Publisher: OSW Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia

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The calm before the storm: the state and prospects of Russia’s oil sector

The calm before the storm: the state and prospects of Russia’s oil sector

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia’s oil sector; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; financial and economic health; Oil and gas condensate production; oil exports from Russia;

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have serious consequences for the health of the Russian oil sector, which is one of the most important branches of the country’s economy. Although its production and export performance, and consequently its budget revenues, remained high in2022, the situation began to worsen in December, and the negative trend is likely to continue in the coming months. The main reason for this state of affairs is the sanctions introduced by Western countries, in particular the European Union’s embargo on imports of Russian oil and petroleum products. Russia’s government and companies have taken adaptive measures, such as reconfiguring the directions of oil exports; however, economic, infrastructural and political constraints may make it much more difficult to follow through with the plan for sustainable market diversification. Thus, the EU embargo may lead to a significant reduction in oil production in Russia over the coming years, which will worsen the country’s financial and economic health. The ultimate effect of the restrictions will depend on the determination of Western countries and the pace at which they implement sanctions, as well as the attitudes of Moscow’s other trading partners.

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Germany: how the gas sector changed in the crisis year of 2022

Germany: how the gas sector changed in the crisis year of 2022

Author(s): Michał Kędzierski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Germany; Gas sector; gas crisis; LNG supplies; Gazprom Germania; Russia; Primary energy consumption; gas consumption; electricity generation sector;

Due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the mounting energy and gas crisis in Europe,2022 saw a spell of permanent crisis management in the German energy sector, in particular gas. The structure of Germany’s imports has changed significantly: shipments from Russia, its former principal supplier, have ceased; and Germany has had to launch extremely costly emergency measures to find alternative suppliers on the global market. The war has pushed Berlin to take numerous steps to diversify its supplies, in particular to develop its LNG import infrastructure at a rapid and unprecedented pace. A significant reduction in gas consumption, mild weather and LNG supplies have all enabled Germany to fill its gas storage facilities and avoid the risk of gas shortages this winter. Major changes have also occurred in the management and ownership structure of the German gas sector: Berlin has nationalised the SEFE (Gazprom Germania) and Uniper companies, which has enabled the German state to seize control of the country’s key gas infrastructure and its strategically important gas importers. All these factors have contributed to a major weakening of Germany’s energy ties with Russia.

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Russia: export restrictions and mobilisation – more blows to the economy

Russia: export restrictions and mobilisation – more blows to the economy

Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Russia’s GDP; Economic crisis in Russia; Russian counter-sanctions; gas blackmail against the EU; Coal production; Russian exports of goods and services;

In Q3 2022, the economy of the Russian Federation increasingly suffered negative consequences from the sanctions imposed on Russian exports. A ban on imports of a substantial part of Russian steel and iron into the EU came into force in mid-June, followed by a ban on imports such as cement and wood on 10 July, and a ban on coal imports on 10 August. The mood among business and the public soured further with the military mobilisation announced on 21 September, which also had a negative impact on the domestic outlook. As a result, the Russian budget is coming under increasing strain.

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Orbán’s fifth government: full power overshadowed by crises

Orbán’s fifth government: full power overshadowed by crises

Author(s): Andrzej Sadecki / Language(s): English

Keywords: Viktor Orbán; Hungary; Hungary’s isolation; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; power structures;

Upon attaining a fourth consecutive election victory, Viktor Orbán’s new government is sticking to its usual methods of operation: the concentration of power, control of the narrative, and ‘unorthodox’ economic policies, such as additional taxation on large profits. The cabinet functions in comfortable intra-political conditions, holding full power and facing a defeated and divided opposition. However, it faces its biggest challenges in years with the deteriorating economic situation and the unstable international environment. The government has no clear reform aspirations and is rather promising to manage the crisis permanently, while looking after its business base and further tightening its grip on media coverage. In view of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it will be increasingly difficult for Budapest to benefit from balancing between East and West. In this area, it is likely to attempt a rapprochement with the Western states that are more accommodating towards Moscow, while at the same time looking for ways to maintain the relations with the US and its partners in Central Europe, albeit these are the frostiest they have been in decades. Orbán is trying to postpone a reorientation in foreign policy until the result of the Russian-Ukrainian war is known. Should the West return to dialogue with Russia, he is counting on the benefits of a developed cooperation with the Kremlin, especially in the energy sector and, should Russia enter into a situation of protracted isolation, Orbán will seek to ensure that any reduction in this cooperation will see Hungary amply compensated by its Western partners.

