Keywords: Education; social systems; conference;
Estabilishing in 2018 as a scientific initiative; Education, Society & Reform Research (EDUSREF -2018) is an International Conference that aims to bridge the knowledge gap, promote research esteem, and produce democratic information for potential education reforms.
More...Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; conflict; strategic communications; social media; PSYOPS; cyber attacks; security;
Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili and Sanda Svetoka of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia, in Chapter 12, discuss the role of social media in this conflict. In the Internet era, the battle for hearts and minds has never been more important. Social media is a trust-based network that provides fertile soil for intelligence collection, propaganda dissemination, and psychological operations (PSYOPS) to influence public opinion – or to lead adversaries into harm’s way. ‘Soft’ cyber attacks can be as severe as any attack on critical infrastructure. In Ukraine, they have generated fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the economic, cultural, and national security of Ukraine, while promoting positive messages about Russia’s role in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The authors provide recommendations for defence against such attacks, including how to identify them, challenge them, and how to develop a resilient political narrative to withstand false propaganda.
More...Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; Crimea; information; propaganda; media; warfare; counteract methods;
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the form of the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas has apart from a military also a powerful informative dimension. The latter is a planned, well-coordinated and well-funded disinformation campaign targeting different audiences. From my point of view and that of other experts of the Centre for Russian Studies, to effectively counteract Russian’s propaganda we must take into account three key factors. First, to clearly identify the audience we are talking about. Second, the messages that Moscow propaganda uses for each audience. Third, the tools the Russian propaganda machine uses for their spread. Within the first factor the Kremlin targets three groups. The first – Russian’s civil society (or what is called “civil society” in Russia). The second – the Ukrainian audience, with particular emphasis on areas occupied by Russians in Ukraine (Crimea and parts of Donbas). The third - the EU and NATO member- states. Obviously, each of Russia’s targets has its own specifics and needs different approaches, forms and methods of research. Only this would allow us to realistically analyze Kremlin’s propaganda and offer practical countermeasures. The limited scope of this article does not allow a thorough analysis of all the factors, hence І will focus only on some of them. According to a survey conducted by the Levada Center in Moscow in March 2015, Russian citizens consider the following three countries (or unions) as main enemies of Russia: the US (73%), the EU (64%) and Ukraine (55%). Instead, “friends” of Russia are Belarus (85%) and China (76%). 50% of Russians believe that Putin acted correctly during his Crimea annexation speech mentioning a possibility to use nuclear weapon. Moreover, 49% believe that Russia’s main foreign policy achievement was its return to the status of “a great power.”
More...Keywords: media; communication; information; social media; robotic trolling; fake accounts; algorithm; bots;
What is Robotic trolling? Robotic trolling or ‘robotrolling’ is the coordinated use of fake accounts on social media. It is important to note that the divide between a bot and genuine account, by which we mean human-controlled account, is not a clear-cut one. Bots should be thought of on a spectrum, from fully automated to varying degrees of partially automated accounts. Not all bots claim to be humans. We are especially interested in bots which impersonate people or rely on fake identities. Such accounts may be operated either by human-handlers, or by algorithm. It may be impossible to separate the two. As a result, we refer to bot-like activity, that is, activity that could be performed by a computer. Whether it is a human or an algorithm copy-pasting messages is not important for our purposes: in either case, it is an example of deception.
More...Keywords: media; social media; communication; information; robot trolling; bots; algorithm; Twitter; Russian language; English language; Estonia; Latvia; Poland; Lithuania;
Two in three Twitter users who write in Russian about the NATO presence in Eastern Europe are robotic or ‘bot’ accounts. Together, these accounts created 84% of the total Russian-language messages. The English language space is also heavily affected: 1 in 4 active accounts were likely automated and were responsible for 46% of all English-language content. Of the four states considered—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—Estonia has disproportionately frequently been targeted by bots, whereas Poland and Lithuania have seen the least automated activity. Our impression is that Twitter in Russian is policed less effectively than it is in English. Despite the high presence of automated activity, the period considered saw no large-scale, coordinated robotic campaigns. The vast majority of bot activity is apolitical spam. For this reason, the polluted state of Twitter conversations about the NATO presence may be indicative of Twitter as a whole. The implications are stark: the democratising possibilities of social media appear—at least in the case of Twitter in Russia—to have been greatly undermined. The findings presented have practical implications for any policy maker, journalist, or analyst who measures activity on Twitter. Failure to account for bot activity will—at best—result in junk statistics. This is the first issue of ‘Robotrolling’, a regular product about automation in social media published quarterly by NATO StratCom COE.
