Upis činjenica u matičnu knjigu rođenih – rešavanje problema lica koja nisu upisana u matičnu knjigu rođenih u Republici Srbiji

Author(s): Jasmina Benmansur / Language(s): Serbian

Population Registers are the main official records (and reliable information) on personal status of the citizens of the Republic of Serbia and every official record maintained on the citizens or public document issued to the citizens, are based on the personal informations collected and entered into the population registers. The Law provides the presumption of correctness of those informations so that the data contained therein provides legal reliability for any and all proceedings conducted by the competent state authorities related to the exercise and/or determination of civil rights or obligations. Particularly important place in the system of pupulation registers occupies the Register of Births that records all relevant changes to the pesonal status of any citizen from its birth through its legal personality to its death and/or the loss of legal capacity of any natural person. Bearing in mind the above mentioned and in the terms of a citizen that cannot exercise any of his/her rights regarding his/her personal status before the entry of his/her birth in the Register of Births and further in the terms of the government requirements to have available correct, true and precise information about any and all its citizens, it is of particular importance to establish a most expedient solution in normative and practical terms for this right to be exercised under the rule of the law and full legal reliability. Therefore, this paper analyses the legislation, current practice and the results achieved by the competent authorities of the Republic of Serbia in solving problems of the persons born on its territory whose birth was not entered within the statutory deadline in the Register of Births by the competent registrar.

Impact of Migration on Child Growth in Albania and Macedonia

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Albania and Macedonia are two Western Balkan countries that are characterised by high emigration and remittance dependency rates that appear to have affected the development of these countries across different socio-economic and cultural dimensions. Child growth in particular is one of these important outcomes. This paper uses a survey administered to mothers in Albania and Macedonia to investigate whether migration and remittances have had any impact on child growth in these countries. Child growth indicators, such as body mass index, weight, height, stunting and obesity dummies, together with child health inputs, such as the frequency of visiting the doctor, chronic diseases and reasons for not going to the doctor, are used as left-hand side variables. The paper finds that while migration has led to less stunting and increased height in Albania, in Macedonia, it seems to have led to increased weight and body mass index values and more obesity. These findings imply that exposure to international migration can have different consequences for these countries as Albania appears to have realised improvements in height and stature, while Macedonia has suffered from increased weight associated with increases in obesity.

Věková diverzita a věková diskriminace v České republice: přehledová informace

Author(s): Klára Cozlová / Language(s): Czech

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №35: Opinion poll conducted among the Sandžak youth - How Susceptible are the Youth to Islamic Extremism

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić,Srđan Barišić,Stefan Stefanović,Izabela Kisić,Jovana Saračević / Language(s): English

