(Christian) Bioethical Dilemmas in Using Synthetic Biology and Nanotechnologies

Author(s): Antonio Sandu,Ana Caras (Frunza) / Language(s): English / Issue: 35/2013

Ethical dilemmas raised by the use of nanotechnology in medical practice can be viewed from several perspectives: religious spiritualist perspective, the perspective of human dignity (nanotechnologies can be thought of as an affront to human dignity), the issue of controversial choice. The article aims to expose some bioethical dilemmas in using synthetic biology and nanotechnologies. Nowadays is often brought into discussion the fact it is possible to appear in the future new human species resulted not via natural selection and evolution, but through the demiurgic effect of technology development in areas such as: synthetic biology, genetics, neurobiology and neurosciences, prosthesis technology and not least of artificial intelligence research. We will also refer into this paper at the possible raised challenges to ethicists who are oriented towards an ethics of species. Those challenges are raised right from the dawn of a consciousness of species, a social construction generated by changes of the meaning of belonging to humanity. During our article we argue that medical technology, especially genetics, medical assisted human reproduction and not least synthetic biology, require a rethinking ethical meanings of applying those technologies in everyday practices.

(Mock-)Thinking about the Same

Author(s): Alberto Voltolini / Language(s): English / Issue: 3/2017

In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are constituted either by what they are about, their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition-like intentional contents, one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on two factors: a) what sort of metaphysical nature intentional objects effectively possess, once they are conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001, 2013); b) whether such objects really belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is. According to this solution, two thoughts are about the same nonexistent intentional object iff i) that object satisfies the identity criterion for objects of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is, independently of whether they exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither realist nor antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about the same nonexistent intentionale; otherwise, they are simply constituted by the same intentional content (provided that this content is not equated with that intentionale). Third, armed with this solution, I will hold that one can find a suitable treatment of the specific and related problem of whether different people may mock-think about the same thing, even if there really is no such thing. Finally, I will try to show that this treatment can be also applied to the case in which different thoughts are, according to phenomenology, about the same intentionale and yet this intentionale is of a kind such that there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are about the same intentionale only fictionally.

(Nie)obiektywna podmiotowość

Author(s): Piotr Piotrowski / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 36/2016

In this article, I analyze the issue of subjectivity in the form in which it appears in Charles Taylor’s and Richard Rorty’s writings. Positions of these philosophers are generally regarded as contradictory. I will, however, argued that the position on subjectivity represented by Rorty finds its complementation in Taylor’s concept. To do this, I will show firstly that both Rorty and Taylor use the category of contingency, presenting some common thesis about subjectivity. This way I will show that the location of the category of subjectivity and the scope of its use in each of them concept is closely related to the understanding of objectivity accepted by each of them. This will allow then to reconstruct the concept of subjectivity presented by Taylor and Rorty. Next, in the conclusion, I will present such a summary of those two standpoints, which will include justification of the thesis of their complementarity.

(spr.) Sprawozdanie z konferencji naukowej „Wokół poszukiwania życia w kosmosie”. Instytut Filozofii UKSW, Warszawa, 16 grudnia 2015 r.

Author(s): Adam Swiezynski / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 1/2016

20th Cracow Methodological Conference: Philosophy in Science

Author(s): Piotr Urbanczyk / Language(s): English / Issue: 61/2016

The 20th Cracow Methodological Conference took place on May 30-31, 2016, at the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences in Kraków. The meeting brought together physicists, cosmologists, mathematicians and philosophers interested in research program called philosophy in science started and popularized by Michał Heller. It is worth noting that the 20th Cracow Methodological Conference was dedicated to Professor Heller and can be considered as a contribution to the celebration of the 80th anniversary of his birthday.

