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YUGOSLAVIA’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: The Serbian People’s Moment of Truth (ICG Balkans Report N°102)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

At the time of ICG’s last writing, opinion polls were showing that 50 per cent of the electorate was undecided as to its choice for the Yugoslav presidency.4 We reported that the situation was extremely volatile and could change virtually overnight, and this is precisely what has happened. For the first time since Milosevic came to power in 1989,5 a candidate put forward by a largely unified opposition has developed a large popular following and opened a wide lead in opinion polls.6 Despite a regime crackdown and an aggressive anti-opposition propaganda campaign, Serbia’s sundry opposition forces have at last been galvanised and are optimistic about winning a majority of votes genuinely cast.

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BOSNIA'S NOVEMBER ELECTIONS: Dayton stumbles (ICG Balkans Report N° 104)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Given the series of disappointing election results since the first post-Dayton elections in 1996, it is time for the international community to rethink an inherited strategy that places unrealistic hopes on elections. Instead, the international community should fully exercise the powers given to it under the Dayton Peace Accord to attack the economic and political causes of the tenacity of Bosnian nationalism. This report highlights critical issues demanding immediate decisions: How is the influence of extremists to be curbed? To what extent should the international community try directly to manage a protectorate in Bosnia? And to what extent, and in what respects, should the governance provisions in the Dayton Agreement be modified? Each of these issues will be the subject of forthcoming ICG reports.

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TURNING STRIFE TO ADVANTAGE. A Blueprint to integrate the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICG Balkans Report N° 106)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

If the international community reverts to form and backs down from a long-term struggle, as the HDZ expects, the extremists will maintain their grip on the Croat community and continue to block the development of a stable, democratic state. This in turn would have consequences beyond the Croat community. It would alienate citizens who are already disillusioned by the glacial speed of reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And it would signal to the other entity, the virtually mono-ethnic Republika Srpska (RS), that it can continue to defy efforts to make Dayton work and retain hope of eventually splitting away. ICG presents a blueprint for a strategy in this report. It is designed to provide genuine rewards for individuals and institutions co-operating with the Dayton Accords while applying low-key but legitimate and effective sanctions on those who defy the development of a democratic, stable Bosnia and Herzegovina. It offers a way to engage the constructive elements among the Croats while dividing them from the secessionists, thus giving new impetus to the flagging efforts to build a viable state.

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MONTENEGRO: Settling for Independence? (ICG Balkans Report N° 107)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The Montenegrin government and FRY President Vojislav Ko.tunica have presented different proposals to change the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia. In August 1999, the Montenegrin government adopted a .Platform. that envisaged a very loose union, in a single state, with limited joint functions in areas such as monetary policy, defence and foreign policy. In December 2000, a revised platform was presented by Djukanović.s Democratic Party of Socialists and its coalition partner, the smaller Social Democratic Party (SDP). This differed from its predecessor in the key respect that it envisaged a union of two independent states, with separate international subjectivity and two UN seats. In response, in January 2001 Ko.tunica issued a counter-proposal for a functioning federation, with considerable powers devolved to the two republics. Ko.tunica.s proposal was endorsed by Serbia.s ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).

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AFTER MILOSEVIC. A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace (ICG Balkans Report N° 108)

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In this report , the International Crisis Group (ICG) makes many recommendations as to how best to move forward, some of them going well beyond the present cautious international consensus. The test for us in each case has not been what is currently acceptable in the diplomatic marketplace - though many of our recommendations should be - but what will contribute to lasting peace, bearing always in mind the need to apply consistent principles and to consider the wider consequences of every action. This report is built on the experience of five years of field-based analysis by the ICG. Since our first project commenced in Sarajevo in 1996, we have produced on the Balkans three book-length reports and over 140 other reports and briefing papers. This is the first time we have tried to look at the region as a whole, addressing all the outstanding issues, applying experience learned elsewhere , and identifying wherever possible common policy themes and approaches . It is an approach we have long been urging upon governments themselves ,who have too often responded in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion to problems crying out for a comprehensive approach.

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THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION: Reform or Rebellion (ICG Balkans Report 109)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

In late February, violence flared in Albanian-inhabited villages in northern Macedonia close to the border with Kosovo. In mid March, the violence spread to Macedonia’s second largest city, Tetovo. The rebels claimed to be defending themselves against Macedonian security forces, i.e. their own government, and to be fighting for Albanian national rights in Macedonia. The coalition government in Skopje promptly raised the alarm, blaming Kosovo Albanian elements for exporting rebellion to Macedonia, and calling for the NATO-led forces in Kosovo (KFOR) to seal the border. The rebels claimed they were local Albanians, numbering 2,000 and recruiting dozens of volunteers from the surrounding area every day. Now that the dust around Tetovo has settled, the government and parliament need to face squarely, without panicking, a large political question: Are the Macedonians and Albanians in the country committed to integrated living? Or, should they accept nationalist logic and prepare to negotiate federalisation?

