Fenomenul saturat şi relevanţa sa teologică

Author(s): Nicolae Turcan / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 08/2015

The text presents the concept of the saturated phenomenon as it appears in the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion, while stressing the importance it has in the description of Christian religious experience. If in saturated phenomenon, intuition overflows the concept, meaning that man receives more than he bring himself by his intellectual capacities, then Christian revelation, the Theophany and mystical experience can be adequately described using this paradigm, rather than by modern paradigm of subject and object. Man receives himself from the phenomenon that is excessively donated to him, transforming himself, from knowing subject, to a gifted one, and experience, in its Kantian meaning, is replaced by a counter-experience. Describing the events more adequately, saturated phenomenon finds its place alongside the other (poor and neutral) phenomena which can describe only objects and becomes the most appropriate way of speaking, phenomenologically, about Christ’s revelation in history.

„Moartea morţii lui Dumnezeu”: Apologia lui Jean-Luc Marion împotriva ateismului nietzschean

Author(s): Nicolae Turcan / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 07/2015

Nietzsche’s diagnosis of “death of God” influences contemporary philosophical atheism. He is countered by Jean-Luc Marion with arguments that draws from the apophatic tradition of the Church for which the true God can not be reduced to a rational concept, without being turned into an idol. Trying to deny God, atheism always operates with a well defined concept, and this strictness is the strongest counterargument against it. This text presents the apologetic arguments that the French phenomenologist made against Nietzschean nihilism, against contemporary atheism which feeds from it and against the idol that takes the place of the living God. Marion demonstrates that through the “death of God” an idol of the divine dies, therefore it is the very “death of God” that dies.

Žan-Lik Marion i fenomenologija davanja

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 4/2016

Granice fenomenalnosti

Author(s): Jean-Luc Marion / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 4/2016

This text is based on the lecture held by Jean-Luc Marion at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (University of Belgrade), on December 4., 2015. By thematizing the “limits of phenomenality”, Marion analyzes what exceeds the horizon of objectivity and the framework of subjectivity. By relying on some of the most important philosophers of the history of (post)metaphysics (Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger), Marion offers an alternative way, namely, a phenomenology of givenness that focuses on saturated phenomena.

Donation, tradition et interprétation. Entretien avec Jean-Luc Marion

Author(s): Jean-Luc Marion,Mark Losoncz / Language(s): French Issue: 4/2016

L’erôs ou le corps devenu chair

Réflexions sur Le Phénomène érotique de Jean-Luc Marion

Author(s): Claudia Şerban / Language(s): French Issue: 4/2016

Ante Pažanin

Author(s): Rajka Švrljuga / Language(s): Croatian Issue: 01+02/2014

The intention of this article is to show the character Ante Pažanin as philosophers and political scientists. In this sense, the article relies on the philosophical work Pažaninov than his lecturing and public activity, although emphasizing the key strougholds of his teaching activites. In the wake of Husserl Pažanin attack in philosophy in whose terms include all the existing science, from the standpoint of contemporary phenomenology observed a possible historical continuity of philosophy and science to date. It is important for us today, as a role model and the possibility of developing various forms of knowledge and intellectual formation of human life in the modern global world.

Redukcija u fenomenologiji i slikarstvu

Author(s): Dragan Prole / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 2/2016

The article establishes a premise that the artist differs from a philosopher in that he is by the very nature of his work already in the plain of experience of the phenomenological reduction. Starting with the methodological assumptions of phenomenology, which value above all the departure from the boundaries of mundane philosophy, the author points out that modern art finds the notions of holding onto in any form the reproduction of existing reality very foreign. The second part of the article analyses the philosophical insights which interpret modern painting as the spontaneous negation of the natural attitude. The representation of the transformation of the term of abstraction additionally illuminates the relationship between of phenomenology and modern art. Departing from the expressly negative and the affirmation of the positive meanings of abstraction come from the fundamental change in the relation towards the existing world. If for phenomenology abstracting means practicing a view that from its own freedom creates new forms, named by the ancient term eidos, then we are discussing a generality that transcends the particular phenomena of the natural world. In search for such eidos lies the foundation of the relationship between phenomenology and painting.

O FENOMENOLOGIJI U UMETNOSTI: ŽIVOT DELA

Author(s): Pierre Rodrigo / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 455/2009

Kada je napisao da je „umetnost uskrsnuće večnog života“, da li je Mišel Anri još jednom doprineo produhovljavanju umetnosti, ili ju je protumačio i dalje veran svojoj „materijalističkoj fenomenologiji“? Da bismo odgovorili na ovo pitanje, naša studija povezuje teorijske spise Kandinskog sa fundamentalnim tekstovima Mišela Anrija na temu predmeta i metode fenomenologije. Ovaj dijalog o Vidljivom i Nevidljivom nas dovodi do praga susreta koji se nažalost nije dogodio: između Mišela Anrija i Morisa Merlo-Pontija.