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A creeping annexation. Russia’s plans to partition Ukraine

A creeping annexation. Russia’s plans to partition Ukraine

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor,Piotr Żochowski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; military operation in Ukraine; idea of “uniting Russian lands”; occupation; Donbas;

Russia was forced to modify its plan after its military operation in Ukraine failed. The original intention was the rapid political subjugation of Ukraine. The new plan involves Russia consolidating its position in the territories that it has managed to seize thus far. As a result of major resistance on the part of Ukrainian society, the Kremlin has abandoned its planned implementation of a technique known from 2014 involving the creation of so-called people’s republics in the occupied Kherson Oblast and portions of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Since May 2022, Russian government officials have increasingly frequently spoken of annexing the occupied territories, making reference to the history of the Russian Empire and to the Taurida and Kherson governorates created in 1802. As concerns the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR), the plan to incorporate them into the Russian Federation should be viewed as a correction of the strategy pursued following the signing of the so-called Minsk agreements in 2015, which specified that the Donbas would be granted special status within the Ukrainian state. The self-proclaimed republics and the territories that have been seized since the beginning of the war, covering more than 80,000 square kilometres, are to become an integral part of Russia. This will enable Moscow to maintain a corridor leading to occupied Crimea, to present the “special military operation” as a Russian victory and to launch another stage of the process of “uniting Russian lands”.

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Turkish dilemmas in the shadow of the war in Ukraine

Turkish dilemmas in the shadow of the war in Ukraine

Author(s): Krzysztof Strachota / Language(s): English

Keywords: Turkey; War in Ukraine; War and Turkish politics; Turkey’s relations with Russia;

The war in Ukraine forcefully evoked the question of Turkey’s international position and political strategy in its neighbourhood, but also in its relations with the West and Russia. In the first months of the aggression, Turkey reaffirmed its alignment with the West and its fear of Russian power and ambitions. The war also provided an opportunity for another attempt, not only to strengthen but also to redefine Turkish-Western relations – the lifting of sanctions imposed on Ankara and a stronger consideration of its security interests. Both the relative weakness of Russia, as revealed in the first period of the war, and the absence of the desired breakthrough in relations with the West have reinforced traditional and contentious tendencies in Turkish politics. The first is the desire to exploit Moscow’s weakness to deepen cooperation with it on better terms, which is reflected in the development of trade, including cooperation on the grain supply problems caused by the war. The second is aggressively manifesting Turkey’s interests in NATO. Included in this attitude is Ankara’s demand that some Alliance countries drop sanctions on the import of selected armaments by Turkey and adopt its counter-terrorism perspective, including on Kurdish groups affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and radical opposition organisations (including the Gülen Movement/FETO) that enjoy protection or support in the West. A demonstration of this policy was and still remains – despite the formal launch of the accession process by Sweden and Finland at the Madrid summit –Turkey’s continuing threat to block the enlargement of the Alliance by its national parliament.

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NATO after Madrid: how much deterrence and defence on the eastern flank?

NATO after Madrid: how much deterrence and defence on the eastern flank?

Author(s): Jacek Tarociński,Justyna Gotkowska / Language(s): English

Keywords: NATO; NATO-Russia Founding Act; Eastern flank; US presence in the Baltic and the Black Sea region; NATO Summit in Madrid;

NATO’s new Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid summit defines Russia as the most significant and direct threat to allied security and does not rule out the possibility of an attack against any of the Allies. NATO intends to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture, but there will be no revolutionary change in its military presence on the eastern flank. The compromise reached at the summit implies there will be limited reinforcements of the existing battle groups and a pre-assignment of forces stationed primarily in Western Europe. Additionally, NATO will develop a new Force Model by increasing the pool of higher readiness forces fitted into defence planning and subordinated to SACEUR. This may prove to be a much more far-reaching decision for the future of the allied deterrence and defence posture but it remains to be seen how it will be implemented in practice. Nor will changes be seen in the US military presence on the eastern flank from rotational to permanent – with the minor exception of the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post. Washington will, though, place a second rotational brigade in the Black Sea region. Overall, the security of the eastern flank will be strengthened in the coming years, but not to the extent expected by those NATO members bordering Russia.