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NO EARLY EXIT: NATO's continuing Challenge in Bosnia (ICG Balkans Report N°110)

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As the civilian international agencies and local democratic forces continue to tackle obstructionist elements, the presence of SFOR to provide a 'safe and secure' environment is more crucial than ever. Recent rioting by Dayton's Bosnian Serb and Croat enemies in Banja Luka, Trebinje and Mostar - and the increasing incidence of attacks on refugees seeking to return to their homes - demonstrate that radical elements have become more desperate and dangerous. Experience has shown that the credible display of force by SFOR is necessary to deter such violence. In addition, more arrests by SFOR of persons indicted by The Hague Tribunal would improve the political and security situations, while making it clear that individuals, not nations, bear responsibility for wartime atrocities.

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A FAIR EXCHANGE: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability (ICG Balkans Report N° 112)

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Aid conditionality is an effective tool because the FRY’s shattered economy relies on donor support for numerous social programs, as well as electricity, debt relief, restructuring, and, in the winter, heating. The events leading up to Milosevic’s arrest in the early hours of 1 April 2001 demonstrated the viability of conditionality-based policies. This report argues that major donors should use their leverage by conditioning assistance on concrete actions from the FRY government to fulfil its obligations on three issues vital to regional stability.

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MACEDONIA: The Last Chance for Peace (ICG Balkans Report N° 113)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

In the past three months, since mid March 2001, Macedonia has stared into the abyss of inter-ethnic conflict, pulled away from the precipice, squandered opportunities for a political settlement, then returned as if sleepwalking to the brink of civil war. The downward spiral was interrupted on 11 June, when the Macedonian government and the ethnic Albanian rebels agreed to a ceasefire. The following day the government abruptly endorsed a peace plan proposed by President Boris Trajkovski. For their part, the NLA guerrillas expressed a readiness to halt their insurgency but want to see concrete steps towards improving Albanian rights.

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MONTENEGRO: Resolving the Independence Deadlock (ICG Balkans Report N° 114)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Montenegro‘s authorities remain committed to independence. However, the hopes of the republic‘s ruling parties that the election on 22 April 2001 would bring a comfortable victory, to be followed swiftly by a referendum and independence, were not realised. The narrow victory for the pro-independence parties only confirmed the depth of division over the republic‘s status. Plans for an independence referendum were postponed until early 2002. With some difficulty, the pro-independence ruling parties formed a minority government backed by the radically proindependence Liberal Alliance, which demands rapid progress towards a referendum. However, the lack of a broad consensus on the status issue or on the rules and conditions for a referendum makes it difficult to press ahead with independence plans under current circumstances.

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PEACE IN PREŠEVO: Quick Fix or Long Term Solution? (ICG Balkans Report N° 116)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This report traces the political process that achieved this transfer of authority over 1,200 square kilometres of territory, focusing on two issues. First, it considers the reforms that are still needed to achieve lasting peace in the Presevo area. Second, it considers the hopeful claim from some quarters that this transfer of authority, based on unprecedented cooperation between NATO and the new regime in Belgrade, may offer a model for tackling other disputes in the wider neighbourhood. The circumstances of peacemaking in Presevo were unique and cannot be emulated elsewhere. Recent events, moreover, illustrate that declarations of victory by Western observers remain premature. The insurgency in southern Serbia reflected real and deeply rooted problems, both local and regional. Conditions for reconciliation are in place, but the process itself has hardly begun. The longer term prospects for peaceful reintegration now depend on effective follow through by the Serbian authorities assisted by ethnic Albanian leaders and the international community.

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SERBIA’S TRANSITION: Reforms under Siege (ICG Balkans Report N° 117)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Kostunica’s DSS led the attacks against a group of reform-oriented, relatively pragmatic politicians centred mostly around Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic and his Democratic Party (DS). The severity of the DSS attack dealt a heavy blow to the coalition and changed the face of Serbian politics. Although the two sides may soon patch up their differences, the fallout from the events surrounding the ‘Gavrilovic Affair’ will be widespread and could affect the pace and extent of political and economic reforms, as well as Yugoslavia’s cooperation with the international community and its neighbours. So too the lack of civilian control over the Yugoslav Army (VJ) has become more apparent. In regional terms, at stake in the current struggle within DOS are the continuation of FRY funding for the Army of Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Belgrade’s stance towards UNMIK, and the question of further cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

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THE WAGES OF SIN: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (Balkans Report N° 118)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

By recognising Republika Srpska (RS) as a legitimate polity and constituent entity of the new Bosnia, the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement embraced a contradiction. For the RS was founded as a stepping stone to a Greater Serbia. and forged in atrocities against - and mass expulsions of non-Serbs. … Almost six years after Dayton, these hopes lie unfulfilled and partly forgotten. … Converted to Dayton constitutionalism, and fortified by the election of a respectable nationalist to the Yugoslav presidency in Belgrade, the rebranded SDS remains as unwilling as ever to define „its state“ as the rightful home of Bosnians of all faiths. The riots organised in May 2001 to prevent the reconstruction of historic mosques razed during the war and the government‘s continuing refusal, even after Milosevic.s transfer to the ICTY in June, to cooperate with The Hague ought to have made plain that the RS remains true to its wartime self. Vague international threats to punish the RS on both scores led only to token concessions by the authorities.

