Search results for: OSW Reports in Series Title

A neighbour discovered anew. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary’s relations with Ukraine

Author(s): Jakub Groszkowski,Tadeusz Iwanski,Andrzej Sadecki / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2017

The Ukrainian-Russian war has prompted Bratislava, Prague and Budapest to take a new look at their eastern neighbourhood. Cooperation with Ukraine is gaining momentum, although relations with Russia are still the top priority for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Diplomatic contacts with Kyiv have been rekindled, and the Visegrad Group has intensified its political support for Ukraine within the EU. The big success in the relationship between the V4 countries and Ukraine has been their booming energy cooperation. However, the pro-Russian gestures made by some leading politicians from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary remain a challenge for relations between Bratislava, Budapest, Prague and Kyiv. Co-operation between Budapest and Kyiv is further complicated by the dispute over the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. Kyiv's top priority in foreign policy has traditionally been cooperation with wealthier countries, as well as those states seen as the key players in NATO and the EU (especially the US, Germany and France). Kyiv treats the Visegrad Group primarily as a useful forum for lobbying for Ukraine's interests in the EU and NATO. On the other hand, it is less interested in using the V4 as a platform for strengthening regional and bilateral cooperation with the countries of Central Europe.

Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh: unfrozen conflicts between Russia and the West

Author(s): Wojciech Bartuzi,Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz,Krzysztof Strachota / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2008

The Southern Caucasus is the site of three armed conflicts with separatist backgrounds, which have remained unsolved for years: the conflicts in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan's conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (including the areas around Nagorno-Karabakh which were seized by Armenian separatists in the course of the war). Neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan have had any control over the disputed areas since the early 1990s. Both states are simultaneously in conflict with the separatists' informal patrons, respectively Russia and Armenia.

Belarus 2006

Author(s): Rafal Sadowski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2007

The presidential election of 19 March 2006, which Alyaksandr Lukashenka won, played an important role in developing the dictatorial political regime in Belarus. In order to ensure Lukashenka's victory, the authorities employed repressive and undemocratic methods, which since then have become permanent elements of the political system in Belarus. They included legal and administrative measures to limit the citizens' freedom, arbitrary ways of applying these measures, actions by the state security institutions intended to intimidate the public, a large-scale state propaganda campaign, and restrictions on civil liberties and freedom of speech. The presidential election strengthened Alyaksandr Lukashenka's political position, as the president extended his rule by another five years to 2011. It also reinforced the repression apparatus, consolidated the ruling group and ensured that the democrats remained marginalised. This has ensured the stability of the Belarusian regime and preserved the country's specific political and economic system.This report aims to present the situation in Belarus since the presidential election in March 2006.Part I, devoted to the internal situation, is a description of the internal political scene, i.e. the ruling camp and the opposition. It also includes a section on the prevailing moods in Belarusian society. Another section presents the economic situation in Belarus and the government's economic policy.Part II examines the foreign relations of Belarus, and consists of two sections: the first describes the Belarusian government's relations with Russia, its single most important foreign partner, and the second its relations with Western countries, i.e. the EU member states and NATO countries. Finally, the last part contains predictions of future developments in Belarus.

Between energy security and energy market integration

Author(s): Zuzanna Brunarska,Aleksandra Jarosiewicz,Agata Loskot-Strachota,Iwona Wisniewska / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

For many years the European Union has been improving the efficient use of energy resources and yet the demand for energy in the EU continues to increase. When Europe belonged to one of the world’s key energy markets with relatively easy access to energy resources, growing energy needs were not seen as a source of concern. Today, however, as the competition for energy resources is intensifying and the global position of the EU energy market is being challenged by growing economies in the developing countries, above all China and India, the EU needs to adopt bold policies to guarantee the sustainable supply of energy.This report argues the EU needs to develop a fully-fledged external energy policy; i.e. a common, coherent, strategic approach that build bridges between the interests and needs of the EU integrated energy market on the one hand and supplier countries on the other.The EU’s external energy policy has two main objectives. The first one is to ensure a sustainable, stable and cost-effective energy supply. The second is to promote energy market integration and regulatory convergence with neighbouring countries (often but not always this supports the achievement of the first objective). However, in order to improve its effectiveness, the EU’s external energy policy needs to be seen in a broader economic and political context. Any progress in energy cooperation with third countries is contingent upon the EU’s general stance and offer to those countries.

