A Pessimistic Induction against Scientific Antirealism

Author(s): Seungbae Park / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2014

There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories were revealed to be false.

A philosophical investigation in machine understanding. The case of implicit meaning

Author(s): Maria Wilkowska / Language(s): English / Issue: 12/2013

The question of machine thinking and understanding, once initiated by Alan Turing, has puzzled scholars from various disciplines. This paper aims at investigating some of the facets involved in the topic of machine language understanding with particular interest devoted to indirect meaning comprehension (more specifically, the implicature). So far as the subject under examination – the chatbot – manages to understand directly conveyed information, still much is to be done with respect to implicit data in which everyday messages (formulated in ordinary language) abound. This situation generates a number of not only hard-science questions but also, more importantly, given the viewpoint of this paper, it gives rise to a considerable amount of philosophically- oriented and frequently neglected issues and dilemmas too. This study is a brief investigation of exactly those phenomena.

A PLEA FOR THE PLURALITY OF FUNCTION

Author(s): Tony Cheng / Language(s): English / Issue: 15/2016

In this paper I defend a pluralistic approach in understanding function, both in biological and other contexts. Talks about function are ubiquitous and crucial in biology, and it might be the key to bridge the “manifest image” and the “scientific image” identified by Sellars (1962). However, analysis of function has proven to be extremely difficult. The major puzzle is to make sense of “time-reversed causality”: how can property P be the cause of its realizer R? For example, “pumping blood” is a property of hearts, but a property of hearts cannot be the cause of the presence of hearts, since properties cannot predate their realizers and be causes of them. In section 2 I discuss Wright’s etiological analysis, Cummins’ causal-role analysis, and their critics. In section 3 I defend a version of the “consensus without unity” strategy proposed by Godfrey-Smith from Christopher Boorse’s recent critique (2002). In Section 4 I conclude by reflecting on the relation between functional discourses and physicalism.

A posztmodern Don Quijote gebe paripájának Virtual Reality Show-ja avagy A virtuális valóság szélmalomharca az ember beteljesüléséért

Author(s): Dávid Diósi / Language(s): Hungarian / Issue: 2/2018

Unsere Welt verändert sich. Und das ist ohne Zweifel gut so. Die virtuelle Realität beeinflusst immer mehr auch die reale Welt. In vielen Bereichen ist dies sehr hilfreich (z. B. in der Industrie, in der Medizin, beim Militär, sowie in ganz normalen, alltäglichen/ privaten Bereichen, wie bei der Banküberweisung, beim Online-Einkaufen, beim Chatten), doch die VR verbirgt auch viele Gefahren. Der Mensch bewegt sich nämlich in diesen neuen Lebensräumen und wird – oft unwillkürlich – von den Täuschungen dieser Welt nicht bloß beeinflusst, sondern sogar grundlegend verändert. Die virtuelle Gewalt schafft eine gefährliche Scheinwelt. Unsere Gesellschaft ist voll von Schein-Realitäten. Es ist ein ständiger Kampf zwischen Schein und Sein, wo der Schein das Sein selbst wird. Doch die Virtualität ist nicht alles und alles ist nicht virtuell. Es gibt die alles bestimmende Wirklichkeit, die „wirklichste Wirklichkeit” (Hans Küng), die wir Gott nennen. Die Wirklichkeit Gottes kann zwar zum Schweigen gebracht werden, aber sie kann nicht gänzlich vernichtet werden. Früher oder später schreit das Schein-Leben nach dieser Wirklichkeit, nach der Wirklichkeit, die das Sein anspricht und vollendet. Die VR kann die Menschen nicht vollenden. So entpuppt sich die VR als der dürre Gaul von Don Quijote, der das Sein nie zu seinem (endgültigen) Erfüllung verhelfen kann, und ihre Bestrebung für die (ewige) Glückseligkeit der Menschen als ein aussichtloser, vergeblicher Kampf gegen Windmühlen.

A Pragmatist Dimension in Georg Henrik von Wright’s Philosophy

Author(s): Sami Pihlström / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2014

This paper reconsiders Georg Henrik von Wright’s theory of causation from the point of view of pragmatism. Given the conceptual link between causation and action, von Wright’s position might be reinterpreted along pragmatist lines, even though he never explicitly developed his views with reference to pragmatism. However, the dichotomy between the ontological and the conceptual presupposed by von Wright may also be criticized from a pragmatist perspective.

A Process Identity: The Aesthetics of the Technoself. Governing Networking Societies

Author(s): Oana Șerban / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2016

The main aim of this article is to analyse the relationship between two innovative concepts—the technoself and process identity—from a perspective inspired by process ontology. The working hypothesis is that industrialized and mass societies entered into a post-industrial or informational sphere of capitalism, becoming networking societies—also known as knowledge-based societies—which closely followed their role in approaching the plural identity of the digital Subject and the surveillance practices exercised in its governance as correspondent models for the changes of the current reality. The first section of the article is devoted to research on the technoself, a concept recently introduced by Luppicini in 2013. Criticizing the technoself in terms of process ontology and as a result of digitalization, subjectivity, and technical rationality, I will argue that the constitution of digital subjects, as well as their interactions, should be defined in terms of processes. Therefore, I introduce the concept of process identity—which includes the technoself—and explain how this approach contributes to the development of different research fields (such as speculative realism and object-oriented ontology) and how it affects Floridi’s distinction between digital ontology and informational ontology. The second section focuses on the effects of the digital environment on self-constitution practices and techniques, virtual worlds experiencing what Foucault recognizes as the aesthetics of existence. In the final part, I confront Bentham’s and Foucault’s panopticism, arguing that based on what is accomplished by process identities, networking societies represent societies of control, not disciplinary ones, and consequently this distinction should be applied in governing virtual communities. In the end, I will explain why notions such as digital personae or databased selves are insufficient, and should be replaced by the concepts of process identity and technoself, respectively, in order to improve the models of governing networking societies.