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BOSNIA: Reshaping the International Machinery (ICG Balkans Report No. 121)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

After six years and billions of dollars spent, peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains far from complete. Reshaping (‚recalibrating‘, in local jargon) the international community (IC) presence is vital if the peace process is to have a successful outcome. Above all, however, the reform must acknowledge that if Bosnia cannot be put on its feet by evolution, nudged along by the High Representative, or by some negotiated constitutional settlement, then the IC must be ready to impose a more workable and democratic model than Dayton envisaged. This could involve creating a strong but fully representative central government, clearing away the counterproductive entity and cantonal structures, devolving substantial powers to the municipalities, and designing largely depoliticised structures for regional administration. It is not too soon for the PIC Steering Board to start consultations on post-Dayton structures.

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MACEDONIA’S NAME: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve it (ICG Balkans Report No. 122)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

On 16 November 2001, Macedonia’s parliament passed a set of constitutional amendments that were agreed in August, when Macedonian and Albanian minority leaders signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Later that day, President Trajkovski clarified the terms of an amnesty for Albanian rebels, in line with international requests. So far as Macedonians are concerned, the Agreement contains a double weakness. First, it redresses long-standing minority grievances mainly by reducing the privileges of the majority. Secondly, its purpose of turning Macedonia into a ‘civic state’ – while admirable and necessary – makes Macedonia an anomaly in a region of emphatically ‘ethnic’ states, three of which uphold fundamental challenges to the Macedonian identity. Greece vetoes international acceptance of Macedonia’s name, Serbia denies the autonomy of its church, and Bulgaria (while accepting Macedonia as a state) denies the existence of a Macedonian language and a Macedonian nation.

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A KOSOVO ROADMAP (I). Addressing Final Status (ICG Balkans Report No. 124)

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In order to move towards a resolution of Kosovo’s final status, two distinct aspects need to be considered: an ‘external’ and an ‘internal’ dimension. The ‘external’ dimension involves devising a process to address final status, including all of the different actors with a stake in Kosovo’s future. The ‘internal’ dimension concerns the development of Kosovo’s own democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights, so as to prepare Kosovo for whatever final status may eventually be agreed. These dimensions are duly treated in a pair of reports sharing a common title, A Kosovo Roadmap, issued simultaneously and subtitled I. Addressing Final Status and II. Internal Benchmarks.

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A KOSOVO ROADMAP (II). Internal Benchmarks (ICG Balkans Report N° 125)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

In examining Kosovo’s final status, the International Crisis Group argues that the issue has two aspects, inseparable and overlapping but nevertheless distinct. The ‘external’ dimension involves the interests of, and relationships between, the different actors with a stake in Kosovo’s future, while the ‘internal’ dimension concerns the development of Kosovo’s own democratic institutions, laws and standards. These dimensions are duly treated in a pair of reports sharing a common title, A Kosovo Roadmap, issued simultaneously and subtitled I. Addressing Final Status and II. Internal Benchmarks. Together, these reports show two, parallel paths which need be negotiated simultaneously in order to reach the desired destination: a stable, democratic Kosovo, standing on its own feet, peacefully integrated in its region, and with a clearly defined place in the international community.

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BELGRADE’S LAGGING REFORM: Cause for international Concern (ICG Balkans Report N° 126)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

For more than a decade Serbia was the driving force behind much of the instability in the Balkans. Following the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic on 5 October 2000, it was hoped that Serbia would promptly reform the external policies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) that had caused such disruption. To date, these hopes have been substantially disappointed. Nevertheless, the FRY has set its sights on catching up with its neighbours by integrating into Euro-Atlantic institutions and political processes. In particular, it wants to make significant progress during 2002 towards three major foreign policy goals: accession to the Council of Europe (CoE); membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP); and negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union (EU).

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IMPLEMENTING EQUALITY: The “Constituent Peoples” decision in Bosnia & Herzegovina (ICG Balkans Report No. 128)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This report recounts the origins of the “constituent peoples” case and the scope of the Court’s decision. It then describes the unprecedented debate on fundamental aspects of the DPA that has occurred in both entities since December 2001. It analyses the Sarajevo Agreement, the amendments enacted by the RSNA and the draft amendments awaiting debate in the Federation parliament in terms of the guarantees needed to ensure equal rights for Bosnia’s “constituent peoples” and “others”. Finally, it analyses changes not specifically regulated by the Sarajevo Agreement, but mandated by the decision of the Constitutional Court.

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STILL BUYING TIME: Montenegro, Serbia and the European Union (ICG Balkans Report No. 129)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

On 14 March 2002 the leaders of Serbia, Montenegro and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) signed an agreement in Belgrade to replace FRY with a new “state community”: a “union of states” to be called “Serbia and Montenegro”. If the agreement can be implemented, it will establish a loose association in which the two “member-states” enjoy virtually all the prerogatives of independence except those that depend on international personality (e.g. UN membership). The republics will control their borders – including customs – and become fully responsible for their economies and internal security. The union will depend on the republics to fund its institutions: an assembly, president, council of ministers, court, and the armed forces.

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