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Fictional Names, Fictional Characters and Persons Referred to in Narrative Fiction

Author(s): Petr Koťátko / Language(s): English Issue: 3/2017

The paper is based on a strict distinction between the notion of a person referred to by a fictional name, as uttered within a text of narrative fiction, and the notion of a fictional character. The literary functions of such a text require the reader to interpret the occurences of a fictional name as records of utterances of that name by the narrator, referring to that individual which has been assigned that name at the beginning of the chain to which these utterances belong. This, according to the author’s view, provides proper basis also for interpretation of various kinds of extratextual use of fictional names. A literary character is, on the contrary, an element of a construction of a literary work and is identified by a set of requirements (e.g. of the kind mentioned above) imposed by the text’s literary functions on the reader. The author attempts to justify the assumption that the referential function of fictional names so understood is to be interpreted as directed to the actual world (rather than to an artificial world created by the writer), to specify the (rather limited) role reserved for pretense within this approach, to explain the implications of this account of fictional characters for the dispute between realists and anti-realists in this field etc.

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Spory o realismus, Hegel a jazyk(y) matematiky

Author(s): Jaroslav Peregrin / Language(s): Czech Issue: 1/2012

Jedna z klíčových filosofických diskusí poslední čtvrtiny dvacátého století se týkala sporu mezi „metafyzickým realismem“ a „relativismem“ (Putnam, 1980, 1990, 1994; Lewis, 1984; Rorty, 1972, 1993). Je jazyk, jak tvrdí „realisté“, pouze prostředkem kopírování na nás zcela nezávislého světa, nebo se, jak mají za to „relativisté“, nějak podílí na utváření tohoto světa? Z hlediska ‘selského rozumu’ se to může zdát být jasné: svět přece jasně je na nás nezávislý a představovat si, že ho my, naším jazykem, můžeme nějak „utvářet“, se zdá být absurdní. Méně absurdní se ale tahle myšlenka stává, když si uvědomíme, že to, čemu říkáme svět, se skládá z kategorizovaných objektů s různými druhy vlastností a vztahů, a že to, jaké kategorie máme či co považujeme za vlastnost či vztah může být – do nějaké míry – věcí našeho jazyka.

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Zagrebačka magla i marčana bura: meteorološki izrazi u pozadini lokalnih identiteta

Author(s): Daniela Katunar,Jan Defrančeski / Language(s): Croatian Issue: 1/2023

This study investigates the role of meteorological expressions in conceptualizing and contextualizing local identities with special reference to Lovranski list, a local news publication of the municipality of Lovran, Croatia. From a linguistic perspective, meteorological expressions refer to lexical and syntactic means that serve to describe and categorize the domain of meteorological weather and meteorological events (Eriksen et al. 2012; Katunar and Simeon 2023), and they also play a role in the study of linguistic data from the perspective of folk meteorology (cf. Sijerković 1996; Gluhak 2004). From the perspective of ordinary language philosophy (e.g., Wittgenstein 1998, 2007, 2009), meteorological expressions can also be understood as lexical-syntactic means that contain semantic features relevant for understanding the (local) identity of certain communities (e.g., Zagreb fog and March bora).

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HOLISTIČKI I KONCEPTUALNI KARAKTER MENTALNOG U DELU DONALDA DEJVIDSONA

Author(s): Miloš Bogdanovic / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 1/2020

In this paper we will try to confront Quine’s and Davidson’s holistic position through Davidson’s thesis of mental as a non-ontological category. In this regard, since Davidson came to this position through the thesis of mental as a decidedly conceptual category, we will try to show how this approach does not, nevertheless, rule out the possibility of its interpretation in ontological terms. However, in what follows we will draw attention to the fact that mental can be interpreted so that it proves to be immune to ontologization in Quine’s sense. This would be the evidence of different ways, which are not necessarily compatible, to argue for Davidson’s central thesis – the thesis about holistic character of mental – as well as, which is closely related, a certain difference that exists between Davidson’s view of mental as a conceptual category on the one hand, and a holistic category on the other hand.