More...Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; Europe; EU; politics; manipulation; information; communication; media; values;
Since November 2013, when the uprising of the Ukrainian nation set in motion a wide spectrum of events and political process, researchers and policy makers have been questioning the reasoning, consequences, and international implications of those political processes, as well as their impact on the future of the international political environment. This study, Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia`s Manipulative Techniques, is not one of the many investigations published in recent months focusing on Russian information warfare in Ukraine. It is not a study about them. This is a study about us, namely, the ‘transatlantic community’—a community we consider to be based on democratic values. This study seeks to answer an essential question: how can it be that countries, which enjoy leading positions in terms of prosperity, freedom, solidarity, innovation, economic competitiveness, and seemingly unlimited normative power based on the long-standing democratic traditions have neglected or ignored (intentionally and unintentionally) the manipulative redefinition of their core democratic values. By allowing our core democratic values to be deconstructed and reconstituted by values derived from an authoritarian regime makes Western society vulnerable to influence. Russia’s international ambitions are not based on conquering new territories, but on creating mental landscapes susceptible to political manipulation. Russia’s foreign policy goals with regard to the West are clear: ‘to weaken the West economically, to split it politically, and to establish Russia as the hegemonic power on the European continent’1 . Extensive material resources are unnecessary; individuals and societies that question themselves are decisive ‘weapons’ in the battle for influence. Transitioning out of the international relationships that dominated during the Cold War was an eye- and mind-opening exercise for both governments and societies. Most of the countries that left the Soviet bloc, including the Baltic States, joined those that are based on democratic values; however some keep their old values, fashionably redressed in a style called ‘sovereign democracy’.
More...Keywords: Russia; Kremlin; politics; information; communication; strategic communication; media; Daesh; social media;
The paper summarizes discussions held on 24 May 2016 in Riga, Latvia, which focused on exploring the Kremlin and DAESH information activities in order to improve our understanding of the nature of these communications and their effect on Western societies. The questions discussed were: How are the communications and messages of DAESH and the Kremlin constructed and disseminated? Are their methods changing? Why do such messages appeal to youth, even if they are familiar with Western values and consumerism? What are the weakest aspects of our information environment and what can we do to improve? Six items emerged from the discussion as most relevant to the investigation of these issues. 1) Identity and Values Identity and values are in constant flux across time and space. It is easier to attack the values and identity of the other, rather than offering something different and better than the opponent. However, the West should be clear that it cannot simply assume the moral high ground. One of the weakness of the West is that we have allowed some members of society to become isolated and/or marginalised; they are now the ones who are more open and susceptible to the messaging of DAESH and the Kremlin, especially messages that project a sense of pride and/or a feeling of inclusiveness because they appear to offer the opportunity to participate meaningfully in some sort of utopian society. 2) Strategic Communications and the National Narrative There is a distinct need to create and maintain a positive national narrative in which words and deeds align, and to communicate that effectively. A narrative should not be static, but responsive to the environment in which it is based. One idea that came up in discussion was to task a specific governmental entity with coordinating messages concerning the national narrative and the strategic communication approach. This entity should be situated close to the Presidential Administration or the Prime Minister’s Office and have clear operating procedures, goals, and resources that address the identified risks and threats. The highest political backing would ensure sufficient clout to function adequately and carry out the mission. This body should oversee national narrative and strategic communication efforts, and act as an advisory and educational hub for other parts of government. A whole government approach, spanning both civil and military spheres, is required. The increase in the number of stakeholders reduces chances to create and manage coherent but relevant international narratives 3) Messaging and Counter-Messaging There is a continuing discussion as to whether the West should concentrate on counter-messaging or should focus on messaging instead. An argument for engaging in counter-messaging is that lies and harmful messages should not go unchallenged, otherwise falsehoods and partial truths may become accepted as facts and be assimilated into a society’s ‘knowledge base’. An argument against engaging in countermessaging is that this practice is likely to ensure that the West remains in a defensive and reactive posture in the current information confrontation, and adversaries’ harmful messages get unintentionally repeated. However, by actively messaging there is a chance to dictate the informational agenda, thereby forcing the opponent into a reactive position. Irrespective of the focus on messaging or countermessaging, information activities should not be done in isolation, but as an integrated part of a political or policy programme. 4) Perception and Legitimacy Emotional resonance holds greater sway than logical argument as a political or social relationship is formed between an audience and a communicator. Some individuals and groups are more susceptible to messaging than others, often as the result of an unfulfilled need. The motivation to join and/or support DAESH is largely based upon the perception that what is being offered is legitimate and will fulfil some psychological or physical need of the individual recruit. The messenger that communicates a believable response to such needs may well be able to influence that particular individual or group. However, when an individual personally experiences the dissonance between the projected utopia and reality, their trust in the utopian vision soon disappears, and along with it any sense of motivation or commitment to the cause. 