Chasing globalisation. Germany's economic relations with the BRIC countries

Author(s): Konrad Poplawski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2013

The Eurozone crisis has forced German exporters to speed up their expansion onto the emerging markets, in particular Brazil, Russia, India and China. The development observed in those countries has become an important substitute for the consequences of the economic slowdown in Europe.To illustrate the scale of cooperation between Germany and the BRIC countries, it is enough to quote figures concerning Germany’s trade. Between 2000-2011 the share of trade with the BRIC states in the entire German trade exchange rose from 5.5% to 13.3%. In the same period opposite tendencies were observed in the figures relating to trade with the USA, whose share in German trade fell from 9.6% to 6.2%.The report discusses the major tendencies present in Germany’s cooperation with the BRIC countries, and examines how the German state supports German companies in their business activities on these markets. The main method used to investigate these processes is the economic analysis of trade and capital flows between Germany and the BRIC countries, supplemented by conclusions drawn from discussions with German experts.The main issue discussed in the text is the role of the state in stimulating the expansion of German companies onto the BRIC markets. In the context of these activities, political relations and the proper use of export and investment guarantees and development aid are of major importance.

Closing the gap? Military co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea

Author(s): Tomasz Daborowski,Mateusz Gniazdowski,Justyna Gotkowska,Jakub Groszkowski,Andrzej Sadecki,Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2012

The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.

Development co-operation made in Germany

Author(s): Kamil Frymark / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2015

For years, development policy has attracted the attention of public opinion in Germany and been strongly supported by the public. It takes the form of an agreement between equal partners who draw mutual benefits from this co-operation. German development policy is structured to support the German economy. This policy and the state’s significant share in development projects reduces the investment risk incurred by German entrepreneurs who engage their assets in developing countries. Furthermore, bilateral co-operation successfully builds the made in Germany brand as regards both development policy and further economic co-operation, making the beneficiaries of development co-operation indirectly dependent on German goods and services. Development co-operation, along with diplomacy and defence policy, is the third pillar of German foreign policy. In this context it plays above all a preventive function in the case of international conflicts. Investing funds as part of development projects in areas affected by military conflicts or facing a high risk of military conflict is viewed by Germany as its contribution to overcoming crises or removing their causes. This goes hand in hand with the conviction that international conflicts, wherever they appear, adversely affect the German economy, which heavily relies on exports.

Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination?

Author(s): Agata Loskot-Strachota / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2009

The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated.

Gazprom's expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination?

Author(s): Agata Loskot-Strachota,Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2008

The energy sector, especially with regard to natural gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the character of this co-operation has given rise to increasing doubts both in Brussels and among the EU member states. The questions have emerged whether this co-operation does not make the EU excessively dependent on Russian energy supplies, and whether Gazprom's presence in the EU will not allow Moscow to interfere in the proces of devising the EU energy policy. This report is intended to present the factual base and data necessary to provide accurate answers to the foregoing questions. The first part of the report presents the scope and character of Gazprom's economic presence in the EU member states. The second part shows the presence of the EU investors in Russia. The data presented has been provided by the International Energy Agency, European Commission, the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Some of the data is the result of calculations made by the Centre for Eastern Studies' experts who were basing on the data provided by energy companies, the specialist press and news agencies.

German Networks in the East. German soft power in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the South Caucasus

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2010

In order to implement its interests in foreign, security and economic policy, Germany has employed soft power tools from such areas as public diplomacy and policy for development, culture and science. Contact network building and political lobbying, development co-operation programmes and foreign cultural and science policy are vital for supporting the German economy – which relies heavily on exports – and for the country’s ambition to gain the status of a European centre of technology and innovation, and to have a stronger influence on the EU’s external activity. From the German perspective, priority areas for the application of these tools include: the countries of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This is an effect of the geographical proximity and of markets opening up, the indispensability of modernisation for the economies of those countries, the threats to Germany’s ‘soft’ security and the development of relations between the EU and those countries. German activity in those countries is independent of the political situation and is part of a long-term strategy aimed at reinforcing the position of Germany as their key European economic and political partner.