A Bottom-up Discursive Approach to Genetically Modified Organisms

Author(s): Camelia-Mihaela Cmeciu / Language(s): English / Issue: 11/2017

The debate on genetically modified foods has been characterized by a heteroglosia of voices, ranging from experts, authorities, to scholars, community organizations, media, or consumers. Within such a context where there have been observed various food safety scares over the past decades or some public ignorance regarding the use of biotechnology related to food issues, the Debating Europe platform launched debates on arguments for and against GMOs. Thus citizens turn into prosumers of content regarding food safety and (de)legitimators of EU policies and/or other social institutions. In our study of the comments posted by e-citizens on four debates on GM foods launched on the Debating Europe platform, we will use framing theory (Goffman, 1974; Entman, 1993; Wynne, 2001; Cook et al., 2004) and the Integrated Crisis Mapping Model (Jin et al., 2012) for negative emotions and Plutchik’s wheel of emotions (2001) for positive emotions to determine the salience of (de)legitimating frames employed by the supporters and opponents of GM foods, and to examine the role of affective stance in the evaluation of the social actors related to GMOs. Using QDA miner and WordStat, computer assisted qualitative data analysis softwares, we will conduct a content, cluster and correspondence analysis of the (de)legitimating frames and emotion valences. Whereas the content analysis provides an insight into the frequency of frames used by e-debaters and into the key lexical items that express evaluation and affective stance related to GM foods, the explorative analyses reveal the types of (sub)clusters which prevail in the e-debaters’ comments on GM foods. The findings of this study suggest that e-citizens mainly perceive the issue of GMO through a political frame associated with anger and a health frame associated with fright.

A Contextual Concept of Science

Author(s): Sumei Cheng / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2016

The contextual concept of science regards a scientific theory as a whole simulation for the mechanism of natural world under the given context. It argues that a scientific theory is to understand the reality only in the sense of intentionality in the process of reality simulation, rather than to describe reality in the sense of one-to-one correspondence. This concept of understanding reality is totally different from that of describing reality.Compared with the realist approaches and the anti-realist approach, the contextual approach has the following advantages: (1) it contributes to bridge the communication between the preachers of scientism and the humanists;(2) it has helped to solve the problem of underdetermination faced by scientific realism; (3) it is relatively easy to understand the correction about the concept and theory; (4) it could reflect the true process of science more properly. Therefore, it is a more promising and convincing new perspective to understand science.

A criterion for realism, with an application to behavioral economic models

Author(s): Gustavo Marques,Diego Weisman / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2015

Many economists working within the framework of behavioral economics (BE) label the conventional way of modeling as unrealistic, and consider their own approach as more realistic than the standard practice. However, a criterion for realism is lacking in behavioral economics literature. This paper offers a simple criterion for predicating realism to economic models, and provides an illustration of such criterion at work on a particular BE model.

A Critique of Compound Presentism

Author(s): Tabitha Taylor / Language(s): English / Issue: 4/2016

In this paper I argue that Barry Dainton’s proposed Compound Presentist view in (Dainton, 2010) is unsuccessful in solving two of the problems that Presentism incurs; firstly, the relation/relata problem and secondly, the clash with Truthmaker Theory. I begin by outlining Presentism, and describing its advantages and disadvantages. I then describe Dainton’s Compound Presentism in Section Two before critiquing it in Section Three. Finally, I conclude that Presentists must do more work to defend their view against the two problems I explore.

A Different Take on Humanities

Author(s): Wlodzimierz Bolecki / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2015

The foreword to this issue focuses on the core functional differences between the humanities and hard sciences (i.e. different approaches to such phenomena as language, translation, teamwork, writing, discipline.s history, publishing, tradition, innovation). Yet, this dichotomy is questioned in the conlusion. The author argues that whenever human artifacts are at stake, both the humanites and experimental sciences are equally hard, because they inquire the same matter, ie. how the products of human cognitive activities were created and what are their social functions. Therefore, the author calls for a new model for interdisciplinary studies.

