose the causal powers of chance and necessity. Instead, it forces the scientist to appreciate the ontological characteristics of nature and to leave the question of causation completely open, thereby, avoiding the pitfalls that ontological naturalism, and its faithful ally, methodological naturalism, habitually impose on science.

Teologia naturalna, naturalizm metodologiczny i „żółwie do samego dołu”

Author(s): Del Ratzsch / Language(s): Polish Issue: 13/2016

Natural theology has not been held in particularly high regard during the past century and one half. However, recent developments both within science and within philosophy of science offer some new possibilities and resources. In what follows I explore some areas and structures within which natural theological potential might (in principle) emerge. I further argue that the current weapon of choice against substantive science/religion intertwining — methodological naturalism — not only fails as an inviolable norm, thus leaving the possibility of a genuine natural theology intact, but that it may even have unhappy theological consequences.

Program badawczy SETI a teoria inteligentnego projektu

Author(s): Adam Trybus / Language(s): Polish Issue: 13/2016

In some publications dealing with the theory of intelligent design (or perhaps one should say, a theory of intelligent design, as there seem to be no universally accepted definition) one encounters an argument that the SETI research programme is, in a way, related to design detection and hence is a “version” of the theory of intelligent design. This article, by analysing the article that is foundational for SETI describing the assumptions behind this research programme, aims at showing that such a comparison of SETI and the theory of intelligent design is not justified as it is based on a simplified — and wrong — understanding of what the SETI researchers do. To this end, I compare SETI with both broad and narrow understanding of a theory of intelligent design, in both cases pointing to difficulties related to showing that SETI is a “version” of the considered theory of intelligent design. The main obstacle being that within SETI one assumes the existence of a given artefact (in this case a signal from another civilisation) rather than tries to prove that such an artefact does exist (to detect design, in the lingo of the supporters of the theory of intelligent design). In case of the narrow understanding of a theory of intelligent design, attempting to “mould” one theory so that it resembles the other shows that such an endeavour is deeply flawed, as exemplified in the text.

Dyskusja nad artykułem Adama Trybusa, „Program badawczy SETI a teoria inteligentnego projektu”

Author(s): Piotr Bylica,Małgorzata Gazda,Kazimierz Jodkowski,Krzysztof J. Kilian,Dariusz Sagan / Language(s): Polish Issue: 13/2016

This text is a record of the discussion on the paper “Program badawczy SETI a teoria inteligentnego projektu” [The SETI Research Programme and the Theory of Intelligent Design] by Adam Trybus on a seminar of the Zielona Góra Local Group “Science and Religion” held at the Institute of Philosophy, the University of Zielona Góra. The author argues that comparing the theory of intelligent design and the SETI research programme does not form a valid argument for the scientific character of the former. During the discussion, its participants indicate errors and omissions of the presented paper and discuss various issues related to the described subject area.

Kosmoekologia, etyka ekoholistyczna, hipoteza Gai-Uranosa, psychologia głębi, nieświadomość zbiorowa, noosfera, astrologia medyczna, medycyna antropozoficzna, mędrcy Dalekiego Wschodu i inne ucieszne banialuki

Author(s): Kazimierz Jodkowski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 13/2016

Review of: Honorata Korpikiewicz, Kosmoekologia. Obraz zjawisk, Wydawnictwo UAM, Poznań 2006, s. 203; Honorata Korpikiewicz, Kosmoekologia z elementami etyki holistycznej. Hipoteza Gai-Uranosa, Wydawnictwo Prodruk, Poznań 2002, s. 321.

Filozofia w tzw. wielkiej nauce

Author(s): Jacek Poznański / Language(s): Polish Issue: 1/2017

Both our understanding of the term “science”, and that which it is employed to refer to, have undergone significant changes over the centuries. The 20th century, in particular, has seen important transformations within science and, in consequence, heated debate. One important transformation, rarely noticed by philosophers of science, has been the emergence of large scale research projects of the sort oen referred to as “big science”. Such projects require science to be organized, and function, in quite new ways. eir influence upon science, construed as an activity and an institution, has been very great indeed — as has been their impact on our understanding of what it is that such activities ultimately produce (theories, hypotheses). The aim of this article is to identify and spell out the philosophical aspects of this scenario as it pertains to science. I begin with an outline of the historical development of big science. en, with reference to other scholars, I try to establish a definition of it. I briefly point to some developments in 20th century philosophy of science, and argue for the need to construct a distinctive philosophy of big science itself. e latter, I claim, should construe the philosophy of science in terms broad enough to be adequate for the analysis of a number of issues emerging in the context of the most developed branches of the natural sciences. I review a selection of these issues in the last part of my article.