The crucial question here is: Are the Muslim youth in Sandžak imbued with religious extremism or not? Hardly any interethnic and inter-religious incident has been registered in this part of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, fighters from Sandžak are being involved in the Iraqi and Syrian wars. Depending on the answer to the question above, the authorities could take appropriate actions aiming at young people in Sandžak. Both domestic and international stakeholders – and there are many of them, including the non-governmental sector – could develop plans and take a variety of concrete steps depending on the answer to this very question. Fahrudin Kladničanin wrote about the influence of Wahhabi Islamic extremism on the youth in Sandžak: “Wahhabis are usually focused on recruiting young people 19 – 27 years old with little education, who are poor and often come from dysfunctional families. The youth are being indoctrinated in private places of worship (masjids), which are either rented or owned by Wahhabis, and in certain religious objects (mosques) whose imams support Wahhabi teaching, and prayers in these mosques are always led by Wahhabis. (Kladničanin, 2013: 130) Marija Radoman analyzed the reasons driving young people in Serbia towards extremist ideologies. Two citations from an earlier research of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia will thus be mentioned: „Regarding the period after 2000, surveys show that the family remains the mainstay of its young members, that young people’s life patterns lack individualization, and that they normatively accept the traditional sequence of events in a person’s life (i.e. completion of education, getting a job, entry into marriage and only then having children). What intrigues me is the sphere of influence between the respondents to this survey and their families. I tried all the time to keep a picture in my head of the families in which they grew up. I wanted to find out whether the respondents’ attitudes would reflect that background, which is hardly bright and optimistic, or whether the differences would be more than conspicuous.” (Radoman, 2011: 12). Family is the primary mechanism by which extremism is interiorized. However, it is not a cause, given that the changes stemming from structural circumstances also occurred within the family. Radoman wrote that “Today’s efforts to establish a stable democratic society in Serbia are being sabotaged, conditionally speaking, by the second generation of the nationalist current (i.e. by the circles close to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the remaining appointees of political parties who served the Milošević regime and members of Russophile conservative options, notably the Democratic Party of Serbia and New Serbia, but also the Serbian Progressive Party), as well as by the extreme right-wing reactionary Russophiles, i.e. the Serbian Radical Party. The efforts to establish a democracy are also hindered by the economic crisis.” (Ibid: 10) The analysis is based on the survey the Helsinki Committee conducted with the youth in Sandžak in May 2016. The focus was on their attitude towards religious extremism, whereas the goal to contextualize the findings: to see how to recognize and understand Islamic extremism and what could be done – preventively and concretely – considering the factors that have influenced the Sandžak youth. No doubt, interviewees’ attitudes towards extremism – or their everyday experience – differ from theoretical considerations of the phenomenon. The very notion of extremism is indisputable. In 2013 I wrote that mainstream social forces of individual societies were arbitrarily determining the notion of extremism. Official codification of political extremism and radicalism make it possible for governments and other political factors to place all those opposing the values such as equality, freedom, democracy, rule of law, etc. under control or control those advocating these values in the manner that contradicts a government’s interests. On the other hand, radicalism (or extremism) gauged by “political correctness” is being determined, as a rule, by the manner or scope in which a certain value is considered either unquestionable or unacceptable. And in all this, decision makers and the majority of population need not see eye to eye. For instance, according to many opinion polls, the majority of Serbia’s population discriminates sexual minorities, national minorities, some religious minorities and, especially fenced off communities such as Roma. By the standards of political correctness decision-makers term such stands – notwithstanding its predominance – extremist and “expel” them from media space. Extremism is deep-rooted in social structures. “The emergence of extreme right-wing and rightist ideology in Serbia derive from structural changes following on the disintegration of the socialist state. The 1990s wars, inspired by the idea of recomposition of the Balkans – or the Greater Serbia idea – are only one of many ideological bases on which the right-wing thought still lives; and its basic characteristics are: ethnic homogenization, wish to have ethnic and state borders ‘merged,’ anticommunism and denial of antifascism, the growingly stronger traditionalism and authoritarianism, the Eastern Orthodoxy seen as superior to other religions and ethnic groups (especially Croats, Muslims and Albanians), resistance to multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, and intolerance of ‘new’ (LGBT population) and traditional minorities (Roma),” writes Sonja Biserko in 2014. To what extent is Islamic, religious extremism spread in Sandžak? In June 2015 in Novi Pazar Snežana Ilić quoted the ICG report “Serb Sandžak still Forgotten” saying that there were some 300 Wahhabis in Sandžak who were not exactly organized, that only some 50 of them were active, but the movement was spreading anyway. According to the said report, Wahhabism emerged in Sandžak in 1997, triggered off by an imam wanting his believers in a mosque to pray in a different way. The believers had opposed the imam and sent him away. However, over the past couple of years Wahhabis have better organized themselves in Sandžak, while getting more and more funds from abroad for their movement. Many of them were going to work in Vienna; apparently to be recruited in a way, since they dressed and behaved like true Wahhabis once back home. Snežana Ilić believes that the highest authorities of the Islamic Community in Serbia have been using Wahhabis in several ways. For instance, they have been presenting themselves internationally as someone capable of controlling Bosniaks’ religious radicalism by the principle of Islamic legitimacy. The message they have been putting across to Western diplomats and governments runs, “Give us a free hand, we must advocate Islamization of the society as that is the only way of keeping religious radicals under control.”