A methodological analysis of the scientific research

Author(s): Kadzik OGANYAN / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2017

The article addresses the structure of scientific research in the context of the methodology of science. This goal is realized through the concrete material of physical theory, detailing the structure of scientific research and its elements; its process and the laws it obeys; its results, which leadthe process; its motives, e.g. the "driving forces" of research and the role of philosophy in the process.The paperexamines the theoretical phase of researches as a synthesis of the empirical and the speculative,in contrast to the existing literature that presents the opposition between theoretical and empirical research. The steps of knowledge of the objective laws in a particular area are analysed: the empirical research,the non-fundamental theoretical,the speculative, and the fundamental theoretical; this analysis allows the generalization of the patterns of scientific research. Particular attention is paid to the speculative research and its main elements. The“methodological mechanism” of formation of new fundamental conceptions in science is unravelled. The essence of this mechanism consists of some non-logical cognitive operations (idealization, choice of “Gestalt”, substitution, generalization). The knowledge of corresponding combinations of these operations made by the investigator facilitates the process of research, decreases the probability of errors in the scientific cognition.

A Minimalist Framework for Thought Experiment Analysis

Author(s): Marek Picha / Language(s): English / Issue: 4/2016

Thought experiments are frequently vague and obscure hypothetical scenarios that are difficult to assess. The paper proposes a simple model of thought experiments. In the first part, I introduce two contemporary frameworks for thought experiment analysis: an experimentalist approach that relies on similarities between real and thought experiment, and a reasonist approach focusing on the answers provided by thought experimenting. Further, I articulate a minimalist approach in which thought experiment is considered strictly as doxastic mechanism based on imagination. I introduce the basic analytical tool that allows us to differentiate an experimental core from an attached argumentation. The last section is reserved for discussion. I address several possible questions concerning adequacy of minimalistic definition and analysis.

A Pessimistic Induction against Scientific Antirealism

Author(s): Seungbae Park / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2014

There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories were revealed to be false.

A philosophical investigation in machine understanding. The case of implicit meaning

Author(s): Maria Wilkowska / Language(s): English / Issue: 12/2013

The question of machine thinking and understanding, once initiated by Alan Turing, has puzzled scholars from various disciplines. This paper aims at investigating some of the facets involved in the topic of machine language understanding with particular interest devoted to indirect meaning comprehension (more specifically, the implicature). So far as the subject under examination – the chatbot – manages to understand directly conveyed information, still much is to be done with respect to implicit data in which everyday messages (formulated in ordinary language) abound. This situation generates a number of not only hard-science questions but also, more importantly, given the viewpoint of this paper, it gives rise to a considerable amount of philosophically- oriented and frequently neglected issues and dilemmas too. This study is a brief investigation of exactly those phenomena.

A PLEA FOR THE PLURALITY OF FUNCTION

Author(s): Tony Cheng / Language(s): English / Issue: 15/2016

In this paper I defend a pluralistic approach in understanding function, both in biological and other contexts. Talks about function are ubiquitous and crucial in biology, and it might be the key to bridge the “manifest image” and the “scientific image” identified by Sellars (1962). However, analysis of function has proven to be extremely difficult. The major puzzle is to make sense of “time-reversed causality”: how can property P be the cause of its realizer R? For example, “pumping blood” is a property of hearts, but a property of hearts cannot be the cause of the presence of hearts, since properties cannot predate their realizers and be causes of them. In section 2 I discuss Wright’s etiological analysis, Cummins’ causal-role analysis, and their critics. In section 3 I defend a version of the “consensus without unity” strategy proposed by Godfrey-Smith from Christopher Boorse’s recent critique (2002). In Section 4 I conclude by reflecting on the relation between functional discourses and physicalism.