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NOMINALIZAM DŽOZEFA MELIJE I INDEKSIČKO SHVATANJE BROJEVA

Author(s): Aleksa Čupić / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 1/2019

According to the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, we are committed to all the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theory. John Melia argues contra Quine-Putnam by claiming that even though such entities as numbers are indispensable to our best science, there is reason to deny their existence. In order to defend Melia’s theory from criticism put forth by Mark Colyvan, who demands that Melia provide a nominalistically acceptable paraphrase of our best scientific theory, supporters of this view have argued for the stronger claim that numbers are not indispensable. They all claim that numbers have an indexing role in the scientific explanation. In this article, I will consider some of the arguments for the indexing theory and point out its inadequacies.

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SEMANTIČKI MENTALIZAM, INTERSUBJEKTIVNOST I METAFIZIKA NORMATIVNOSTI

Author(s): Miloš Šumonja / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 4/2017

The subject of this paper is Kripkensteinˈs critique of mentalistic explanation of linguistic normativity, as well as his intersubjective conception of normativity. The author argues against dominant intepretation of Kripkensteinˈs view on meaning as social metaphysics of normativity, the theory which reduces language rules to community consensus. It is pointed out that Kripkensteinˈs rejection of mentalistic thesis that meaning is some kind of mental state in the head of a speaker results in anti-reductionistic character of intersubjective conception of normativity, which describes how we speak about difference between correct and incorrect uses of language in everyday life, but does not say what that difference is, or what it consists of. Hence, it is concluded that, according to Kripkenstein, community is the only normative tribunal in matters of language, but itˈs not the supreme judge because, rather than passing irrevocable judgments on correctness of individual speech acts, community actually constitutes a framework that enables the normative disputes between its members.

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VITGENŠTAJNOVA KRITIKA FROJDA

Author(s): Filip Čukljević / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 3/2017

The aim of this paper is to present the critique that Ludwig Wittgenstein directs to the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud, as well as to critically evaluate its successfulness. At the beginning I will review some of the main arguments that Wittgenstein offers against this theory. First I will consider the argument that calls into question the psychoanalytic ontology and according to which there are significant problems in its conceptualization. Then I will deal with the critique which holds that the psychoanalytic method is problematic, primarily because it is allegedly unscientific. After this I will show the third argument that attacks Freud’s assumption according to which phenomena such as dreams must have a certain essence. It will be shown that none of these arguments is entirely successful. Subsequently I will focus on the argument that is, according to some, the main Wittgenstein’s argument and according to which Freud makes a mistake by not distinguishing the concepts of cause and reason. I will claim that psychoanalysis can be defended from this objection likewise. In order to show this, I will refer to the interpretation of Freud’s teachings according to which the so-called subintentional explanations are used in psychoanalysis.

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PROBLEM TUĐIH SVESTI I PSIHOLOŠKI POJMOVI

Author(s): Ljiljana Radenović / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 3/2016

Wittgensteinian solution to the problem of other minds is usually associated with Wittgenstein’s position that psychological concepts do not describe but express mental states. In his book An Essay on Philosophical Psychology An Essay on Philosophical Psychology L. Kojen (2009) develops an interpretation of Wittgenstein according to which Wittgenstein himself was aware that all psychological concepts cannot be analyzed in terms of the expression of inner states. My goal in this paper is to examine whether the admission that psychological concepts have descriptive uses involves a return to mentalism and a reintroduction of skepticism regarding other minds. By relying on developmental psychology, I hope to show: a) that expression is the primary function of psychological concepts as it occurs first in child’s development, and b) that the descriptive uses appear later with language acquisitioion but do not lead to the skeptical problem of other minds.