A Reason to Avoid the Causal Construal of Dispositional Explanations

Author(s): Lilia Gurova / Language(s): English / Issue: 4/2017

Those who argue that dispositional explanations are genuine explanations usually construe them as causal explanations. There are several well-known arguments against the causal efficacy of dispositions, but there are as well demonstrations that on some minimal conditions, dispositions could be viewed as causally relevant to the effects which they are taken to explain. Although the latter position is generally tenable, it may be shown that in some important cases it is not a good idea to commit to a causal construal of dispositional explanations. The argument goes as follows: (1) Dispositional explanations are valued for certain specific extra-inferences which they allow us to draw; (2) The causal construal of dispositional explanations can account for some of these extra-inferences only on the assumption that the disposition is a common cause of its manifestations; (3) However, under certain circumstances, the common cause assumption is refuted on theoretical or empirical grounds; Therefore, (4) under certain circumstances, the causal construal of dispositional explanations cannot account for what these explanations are valued for. The latter conclusion is a reason to argue that in some cases at least, the causal construal of dispositional explanations should be avoided.

A Review of Christian Arnsperger, Full Spectrum Economics. Towards an Inclusive and Emancipatory Social Science, Routledge, 2010, 277 pp.

Author(s): Irina Zgreabãn / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2010

A review of David Colander, The Making of a European Economist, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2009, 190 pp.

Author(s): Mariana Nicolae / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2009

A review of George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton University Press, 2009, 264 pp.

Author(s): Cornel Ban / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2009

A Review of Jean-François Ponsot and Sergio Rossi (eds), The Political Economy of Monetary Circuits: Tradition and Change in Post-Keynesian Economics, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 264 pp.

Author(s): Rémi Stellian / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2010

A Review of Marshall and Schumpeter on Evolution: Economic Sociology of Capitalist Development, Edited by Yuichi Shionoya and Tamotsu Nishizawa, Cheltenham UK, Edward Elgar, 2008, 285 pp.

Author(s): Andreas Stamate / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2009

A Review of Moral Markets: the Critical Role of Values in the Economy, Edited by Paul J. Zak, Princeton/Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2008, 386 pp.

Author(s): Thomas Wells / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2009

A review of Peter Söderbaum, Understanding Sustainability Economics. Towards Pluralism in Economics, London, Sterling/VA: earthscan, 2008, 158 pages

Author(s): Karl Georg Zinn / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2009

A Review of Piero Ferri, Minsky’s Moment. An Insider’s View on the Economics of Hyman Minsky, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019, 252 pp., ISBN 978-1-78897-372-4

Author(s): ANDREAS STAMATE-ŞTEFAN / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2019

A review of Ralph Harris in His Own Words, the Selected Writings of Lord Harris, Edited by Colin Robinson, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar and the Institute of Economic Affairs, 2008, 343 pages

Author(s): Valentin Cojanu / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2009

A review of Stephen T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey, The Cult of Statistical Significance. How the Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice, and Lives, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2008, 320 pages

Author(s): Tamás Dusek / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2009

A Review of The Genesis of Innovation: Systemic Linkages between Knowledge and the Market, Edited by Blandine Laperche, Dimitri Uzunidis, Nick von Tunzelmann, Cheltenham UK, Edward Elgar, 2008, 285 pp

Author(s): Dana Gârdu / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2009

A review of the Granger-causality fallacy

Author(s): Mariusz Maziarz / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2015

Methods used to infer causal relations from data rather than knowledge of mechanisms are most helpful and exploited only if the theoretical background is insufficient or experimentation impossible. The review of literature shows that when an investigator has no prior knowledge of the researched phenomenon, no result of the Granger-causality test has any epistemic utility due to different possible interpretations. (1) Rejecting the null in one of the tests can be interpreted as either a true causal relation, opposite direction of the true causation, instant causality, time series cointegration, not frequent enough sampling, etc. (2) Bi-directional Granger causality can be read either as instant causality or common cause fallacy. (3) Non-rejection of both nulls possibly means either indirect or nonlinear causality, or no causal relation.

A Short Note on the Scientific Attitude, the Religious Attitude and the Surrational

Author(s): Bruno Marchal / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2016

We explain that the scientific attitude, with a “good understanding” of what is science, might be the most genuinely religious attitude, and that in fact, religion and science are much closer than what we are usually told. Nevertheless they cannot be identified effectively in any terrestrial applications without leading to inconsistency, but are truly, and thus non effectively, identical in the ever guessed true realm.