5) Measuring Activity and Effect Both DAESH and Russia have adopted Western technologies and understood the audience appetite for infotainment and quick satisfaction. DAESH and the Kremlin employ the tactic of shifting focus and attention away from areas where they are losing or vulnerable. They have the ability to affect our news agenda and our focus through big event news. Even if the Kremlin or DAESH are engaged in harmful or disruptive communication, the activity does not necessarily translate into influence that would weaken the national security of the target state. The measure of an activity, i.e. communicating, does not automatically neatly translate into the measure of its effect, i.e. influence and change of behaviour. There are many variables that can either obstruct or facilitate the level of influence and persuasion that actually takes place when an actor communicates. These differences put pressure on us to achieve a better understanding of human behaviour and develop more meaningful ways of measuring. Observing, let alone measuring, the effectiveness of ‘hybrid warfare’ is particularly challenging. 6) Analytical Tools and Frameworks In addition to traditional historical area studies and social science perspectives, there are a variety of promising frameworks that can be used to investigate the information activities of DAESH and the Kremlin. The potentially fruitful approaches discussed included political and obstruction marketing and psychology.
More...Keywords: NATO; StratCom; NATO countries; communication; strategic communication; research; interview;
“There is a curious dichotomy concerning StratCom in the NATO Alliance and in its membership nations. The term occupies an inordinately larger space in verbiage and documents than the function is given in the environments in which it is has the most potential to effect. This most recent study not only re-affirms previous results but more importantly, attempts to add to them by seeking to get to the “why”. While it does get to the “why”, the integrity of the results is somewhat diminished by the disappointing level of national participation with only 11 of 28 nations responding. For a function often on the lips of leadership -- both in the Alliance and its nations -- it is rather telling that 17 nations passed over the opportunity to illuminate the function and contribute to the discussion. Nevertheless, the report builds on the baseline understanding of how Allied nations define, organise and implement the StratCom function, and the results are as encouraging as they are concerning. Concerning because the author found that many responding nations still consider Strategic Communication to essentially be another name for what they formerly termed Public Affairs. Encouraging because the authors found that many nations acknowledged that the StratCom function needed to change from a supporting to a supported role – an understanding which is finding traction amongst experienced operators. Having previously written a paper which included Alliance nation mapping with respect to StratCom, I welcome this report for updating and contributing more to NATO’s understanding about how its membership individually considers StratCom. It gives needed insight into NATO policy development on behalf of all nations.”
More...Keywords: Russia; media; internet; information; communication; trolling; tool; hybrid warfare; Latvia; case study;
Social media has been used increasingly to support military actions. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that the fight for hearts and minds is as important as kinetic activity, and social media plays a crucial role in this process. Both state and non-state actors effectively exploit social media to gain support for their actions, recruit new members, deceive and intimidate the adversary, and even use it for traditional military activities such as intelligence collection or command and control. Given these conditions, the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) was tasked to conduct a study on how social media can be used as a weapon of hybrid warfare. The recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict demonstrated how fake identities and accounts were used to disseminate narratives through social media, blogs, and web commentaries in order to manipulate, harass, or deceive opponents. Several reports by investigative journalists have reported about the existence of so called troll farms in Russian cities, employing people to spread disinformation, rumours, or falsified facts, enter into discussions and flood topic-related web spaces with their own messages or abuse. Nevertheless, trolling is still a relatively unexplored phenomenon. Although such activities have been widely identified, their effects have not been measured, particularly due to the fact that is it difficult to distinguish between the paid trolls and people who are simply expressing their opinions. In order to analyse how pro-Russian trolling is used to influence the public opinion in NATOmember countries the NATO StratCom COE commissioned the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: the Case of Latvia. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University, and was aimed at analysing organised proRussian trolling in internet media to measure its impact on public opinion in Latvia. Latvia was chosen for the case study due to the specifics of its information environment (a strong division between the Latvian and Russian language information spaces), as well as the country’s historical background and potentially vulnerability to Russian hybrid warfare tactics. Communication science, social anthropology, political science, and information technology expertise was employed to gain a better understanding of the trolling phenomenon, and to develop methods to identify trolling and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used. This research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and it offers recommendations on how to mitigate the effects of trolling when used as a tool in hybrid warfare, beyond the specific case study.