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PROJEKTIVIZAM I KVAZI-REALIZAM SAJMONA BLEKBERNA

Author(s): Monika Jovanović / Language(s): Serbian Issue: 1/2014

In this paper, I will deal with Simon Blackburn’s metaethical theory. Blackburn’s metaethics can be described by two ‘-isms’ – projectivism and quasi-realism. In the first part of the paper, I will try to show what the nature of their relation is. In the second part of the paper, I will discuss two reasons Blackburn advances in favor of his projectivism. The first pertains to the simplicity of his position, whereas the second claims that projectivism, unlike cognitivism, can explain the thesis of supervenience of moral features over the natural features. I will try to show that the first argument does not have the strength, and that the second argument does not have the plausibility that Blackburn ascribes to the two. In the third part of the paper, I will point out to probably the hardest problem that every non-cognitivist theory is faced with – the Frege-Geach problem. I will discuss Blackburn’s attempt at a solution, and after that, express some doubts with respect to the proposal that Blackburn puts forward.

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Inférences au pays de la prosodie

Author(s): Wiesław Banyś / Language(s): French Issue: 35/2023

When it comes to language, it’s not just the grammatical structure and the literal meaning of words that matter. The way a predicate imposes inferences on its propositional arguments is crucial to understanding the true meaning of a message. However, these inferences are influenced by many factors, such as prosody, world knowledge, speakers’ expectations regarding language use, situational stereotypes, and other implicit or contextual elements. In this paper, we examine the inferential status of the verbs referred to by Karttunen as “implicative verbs”. On the one hand, two-way implicative verbs, and on the other, one-way implicative verbs. The latter have been little studied from this perspective. This will lead us to highlight the fundamental role, too often forgotten, of prosody and focus/theme in this type of analysis and in determining the inferential status of predicates. Our analyses show that, once prosody has been considered, the classification of theoretically possible verb inferences accepted until now needs to be modified. We do not have 4 groups of one-way implicative verbs, as has been argued, but 2, namely the groups: [+/+/– // –/–] [affirmed > true or false // denied > false] of the type etre capable, pouvoir and [+/+/– // –/+] [affirmed > true or false // denied > true] of the type hesiter a. The remaining two groups, considered as distinct and autonomous one-way implicative verbs with the suggested characteristics: [+ + // – +/–] [affirmed > true // denied > true or false] of the type forcer to and [+ – // – +/–] [affirmed > false // denied > true or false] of the type refuser de, belong to the canonical groups of two-way implicative verbs, respectively: forcer a to the group of verbs of the type reussir a: [+/+ // –/–] [affirmed > true // denied > false] and refuser de to the group of verbs of the type oublier de: [+/– // –/+][affirmed > false // denied > true]. Naturally, this classification differentiation, important as it is, only reflects the different behaviour of certain types of predicate, and this is the most important element of these analyses with a view to automating the recognition of predicate inferences.

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No Path from Modal Rationalism to Fundamental Scrutability

Author(s): Darren Bradley / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2024

Gabriel Rabin (2020) offers an argument from Modal Rationalism to Fundamental Scrutability. I show that the argument is invalid as stated. I offer two ways of strengthening the argument but argue that neither is effective.

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Husserl, Ajdukiewicz, and Blaustein on meaning

Author(s): Daniele Nuccilli,Rafał Lewandowski / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2024

The aim of this article is to investigate the reception of Husserl’s theory of meaning by Ajdukiewicz and Blaustein, two members of the analytically-oriented Lvov-Warsaw School, who, in different ways, were attracted to and confronted with Husserl’s phenomenology. The discussed hypothesis is that Ajdukiewicz’s interpretation of Logical Investigations, and his original theory of meaning influenced both Blaustein’s critical reading of Husserl’s theory of intentionality and his account of meaning-intention. After outlining the central elements of “First Logical Investigation” the paper shows how itis interpreted by Ajdukiewicz in his Lvov lectures on logic and in his directival theory of meaning. What emerges is a psychological-descriptive interpretation of Husserl’s concept of meaning, and are consideration of his theory of intentionality within the inferential structure of beliefs in premises that motivates a person who speaks a language to believe in conclusions of a certain form. This leads Ajdukiewicz to his own original conventionalist account of meaning which is based on the identification of three main directives of meaning that represent the matrix of a given language, i.e., the grid in which each meaning finds its place. These elements allow one to demonstrate how Ajdukiewicz’s interpretation resonates in Blaustein’s critique of Husserl in his early writings, where, in addition to a psychological-descriptive reading of phenomenology we also find a conventionalist conception of meaning acts and signitive presentations. According to Blaustein, a sign can represent an object only through the conventions arising from the directives of meaning that belong to a given natural language.