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №35: Stavovi mladih u Sandžaku - Koliko su mladi otvoreni prema islamskom ekstremizmu

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić,Izabela Kisić,Jovana Saračević,Stefan Stefanović,Srđan Barišić / Language(s): Serbian

(Serbian edition) The crucial question here is: Are the Muslim youth in Sandžak imbued with religious extremism or not? Hardly any interethnic and inter-religious incident has been registered in this part of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, fighters from Sandžak are being involved in the Iraqi and Syrian wars. Depending on the answer to the question above, the authorities could take appropriate actions aiming at young people in Sandžak. Both domestic and international stakeholders – and there are many of them, including the non-governmental sector – could develop plans and take a variety of concrete steps depending on the answer to this very question. Fahrudin Kladničanin wrote about the influence of Wahhabi Islamic extremism on the youth in Sandžak: “Wahhabis are usually focused on recruiting young people 19 – 27 years old with little education, who are poor and often come from dysfunctional families. The youth are being indoctrinated in private places of worship (masjids), which are either rented or owned by Wahhabis, and in certain religious objects (mosques) whose imams support Wahhabi teaching, and prayers in these mosques are always led by Wahhabis. (Kladničanin, 2013: 130) Marija Radoman analyzed the reasons driving young people in Serbia towards extremist ideologies. Two citations from an earlier research of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia will thus be mentioned: „Regarding the period after 2000, surveys show that the family remains the mainstay of its young members, that young people’s life patterns lack individualization, and that they normatively accept the traditional sequence of events in a person’s life (i.e. completion of education, getting a job, entry into marriage and only then having children). What intrigues me is the sphere of influence between the respondents to this survey and their families. I tried all the time to keep a picture in my head of the families in which they grew up. I wanted to find out whether the respondents’ attitudes would reflect that background, which is hardly bright and optimistic, or whether the differences would be more than conspicuous.” (Radoman, 2011: 12). Family is the primary mechanism by which extremism is interiorized. However, it is not a cause, given that the changes stemming from structural circumstances also occurred within the family. Radoman wrote that “Today’s efforts to establish a stable democratic society in Serbia are being sabotaged, conditionally speaking, by the second generation of the nationalist current (i.e. by the circles close to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the remaining appointees of political parties who served the Milošević regime and members of Russophile conservative options, notably the Democratic Party of Serbia and New Serbia, but also the Serbian Progressive Party), as well as by the extreme right-wing reactionary Russophiles, i.e. the Serbian Radical Party. The efforts to establish a democracy are also hindered by the economic crisis.” (Ibid: 10) The analysis is based on the survey the Helsinki Committee conducted with the youth in Sandžak in May 2016. The focus was on their attitude towards religious extremism, whereas the goal to contextualize the findings: to see how to recognize and understand Islamic extremism and what could be done – preventively and concretely – considering the factors that have influenced the Sandžak youth. No doubt, interviewees’ attitudes towards extremism – or their everyday experience – differ from theoretical considerations of the phenomenon. The very notion of extremism is indisputable. In 2013 I wrote that mainstream social forces of individual societies were arbitrarily determining the notion of extremism. Official codification of political extremism and radicalism make it possible for governments and other political factors to place all those opposing the values such as equality, freedom, democracy, rule of law, etc. under control or control those advocating these values in the manner that contradicts a government’s interests. On the other hand, radicalism (or extremism) gauged by “political correctness” is being determined, as a rule, by the manner or scope in which a certain value is considered either unquestionable or unacceptable. And in all this, decision makers and the majority of population need not see eye to eye. For instance, according to many opinion polls, the majority of Serbia’s population discriminates sexual minorities, national minorities, some religious minorities and, especially fenced off communities such as Roma. By the standards of political correctness decision-makers term such stands – notwithstanding its predominance – extremist and “expel” them from media space. Extremism is deep-rooted in social structures. “The emergence of extreme right-wing and rightist ideology in Serbia derive from structural changes following on the disintegration of the socialist state. The 1990s wars, inspired by the idea of recomposition of the Balkans – or the Greater Serbia idea – are only one of many ideological bases on which the right-wing thought still lives; and its basic characteristics are: ethnic homogenization, wish to have ethnic and state borders ‘merged,’ anticommunism and denial of antifascism, the growingly stronger traditionalism and authoritarianism, the Eastern Orthodoxy seen as superior to other religions and ethnic groups (especially Croats, Muslims and Albanians), resistance to multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, and intolerance of ‘new’ (LGBT population) and traditional minorities (Roma),” writes Sonja Biserko in 2014. To what extent is Islamic, religious extremism spread in Sandžak? In June 2015 in Novi Pazar Snežana Ilić quoted the ICG report “Serb Sandžak still Forgotten” saying that there were some 300 Wahhabis in Sandžak who were not exactly organized, that only some 50 of them were active, but the movement was spreading anyway. According to the said report, Wahhabism emerged in Sandžak in 1997, triggered off by an imam wanting his believers in a mosque to pray in a different way. The believers had opposed the imam and sent him away. However, over the past couple of years Wahhabis have better organized themselves in Sandžak, while getting more and more funds from abroad for their movement. Many of them were going to work in Vienna; apparently to be recruited in a way, since they dressed and behaved like true Wahhabis once back home. Snežana Ilić believes that the highest authorities of the Islamic Community in Serbia have been using Wahhabis in several ways. For instance, they have been presenting themselves internationally as someone capable of controlling Bosniaks’ religious radicalism by the principle of Islamic legitimacy. The message they have been putting across to Western diplomats and governments runs, “Give us a free hand, we must advocate Islamization of the society as that is the only way of keeping religious radicals under control.”