MISTIKA PAKOVANJA, ILI UVOD U TEGIMENOLOGIJU

Author(s): Michael Epstein / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 439/2006

Veštini pakovanja čovek se uči od prirode. Primer savršene upakovanosti je orah. Njegovo jezgro je tako dobro zaštićeno ljuskom, da može da preživi i duga lutanja, i vrućinu, i mraz, i buru i svakakve nepogode. U celini gledano – zrnevlje, ti zameci novih bića, nosioci najdragocenije genetske informacije, koji u sebi čuvaju budućnost celog roda – najpažljivije su obavijeni. Ali su i pojedinačna stvorenja, osuđena na neumitnu smrt, takođe zaštićena: drveće – korom, plodovi – ljuskom, životinje – kožom i dlakom... Obavijanje je univerzalno sredstvo prirode da samu sebe zaštiti, i to je ono što kultura preuzima od nje.

БЕСЕДА С КЛОДОМ РОМАНО

Author(s): Ruslan Loshakov / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2017

What is the event? How the phenomenology of event is possible if the “event” is not the phenomenonin the classical meaning of this word? French philosopher Claude Romano discusses these questionswith his Russian colleague Ruslan Loshakov. The interlocutors consider the concept of event indifferent contexts, paying special attention to the relationships which connect the phenomenologyof event with Husserl, Bergson, Heidegger and Levinas’ ideas.

FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON HERRMANN “HERMENEUTICS AND REFLECTION: HEIDEGGER AND HUSSERL ON THE CONCEPT OF PHENOMENOLOGY”

Author(s): Man-To Tang / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2017

The review provides an outline of the book and critically examines the Heideggerean hermeneuticphenomenological approach developed by F.-W. von Herrmann to the refutation of Husserl’sphenomenology. Reviewer traces four essential differences in author’s critical analysis of the twophenomenological approaches by Heidegger and Husserl, and problematizes several difficulties inthe author’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology. On the one hand, the reviewer shows thatHusserl’s phenomenology, at least, can be interpreted in two ways, namely the static approach andthe genetic approach. Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, especially in Crisis, explicitly expresseshis hermeneutic character. Therefore, Herrmann’s interpretation may not be faithful to Husserl’sphenomenology as a whole. On the other hand, Herrmann develops Heidegger’s idea of the primacyof a-reflective hermeneutics, which is a pre-theoretical primordial science. With reference to K.Popper’s and K. Jaspers’ criteria of science, the reviewer doubts that the development, which aims atgoing beyond reflective and theoretical science, can still be regarded as a science because it cannotmeet any established criterion.

CATEGORIAL INTUITION AND PASSIVE SYNTHESIS IN HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY

Author(s): Marcus Sacrini / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2016

The aim of this article is to show that Husserl’s later analyses of the perceptual syntheses (for instance in Analyses concerning passive and active syntheses) dispense with the notion of categorial intuition, carefully described in the Sixth Logical Investigation (1901). In order to show this result,initially I reconstruct Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition described in “Logical Investigations”,relating it to the problem of evident knowledge conceived as intuitive fulfillment of signifying acts. Categorial intuition is founded on simple intuitions, although it cannot be reduced to them. Simple intuitions only offer a global grasping of the intended object, with partial perceptual intentions continually fused therein. In its turn, categorial intuition consists in a new sort of act, the result of a covering synthesis between disclosed partial perceptual intentions and the global perception in which those same intentions had already been operating, although implicitly. It is highlighted that in this synthesis intuition depends on signifying intentions that guide the selection of intuitive aspects to be synthesized. It follows from this that the categorial components of the so called categorial intuition come from outside the very sphere of perception. In contrast with this position, Husserl, in later texts describes, by means of the notion of passive synthesis, the genesis of categoriality in the very realm of sensibility, which allows him to formulate a new approach to clarify the phenomenological sources of knowledge.