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China: the consequences of the ‘zero COVID’ strategy

China: the consequences of the ‘zero COVID’ strategy

Author(s): Michał Bogusz / Language(s): English

Keywords: China; Zero COVID strategy; SARS-CoV-2; politicisation of the fight against a pandemic;

In the first half of 2020, it seemed that, with its ‘zero COVID’ strategy, China had outperformed many other countries in its efforts to contain the pandemic. Two years on, when COVID-19 is no longer a critical issue for most of the world, the pandemic situation in China, whose population has not acquired collective immunity, is becoming increasingly difficult. Furthermore, the economy is grappling with challenges that the rest of the world has largely moved on from and is facing new ones arising from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, the fight against coronavirus has become politicised and has largely become stripped of its health dimension. China is sinking deeper and deeper into self-isolation, which is beginning to have a negative impact on its international environment, and the continuation of its ‘zero COVID’ strategy is destabilising the global economic system by disrupting supply chains.

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Israel’s Mediterranean gas: the potential for gas export to Europe and the dynamic of regional cooperation

Israel’s Mediterranean gas: the potential for gas export to Europe and the dynamic of regional cooperation

Author(s): Karolina Zielińska / Language(s): English

Keywords: Israel’s Mediterranean gas; Gas export; Israel’s regional integration; Israel’s energy policy;

Once gas extraction from the Karish gas field starts, which is scheduled for September 2022,Israel will have a gas surplus enabling it to export around 10 bcm of this fuel to the European Union states every year. To this end, it intends to use the infrastructure connecting its gas fields with LNG terminals in Egypt, in line with the provisions of a Memorandum of Understanding which Egypt, Israel and the EU signed in June 2022. For the time being, no contracts with gas recipients in Europe have been signed, and no details regarding the price of gas sold to the EU have been provided. The continued development of Israel’s gas fields and the expansion of its infrastructure (pipelines and floating LNG platforms) will further increase the country’s export potential. The Israeli government intends to keep prioritising the country’s domestic demand. Despite its increasing commercial significance, the importance of the sale of gas to foreign partners is mainly of a political nature, as it helps to foster the development of relations in the region. Aside from Egypt, Israel’s major partners in the energy sphere include Cyprus, Greece and Jordan. The role of the United Arab Emirates in this context is also increasing. Hezbollah may pose a threat to gas export plans, as it has been pursuing Iran’s interests, which in the context of gas issues are convergent with those of Russia, and ties between these two countries are growing ever closer.

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Separatism and gas: Russian attempts to destabilise Moldova

Separatism and gas: Russian attempts to destabilise Moldova

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Moldova; Tensions in Gagauzia; energy crisis; Moldova’s socio-economic crisis;

As the price crisis in Moldova has worsened in recent months, Moscow has taken steps destabilize the country. These are particularly evident in the autonomous Gagauzia, which has traditionally orientated itself towards Russia and where anti-government and pro-Russian economic protests regularly occur. The sense of insecurity is reinforced by frequent false bomb warnings (more than 50 in July alone), triggered mainly in Chisinau by individuals from Russia and Belarus territories. The uneasy situation persists in Moscow-controlled breakaway Transnistria, which has accused Moldova and Ukraine of complicity in carrying out a series of “attacks” on civilian and military facilities. There is no doubt that by fuelling Moldova’s economic crisis with high energy prices and supporting pro-Russian forces, the Kremlin is counting on the outbreak of mass protests as early as autumn and winter and also that the opposition Electoral Bloc of Communists and Socialists (BECS) will seize power in the country. The public’s deteriorating financial condition and continuing unrest are negatively affecting the popularity of the ruling pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). According to a June 2022 poll, it can count on only 22.6% of the vote, despite winning more than 52% in the snap parliamentary election just one year ago.