Problematyka filozoficzna w dorobku pisarskim Wojciecha Tylkowskiego SJ

Author(s): Bogdan Lisiak / Language(s): Polish Issue: 31/2017

The article presents the issue of philosophy and science cultivated by the Polish Jesuit, Fr Wojciech Tylkowski (1624-1695), a polymath viz. scientist of many varied interests. Tylkowski acted primarily as an educator and lecturer in philosophy at schools run by the Jesuit Order. Tylkowski aspired toward mastering all philosophical and natural science known to him. The notion of the complete scholar of the baroque period – the homo universalis – was a crucial factor in his way of thinking and scientific work. The synthesizing of all knowledge known to him marked the purpose of his writing. For this very reason he also led independent studies, which resulted in his writing activity in the fields of philosophy, theology, astronomy, mathematics, geography, technology, art, and even agriculture. Tylkowski practised philosophy in the spirit of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition. An important area of his writing initiative is the so-called philosophia curiosa, understood as philosophy that evokes in the mind of the recipient an interest in the world and knowledge of the subject. Tylkowski was an original representative of this style of practising philosophy and science. His books, especially those written in the popularized convention, the philosophia curiosa, were directed towards a wide circle of readers.

Jezuici i nauka

Author(s): Jacek Poznański / Language(s): Polish Issue: 2/2017

Does time exist in quantum gravity?

Author(s): Claus Kiefer / Language(s): English Issue: 59/2015

Time is absolute in standard quantum theory and dynamical in general relativity. The combination of both theories into a theory of quantum gravity leads therefore to a “problem of time”. In my essay, I investigate those consequences for the concept of time that may be drawn without a detailed knowledge of quantum gravity. The only assumptions are the experimentally supported universality of the linear structure of quantum theory and the recovery of general relativity in the classical limit. Among the consequences are the fundamental timelessness of quantum gravity, the approximate nature of a semiclassical time, and the correlation of entropy with the size of the Universe.

Granice fizyki w kosmologii

Author(s): Leszek M. Sokołowski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 59/2015

The message is that physics has an „outward bound” of scientific inquiry in the field of cosmology. I present it in the historical development. Physics and astronomy, developing since the seventeenth century, inherited from the early Greek philosophers the conception that the Universe as a whole is invariable. In nineteenth century this conception in conjunction with the conception of eternity of the Universe (being a philosophical conclusion from the conservation laws of mass and energy) gave rise to contradictions with other laws of physics indicating that cosmology is not a branch of physics since the notion of the Universe is not a physical one. Cosmology returned to physics as its important branch due to the advent of general relativity theory and the discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation. Modern cosmology generates fundamental problems creating real limits to inquiries in physics viewed as an empirical science. The very notion of the Universe shows that the scientific method reaches there limits of its applicability. Does „to exist” mean „to be observed by someone”? Should the definition of the Universe be based on a current physical theory, e.g. on Einstein’s general relativity, giving rise to a kind of mathematical instability? Is the fashionable concept of the „multiverse” a physical one or is a purely metaphysical notion in a scientific disguise? If the Universe is unique (as we believe), is it meaningful to describe it in the framework of physics, which by its method always assumes that the number of objects it describes, is unlimited? Apart from these permanent philosophical problems there are concrete urgent problems generated by cosmology: the nature of dark matter and dark energy. These two species of „substance” appear only in cosmology and do not fit the laboratory physics; contrary to the three centuries long tradition of modern science, now cosmology inspires physics in a troublesome way. A separate class of limits to physics is generated by the theorem in general relativity that the Universe emerged from an initial curvature singularity of the spacetime. At the singularity the whole scientific inquiry breaks down. Cosmology of the very early Universe suggests that in its evolution two specific epochs took place, that of quantum gravity and an inflationary epoch. The underlying them two physical theories are incomplete and seem to be inherently untestable. Furthermore, the experimentally verifiable physics cannot explain the origin of the initial conditions determining properties of the Universe which emerged from the singularity.