More...Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; conflict; information; communication; Crimea; media; narratives; warfare; social media;
The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy. Over the years, Russia has been drawing lessons from different Allied operations and has worked on adapting its military planning to the realities of a modern conflict. It tested these lessons in the recent August 2008 war with Georgia which marked the first use of cyber warfare and information operations in conjunction with a conventional military operation. Russia has also shown a willingness to modernize Soviet-era tools and adapt them to today’s complex information environment. Critically, it has been willing to afford informationbased activities primacy in operations, using more conventional military forces in a supporting role. Russia’s information campaign has to be analysed in the context of the strategic narrative of the Russian government, reflected in policy documents like the Foreign Policy Review of 2007 and the State Security Review of 2009, and supported by legislative initiatives like the Federal Law on the Russian Federation’s State Policy on Compatriots Living Abroad. The notion of compatriots deserves particular attention as it allows Russia to legitimize the state’s duty to defend its compatriots abroad from any kind of threat to their rights or physical well-being. It also leads to the explanation of the need to sustain the so-called Russian World which implies maintenance of a unified Russian-language information sphere beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (mainly targeting the territory of the former USSR). The Russian government’s long-developed control over the mass media has been an important factor in the effective implementation of the information campaign against Ukraine. Russia’s narrative was instrumentalized with the help of concurrent messaging. For example, the main Russian TV channels were actively involved in framing opinions about the situation in Ukraine from the very beginning of the crisis. Control is exerted directly by the Presidential Administration, including also government-controlled internet ‘trolling’ which is a growing, under-researched phenomenon used to support the Russian government’s narrative. This control over the media has made it difficult for democratic states with free media to compete with the forceful, synchronized messaging of the Russian government. The Russian narrative includes several dominant themes: positioning Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization in opposition to “decadent” Europe; positioning Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union; promoting the Russian World which unites Eastern Slavs, implies that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation, and recognizes the natural supremacy of Russia; portraying Ukrainians as a pseudo-nation who are unable to administer their own country and sustain their statehood; referring to the Great Patriotic War thus bringing out the hatred of Nazism and relating it to the Euromaidan protesters who are labelled as nationalists, Nazis and fascists posing a threat to the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine’s population; dividing the West by utilising the differing interests of EU member states and positioning the USA in opposition to the EU; and using legal and historic justifications to legitimize Russia’s actions in Ukraine (including the Crimea Referendum). The report identifies that Russia’s information campaign was central to Russia’s operations in Ukraine. The information campaign and related military action by Russia corresponds to the characteristics of a new form of warfare where the lines between peace and war, foreign military force and local self-defence groups are blurred and the main battle space has moved from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the populations in question. Crimea may be considered a test-case for Russia in trying out this new form of warfare where hybrid, asymmetric warfare, combining an intensive information campaign, cyber warfare and the use of highly trained Special Operation Forces, play a key role. The crisis in Ukraine has provided valuable lessons for the Ukrainian government, the countries neighbouring Russia (whose Russian-speaking communities were enlarged as a result of Soviet-era policy), and NATO and the EU as organisations. The following are the general conclusions of the report: • Russia was prepared to conduct a new form of warfare in Ukraine where an information campaign played a central role. The characteristics of the new form of warfare which were implemented in Crimea were outlined by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, nearly a year before the crisis in Ukraine. Analysis of the Ukraine conflict suggests that NATO and the EU must adapt to the new reality where information superiority, as opposed to military power, is becoming increasingly important. • Russia’s narrative is largely based on historical memory. Russia’s thorough understanding of its own audiences – including compatriots abroad – was able to leverage historical memory: the Great Russian Empire, World War II and Nazi atrocities, and the might and collapse of the USSR. • Crisis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long term strategy. Learning from the Russian information campaign in Ukraine, it is clear that early detection and analysis of those elements within the Russian narrative signalling potential aggressive behaviour is critical. The report also demonstrates that Russia’s state policy documents contain such indications. • The role of Compatriots Abroad is critical and should be considered carefully in the future. The security implications for