HUMBLING THE RATIONAL: A HUMEAN CRITIQUE OF LEIBNIZ’S PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON Cover Image

HUMBLING THE RATIONAL: A HUMEAN CRITIQUE OF LEIBNIZ’S PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
HUMBLING THE RATIONAL: A HUMEAN CRITIQUE OF LEIBNIZ’S PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

Author(s): Rocco ASTORE
Subject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Ideas Forum International Academic and Scientific Association
Keywords: Leibniz; Hume; Epistemology; Principle of Sufficient Reason; Causality; Induction;

Summary/Abstract: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” asked 17th-century polymath and philosopher G.W.Leibniz. Indeed, it is this query which still looms over metaphysics today. To Leibniz, the fact that everyeffect has a cause led to his commitment to what philosophers refer to as the principle of sufficientreason. However, does every derivative genuinely derive from some derivation? If not, what ramificationswould this error have on the Leibnizian project? This piece will begin with an explication concerningsome main instances in the Leibnizian corpus, where Leibniz gives argumentative support for theprinciple of sufficient reason. Next, this article will enter the perspective of 18th-century philosopherDavid Hume, who by denying the sturdiness of causal relations, assisted in jeopardizing this backbone ofLeibnizian thought. Lastly, this essay will close with support for Hume’s account of causality overLeibniz’s, by drawing the reader to consider the problems uncovered by Hume, and their impact onLeibnizian metaphysics, via discrediting the principle of sufficient reason.

  • Issue Year: 2/2018
  • Issue No: 2
  • Page Range: 77-82
  • Page Count: 6
  • Language: English