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War as the new normal: Ukraine six months since the Russian invasion

War as the new normal: Ukraine six months since the Russian invasion

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwański / Language(s): English

Keywords: War in Ukraine; Russia's invasion in Ukraine; politics behind the war; economic policy;

On 24 August 2021 Ukraine was celebrating the beginning of the fourth decade of its independence. Selected units of its Armed Forces paraded through Khreshchatyk, Kyiv’s main street. It would never have occurred to the Ukrainian citizens and politicians or foreign guests who gathered on that day in Kyiv that half a year later the same units would face a full-scale invasion, and even more so, that six months after invasion they would still be successfully defending themselves. After six months, war is slowly becoming the new normal. Although Russia is trudging towards the borders of the Donetsk oblast in the east, and Ukraine still lacks sufficient forces to launch a counteroffensive in the south, the series of explosions at military facilities seen in August in Crimea, which has been occupied by Russia since 2014, shows that Kyiv has the potential for offensive actions. The Ukrainian public is getting poorer and increasingly tired, but it still remains resolute in resisting the aggressor and supporting the government’s policies. Only a small minority believe that Ukraine should put an end to the war at the price of political concessions, and the view that territorial concessions should be made remains a marginal one. The economy is also adapting to the wartime conditions. Despite the deep crisis, the decline in exports is abating, and companies are resuming their businesses or moving them to safer areas of the country while looking for new sales channels abroad. However, the state budget is still dependent on financial support from the West, and this will not change in the coming months.

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Total defence. Six months of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

Total defence. Six months of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; geopolitics; The Western sanctions against Russia;

After six months of war, Ukraine can celebrate success – due to the mobilisation of its entire population to fight, and to unceasing reconnaissance and logistics support from the West, it continues to successfully defend itself. Russia, in turn, has failed to attain its initial objectives, including the “denazification” and “demilitarisation” of Ukraine and the intention to seize control of the country. The armed confrontation has already lasted far longer than the Kremlin had anticipated, which suggests that the first six months of war can be viewed from Russia’s perspective as a failure. Since the end of March 2022, when Russia decided to withdraw its troops from northern Ukraine and from portions of Mykolaiv Oblast, and when a frontline was formed in the south and in the east, Russian aggression has shifted from a phase of manoeuvre warfare to that of trench warfare. Since then, the strategic situation has not changed significantly and remains largely static. However, Russia continues to possess the initiative and any changes happening at the front are the consequences of its actions. The aggressor’s troops have maintained a relatively stable land bridge with Crimea and are slowly pushing the Ukrainian army back from its positions in the Donbas, which continues to be the main area of fighting. For the time being, the counter-offensive announced by Kyiv continues to form part of an information strategy aimed at boosting the defenders’ morale. Ukraine continues to lack sufficient manpower and adequate means, i.e. mainly heavy weaponry of an offensive nature, to attempt to recapture the occupied territories.

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An abundance of gas ports. The emergency diversification of gas supplies in Germany

An abundance of gas ports. The emergency diversification of gas supplies in Germany

Author(s): Michał Kędzierski / Language(s): English

Keywords: gas supplies; Germany; The Russian attack on Ukraine; FSRU; Gas ports;

The LNG terminal projects planned so far in Germany could not be implemented due to unfavourable regulatory and market conditions. The ability to opt for cheaper Russian gas, imported via pipelines, was one of the main obstacles since the German government saw no need to invest in securing supplies, mistakenly believing that it shared common interests with Russia as part of the two countries’ energy alliance. The aggression against Ukraine has revealed these beliefs to be myths and has become a catalyst for a profound revision of the approach to cooperation with Russia. Aware of the risk of cutting off gas supplies and the ensuing serious economic consequences, Germany has intensified its efforts and is taking emergency measures to develop LNG import infrastructure. In the short term, Germany will have four floating storage and regasification units (FSRU) which, combined with other measures to diversify supplies, will enable Germany to become independent of gas imports from Russia in 2024. This, however, does not automatically mean that Germany will decide to totally and permanently discontinue the imports of Russian gas.

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Sweden and Finland on the threshold of NATO membership

Sweden and Finland on the threshold of NATO membership

Author(s): Justyna Gotkowska,Witold Rodkiewicz / Language(s): English

Keywords: Sweden and Finland; NATO membership;

On 17 May, the foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland signed their applications to join the North Atlantic Alliance, and these were officially submitted to NATO in Brussels a day later. This marked the end of a process of revolutionary speed to form internal political consensus, fundamentally changing the security policy of the two hitherto non-aligned states. The brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine caused a sudden change in public opinion in Finland, which influenced the position of the Finnish political parties. The expected turnaround in Helsinki’s security policy in turn influenced the stance of Sweden’s governing Social Democrats. During the accession process Sweden and Finland, with the help of the NATO member states, will have to remove Turkey’s objections to their NATO membership and be prepared for Russian retaliatory actions.