A Process Identity: The Aesthetics of the Technoself. Governing Networking Societies

Author(s): Oana ?erban / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2016

The main aim of this article is to analyse the relationship between two innovative concepts—the technoself and process identity—from a perspective inspired by process ontology. The working hypothesis is that industrialized and mass societies entered into a post-industrial or informational sphere of capitalism, becoming networking societies—also known as knowledge-based societies—which closely followed their role in approaching the plural identity of the digital Subject and the surveillance practices exercised in its governance as correspondent models for the changes of the current reality. The first section of the article is devoted to research on the technoself, a concept recently introduced by Luppicini in 2013. Criticizing the technoself in terms of process ontology and as a result of digitalization, subjectivity, and technical rationality, I will argue that the constitution of digital subjects, as well as their interactions, should be defined in terms of processes. Therefore, I introduce the concept of process identity—which includes the technoself—and explain how this approach contributes to the development of different research fields (such as speculative realism and object-oriented ontology) and how it affects Floridi’s distinction between digital ontology and informational ontology. The second section focuses on the effects of the digital environment on self-constitution practices and techniques, virtual worlds experiencing what Foucault recognizes as the aesthetics of existence. In the final part, I confront Bentham’s and Foucault’s panopticism, arguing that based on what is accomplished by process identities, networking societies represent societies of control, not disciplinary ones, and consequently this distinction should be applied in governing virtual communities. In the end, I will explain why notions such as digital personae or databased selves are insufficient, and should be replaced by the concepts of process identity and technoself, respectively, in order to improve the models of governing networking societies.

A Reason to Avoid the Causal Construal of Dispositional Explanations

Author(s): Lilia Gurova / Language(s): English / Issue: 4/2017

Those who argue that dispositional explanations are genuine explanations usually construe them as causal explanations. There are several well-known arguments against the causal efficacy of dispositions, but there are as well demonstrations that on some minimal conditions, dispositions could be viewed as causally relevant to the effects which they are taken to explain. Although the latter position is generally tenable, it may be shown that in some important cases it is not a good idea to commit to a causal construal of dispositional explanations. The argument goes as follows: (1) Dispositional explanations are valued for certain specific extra-inferences which they allow us to draw; (2) The causal construal of dispositional explanations can account for some of these extra-inferences only on the assumption that the disposition is a common cause of its manifestations; (3) However, under certain circumstances, the common cause assumption is refuted on theoretical or empirical grounds; Therefore, (4) under certain circumstances, the causal construal of dispositional explanations cannot account for what these explanations are valued for. The latter conclusion is a reason to argue that in some cases at least, the causal construal of dispositional explanations should be avoided.

A Short Note on the Scientific Attitude, the Religious Attitude and the Surrational

Author(s): Bruno Marchal / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2016

We explain that the scientific attitude, with a “good understanding” of what is science, might be the most genuinely religious attitude, and that in fact, religion and science are much closer than what we are usually told. Nevertheless they cannot be identified effectively in any terrestrial applications without leading to inconsistency, but are truly, and thus non effectively, identical in the ever guessed true realm.

A Simple Model of Fields Including the Strong or Nuclear Force and a Cosmological Speculation

Author(s): David L. Spencer / Language(s): English / Issue: 17/2016

Reexamining the assumptions underlying the General Theory of Relativity and calling an object’s gravitational field its inertia, and acceleration simply resistance to that inertia, yields a simple field model where the potential (kinetic) energy of a particle at rest is its capacity to move when its inertial field becomes imbalanced. The model then attributes electromagnetic and strong forces to the effects of changes in basic particle shape. Following up on the model’s assumption that the relative intensity of a particle’s gravitational field is always inversely related to its perceived volume and assuming that all black holes spin, may create the possibility of a cosmic rebound where a final spinning black hole ends with a new Big Bang.

A transformation in islamic thought: the house of wisdom (bayt al-hikmah) in the context of occidentalism versus orientalism

Author(s): Ismail Tas / Language(s): English / Issue: XXIII/2011

The House of Wisdom (Bayt al-Hikmah) was built first as a library where the books on the sciences of the Ancients were kept. Under the sponsorship of the Caliph Al-Ma’m¯un (813–833), it developed into a scientific institute where the books on Ancient Greek philosophy were translated into Arabic. The Caliph acquired many Greek manuscripts and generously supported the translation activities in the House. By the end of the century, Arabic translation of the major works of the Greek philosophy and science had been completed. Thus, the Caliph and his House paved the way for the rise and flourish of Islamic philosophy and science.