ZUM BEGRIFF DER ENTFREMDUNG BEI HUSSERL UND HEGEL

Author(s): Mikhail Belousov / Language(s): German Issue: 2/2015

The article deals with alienation as a difference between subjectivity and itself. Based on the comparativeanalysis of the concept in Phenomenology of Spirit and The Crisis of European Sciencesthe study treats the difference as a presupposition underlying both phenomenology and GermanIdealism and reveals its heuristicity. The first section explicates the conceptual horizon of thealienation problem in Phenomenology of Spirit. It is the interpretation of Kantian concept of selfconsciousnessin German Idealism. The article analyzes two aspects of the concept motivatingthe interpretation: self-consciousness as a spontaneous act and both as the condition and result ofthe synthesis. The second section demonstrates the correlation between these aspects and two dimensionsof alienation in Phenomenology of Spirit: the self-assertion of the subject as object, i.e.as other for itself, and transition from the subject to a predicate, also treated as the self-assertionof the one (subject) as other (predicate). So the research shows that Hegel identifies actuality ofthe subject with becoming itself as becoming other for itself. In its completeness it appears to besuspended (not eliminated) alienation. The last section is devoted to alienation as the constitutionof another ego in Crisis and compares Husserlian and Hegelian understanding of the phenomenon.Unlike Hegel, Husserl discovers irreversibility of alienation, as the difference between egoand alter ego is not the one between ego and itself. Yet the concepts of the primal I (Ur-Ich) andtemporalization as the difference of the I from itself suggest that the difference between ego andalter ego is grounded in the one of the I from itself. The heuristicity of the grounding is the suspensionof the adequate evidence principle. The difference of ego from itself in intersubjective andtemporal experience as the fundamental difference is constituted insofar as immediate perceptionis slipping away.

EINIGE BEMERKUNGEN ÜBER FINKS INTERPRETATION DER PHÄNOMENOLOGIE DES GEISTES UND HEGELS EINFLUSS AUF DIE WELTPHILOSOPHIE

Author(s): Simona Bertolini / Language(s): German Issue: 2/2015

Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel’s conception of the absolute had a decisive role in the genesis anddevelopment of Eugen Fink’s philosophy. While Husserl and Heidegger showed Fink two differentand fruitful ways to interpret phenomenology, Hegel suggested and offered him the conceptual meanswith which to combine these theoretical models and elaborate a third phenomenological paradigm,based on the concept of world. This is not only valid for Fink’s early interpretation of Husserl’sthought, but also (and especially) for the version of phenomenology that Husserl’s last researchassistant developed after World War II and the death of the old professor. Two goals characterize thissecond phase of Fink’s phi-losophy: on the one hand, the purpose to pose the fundamental question ofBeing anew, without mistak-ing it for the «ontic» question referred to beings and things (in accordwith Heidegger’s indications and with the concept of «ontological difference»); on the other hand, thepurpose to combine ontology, so interpreted, with genetic phenomenology and its rigorous method.The aim of the paper is to highlight how and to what extent the realization of this philosophicalproject is based on the interpretation of both Hegel’s idealism and of the experience of consciousnessHegel describes in Phenomenology of Spirit. Assuming that Fink is looking for an ontological groundcoinciding with the genesis of the structure of the world (in accord with the concept ofphenomenological reduction), Hegel appears as the Western philosopher whose system of thoughtoffers a conceptual model in accordance with such a requirement.

THE LEFTOVER OF GOOD SENSE: ON TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIGHT OF THE POSTSTRUCTURALIST CRITICISM

Author(s): Georgy Chernavin / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2015

Radically different strategies of interacting with sound common sense, found within three big philosophicaldiscourses of the 20th century (analytic philosophy, poststructuralism, phenomenology), lednearly to the impossibility of communication between those discourses. The judgement by Deleuzeconcerning Kant’s critical philosophy and Husserl’s transcendental philosophy seems to be an exampleof the failed philosophical dialogue, this time between post-structuralism and (classical as well as modern)transcendentalism. Deleuze sees in transcendental philosophy the dominance of the twofold instanceof the common sense; the two forms are the sensus communis (which dominated already in Kant)and the bona mens (which crystallized in the Husserlian Urdoxa). Even if one could agree that the poststructuralistreading of transcendental philosophy is likely sometimes too rash, it is still helpful. Onecan then see that at the center of the research-field of transcendental phenomenology a real nodal pointof paradoxes remains: first of all, the so-called «paradox of human subjectivity» — the relation betweenthe empirical and the transcendental, which seems to be paradoxical for sound human understanding.One could contrast here the goal of transcendental research, which consists in sense-building andsense-enrichment, with the poststructuralist art of the forming, inventing and production of concepts.The passion for paradoxes, the provocation of the sound human understanding as a motor of thinking(characteristic of poststructuralism) is still bound to doxa and to the common sense, although it tries to«turn it inside out». Transcendental philosophy tries rather to take a «step back» from the solidificationof common sense in order to observe the sense-building in statu nascendi.