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Borges, James a Proust mezi Krabicemi Brillo. K místě literatury ve filozofii umění Arthura C. Danta

Author(s): Šárka Lojdová / Language(s): Czech Issue: 44/2024

This paper focuses on Arthur Danto’s approach to literature. One of the leading philosophers of art in the analytical philosophical tradition, Danto published on art ontology, defining art and art historicity as well as serving as an art critic for the magazine The Nation in the late phase of his career. The essence of Danto’s philosophy thus lies in the visual arts, and it seems he was not interested in literature from a philosophical point of view. However, following Garry L. Hagberg, I show that Danto was not only a keen reader but also reflected on literature, its specificity, and its role. In the first part of the paper, I scrutinize what — in Danto’s view — is a literary work of art, and I compare his position to the view of New Criticism. In the second part, I explore the often neglected dimension of Danto’s philosophy of art, i.e., the spectator’s emotional response to an artwork. I argue that Danto draws on works of literature to illustrate the nature of this response for the reason that they provide the basis for a deeper understanding in this context.

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Israel Scheffler ve Paul H. Hirst’te Eleştirel Düşünme ve Özerklik Kavramlarının Rolü ve Önemi

Author(s): Bayram Kaya / Language(s): Turkish Issue: 2/2023

Analytic philosophy is a movement which emerged as a reaction to traditional philosophy around the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Analytic Philosophy of Education emerged partly as a reaction to traditional philosophy of education and partly with the desire to apply the general principles of analytic tradition in education. American Israel Scheffler and English Paul H. Hirst have produced many works since 1960s and so they are considered among the eminent philosophers of this field. In this study, the concepts of “critica/rational thinking” and “autonomy” have been studied and analyzed in the works of these two important figures. By adopting an analytic approach, firstly their arguments and propositions as regards the different educational topics have been classified and analyzed. Then their opinions as regards how they interpret these concepts, how importance they attribute to them and how these concepts can be used in education have been analyzed extensively. It has been found that critical/rational thinking can be seen as both the ultimate aim of education and the best means to reach this target for both philosophers, particularly for Scheffler. When it comes to the concept of autonomy, both philosophers think that every individual has an innate value and human dignity and so every person must have the right of free choice through rational thinking.

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Jutro będzie bitwa kosmiczna: futura contingentia w XXI wieku

Author(s): Jacek Wawer / Language(s): Polish Issue: 68/2024

This is a summary of the recent research related to the issue of future contingents. It focuses on the aspects that were largely neglected in the traditional debate, such as relativism, pragmatics of assertion, probability, epistemology, and metaphysics

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THE ARCHE FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Author(s): Vasile R. Todoran / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 38/2024

The elements of water, fire, earth, air, light and darkness have always played an essential role in human thought, philosophy and mythology. These elements, each with their distinctive characteristics and symbols, have been fundamental in defining the universe and life in numerous cultural and religious traditions. Water, associated with life and purification, is considered a source of existence and regeneration. Fire, symbolizing power and transformation, has fascinated human minds throughout time, representing destruction as well as light and heat. Earth, a stable and fertile element, was seen as the foundation upon which life and fertility rest. Air, invisible and imperceptible but essential to breathing and life, has often been associated with freedom and movement. Light, as a manifestation of energy and knowledge, has been revered as a source of wisdom and enlightenment in many cultures and spiritual traditions. In contrast, darkness often evoked fear and mystery, but also contemplation and introspection. Together, these elements make up a complex web of meanings and symbols that have influenced human thought and creativity throughout history. Their interpretations differ according to cultural and philosophical context, but they remain a fundamental aspect of human experience and our understanding of the world around us.