Germany's energy transformation: difficult beginnings

Author(s): Marta Zawilska-Florczuk,Konrad Poplawski,Piotr Buras / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2012

Initiated in May 2011, several months after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Germany’s energy transformation (Energiewende) has been presented as an irrevocable plan, and – due to the speed of change required – it represents a new quality in Germany’s energy strategy. Its main objectives include: nuclear energy being phased out by 2022, the development of renewable energy sources (OZE), the expansion of transmission networks, the construction of new conventional power plants and an improvement in energy efficiency.The cornerstone of the strategy is the development of renewable energy. Under Germany's amended renewable energy law, the proportion of renewable energy in electricity generation is supposed to increase steadily from the current level of around 20% to approximately 38% in 2020. In 2030, renewable energy is expected to account for 50% of electricity generation. This is expected to increase to 65% in 2040 and to as much as 80% in 2050. The impact of the Energiewende is not limited to the sphere of energy supplies. In the medium and long term, it will change not only to the way the German economy operates, but also the functioning of German society and the state. Facing difficulties with the expansion of transmission networks, the excessive cost of building wind farms, and problems with the stability of electricity supplies, especially during particularly cold winters, the federal government has so far tended to centralise power and limit the independence of the German federal states with regard to their respective energy policies, justifying this with the need for greater co-ordination. The Energiewende may also become the beginning of a "third industrial revolution", i.e. a transition to a green economy and a society based on sustainable development. This will require a new "social contract" that will redefine the relations between the state, society and the economy. Negotiating such a contract will be one of the greatest challenges for German policy in the coming years.

Homo Jihadicus

Author(s): Maciej Falkowski,Józef Lang / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2015

The post-Soviet area, along with the countries of the Middle East, North Africa and Western Europe, have become one of the main global exporters of Islamic militants. Currently on the territory of Syria, and to a lesser extent of Iraq, there are several thousands of foreign fighters from the post-Soviet states. The causes of the war migration from the former USSR states to the Middle East have their roots in the dynamic changes taking place inside Islam in the post-Soviet area: primarily the growth of Salafism and militant Islam, as well as the internationalisation and globalisation of the local Islam. The deep political, economic, social and ideological changes which Muslims underwent after the collapse of the USSR, led to the creation of a specific group within them, for which Islam in its radical form became the main element of their identity. Homo sovieticus, without fully eradicating his Soviet part, became Homo jihadicus who not only identifies himself with the global Ummah, but is also ready to leave his country and join jihad beyond its borders in the name of the professed ideas.

How far do the borders of the West extend?Russian/Polish strategic conflicts in the period 1990-2010

Author(s): Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2010

From a historical perspective, the last two decades can almost be regarded as a 'golden age' of Polish-Russian relations. This is the first time in several centuries that a sovereign Poland and Russia have been able to develop mutual relations without resorting to force; moreover, they have established a bilateral legal basis and put into practice its provisions on "the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, non-interference with internal affairs and the nations' right to self-determination.This does not change the fact that since 1990 the atmosphere between the two countries has much more often been chilly and tense. Contrary to the widely-held belief, Polish-Russian conflicts do not stem from genetic Russophobia on the part of Poland, or irrational prejudice on the part of Russia. Their substance is real and concerns strategic issues. At the deepest level, though, this is a dispute about how far the borders of the Western world extend, and about the Russian Federation's sphere of influence. However, it is not a clash between two states; moreover, Poland is certainly not the most important actor in this regard, although due to the historical context and its geographic location, it is one of the countries that lies closest to the 'line of contact', and is therefore particularly entangled in the disagreement.