AN DEN GRENZEN DER SELBSTERSCHEINUNG. SELBSTAFFEKTION UND REFLEXION IN DER WIEDERERINNERUNG BEI KANT UND HUSSERL

Author(s): Guillermo Ferrer / Language(s): German Issue: 2/2015

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant points out that the inclusion of the inner representations ofa subject in the form of time does not link them so as to produce the self-consciousness. To thisend, a synthesis of the understanding — by means of the transcendental imagination — that affectsthe inner sense is necessary. Therefore the temporal succession of my inner states will appearto me until I draw implicitly an infinite line which is an image of time representing its successionon the space, thus inasmuch as I am conscious, at least implicitly, of my activity of the drawing.Using the example of the peculiar reflection of remembering, I will hypothesize the idea thata phenomenology of self-consciousness could readopt and renew Kant’s theory of self-affection;however the limits of a phenomenological analysis of the reflection on my past and my past Selfshall be set. Because of these limits, the reflection on my past I is always tainted with «substitutes»of my life-history, namely fluctuating representations of my experience in the past. Also, in thisrespect I am a passive subject facing the spontaneity of my phantasy while I remember myself.From a phenomenological point of view we can rearrange Kant’s theory in this way: by reflectionon my past, the I splits into a remembering-I and a phantasy-I that fills out the horizon of memoryto some extent with substitutes. In this respect my life-history is never given to me without a mediationof phantasy and imagination.

О СУЩНОСТИ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ ФИЛОСОФИИ

Author(s): ALEXEY SAVIN / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2015

This article aims to define the phenomenological philosophy. To achieve this goal, the author exposes a phenomenological philosophy’s genesis by means of genetic phenomenology. This investigation is necessitated by the problem situation. On the one hand, many versions of phenomenological philosophy emerged and developed; on the other hand, the idea of postphenomenological philosophy was put forth. Therefore the question inevitably arises about the foundation of unity of phenomenological philosophy and about its essence. In order to solve the problem the author traces the history of phenomenology’s basic methodological concepts — epoche and reduction, and clarifies the meaning of the discussion on the nature of the phenomenological method. In the light of genetic phenomenology, epoche and reduction are the exposure of the connection between habitualization and horizon in the main aspect — as the connection between the natural attitude as the primary habit (Urgewohnheit) and the world as the universal horizon. The analysis of the history of interpretation and criticism of Husserlian epoche and reduction concepts reveals latent consensus among thinkers, who adhere to different variants of phenomenological philosophy, in the understanding of the phenomenological enterprise as such. The author demonstrates that the universal theme of phenomenological research within the framework of the latent basic consensus is the intimacy with the world. The general method of phenomenological investigation is the explication of the history of the intimacy with the world as the origin of all thinkable horizons. The author supposes that the phenomenological philosophy is the disclosure of the transcendental history of the domestic world (Heimwelt). Moreover the phenomenological philosophy implies the phenomenological understanding of the phenomenological reduction, i. e., comprehension of its historicity and its connection with the horizon of the world, which it takes as the theme. Hence the author infers his definition of phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenological philosophy is the genealogy of the intimacy with the world. (Phänomenologische Philosophie ist Genealogie des Vertrauens mit «der» Welt).

HORIZON AND VISION. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL IDEA OF EXPERIENCE VERSUS THE METAPHYSICS OF SIGHT

Author(s): Fausto Fraisopi / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2015

Can the nature of «vision» be captured by a metaphysics of sight or only by a phenomenological descriptionof «seeing»? Furthermore, the relation between a metaphysics of sight and a Phenomenologyof «seeing» can be presented in two different ways: a relation of continuity as well as of opposition.The first one takes necessarily the Phenomenology of «seeing» as only preparatory for the Metaphysicsof sight as such. The second one affirms that we have to do with two opposite ways of questioningthe nature of the prominent approach of mankind to the world, the theôrein. The aim of this paper is toshow how this second way is possible if and only if we affirm that the Phenomenology of «seeing» isa method to keep away the problems and the paradoxes of the first way and of an a-critical acceptationof the metaphysics of sight. What provides to give to Phenomenology of «seeing» an anti-metaphysicalcommitment is the idea of horizon as transcendental structure of «seeing». Seeing as «experiencing»as well as «theorizing» became a contextual seeing, essentially related to a contextual situation. Moregenerally, each appearance (phainomenon) consists of a whole system of appearances that are contentlessbut are also potential manifestations of the same type. The structure of possibility of horizon isa modal (not substantial) structure, denying any possible statement concerning the metaphysical natureof seeing or the possibility of a «metaphysical» seeing as such.

АНОНС МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ «ПРОБЛЕМАТИКА ПРИРОДЫ У ОЙГЕНА ФИНКА» 7–9 октября, Прага, Чешская Республика

Author(s): The Editorial Board HORIZON / Language(s): Russian Issue: 1/2015