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Ukrainian oligarchs in wartime

Ukrainian oligarchs in wartime

Author(s): Sławomir Matuszak / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian aggression against the Ukraine; Financial losses; control of the media;

Russia’s military invasion has contributed to a major decline in the role of oligarchs in Ukraine. This is largely due to the fact that domestic political rivalry both in the media and in parliament has ceased, which in turn has reduced the role played by those spheres of life in which their influence was most perceptible. Ukraine’s main political forces have backed President Volodymyr Zelensky in defending the country, as a result of which laws are presently passed almost unanimously. In addition, the most important oligarch-owned TV stations, which before the war formed their main tool of influence, have decided to air a joint news programme. Alongside this, the owners’ control of broadcasting content has been further weakened through specific legal regulations. Some oligarchs have lost portions of their assets as a result of military activity and occupation, and some have suffered significant financial losses due to the economic crisis and export restrictions in a situation when they still need to service their foreign debt. Most of the oligarchs have offered funds to help the country in its fight against the aggressor, but some of these activities are being kept low-profile. If the war’s outcome is positive for Ukraine, and if Kyiv receives substantial Western support for its recovery and investment effort, the position of the oligarchs will diminish, and the president, who enjoys an enormously high level of trust from society, will in practical terms be free to continue to reduce the oligarchs’ influence on Ukraine’s political life.

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Dangerous liaisons. A quick and coordinate withdrawal from Russian gas is proving hard for the EU

Dangerous liaisons. A quick and coordinate withdrawal from Russian gas is proving hard for the EU

Author(s): Agata Loskot-Strachota / Language(s): English

Keywords: REPowerEU; Russian gas imports; Russian gas supplies to the EU; Russian counter-sanctions;

The REPowerEU proposals announced on 18 May confirm the EU’s desire to end its dependence on Russian energy. Nonetheless, it illustrates the problems associated with the process of withdrawing from Russian gas, and above all with the rapid reduction of importing it. The heavy dependence which some EU countries have on Russian gas, the persistence of very high prices and the prospect of crisis and potential shortages in the coming winter make it difficult for the EU to agree internally on a significant, coordinated reduction in supplies this year. As a result, on the one hand, intra-EU discussions about sanctions on Russian gas are very difficult and increasingly rare, while on the other hand, some restraint in the European Commission’s (EC) REPowerEU ambitions regarding the level and pace of reductions in Russian imports is becoming apparent. This weakness of the EU is being exploited by Moscow. Russian counter-sanctions, including the ‘roubles-for-gas’ demand, not only lead to divisions within the EU but also reverse the previous logic of the discussion. The majority of states and companies active on the EU market, instead of thinking about ways to limit imports of Russian gas as quickly as possible, began thinking about ways to guarantee their supplies under new conditions. Therefore, the role of the European Commission in working out common principles for EU gas relations with Russia is diminishing, in favour of the individual actions of member states, which weakens the consistency of EU action. Meanwhile, Moscow appears to be taking control of the process of reducing supplies of Russian gas to the European market. While still maintaining a significant level of exports, Moscow is also maintaining an energy weapon that it could use against the EU in the context of the approaching winter.

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A war not won, a war not lost. The military situation after 100 days of the Russian aggression against Ukraine

A war not won, a war not lost. The military situation after 100 days of the Russian aggression against Ukraine

Author(s): Andrzej Wilk / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian aggression against Ukraine; War in Ukraine and the media;

One hundred days of Russian aggression against Ukraine has still not answered the basic question: who will win? The first phase of the clash – a manoeuvre warfare until the end of March, in which the aggressor had broadly defined operational goals – ended in failure for Russia, and resulted in it withdrawing from one of the two main theatres of operations and reducing its aspirations in other directions. The trench warfare phase, which has lasted since the turn of April, has not led to a breakthrough, but the extended actions have exhausted the Ukrainian army to an extent that the enemy has been able to make slow but consistent progress in achieving its assumed minimum goal: taking control of the entire Donbas and the land bridge to Crimea. Moscow has largely achieved this aim; since 24 February it has taken control of80,000 km² of Ukraine’s territory. It is not enough simply to maintain the status quo regarding external support for Ukraine, without which it will no longer be able to fight off the aggressor. The comprehensive rearming of the Ukrainian army with Western weapons and military equipment offers a chance to stop the Russian aggression. Moreover, in order to defeat Russia militarily, the West must display an attitude of consistent solidarity.