Kaliningrad Oblast 2016. The society, economy and army

Author(s): Iwona Wisniewska,Maria Domanska,Jan Strzelecki,Piotr Zochowski,Andrzej Wilk,Marek Menkiszak / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2016

Moscow has been developing a new model of governance for Kaliningrad Oblast in 2016. The changes in the regional government (the governance of the oblast was entrusted to people sent from Moscow and had no links with the region) were part of it. These are a result of Russia’s depleting financial resources and austerity policy, the increasing militarisation of the Russian Federation and the important role the oblast plays in this policy, and the need to ensure a satisfactory result in the upcoming presidential election. Although there are at present no visible symptoms suggesting an intensification of protest sentiments, Moscow is taking preventive action to try to tighten its grip on local elites and residents. Kaliningrad Oblast remains an essential element of the Russian military strategy in the Baltic region. This is borne out by the deployment in the region of S-400 air defence systems, ships equipped with Kalibr missiles, and Bastion missile defence systems (which are nominally anti-ship weapons but are also adjusted to attacking ground targets). Furthermore, the deployment of Iskander missile systems has been launched which enables the creation of a so-called ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial’ (A2/AD) zone, extending the range of Russian weapons to the territories and airspace of the neighbouring NATO member states.

Kryzys gospodarczo-finansowy w Rosji. Uwarunkowania, przejawy, perspektywy

Author(s): (OSW) The Centre for Eastern Studies / Language(s): Polish / Publication Year: 2015

Kryzys na rosyjskim rynku finansowym, do jakiego doszło w połowie grudnia 2014 roku, obnażył skalę narastających od kilku lat problemów gospodarczych Rosji. W ciągu minionego roku zauważalnie pogarszały się podstawowe wskaźniki makroekonomiczne, spadło zaufanie obywateli do państwa i jego instytucji odpowiedzialnych za stabilność ekonomiczną, a w elitach władzy i biznesu narastało niezadowolenie z obranej przez Kreml drogi rozwoju i zaostrzała się walka o kurczące się zasoby. Według zgodnych prognoz środowisk eksperckich i rządu, w 2015 roku Rosję czeka recesja. Przyczyn obecnego stanu rzeczy należy szukać w nałożeniu się na siebie trzech niekorzystnych trendów: wyczerpania się surowcowego modelu rozwoju gospodarki rosyjskiej w wyniku słabości strukturalnych, drastycznego spadku cen ropy naftowej w drugiej połowie 2014 roku, wreszcie wpływu zachodnich sankcji ekonomicznych. W ciągu najbliższych kilku lat rosyjskie władze, wobec niewydolności mechanizmów systemowych, będą się uciekać do działań ad hoc – „ręcznego sterowania” państwem. W perspektywie krótkoterminowej pozwoli to na częściową neutralizację najbardziej palących problemów, jednak realizacja efektywnej strategii rozwojowej niemożliwa jest bez fundamentalnej przebudowy systemu polityczno-gospodarczego Rosji.

Migration from Ukraine to Poland

The trend stabilises

Author(s): Marta Jaroszewicz / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2018

The increased wave of migration from Ukraine to Poland which began in 2014 is slowly beginning to decelerate. This migration is still mainly temporary in nature, and it is difficult to assess to what extent it may become fully residential. Probably over the passage of time, the current circular migration model will stop attracting new people. However, Poland remains the main EU country in which Ukrainians work, because of several competitive advantages: extensive migration networks, a liberal procedure for legalising residence and work (for short periods). In addition, despite the fact that the salaries migrants earn in Poland are small compared to countries in the west of the EU, the low living costs allow for regular and relatively high remittances to Ukraine. Poland’s neighbouring countries have started to open up their labour markets to citizens of Ukraine to a limited degree; for example, the Czech Republic has increased its quotas for labour migrants, and Hungary has introduced an easier procedure for acquiring citizenship. Only in Germany do Ukrainians remain marginal among groups of foreign workers. No further rapid increase in migration from Ukraine is possible, due to the country’s dramatic demographic situation, the problems on local labour markets in western Ukraine, and the falling numbers of people of working age.