Imunitet krda

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

Još par desetina hiljada umrlih, pa ćemo pobediti koronu. Pri čemu pojmovima poput pobede i rata antropomorfizujemo „neprijatelja“. Ne ratujemo mi sa virusom, kao što ne ratujemo sa embolijom, niti sa infarktom. Ratujemo sa samima sobom. I ratujemo međusobno. A u narativima o pandemiji realno postojeći virus ima ulogu krivca. Nečemu što je na samoj granici živog pridajemo vlastite osobine.

Veliki zaborav

Author(s): Nina Burleigh / Language(s): Serbian

Slošilo mi se od druge vakcine Moderne, kao što sam i očekivala. U toj kratkotrajnoj, 24-časovnoj epizodi osetila sam kako izgleda kad se imunski sistem uzbuni. Neizmerno sam zahvalna na prilici da izbegnem pravu zarazu i na životu u doba kada nauka može da smisli 95% delotvornu vakcinu za rekordno vreme.

Umrli

Author(s): Vladimir Gligorov / Language(s): Serbian

Reč je o stopi umrlih (broj umrlih na 1.000 stanovnika). Podaci su Zavoda za statistiku Srbije. Ako se uzme prosek za period od 2015. do 2019, stopa umrlih je 14,6. Ako se izračuna stopa smrtnosti na osnovu broja umrlih i procenjenog broja stanovnika u 2020, to daje stopu umrlih od 16,6. Što su dve osobe više na hiljadu stanovnika, a to je oko 14.000 umrlih više od petogodišnjeg proseka. Prema izvornim podacima o broju umrlih, prošle godine je umrlo gotovo 12.700 više ljudi od petogodišnjeg proseka. U odnosu samo na pretprošlu godinu, to je prema statističkom zavodu 13.991 osoba. Verovatno nema smisla uzeti prosek za duži period zbog demografskih promena. Stanovništvo Srbije ubrzano stari, što bi moglo da bude razlog što se stopa umrlih postepeno povećava. No, ona je bilo stabilna u petogodišnjem periodu pre 2020, pa je, sva je prilika, to najprikladniji prosek.

Prvi antivakseri u Engleskoj u 19. veku

Author(s): Susan Pedersen / Language(s): Serbian

Prikaz knjige Nadje Durbach „Bodily Matters: The Anti-Vaccination Movement in England, 1853-1907“ / „Telesna pitanja: antivakcinacijski pokret u Engleskoj, 1853-1907“, Duke, 2005.

Ispričavam se!

Author(s): Viktor Ivančić / Language(s): Croatian

Drage Hrvatice i Hrvati, poštovani građani, ovom prilikom izražavam iskreno žaljenje zbog tragičnih zdravstvenih prilika u zemlji i nesreće koja vam je nanesena, a za što odgovornost snosimo isključivo ja i vlada kojom rukovodim. Stotine i stotine života bili bi spašeni, tisuće oboljelih danas bi bili zdravi da ja i pripadnici vlade kojoj sam na čelu, kao i članovi Nacionalnog stožera civilne zaštite, nismo bahato ignorirali apele eminentnih medicinskih stručnjaka, cijele jedne armije znanstvenika i liječnika koji su nas pravovremeno, uporno i krajnje dobronamjerno upozoravali kako će se u slučaju da ne proglasimo rigoroznije mjere protiv širenja epidemije dogoditi katastrofa.