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Moscow’s long war: Russia’s political calculations after 100 days of conflict

Moscow’s long war: Russia’s political calculations after 100 days of conflict

Author(s): Marek Menkiszak / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian invasion of Ukraine; Moscow; The Kremlin;

Although 100 days have passed since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has not achieved even the hypothetical minimum objective of the operation: the capture of the entire Donbas. The fierce Ukrainian resistance and Western support for Kyiv mean that, despite the concentration of forces in selected sections, the Russian army’s progress is slow, and being paid for with high losses. However, the Kremlin has still not decided on a serious escalation of the conflict, whether by declaring general mobilisation, using weapons of mass destruction, or moving the conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders. These scenarios, although they cannot be completely ruled out, seem unlikely today. Rather, Russia is limiting (albeit probably temporarily) the scale of its ambitions for territorial gains in Ukraine, and is striving to reach lines that could create the appearance of victory and the achievement of the formal objectives of its ‘special operation’. Above all, however, the Kremlin now proclaims and believes that the current situation is merely an episode in a long-term war with the West as a whole. Accordingly, it is attempting to conduct economic and humanitarian aggression, and seeking to maximise the costs on the part of both Ukraine and the West that supports it. At the same time, it hopes that their resilience has clear limits and will ultimately force them to make political concessions to Moscow, which will bring a needed pause allowing Russia to prepare for the next stage of confrontation.

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Ukraine: 100 days of existential war

Ukraine: 100 days of existential war

Author(s): Tadeusz Iwański / Language(s): English

Keywords: Volodymyr Zelensky; Vladimir Putin; Russian invasion of Ukraine; Political war games;

Ukraine: 100 days of existential war President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decision to stay in Kyiv after the start of the Russian invasion on 24 February and his immediate assumption of leadership in defending the country on the very first day of the war made him the leader around whom society and most of the political elite consolidated. His attitude fully reflected the public mood. Together with the army’s effective resistance, it allowed Ukraine, despite losing control over part of its territories in the east and south of the country (a total of around 80,000 km2), to maintain its sovereignty, the functionality of its state institutions and prevent the Kremlin from achieving its original military and political objectives. The 100 days of effective resistance is an undoubted success. It has boosted the pride and ambitions of Ukrainians and prompted the authorities and society to formulate far-reaching political goals: to regain Crimea and Donbas, to cut themselves off from everything Russian, and ultimately to build a new Ukraine – a modern one, institutionally belonging to Europe. The scale of Russian war crimes has drastically reduced public consent to any compromise with Russia. At the same time, the prolonged war has increased the number of military and civilian casualties and deepened the economic and infrastructural disaster, making the country dependent on aid from Western countries. Similarly, capabilities on the battlefield depend on Western military aid: arms and ammunition supplies and, by the same token, the political will of the ruling elites of these countries.

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Having your cake and eating it. Georgia, the war in Ukraine and integration with the West

Having your cake and eating it. Georgia, the war in Ukraine and integration with the West

Author(s): Wojciech Górecki / Language(s): English

Keywords: the war in Ukraine; Georgia; Tbilisi government’s ambivalent attitude; Georgian Orthodox Church;

Georgia’s reaction to the war in Ukraine can be called ambivalent. Although Tbilisi condemned the aggression, it has not joined the anti-Russian sanctions. Indeed, according to Kyiv, Georgia has been violating them and allowing Russia to circumvent them, although so far there is no hard evidence of this. Georgia’s stance of ‘benevolent neutrality’ towards the aggressor maybe partly explained by the fear of a Russian threat; objectively, however, this stance means de facto support for Moscow. In the context of the cooling of relations between Georgia and the West (i.e. the EU & US) observed over the last few years, this raises the question of whether Tbilisi is not carrying out a creeping reorientation of its foreign policy from pro-Western to pro-Russian – something which the Georgian opposition has accused the government of doing. It seems that although at the moment there is no question of a deliberate geopolitical shift, the drift towards Moscow is setting a new tone, and it is becoming increasingly inconvenient for Washington and Brussels to support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

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