countries neighbouring Russia are particularly serious. The kind of strategy that Russia has employed in Ukraine is likely to work best in areas where there are larger communities of Russia’s Compatriots Abroad. They are the targets of Russia’s information campaign and potentially may be ready to provide local support in cases of Russian aggression. The Ukraine and Georgian cases demonstrate that such information campaigns, backed by military means, are easier to carry out in territories bordering Russia – in particular, in those countries which are not members of NATO and therefore not party to the Washington Treaty. • Audience Analysis is critical to operational success. Russia has demonstrated that understanding audiences and what motivates them is critical to operational success that is enduring. • There is “another side of the coin” to Russia’s information campaign. Although Russia’s information campaign has been successful in influencing its audiences (the Russian population and compatriots abroad), it also bears a degree of counter-productivity as it has radicalized and alienated other audiences – West Ukraine and Kyiv, the populations of NATO and EU countries and the USA. • Deception is used by Russia as a tactic to distract and delay. Investigating and disproving the false information, different versions of events and even conspiracy theories rapidly disseminated by Russia requires a lot of time, effort and resources on the part of international organisations like NATO, the Ukrainian government, independent media, experts and even ordinary citizens. • Disinformation campaigns erode over time. The evolution of the crisis in Ukraine beyond Crimea demonstrates that disinformation campaigns erode over time as more and more factual evidence is revealed to negate lies and falsification.
More...Keywords: Afganistan; NATO; security; military mission; communications; ISAF;
By the time the green International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) flag was lowered for the last time at NATO headquarters in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, over 1 million NATO troops, civilians and contractors had served in theatre and many continue to do so as part of NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan. The financial cost is estimated conservatively to be at least $1 trillion US dollars. Almost 3,500 troops from 29 nations lost their lives, and tens of thousands more suffered serious injury. By any metric it is the longest, most complex, expensive and fractious operation in NATO’s history. The information environment today bears little resemblance to when the ISAF mission began. The past decade has witnessed a transition from the implications of the ‘strategic corporal’ to that of the ‘strategic tweet’ and adversaries have become increasingly more capable at using new communication tools. While it may be unlikely that the Alliance will conduct another mission like ISAF, important lessons can be drawn about policy, doctrine and capabilities to ensure that NATO Strategic Communication (StratCom) is fit for purpose in future operations. The NATO Strategic Communications Centre for Excellence was engaged to carry out an examination of the NATO StratCom effort during the ISAF years 2003-2014, with a particular focus on Public Affairs, Psychological Operations and the coordinating function Information Operations. It is the most extensive study to date of NATO StratCom, drawing from nearly 100 interviews with persons having direct knowledge of the Afghanistan mission from across the full scope of the campaign, representing many different nationalities and responsibilities. Source material includes speeches, NATO and ISAF briefings, extensive media reporting and a substantial collection of published literature. Numerous experts reviewed chapters throughout its development, and the report was peer reviewed by 22 experienced practitioners from 8 nations, from all communications disciplines. The study aims to question the commonly held view that NATO ‘lost’ the communications battle by assessing how effective the collective StratCom effort was and to understand the factors that contributed to its successes and major shortcomings.
More...Keywords: extremist groups; terror; Daesh; information; communication; media; psychology; ICT; social media;
The terrorist organization, Daesh, also known as so-called Islamic State/IS/ISIS/ISIL, has launched an extremely sophisticated information campaign at various target audiences in order to gain support for its expansion in the Middle East. Daesh’s first strategic achievement, drawing considerable attention from various governments and mainstream Muslim groups, was the first public speech given by self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It was devoted entirely to the proclamation of the so-called Caliphate. In order to find out how this campaign is managed, and to propose practical solutions to existing challenges concerning situation on the Middle East, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) conducted research into Daesh’s information strategy. The methodology for analysing Daesh’s information strategy included a number of techniques such as social psychology, the psychology of communication, and social media analysis. The work was done in consultation with social media experts and advisors from NATO member states in order to achieve the best result. This executive summary summarizes three reports - “Type of applied persuasive strategy and its influence on message effectiveness” (Ph. D. T. Grzyb), „Visual framing in the Islamic State” (Ph. D. Shahira Fahmy) and “Network of Terror: How Daesh Uses Adaptive Social Networks to Spread its Message” (Mr. Joseph Shaheen).
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