Cjepivo i diskriminacija

Author(s): Marc Botenga / Language(s): Serbian

U zadnjih nekoliko tjedana, suočeni s drugim dramatičnim valom Covida-19, svjedoci smo niza optimističnih vijesti. Početkom studenog farmaceutska kompanija AstraZeneca obznanila je da bi se njeno cjepivo već u prosincu moglo naći na tržištu. U nadi da će cjepivo, iako ne panaceja (čudotvoran lijek za sve), biti važan faktor u borbi protiv Covida-19, sve obavijesti o tome većina nas dočekuje s velikim entuzijazmom. Njega dijele i financijska tržišta. Svaki put kad mediji najave skoru pojavu nekog cjepiva, skoče cijene dionica te farmaceutske kompanije. To je poticaj farmaceutskim kompanijama da čim prije objave bilo kakav napredak u ispitivanju svojih proizvoda. A on je tim veći što je svaka takva objava popraćena s bilijunskim ugovorima kojima anksiozne vlade pokušavaju osigurati dostatne doze budućeg cjepiva.

Vučićeva vakcina II

Author(s): Sofija Mandić / Language(s): Serbian

Predsednik Srbije je tokom jula rekao da „postoje razgovori sa jednom zemljom koja je završila vakcinu protiv korona virusa“, kao i da „očekuje da će Srbija pre kraja godine imati tu vakcinu“. Ovde smo već istakli negativne posledice neodređenih informacija o kupovini i upotrebi vakcine protiv korona virusa. Nažalost, trend se nastavlja nedavnom objavom da je Srbija, uz Pakistan, „pristala na testiranje kineske vakcine“. Vest je objavio Rojters, na osnovu saopštenja kineskih proizvođača.

Zatočeni ljudi

Author(s): Svetlana Lukić,Marija Acić,Maja Popović / Language(s): Serbian

Preko 20.000 ljudi zbog pandemije je već pola godine zatočeno u staračkim domovima, ustanovama za osobe sa invaliditetom i sličnim objektima. Sada im je dozvoljeno da vide članove svojih porodica na 15 minuta. I šestomesečni karantin i ove apsurdno kratke posete država pravda brigom za zdravlje najnemoćnijih članova društva. Od tolike brige niko ne stiže da odgovori na dva prosta pitanja: koliko se ljudi zarazilo u ovim ustanovama, i koliko njih je umrlo. Govore Maja Popović iz Inicijative za prava osoba sa mentalnim invaliditetom (MDRI-S) i Marija Acić, samozastupnica. Razgovor vodi Svetlana Lukić.

Istočna i zapadna vakcina

Author(s): Dimitrije Boarov / Language(s): Serbian

Slutim da će se sledeće zime Srbija naći pred krupnom i tugaljivom dilemom – koju vakcinu protiv covida-19 ponuditi građanstvu, neku sa Istoka ili neku sa Zapada. Prema onome što je već ishitreno najavio predsednik Aleksandar Vučić, Srbija je već stala u red za kupovinu neke vakcine kod „jedne države“, kako se tajanstveno izrazio, kako bi „među prvih 20 zemalja“ našim ljudima obezbedila „po mogućstvu besplatnu vakcinu“, a ne neku navodno skupu, kako se to već najavljuje od potencijalnih proizvođača. Kako Evropska unija ima 27 članica, moglo bi se iz Vučićevih reči zaključiti da buduća uvozna vakcina neće biti iz EU nego verovatno iz Rusije ili Kine. Analizirajući taj detalj, navodno je glavni lider vanparlamentarne opozicije u Srbiji Dragan Đilas ulučio priliku da odmah izađe sa zahtevom da „građani Srbije budu zaštićeni od korona virusa istom vakcinom kojom će biti zaštićeni građani Nemačke, građani Francuske, građani Velike Britanije i drugih razvijenih zemalja Evrope i EU“. Tome je dodao da je njegova stranka takav zahtev već uputila Evropskoj komisiji – da zemlje Zapadnog Balkana „uđu u paket vakcina za EU“ (Beta, 3. avgusta).

Vučićeva vakcina

Author(s): Sofija Mandić / Language(s): Serbian

Ceo svet očekuje vakcinu protiv pandemijskog virusa. Dok planeta čeka, predsednik Srbije Aleksandar Vučić, sada i van granica naše zemlje poznatiji kao Gospodar zaraze, najavio je „da postoje razgovori sa jednom zemljom koja je završila vakcinu protiv korona virusa“ i da „očekuje da će Srbija pre kraja godine imati tu vakcinu“. U poznatom maniru, govornik nije želeo da odgovori na pitanje sa kojom zemljom će Srbija potpisati protokol o nabavci vakcine. To je valjda njegova privatna stvar.

THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY

Author(s): Mikhail Bukhtoyarov,Anna Bukhtoyarova,Aleksandar Jazić,Ljubiša Bojić,Ljiljana Pantović,Jelena Ćeriman / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

True Investment: Post-Authentic Honesty on Social Media, Hans-Georg Moeller; Fill In, Accept, Submit, and Prove that You Are not a Robot: Ubiquity as the Power of the Algorithmic Bureaucracy, Mikhail Bukhtoyarov and Anna Bukhtoyarova; A Balanced Approach to Artificial Intelligence in Government Decision-Making Processes, Aleksandar Jazić and Ljubiša Bojić; The Business of Umbilical Cord Biobanking in Serbia: Biocapital(ism) and Symbolic Geographies of Health, Ljiljana Pantović and Jelena Ćeriman

Poslední židé v soudním okrese Planá

Author(s): Markéta Novotná / Language(s): Czech Publication Year: 0

The Jewish community in the judicial district of Planá experienced significant changes from the late 19th century to the 1930s. By 1930, only a fraction of the original Jewish population remained, with many having moved to larger cities or emigrated abroad. The community faced severe persecution during the Holocaust, with most members being deported to ghettos and concentration camps, where they perished. The confiscation of Jewish property and its subsequent redistribution post-war further impacted the community. Detailed records from the 1930 census provide insights into the lives of the remaining Jewish families, their occupations, and their contributions to local society. Despite the tragic losses, the historical documentation preserved in various archives offers a poignant glimpse into the resilience and legacy of the Jewish community in Planá. The study emphasizes the importance of these records in understanding the broader socio-economic and cultural history of the region.

Epilog Židů v Tachově. Demografická sonda o stavu židovské komunity v Tachově III

Author(s): Jan Edl / Language(s): Czech Publication Year: 0

The Jewish community in Tachov faced significant challenges during the late 1930s, culminating in their tragic displacement and persecution. Initially, the community experienced relative peace, but the rise of German nationalism and the events of 1938, including the Sudetenland crisis, led to increasing hostility and violence. Many Jewish residents fled Tachov, seeking refuge in larger cities or abroad. The community's properties were seized, and the synagogue was destroyed during Kristallnacht. Despite these hardships, some members managed to survive the Holocaust, either through emigration or by enduring the horrors of concentration camps. The study highlights the resilience and tragic fate of Tachov's Jewish community, emphasizing the importance of preserving their history. The demographic analysis provides insights into the community's composition, migration patterns, and the impact of Nazi policies. The document underscores the need for further research to fully understand the experiences of Jewish communities in the region during this period.

Židovská čtvrť v Údlicích z pohledu daňové evidence

Author(s): Michaela Balášová / Language(s): Czech Publication Year: 0

The Jewish quarter in Údlice, located in northwestern Bohemia, was a significant settlement from the 15th century, with Jewish inhabitants possibly arriving as early as the late 15th century. By the mid-18th century, the quarter had its own synagogue, school, and hospital, and housed around 15 buildings. The Jewish population peaked in the early 19th century, with over 600 residents. However, a fire in 1815 destroyed most of the quarter, sparing only the synagogue. Despite rebuilding efforts, the Jewish population began to decline in the latter half of the 19th century, and by the early 20th century, the community had significantly diminished. The quarter was eventually integrated into the broader town structure, and many of its buildings were demolished or repurposed.

7935 let Židů v Tachově, co s tím? Demografická sonda o stavu židovské komunity v Tachově v roce 1921

Author(s): Jan Edl / Language(s): Czech Publication Year: 0

The document provides a demographic analysis of the Jewish community in Tachov in 1921, based on census data and other archival sources. It highlights the age distribution, family structures, and economic activities of the Jewish population, noting a significant decline in numbers over the years. The study also examines the living conditions, including housing and employment, and the impact of historical events such as World War I and the subsequent economic crises. The document discusses the challenges in tracing the community's history due to the loss of many original records and the importance of preserving Jewish heritage. It concludes with reflections on the contributions of the Jewish community to the local economy and culture, despite the adversities they faced.