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THE DIALECTIC PORTAL: THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE IN THE MYSTICAL ELEMENTS OF THE FAUSTIAN WANDERING

Author(s): Vasile R. Todoran / Language(s): Romanian Issue: 38/2024

,,The Dialectic Portal: The Sacred and the Profane in the Mystical Elements of the Faustian Wandering” presents the complex interplay between sacred and profane dimensions in the context of the protagonist's spiritual and mystical quest in 'Faust'. The dialectic portal functions as a symbolic space of transition, where the sacred and the profane confront, coexist, and influence each other, generating a perpetual tension between the desire for divine knowledge and the tempting allure of the material world. This wandering, both physical and spiritual, reflects Faust's effort to transcend the limits of the human condition through his pact with Mephisto and the exploration of occult dimensions. The mystical elements that mark his path symbolize an endless search for absolute truth, and the intersection of the sacred and the profane is the focus of this Faustian dialectic. Thus, Faust's journey becomes a profound exploration of conflict and reconciliation between opposing forces, in a transformative process of spiritual becoming.

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Is there any logic at all?

Author(s): Pavel Arazim / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2022

Though to this point not as popular as logical pluralism or logical monism, logical nihilism has become a serious position in the philosophy of logic and a new alternative in the disputes about the notion of a logical system being right. We will review some basic moments of the discussions that have occurred so far and try to propose a viable version of logical nihilism. Some of the aspects of the doctrine as it has been proposed, mainly by Gillian Russell need revision but overall it proves plausible and well suited in particular to incorporation into inferentialist and expressivist accounts of meaning and logic. From a more general point of view, logical nihilism shows how essential it is to appreciate the pragmatic significance of logic and acknowledge that logical practice bestows its legitimacy on logical theory and not the other way round. Appreciating this, together with lessons about the open-ended nature of meaning of even logical vocabulary, leads to a more dynamic conception of logic.

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Essence and Modality: Continued Debate

Author(s): Andrew Dennis Bassford / Language(s): English Issue: 3/2024

Here I offer a critical evaluation of modalism about essential properties. To that effect, I begin by rehearsing Fine’s now infamous counterexamples to pure modalism. I then consider two recent defenses of it, offered by Livingstone-Banks and Cowling, respectively. I argue that both defenses fail. Next I consider the most plausible variety of impure modalism – sparse modalism – which has recently been defended by Wildman and de Melo. Skiles has argued that sparse modalism fails too. I argue that Skiles’s counterexamples misfire; nonetheless, his conclusion that, like pure modalism, sparse modalism is too broad, is on the right track. And so, I offer an original objection – the sparse modal propria counterexample – to show that this is so. I conclude by considering ways the modalist might once again modify her account to circumvent this new objection and improve the account’s extensional adequacy.

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What Is so Bad about Permanent Coincidence without Identity?

Author(s): Harold Noonan / Language(s): English Issue: 4/2024

‘What is so bad about permanent coincidence without identity?’ (Mackie 2008: 163). This is the very question at the heart of the debate between pluralists and monists about constitution (Baker 1997, Fine 2003, Gibbard 1975, Johnston 1992, Lewis 1986, Thomson 1983). My answer to Mackie’s question is that it contradicts a supervenience principle we all believe we know to be true. I approach this by considering three possibilities and the supervenience principles with which they conflict. One is somewhat politically controversial; the others are described by Wittgenstein (1967) and Dummett (1979). I focus on the possibility described by Dummett and the su- pervenience principle with which it conflicts. Our reaction to that possibility shows that we believe that supervenience principle to be true. But I argue that (as is obvious), it is inconsistent with permanent coincidence without identity. That is what is so bad about permanent coincidence without identity.

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