Niekończąca się zapaść. Stan ukraińskiego sektora naftowego

Author(s): Wojciech Kononczuk / Language(s): Polish / Publication Year: 2017

W energetyce Ukrainy sektor naftowy nie odgrywa głównej roli i pod względem znaczenia gospodarczego i politycznego ustępuje sektorom gazowemu, węglowemu i jądrowemu. Kwestie związane z ukraińskim sektorem paliwowym zwykle nie trafiają do mediów innych niż branżowe. Tymczasem całościowa analiza wskazuje na dotkliwą i długotrwałą zapaść tej strategicznej branży gospodarki. Potężny niegdyś przemysł rafineryjny znajduje się od lat w głębokim kryzysie. Z sześciu istniejących rafinerii działa jedna, która wykorzystuje tylko niewielką część mocy produkcyjnych. Wszystkie przedsiębiorstwa są niedoinwestowane, niemodernizowane i niezdolne do produkcji paliw w ilości i jakości wymaganej przez rynek. Nierozwiązanym od lat problemem jest również zaopatrzenie w surowiec do przerobu. W rezultacie ukraińskie rafinerie są najbardziej przestarzałe w Europie, a przetwórstwo ropy naftowej na Ukrainie utrzymuje się na najniższym w historii tego państwa poziomie około 2,5 mln ton rocznie. Jednocześnie udział importowanych paliw w rynku od kilku lat sięga 80–85% całości konsumpcji, w tym znaczna ich część pochodzi z Rosji. W najbliższych latach trudno jest liczyć na znaczącą poprawę sytuacji ukraińskiego sektora paliwowego. Jego stan jest również dobrym studium przypadku, pokazującym wiele słabości państwa ukraińskiego.

Niemcy wobec wieloletnich ram finansowych Unii Europejskiej na lata 2014-2020

Author(s): Konrad Poplawski / Language(s): Polish / Publication Year: 2011

Germany as the largest contributor to the EU budget will have a great impact on the form the financial framework will take after 2013. Germany’s stance is gaining significance owing to this country’s assertiveness in pursuing its policy and the key role it has played in rescuing the eurozone. Germany’s financial contribution to the EU budget is not merely an expression of its solidarity with other EU member states. Germany is prepared to put the money up for the EU budget because they are aware of the trade and political benefits that European integration offers them. The aim of this report is to look at the EU budget from the point of view of Germany as one of the greatest beneficiaries of EU policies. The text presents the significance of particular budget items for Germany, such as the Common Agricultural Policy or the Cohesion Policy. This report also describes in detail the conditions which affect the political and economic context of the German debate on the EU budget.

Niemiecka transformacja energetyczna: trudne początki

Author(s): Konrad Poplawski,Marta Zawilska-Florczuk,Piotr Buras / Language(s): Polish / Publication Year: 2012

Zainicjowana w maju 2011 roku, kilka miesięcy po awarii elektrowni atomowej w Fukushimie transformacja energetyczna RFN przedstawiana jest jako decyzja ostateczna, a ze względu na narzucone tempo zmian stanowi nową jakość w strategii energetycznej Niemiec. Głównymi jej założeniami są: rezygnacja z energii jądrowej do 2022 roku, rozwój odnawialnych źródeł energii (OZE), rozbudowa sieci przesyłowych, budowa nowych elektrowni konwencjonalnych i wzrost efektywności energetycznej.Strategia ma się opierać głównie na rozwoju odnawialnych źródeł energii. Zgodnie z nowelizacją ustawy o OZE, udział energii odnawialnej w produkcji prądu ma systematycznie wzrastać – z obecnych ok. 20% do ok. 38% w 2020 roku. W 2030 roku ma on już wynieść około 50%, w 2040 roku – 65%, a w 2050 – aż 80%. Konsekwencje Energiewende nie ograniczają się do sfery zaopatrzenia w energię. W średnim i długim okresie spodziewać się można zmian w funkcjonowaniu nie tylko gospodarki, lecz także niemieckiego społeczeństwa i państwa. Utrudnienia rozbudowy sieci przesyłowych, zbyt wysokie koszty budowy farm wiatrowych, problemy z zaopatrzeniem w energię elektryczną w szczególnie mroźne zimy skłaniają rząd federalny do centralizacji władzy i ograniczania suwerenności krajów związkowych w realizacji ich polityk energetycznych. Dotychczas takie próby dokonują się pod hasłem zwiększenia koordynacji. Energiewende może też okazać się początkiem „trzeciej rewolucji przemysłowej” w kierunku zielonej gospodarki i społeczeństwa opartego na zrównoważonym rozwoju. Konieczne będzie zawarcie nowej „umowy społecznej”, a więc ułożenia na nowo relacji państwo-społeczeństwo-gospodarka. Wynegocjowanie takiej umowy będzie jednym z najważniejszych wyzwań niemieckiej polityki w nadchodzących latach.